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Abstract
The New York Convention of 1958 has been applied for the past 48 years in many 
contracting states, and for 12 years in Saudi Arabia, The fundamental objective of the 
convention is to make foreign arbitral awards more simply and extensively 
enforceable worldwide, and less subject to challenges based on national law. It 
therefore limits the exceptions on which enforcement of foreign award may be refused 
to the grounds listed exclusively in its Art. V. Hence, this thesis aims to examine and 
evaluate the grounds for refusal of enforcement o f foreign awards under Art. V of the 
New York Convention according to both the theoretical discussions and, more 
importantly, the applications and interpretations by national courts of the states parties 
to the Convention in general. The thesis pays particular attention to the operation of 
Art. V of the NYC in Saudi Arabia in the light of Shari’ah rules, Saudi laws, juridical 
practice of the Saudi enforcing courts.
This thesis comprises eleven chapters. It starts with introductory chapter to outline the 
aim, importance, and structure of the thesis. Chapter two demonstrates the chief 
characteristics associated with application and interpretation of Art. V.
Chapter three deals with the giound o f incapacity of the parties (Art, V(l)(a)). 
Chapter four discusses the ground of invalid arbitration agreement (Art. V(l)(a)). 
Chapter five examines the ground of violation o f due process (Art. V(l)(a)). Chapter 
six considers the gi'ound of excess of jurisdiction by arbitrators (Art. V(l)(c)). Chapter 
seven concentrates on the ground o f defective arbitral tribunal and procedure (Art. 
V(l)(d)). Chapter eight concerns the giound that the award has not became binding 
or was suspended or set aside (Art. V(l)(e)).
Chapter nine goes into the gi'ound of non-arbitrability of the subject matter of the 
dispute (Art. V(2)(a)). Chapter ten debates the ground of violation of public policy 
(Art. V(2)(b)). Finally, the thesis closes with chapter eleven where the general 
conclusion and recommendations are given.
Acbwwledgment iii
Acknowledgment
Praise and thanks are due to Allah, Who facilitated completing the requirements of 
my study.
1 acknowledge with sincere gratitude the help and support of many people. In 
particular, I am deeply indebted to my supervisor. Professor Fraser Davidson, for his 
constant and remarkable supervision, constmctive comments and contribution to this 
work, as well as for his moral support and encouragement. His patience and kindness 
have never ever been failing.
My deepest thanks and gratitude go also to my beloved parents, who have suffered the 
most in my being away during the period of my PhD study in UK.
My heartfelt thanks must go to my wife Wafa and my son Abdulrahman, who have 
born the brunt of my travails and endured the inevitable pressures I have been 
through, for their patience, kindness and support which made studying in Biitain a 
great experience in my life.
I wish also to convey my profound gi*atitude to my older brother Dr. Abdulkarim Al- 
Tuwaijeri (Consultant ENT) for his meaningful assistance and encouragement in the 
early stages of my PhD study.
I should not forget to send special thanks to the memory of Professor Mohamed Shata 
Abou Saad for his kind support prior to the initiation of my PhD study.
Last, but not in any way least, due recognition should also be given to my friends, 
eolleagues, and all those who have helped and encouraged me in one way or another 
during the period of my PhD study.
Table o f  Contents iv
Table of Contents
Title
Dedicated.................................   i
Abstract.................................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgment.................................................................................................................. iii
Table of Contents...................................................................................................................iv
Abbreviations........................................................................................................................xii
CHAPTER O N E ..............................................................................................................1
General Introduction..................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................1
1.2 The Importance of the N Y C ........................................................................................... 1
1.3 Art. V of the NYC............................................................................................................ 3
1.4 The Aim of the Thesis......................................................................................................3
1.5 The Importance of the T hesis.........................................................................................4
1.6 The Structure of the Thesis........................................................................................... 11
CHAPTER TW O ......................................................................................................... 12
Essential Characteristics of Art. V ............................................................12
2. Introduction....................................................................................................................... 12
2.1 Outline of Art. V .............................................................................................................12
2.2 Exhaustive Grounds....................................................................................................... 13
2.2.1 General........................................................................   13
2.2.2 The Possibility of Indirect Exceptions............................................................... 16
2.2.3 Further Limitation under Art. V II.......................................................................18
2.3 The Burden of Proof...................................................................................................... 19
2.4 Court Discretion..............................................................................................................21
2.4.1 Wide Discretion in Favour of Enforcement...................................................... 21
2.4.2 Grounds for Refusing Enforcement Restrictively Applied.............................24
2.4.3 No Review on the Merits of the Award............................................................ 25
2.5 The Position in Saudi Arabia....................................................................................... 27
2.5.1 Exhaustive Grounds............................................................................................. 27
2.5.2 Burden of P roo f....................................................................................................27
2.5.3 Court Discretion....................................................................................................28
Table o f  Contents v
2,6 Conclusion..........................................................................................................   ...29
C H A P T E R  T H R E E   ..........................  31
In c a p a c i ty  o f  P a r ty  ............      31
3.1 Introduction....,........................................................................     31
3.2 General Consideration..........................      31
3.3 Effectiveness of Incapacity Defence?...............................................     .....32
3.4 Law Applicable to Parties’ Capacity..............................................................   33
3.5 Capacity of Natural Person....................................................................     35
3.6 Capacity of Juristic Person...................................   38
3.7 Authority................................................     .....39
3.8 Capacity o f State and State Entities..........................     42
3.8.1 General...................................................................    42 !
3.8.2 Diversity of National Laws................................................   44
3.8.3 Effectiveness of State Incapacity Defence?......................................................45
3.8.4 Incapacity .or Arbitrability..................................................................................48
3.8.5 State Immunity..................................................................................................... 48
3.8.6 Applicability of the NYC to a State Dispute with a Private Party?................. 52
3.8.7 No Immunity from Suit only or from Enforcement as well?  .................. 53
3.9 The Position in Saudi Arabia   54 !
3.9.1 Capacity o f Natural Person.................................................................................54
3.9.2 Capacity of Juristic Person........  ......................................     56
3.9.3 State and State Entities.................................   .....57
3.9.3.1 First Stage  ................................................................................. 57
3.9.3.2 Second Stage..............................................................   58
3.9.3.3 Third Stage     61 ‘
3.9.3.4 Fourth Stage.................    62 '1
5.9.3.5 Fifth Stage................................................................................................ 64
3.9.3.6 Present Position of Saudi State Entities  .................................. 65
3.7.8.6 Case Law  ...................................       66
3.10 Conclusion...........................  ..67
C H A P T E R  F O U R   ................................................................................................ 71
In v a l id  A g r e e m e n t .......................................................  71
4.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................. 71 4
Table o f  Contents vi
4.2 Law Applicable to the Validity o f the Arbitration Agr eement................................ 72
4.2.2 Law Applicable to Substantive Validity of the Arbitration Agi'cement 73
4.2.2.1 General......................................................................................................73
4.2.2.2 Implied Choice.........................................................................................74
First View: The Law of the Seat of the Arbitration.........................................74
Second View: The Law of the Main Contract..................................................77
Third View: The French Approach o f the Substantive Rule Method............82
4.2.3 The Law Applicable to the Formal Validity of the Arbitration Agreement. 83
First View: Art. II is Applicable........................................................................ 84
Second View: Only Art. V(l)(a) is Applicable............................................... 87
4.2.4 Art. VII (1) of the N Y C ...................................................................................... 90
4.3 Grounds of Invalidity.................................................................................................... 90
4.3.1 Formal Grounds of Invalidity.............................................................................90
4.3.1.1 General......................................................................................................90
4.3.1.2 Is Art. II (2) a Unifomi Rule or a Maximum Requirement only? 91
4.3.1.3 How should the Formal Requirement of Art. 11(2) be Interpreted? ..94
4.3.1.4 What Constitutes an Agr'eement in Writing?.......................................97
4.3.1.5 Signatures................................................................................................. 99
4.3.1.6 Exchange of Documents...................................................................... 100
4.3.1.7 Reference to Arbitration Clause in Standard Conditions................. 101
4.3.1.8 Arbitration Clause in Purchase or Sales Confirmation.....................103
4.3.1.9 New Means of Communication.......................................................... 104
4.3.1.10 E-Contract............................................................................................ 105
4.3.1.11 Arbitration Agreement not in W riting..............................................108
4.3.1.12 Tacit Agreement.................................................................................. 108
4.3.1.13 Oral Agreement...................................................................................112
4.3.2 Substantial Grounds of Invalidity  ....................................................... 115
4.4 The Position in Saudi Arabia......................................................................................119
4.4.1 Law Applicable to the Validity of the Arbitration Agreement.....................119
4.4.2 Formal Grounds of Invalidity...........................................................................121
4.4.2.1 Writing Requirement............................................................................122
4.4.2.2 Legitimate Ways for Concluding Arbitration Agi'eement............... 124
4.4.2.3 Modem Means of Communications....................................................125
4.4.3 Substantial Grounds of the Invalidity..............................................................128
4.4 Conclusion.................................................................................................................... 129
Table o f  Contents vii
CHAPTER FIVE ....................................................................................................... 133
Violation of Due Process.......................................................................................... 133
5.1 Introduction................................................................................................................... 133
5.2 The Law Governing Violation of Due Process.........................................................133
5.3 The Relation between Art. V(l)(b) (i.e. due process) and Art. V(2)(b) (i.e. public 
policy).............................................................................................................................135
5.4 Lack of Proper Notice..................................................................................................138
5.4.1 General................................................................................................................. 138
5.4.2 The Standard of Proper N otice.........................................................................140
5.4.3 Shortness of Time Limits...................................................................................142
5.4.4 Disclosure of the Arbitrator’s Name...............................   142
5.4.5 The Language of Notice.....................................................................................143
5.5 Inability to Present One’s Case.................................................................................. 144
5.5.1 General.................................................................................................................144
5.5.2 Default by a Party .............................................................................................. 146
5.5.3 Denial of the Right to Introduce Evidence..................................................... 148
5.5.4 Denial o f the Right to Hear the Other Party’s Argument or Evidence........150
5.5.5 Denial of the Right to Controvert Other Party’s Argument or Evidence ... 151
5.5.6 Adjournment to Introduce Evidence................................................................152
5.5.7 Inability to Participate for Reasons outwith a Party’s Control.....................153
5.6 Estoppel/Waiver............................................................................................................155
5.7 If Violation of Due Process has no Effect on the Arbitration Result?.................. 157
5.8 The Position in Saudi Arabia......................................................................................159
5.8.1 The Requirements of Due Process under the Saudi Arbitration Law..........159
5.8.2 The Requirements of Due Process under Shari’ah Law ................................160
5.8.2.1 Fist: Treating Parties in Equal M anner...............................................161
5.8.2.2 Second: Hearing both Parties...............................................................163
5.8.3 Case Law..............................................................................................................164
5.9 Conclusion.................................................................................................................... 166
CHAPTER SIX ............................................................................................................168
Excess of Jurisdiction ................................................................................................168
6.1 Introduction................................................................................................................... 168
6.2 The Scope o f Art. V (l)(c)........................................................................................... 168
Table o f Contents viii
6.3 Detemiining the Scope of Disputes Submitted to Arbitration............................... 171
6.4 Extra Petita ................................................................................................................... 174
6.5 Ultra Petita ...................   177
6.6 Partial Enforcement.....................................................................................................179
6.7 The Position in Saudi Arabia........................................... .........................................183
6.8 Conclusion....................................................................................................................187
C H A P T E R  S E V E N ...................................................................................................189
D efec tiv e  C o m p o s it io n  o r  P r o c e d u r a l  I r r e g u la r i ty ....................................189
7.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................189
7.2 General Remarks.......................................................................................................... 189
7.3 The Unpopularity of Art. V (l)(d)...............................................................................190
7.4 The Difference between Art. V(l)(d) and Art. V (l)(b) ....................................... 190
7.5 The Applicable Law.....................................................................................................191
7.6 The Scope of Party Autonomy................................................................................... 192
7.7 Critieisms of Art. V (l)(d )...................   194
7.8 IiTegularities in the Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal......................................196
7.9 Irregularities in Arbitral Procedure............................................................................201
7.10 The Position in Saudi Arabia................................................................................... 206
7.10.1 General.............................................................................................................. 206
7.10.2 IiTegularities in the Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal..........................207
7.10.3 IiTegularities in the Arbitral Procedure.........................................................207
7.10.4 The Applicable Law.......................................................................   208
7.11 Conclusions................................................................................................................ 209
C H A P T E R  E I G H T .................................................................................................. 211
A w a r d  n o t  B in d in g  o r  S e t A sid e  o r  S u s p e n d e d ...........................................211
8.1 Intro duetion..................................................................  211
8.2 Not binding............................................................................................ ..................... 211
8.2.1 Eliminating Double-Exequatur........................................................................ 211
8.2.2 When the Award Become Binding..................................................................213
First View: Reference to the Law of the Country of Origin..........................213
Second View: Autonomous Determination under the NYC..........................214
8.2.3 Approaches to the Autonomous Detennination of Binding Award..............216
8.2.4 Case Law.............................................................................................................220
Table o f  Contents ix
8.3 Award Set A side..........................................................................................................222
8.3.1 General................................................................................................................ 222
8.3.2 Enforeement of Previously Set Aside Awards............................................... 223
8.3.3 Successful Case Law......................................................................................... 230
8.3.4 Unsuccessful Case L aw .................................................................................... 233
8.4 Suspension....................................................................................................................239
8.5 The Position in Saudi Arabia..................................................................................... 241
8.5.1 Not Binding.........................................................................................................241
8.5.2 Setting Sside and Suspension........................................................................... 244
8.6 Conclusion....................................................................................................................245
CHAPTER NINE .......................................................................................................247
Non-Arbitr ability........................................................................................................247
9.1 Introduction.....................................................................   247
9.2 The Relationship between Arbitrability and Public Policy.................................... 248
9.3 Law Applicable to Questions of Non-Arbitrability................................................ 249
9.4 Non-Arbitrability in Domestic Law s........................................................................ 250
9.5 The Distinction between Domestic and International Arbitrability...................... 253
9.6 Case Law.......................................................................................................................256
9.7 The Position in Saudi A rabia..................................................................................... 258
9.7.1 Non-Arbitrability under Saudi L aw s.............................................................. 258
9.7.2 Case Law............................................................................................................. 261
9.8 Conclusion....................................................................................................................262
CHAPTER TEN ..........................................................................................................265
Violation of Public Policy....................................................................................... 265
10.1 Introduction...............................................................................................................265
10. 2 The Importance of the Public Policy Defence......................................................265
10.3 Definition of Public Policy under Art. V(2)(b)......................................................267
10.4 Law Applicable to Public policy under Art. V(2)(b)............................................ 271
10.5 Distinction between National and International Public Policy............................272
10.5.1 Introduction.......................................................................................................272
10.5.2 International Public Policy..............................................................................273
10.5.3 Truly International or Transnational Public Policy.................................... 276
10.6 Case Law for Common Violations of Public Policy............................................. 279
Table o f  Contents x
10.6.1 Comiption......................................................................................................... 279
10.6.2 Irregularity of Procedure or Due Process......................................................282
10.6.3 Lack of Impartiality of the Arbitrator...........................................................284
10.6.4 Lack of Reasons in Award..............................................................................286
10.6.5 Mandatory L aw s.............................................................................................. 288
10.6.6 National Interests/ Foreign Relations............................................................ 290
10.6.7 Case Law Analysis...........................................................................................291
10.7 The Position in Saudi Arabia................................................................................... 292
10.7.1 Introductory Rem arks..................................................................................... 292
10.7.2 Shari’ah and Saudi Public Policy..................................................................294
10.7.3 Definition of Saudi Public policy........................     296
10.7.4 Distinction between Domestic and International Public Policy ................298
10.7.5 Common Examples of Saudi Public Policy................................................. 299
10.7.6 Awards Made by Non-Muslim Arbitrators...................................................299
10.7.7 Governed by Non-Islamic Laws.................................................................... 300
10.7.8 Compensation for Lost Profit or Opportunity.............................................. 301
10.7.9 Interest................................................................................................................304
10.8 Conclusion..................................................................................................................309
CHAPTER ELEVEN .............................................................................................. 311
General Conclusion....................................................................................................311
11.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................311
11.2 General Obseiwations................................................................................................ 311
11.3 Shortcomings of Art. V ............................................................................................. 313
11.4 The NYC in Saudi Arabia.........................................................................................315
11.5 General Recommendations.......................................................................................317
11.6 Recommendations concerning Saudi Arabia.........................................................318
Table of Cases..................................................................................................................... 322
(A) General Cases.............................................................................................................. 323
(B) Saudi Cases........................................................................     337
Bibliogi-aphy....................................................................................................................... 338
(A) Primary Sources.......................................................................................................... 339
(B) Secondary Sources.......................................................................................................342
Table o f  Contents xi
Appendices.......................................................................................................................... 354
Appendix A: the New York Convention of 1958.......................................................... 355
Appendix B; The Saudi Arbitration Law (SAL) of 1983 .............................................. 361
Appendix C: the Implementation Rules of the Saudi Arbitration Law (IRSAL) of 
1985................................................................................................................................365
Abbreviations Xll
Abbreviations
ADRLJ
Am Bus L J 
Am J Comp L 
Am J Inti Arb 
Am Rev Inti Arb 
Arab L Q 
Arb Inti
Boston Univ Inti L J
Colum J Transnat’l 
L
Croatian Arb YB
Disp Resol J
ECOSOC
Fordham Inti L J
ICC
ICCA
ICSID
ILA
Inti Arb L R
Inti Comp & Comm 
L Rev
Inti Lawy
IRSAL of 1985
J Inti Arb
The Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Law Journal 
American Business law Journal 
American Journal of Comparative Law 
Ameriean Journal of International Arbitration 
American Review of International Arbitration 
Arab Law Quarterly 
Arbitration International 
Boston University International Law Journal 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law
Croatian Arbitration Yearbook
Dispute Resolution Journal
The United Nations Economic and Social Council
Fordham International Law Journal
International Chamber of Commerce
International Council for Commercial Arbitration
The International centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes
International Law Association
International Arbitration Law Review
International Company and Commercial Law Review
The International Lawyer
The Implementation Rules of Saudi Arbitration Law of 1985 
Journal of International Arbitration
Ahhreviations Xlll
JCI Arb
Loyola Los Ang Inti 
& Comp L J
LQR
Melbourne J Inti L 
NYC
Pace Inti L Rev 
PBUH
SA
SAL of 1983 
St Thomas L F 
SWT
UN Doc
UNCITRAL
Univ Pennsylvania J 
Inti Econ L
Vindobona J Inti 
Comm L & Arb
Virginia J Inti L
Washington 
Convention of 1965
WTO
YBCA
Maryland J Inti L & 
Trade
The Journal of The Chartered Institute O f Arbitrators
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law 
Journal
Law Quarterly Review 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 
The New York Convention of 1958 
Paee International Law Review 
Peace Be Upon Him 
Saudi Arabia
The Saudi Arbitration Law of 1983 
St.Thomas Law Fomm
Abbreviation letters denoting the Sublime name of Almighty 
Allah, (S) Subhaanahu (Glory be to Allah), (W) and (T) 
Ta'aalaa (The Exalted).
United Nation Document
United Nation Commission on International Trade Law
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Economic Law
The Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law 
and Arbitration
Virginia Journal of International Law
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States of 1965
The World Trade Organization
Y earhook Commercial Arbitration
Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade
Ch 1: General Introduction
CHAPTER ONE 
General Introduction
1,1 Introduction
In the last three decades the extraordinary growth in international commerce has 
witnessed a dramatically increased demand for international arbitration as a means of 
resolving disputes. International arbitration is now the most common method of 
resolving disputes in international trade and commerce. This is because arbitration 
usually offers significant advantages in comparison with litigation before national 
courts, such as procedural flexibility, expedition, cost, confidentiality, and the parties’ 
freedom to choose such matters as the place and time of arbitration, the applicable 
laws, and the composition of arbitral tribunals. There is also the fact that a great 
number of independent arbitral institutions exist to provide arbitration seiwices on a 
national, regional or international basis. '
However, the main factor in the success of international commercial arbitration is 
perhaps the extensive enforceability of arbitral awards throughout the world. 
International commercial arbitration would be diminished in value if awards had no 
effective enforcement mechanism. Accordingly, the world has witnessed several 
regional and international treaties relate to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 
Yet, the most important and widely accepted is the United Nation Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958, which often 
refeiTcd to as the New York Convention o f 1958 (hereafter: the NYC).
1.2 The Importance of the NYC
' eg, the International Chamber o f  Commerce (ICC) in Paris, the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA) in N ew York, the London Court o f International Arbitration (LCIA), the WIPW Arbitration and 
Mediation Centre in Geneva, the International Center for the Settlement o f Disputes (ICSID) in 
Washington, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC),The Singapore International 
Arbitration Centre (SIAC), the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration 
(CRCICA) and the GCC Coimnercial Arbitration Centre in Balrrain.
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The NYC has been broadly considered as the most successful convention in 
international arbitration if not in international private law.  ^ Thus, Lord Mustill has 
said of the NYC that:
this convention has been the most successful international instrument in 
the field of arbitration, and perhaps could lay claim to be the most 
effective instance of international legislation in the entire history of 
commercial law.^
Likewise, Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll state that the NYC “ is the backbone to the 
acceptance of international arbitration by the business world”.  ^ Since its 
establishment in 1958, the NYC has increasingly attracted countries to its membership 
and continues to do so to the present day. The NYC has been so far ratified by more 
than 136 states, including most major trading nations and many developing countries 
from all regions of the world. ^
In 1994, Saudi Arabia adhered to the NYC.  ^ This step was welcomed as a happy 
event for arbitration users in Saudi Arabia as well as internationally. The Saudi
 ^ See, A Redfem and M Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  (3rd edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London 1999) pp 67, 455; AJ van den Berg, 'Striving for unifonn interpretation' 
(Enforcing arbitration awards under the N ew  York Convention: experience and prospects 1998) 40; R 
Merkin, Arbitration law  (Lloyd's o f London Press, London 2004) para 1-8; J Lew, L Mistelis and S 
Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration  (Kluwer Law International, The Hague ; 
London 2003) paras 2-18, 26-20; R Garnett and others, A Practical Guide to International Commercial 
Arbitration  (Oceana Publications, Dobbs F eny NY 2000) 101; A Dicey, J M om s and L Collins, D icey 
and M orris on the Conflict o f  Laws (13th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000) para 16-5; G Born, 
International Commercial Arbitration : Commentary and M aterials (2nd edn, Transnational 
Publishers; Kluwer Law International, NY; The Hague 2001) 21 ;K Annan, 'Opening address 
commemorating the successful conclusion o f  the 1958 United Nations Conference on International 
Commercial Aihitration' (Enforcing arbitration awards under the New York Convention: experience 
and prospects 1998) 2; D Sutton and J Gill, Russell on Arbitration (22nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 2003) 369 fn 4; D Di Pietro and M Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : 
the New York Convention o f  1958 (Cameron May, London 2001) 11; P Fouchard, 'Suggestions to 
Improve the International Efficacy o f  Arbitral Awards' (ICCA Congress Series no 9 Paris 1998) 604.
 ^M Mustill, 'Arbitration: Histoiy and Background'(1989) 6 (2) J Inti Arb 43 at 49.
Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration  p v and para 2-14.
 ^ See, for the states parties to the NYC, UNCTIRAL, 'Status; 1958 - Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement o f  Foreign Arbitral Awards'
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraLtexts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html>
(27/9/2006).
 ^ By issuing Royal Decree No. M / l l  dated 16/7/1414 H (1994) for adoption the NYC in Saudi Arabia, 
Published in the official Gazette, issue. 3489 , dated 10.08.1414 H, (21.01.1994).
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Council of Ministers gave the Board of Grievances  ^jurisdiction over enforcement of 
foreign awards falling under the NYC. ^
1.3 Art. V of the NYC
The NYC deals essentially, as its title suggests, with the "Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards".  ^ Its vital function is to provide an 
international legal framework facilitating the enforcement of arbitral awards all over 
the world. Thus, it simplifies the requirements for enforcing foreign arbitral awards, 
requiring only that the party seeking enforcement supplies the relevant court with: (i) 
the arbitral award or a certified copy thereof, (ii) the arbitration agreement or a 
certified copy thereof. In addition, a certified translations of the award and the 
arbitral agreement is required if they are not in the official language o f the country 
where enforcement is sought. ' ' Once these fonnalities are satisfied, the NYC requires 
the courts of member states to grant enforcement of the award, unless one or more of 
the gi'ounds for refusing enforcement set out in Art. V are established.
Art. V constitutes the heart and essence of the NYC, since it seeks to limit the 
gi'ounds upon which national courts may refuse to enforce foreign arbitral awards. 
The main object o f these grounds is to ensure consistency with the parties' arbitration 
agreement, the basic principles of due process, and the notions of arbitrability and 
public policy recognised by the enforcing state.
1.4 The Aim of the Thesis
 ^ The Saudi judicial system is cunently bifurcated. The S hari’ah courts have general jurisdiction, but 
the Board o f  Grievances has exclusive power to decide disputes regarding Saudi Government contracts 
and certain types o f commercial disputes such as those related companies law and intellectual property.
® Saudi Council o f Ministers Resolution No. 78 dated 14/7/1414 H (1994) for adoption the NYC in 
Saudi Arabia, para 2.
 ^For the hill text o f the NYC, see, Appendix. A.
'°N Y C  o f 1958, Art. IV(1)
" ibid, Art. IV(2).
See, P Sanders, The Histoiy o f the N ew York Convention' (ICCA Congress Series no 9 Paris 1998) 
13.
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This thesis has general and particular goals. The general goal is to examine and 
evaluate the provisions of Art. V of the NYC in light of both relevant theoretical 
discussions and the practical interpretations and applications of Art. V by the courts of 
signatory states. The particular goal is to examine and evaluate the interpretation and 
application of Art. V in Saudi Arabia according to the Shari’ah rules, Saudi arbitration 
laws and the practices of Saudi courts.
1.5 The Importance of the Thesis
Despite that fact that the NYC has been deemed to be the most successful convention 
in the international arbitration field, it was established 48 years ago and some of its 
text is now accused of being old-fashioned or featuring practical shortcomings in light 
o f developments in international trade and arbitration, such as advances in the means 
of communication. Thus, several suggestions for amendment even replacement have 
been made.
Accordingly, it is important to examine the alleged shortcomings of the provisions of 
Art. V to decide whether there is a genuine need for amendment or replacement, or 
whether other remedies would be more appropriate.
Furthennore, the NYC operates in more than 136 contracting States with different 
backgrounds and legal systems, and although at one level it provides unifomi rules 
governing the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and limiting the grounds upon 
which enforcement may be reflised, Art. V often refers back to the national laws of 
the enforcing State. These may vary from country to country, leading to diverse 
applications and inteipretations of Art. V by different national courts. This has been
See, eg, UN Doc, A/CN.9/127; K Roy, 'The New  York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Country 
Use the Public Policy Defense to Refuse Enforcement o f  Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?'(1995) 18 
Fordham Inti L J 920 pp 956-957; N Kaplan, 'New developments on written form' (Enforcing 
arbitration awards under the N ew  York Convention: experience and prospects 1998) pp 17-18; SN 
Lebedev, 'Cotirt assistance with interim measures' (Enforcing arbitration awards under the New  York 
Convention: experience and prospects 1998) 23; J Paulsson, 'Awards set aside at the place o f  
arbitration' (Enforcing arbitration awards under the N ew York Convention; experience and prospects 
1998) 25; W Melis, 'Considering the advisability o f preparing an additional Convention, 
complementaiy to the N ew York Convention' (Enforcing arbitration awards under the New York 
Convention; experience and prospects 1998) 46.
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considered as a weakness o f the NYC, and has led to several attempts to amend it. 
However, a more practical and achievable approach would seem to be to achieve 
unification of judicial interpretation by means of the comparative case law method. In 
this respect, Prof Sanders states that, the compilation and publication of court 
decisions on the interpretation of the NYC would be useful, and would lead to some 
degree of harmonization. Prof van den Berg also emphasises that;
Current international commercial arbitration cannot function without the 
assistance of the national courts. The New York Convention is built upon 
this principle. It can even be said that the Convention effectively derives 
its authority from the national courts. The manner in which they intei*pret 
and apply the Convention is the main source of its effectiveness. ' ^
Therefore, in order to maintain the NYC’s gi'eat success and to achieve greater 
hannonisation in the application of the grounds for refrising enforcement under Art. 
V, this thesis aims to investigate how those gi'ounds have been inteipreted by eourts 
including Saudi courts, and whether those interpretations are consistent with the 
general policy and the spirit of the NYC in supporting enforcement of foreign awards, 
and what new developments have emerged. This would be of particular importance in 
encouraging Saudi courts to take into account the principles and trends relating to the 
application of the NYC, and in finding out whether lessons could be learnt from 
developed arbitration systems, which might be applied in Saudi.
On the other hand, the NYC has been part of the Saudi legal system for the past 12 
years. Thus, this thesis also intends to provide interested non-Saudi judges, 
academics, and legal practitioners with a clear conception about how the Saudi courts 
apply and inteipret Art. V of the NYC. This would be o f particular importance for 
arbitrators who want their awards to be enforceable in Saudi Arabia. Generally
eg, in 1976 the UN Commission on International Trade Law was encouraged by the Asian-African 
Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) to consider the possibility o f preparing a protocol to be 
annexed to the NYC with a view to clarifying and complementing it. See, UN Doc. A C N .9/127. See 
also, Roy, 'The N ew  York Convention and Saudi Aiabia: Can a Country Use the Public Policy Defense 
to Rehise Enforcement o f  Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?' pp 956-957; Kaplan, 'New developments 
on wi'itten fonn' pp 17-18; Lebedev, 'Court assistance with interim measures' 23; Paulsson, 'Awards set 
aside at the place o f  arbitration' 25; Melis, 'Considering the advisability o f preparing an additional 
Convention, coraplementaiy to the New York Convention' 46.
Sanders, 'The Histoiy o f the N ew  York Convention' 13-14.
AJ van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation  (Kluwer Law and Taxation, Deventer 1994) 5.
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speaking, arbitrators “shall make every effort to make sure that the award is 
enforceable at law” of the country where the enforcement might be sought. This is a 
duty to use one’s best attempts, rather than a duty to secure a result. It should be borne 
in mind that arbitrators, unlike courts, have no power to enforce their award, their 
function being concluded once the award has been made, while no arbitrator in the 
world can ever guarantee that the award is enforceable in whatever country where 
enforcement may be sought. Yet, to achieve a successhil arbitration, arbitrators are 
expected to do their best to know what is probably unenforceable in state where 
enforcement may be sought, and render their awards accordingly. The cuiTent study 
thus will attempt to assist arbitrators to do so.
In addition, Arbitration is not new to Saudi Arabia since its legal system is based upon 
Islamic Shari ’ah laws, which have not only recognised arbitration but commended its 
merit for the past 1427 years, and Muslims therefore have long used arbitration to 
resolve disputes. However, Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world whose legal 
system is totally dominated by Shari 'ah mles. Thus, the only example of true Islamic 
inteipretation of the NYC is its application by the Saudi courts.
This thesis is also of paramount importance as regards the widespread conception 
among foreigners that Saudi Arabia is hostile towards international arbitration and in 
particular the enforcement of foreign awards. Unfortunately, there is a considerable 
lack of awareness about the application of the NYC in Saudi Arabia due to the 
absence of reported decisions on the NYC by Saudi courts. Such decisions have not 
yet been published, and thus are very difficult to access. More importantly, there is 
also an obvious lack of research and comparative study concerning the interpretation 
of the grounds of Art. V in Saudi Arabia. As a result, it is generally thought that 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia is either impossible or at least 
extremely difficult, even after the Saudi adherence to the NYC in 1994. By way of 
example, one author said that:
See, ICC Ai’bitration Rules o f 1998, Art. 35.
Available at http://www,iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/rules.asp. [Accessed 28/08/2003].
See, Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration pp 443, 446.
See, eg, Roy, The New  York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Countiy Use the Public Policy 
Defense to Refuse Enforcement o f Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?' 920-958; HG Gharavi, The
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Saudi Arabia has traditionally been hostile to the recognition and 
enforcement of non-domestic arbitral awards, finding these awards 
contrary to Saudi Arabian law and public policy. Saudi Arabia’s
adoption of the New York Convention remains consistent with its 
historical resistance to international arbitration. ... Article V(2)(b) of the 
New York Convention provides a safe harbor wherein Saudi Arabia does 
not have to recognize a non-Saudi Arabian award that is contrary to its 
public policy. Article V(b)(2) allows Saudi Arabia to embrace the 
international community and its rules for international dispute resolution 
and enforcement, without rejecting its own history and public policy.
Such a negative view is even shared by some Saudis. For example, a Saudi arbitrator
stated, with regard to the enforcement of a foreign award in Saudi Arabia, that “I feel
as if we Saudis had promised things which we could not realize”^ ,^ while another
Saudi commentator opined that “the local courts do not tend to enforce foreign
arbitration decisions, particularly if  they are from non-Arab countries” and “there is
little guarantee that a foreign judgment or arbitral award will be enforced” by Saudi 
23courts.
It may be added that these negative ideas about Saudi Arabia’s attitude towards 
enforcement of foreign awards are based, to a large extent, upon the alleged conflict 
between the spirit of the NYC and the Shari’ah rules applied in Saudi Arabia. In 
particular, it is said that Art.V(2)(b) of the NYC, which states that recogiition and 
enforcement may be refused by a competent authority if enforcement of the award
International Effectiveness o f  the Annulment o f  an Arbitral Award  (International arbitration law library, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague; London 2002) pp 39, 115; M Reisman, 'Law, International 
Public Policy (so-called) and Arbitral Choice in International Commercial Arbitration' (ICCA Congress 
Series no 18 Montreal 2006)10; P Mason, 'International Commercial Arbitration; Saudis Accept N.Y. 
Convention'(1994) 49 (2) Disp Resol J 22 at 26; W Cattan, 'Saudi Arabia'(1995) 29 Inti Lawy 245; F 
Akaddaf, 'Application o f  the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of  
Goods (CISG) to Arab Islamic Countries: Is the CISG Compatible with Islamic Law Principles?'(2001) 
13 (1) Pace Inti L Rev 1 at 23; A El-Ahdab, Arbitration in Arab Countries (Nolul Paris 1990 "in 
Arabic")vol. 1 pp 242-243; A El-Alidab, 'Arbitration in Saudi Ai'abia under the N ew  Ai'bitration Act, 
1983 and its Implementation Rules o f 1985: Part 2'(1986) 3 (6) J Inti Arb 23 pp 50-51; A El-Ahdab, 
'Saudi Arabia Accedes to the N ew  York Convention'(1994) 11 (3) J Inti Arb 87 pp 88-91.
Roy, 'The N ew  York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Country Use the Public Policy Defense to 
Refuse Enforcement o f Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?’ 922.
ibid, 953.
M. A1 Houchane, Conference on Euro-Arab Arbitration (Tunisia, 1985). Cited in El-Alidab, 
'Arbitration in Saudi Arabia under the New Arbitration Act, 1983 and its Implementation Rules o f  
1985: Part 2' pp 50-51.
MJ Najar, 'An Overview o f  the Saudi Legal System' 
<http://www.law.du.edu/elliot/mbruemme/overview.htm> (14/5/2003)
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would be contrary to the public policy of the country in question, will mean that any 
foreign awards contrary to Islamic principles will not be enforced in Saudi, due to the 
kingdom’s strict adherence to Shari ’ah. For example, one writer said that:
The scope of this public policy exception, which could affect the 
implementation of the New York Convention in any Contracting State, is 
o f particular relevance in the context of Saudi Arabia, where the Shari’ah 
is the paramount law and, in effect, the ultimate expression of Saudi 
Arabian public policy. Shari’ah precepts are not always reconcilable with 
modern commercial practice. The Saudi Arabian Board of Grievances (the 
competent court), in reliance on the public policy exception, is likely to 
refuse to enforce arbitral awards or such parts thereof as are deemed to be 
contrary to the Shari’ah.
Thus, this thesis will attempt to cover the above-mentioned gaps by providing a 
comprehensive and comparative study of how each ground for refusing enforcement 
under Art. V might actually be applied in Saudi Arabia. The thesis will identify those 
cases in which those gi'ounds have been applied by the Saudi courts, and analyse them 
to highlight the true position of the Saudi courts. Specifically, this thesis will address 
certain unanswered questions, including whether Shari’ah lules ever prevent 
enforcement of foreigi awards in Saudi Arabia, and whether any non-conformity with 
the Shari’ah mles or Saudi law block enforcement. For example, since Saudi 
arbitration law requires that arbitrators be Muslim, will the Saudi courts enforce 
foreign arbitral awards made by non-Muslims? Similarly, Saudi regulations oblige 
arbitral tribunals to follow Shari'ah. If a foreign award is governed by non-Islamic 
Shari 'ah laws, will the Saudi courts reftise to enforce such awards or will deem these 
requirements not to be relevant to international arbitration? What is the effect of legal 
restrictions imposed by Saudi law upon public entities as regards their capacity to 
submit to arbitration? If a part of the foreign award is found to be non-enforceable, 
will the Saudi courts enforce the rest of the award? Review of the national arbitral 
awards by the Saudi courts is not limited to cases of violation of the principles of 
Shari 'ah, but may also include a fiill review of the facts and law when an objection to
See, eg, Roy, 'The New York Convention and Saudi Arabia; Can a Country Use the Public Policy 
Defense to Refuse Enforcement o f Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?' pp 920-958; Cattan, 'Saudi Ai'abia' 
246; Najar, 'An Overview o f the Saudi Legal System' ; El-Alidab, 'Saudi Arabia Accedes to the New  
York Convention' 91.
25 Cattan, 'Saudi Ai'abia' 246.
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the award is submitted by one or more of the parties. Will this also be the case in 
respect of foreign awards under the NYC? Will the Saudi courts take into account that 
international public policy may be not exactly the same as national public policy, and 
thus apply a less strict standard of public policy to foreign awards? The thesis will 
consider such issues.
Finally, the Saudi legal system has witnessed significant developments since the early 
1990's, especially in the commercial sphere. The economic realities of the rapid 
commercial and industrial development of the country have stimulated systematic 
reviews of commercial laws to improve economic performance. As a consequence, 
Saudi Arabia promulgated the following laws: a new foreign investment law (together 
with the establishment of a new General Investment Authority) in 2000; the 
Capital Markets law which sets out the framework for the capital market, including 
the establishment of the Saudi Arabian Securities and Exchange Commission, (SEC) 
in 2003; a new competition law in 2004; a unified anti-dumping law in 2006. 
Furthenuore, Saudi Arabia became a fall WTO Member in 2005. Moreover, several 
new draft laws and major reforms of existing laws are at various stages of 
promulgation, including new draft laws on mining, insurance, taxation, company 
foimation, patent protection and the labour market, e-commerce law and e- 
government law. It can hence be seen that significant reforms have been instituted in 
order to reduce bamiers to business activity and make the country more attractive to
See, S A L of 1983, Art.l9.
Saudi Arabia is the largest economy in the Middle East, comprising 25 percent o f the Arab world's 
GDP. It is the world's leading oil exporter, possessing one-fourth o f  the world's proven oil reserves. 
See, US-SAB Council, 'the Saudi Arabian Economy' < http : //www.us-saudi-
business.org/saudiarabia/Economy.asp> (accessed 20/9/2006).
This is, indeed, a major step which may be considered as the comer stone o f a new drive to make the 
country more attractive to foreign investors, and streamline business related laws and regulations. See, 
SAGIA, 'Capital Markets' <http://www.sagia.gov.sa/inneipage.asp?ContentID=551&Lang=en> 
(accessed 26/08/2003).
During the period from Between 1996 to 2005, the number o f  transactions, volume and value traded 
increased dramatically in the Saudi Stock Market. Market capitalization has increased by 1,490% and 
the all share index has increased by 1,122.04%, See, Tadawul, 'Saudi Stock Market'
<http ://www. tadawul.com, sa/wps/portal/! ut/p/_s, 7_0_A/7_0_4BO/.cmd/ChangeLanguage/, l/en?cID=6_ 
l_9E&nID=7_0_49I> (accessed 20/9/2006).
At the end o f April 2005, the Saudi Market capitalization was worth over $435 billion making it by far 
the largest market in the Middle East, It represents 47 percent o f  the total capitalization o f Arab stock 
markets and 53 percent o f  Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) stocks markets. See, The Saudi Arabia 
Infonnation Resource, 'Saudi Stock Market' (2005) <http://www,saudinf.com/main/y8194.htm > 
(accessed 20/9/2006).
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foreign capital investment. At the same time, this will improve the Kingdom's access 
to international capital markets and create greater opportunities for Saudi 
businessmen. It is, therefore, certain that business disputes will become more 
common. However, having confidence in the country’s legal system is essential for 
foreigners who may do business with Saudi businessmen or enterprises, whether 
within or outside Saudi Arabia.
Thus, in 2000 the Law of Procedure before Shari 'ah Courts, which applies to civil 
litigation, was passed, and the Saudi Arbitration Group was established in order to 
deal with the latest arbitration developments throughout the world, and to improve the 
Saudi arbitration system at national and international levels. In 2001, the Law of 
Legal Practice and the Law of Criminal Procedure were enacted. Moreover, the 
Saudi domestic arbitration law is currently under revision, and the government is 
about to set up a centre for international commercial arbitration in Riyadh with the 
aim of pushing forward the liberalization and efficiency of the arbitral process. Thus, 
one can clearly see that Saudi Arabia has been taking steps to improve its legal 
system, and it is open to new ideas and the prospect of reform, and is detennined to 
incorporate any positive changes into its system, as and when required.
Yet, nothing has been done regarding international arbitration law and the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, despite the fact that confidence regarding the 
enforceability of foreign awards in Saudi Arabia is among the most important factors 
that foreign investors take into account when deciding to deal with Saudi parties 
whether in Saudi Arabia or abroad. Accordingly, and since the Saudi Arabia is 
currently reviewing its arbitration law and about to establish international arbitration 
center in Riyadh, it would be essential for this thesis to suggest possible amendments 
and reforms which might introduce more flexibility, transparency, and efficiency into 
the process of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia. In particular,
Prince Bander Al-Saud is the Chief o f the Saudi Arbitration Group. See, Prince B AL-Saud, 
'Opening Remarks' in The International Bureau O f the Permanent Court o f Arbitration (ed) 
Strengthening Relations with Arab And Islamic Countries through International Law  (Kluwer Law 
International, the Hague 2001) 4.
ibid.
I was a member o f  the drafting panel in Majlis ALShoura (The Saudi parliament) that drafted the 
foreign investment law o f 2000, the Law o f Procedure before Shari'ah Courts of 2000 and the Law of  
Legal Practice o f  2001.
Ch 1: General Introduction 11
the thesis should determine whether there is a need for a new Saudi act implementing 
the NYC, and a Saudi international arbitration law.
1.6 The Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is divided into eleven chapters: Chapter two aims to discuss the essential 
characteristics of Art. V. The succeeding chapters deal with the giounds for resisting 
enforcement established by Article V, Chapter three with party incapacity, Chapter 
four with the invalidity o f the arbitration agi'eement, Chapter five with the violation 
of due process, Chapter six with arbitrators exceeding their jurisdiction. Chapter seven 
with iiTegular arbitral procedure or tribunal. Chapter eight with the award has not 
become binding or being set aside, Chapter nine with non-arbitrability of the subject 
matter of the dispute and Chapter ten with violation of public policy. Chapter eleven 
provides the thesis's general conclusion and recommendations.
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CHAPTER TWO 
Essential Characteristics of Art. V
2. Introduction
Although the NYC establishes a general standard that foreign arbitral awards must be 
recognized and enforced, Art. V provides limited grounds upon which enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards may be refused. The application of the NYC for more than 46 
years by national courts in 137 countries has created a significant jurisprudence under 
Art. V. This will be addressed presently, but first it might be thought useful to 
highlight the main characteristics of Art. V in order to obtain a better understanding of 
that provision, before considering each ground of refusal individually. Thus, this 
chapter first provides a brief outline of Art. V before considering the idea that the 
Article provides exhaustive grounds for resisting enforcement, discussing the issue of 
reversing the burden of proof, and finally examining the wide discretion of enforcing 
court in favour o f enforcement.
2.1 Outline of Art. V
Art. V is divided into two sets of provisions. First, Art.V(l) sets out five grounds for 
refiising enforcement which are largely concerned with safeguarding the most 
fundamental principles of justice and party autonomy. These include party incapacity; 
the invalidity of the arbitration agreement; violation of due process; exceeding the 
scope of the submission; defective composition of the tribunal; significant procedural 
iiTegularity, and the fact that the award has not yet becom binding or has been set 
aside. These grounds can only be invoked by the losing party who has to prove them, 
while the enforcing court cannot raise them of its own motion.^
NYC o f 1958, Art. V (1) states that:
Recognition and enforcement o f the award may be refused, at the request o f the party 
against whom it is invoked, only if  that party furnishes to the competent authority where 
the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
:
■
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By contrast, Art. V(2) focuses on the law of the place where enforcement is sought, 
allowing each contracting state to protect its national interests and moral standards by 
allowing enforcement to be denied on the giounds of inarbitrability and violation of 
public policy, which issues can be raised by the enforcing court of its own motion. ^
2.2 Exhaustive Grounds
2.2.1 General
It is critical to ask whether the enforcement of foreign awards may be resisted only on 
the grounds set forth in Art. V. There is a consensus among scholars  ^ and courts, ^
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to 
them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which 
the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law o f the 
country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice o f  the 
appointment o f the arbitrator or o f the arbitration proceedings or was otheiivise unable to 
present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms 
o f the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope o f  
the submission to arbitration, provided that, if  the decisions on matters submitted to 
arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part o f  the award which 
contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; 
or
(d) The composition o f  the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement o f  the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in 
accordance with the law o f  the countiy where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding, on the parties, or has been set aside or 
suspended by a competent authority o f  the countiy in which, or under the law o f which, 
that award was made.
 ^ ibid, Art. V (2) states that:
Recognition and enforcement o f an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent 
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter o f  the difference is not capable o f  settlement by arbitration under 
the law o f that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement o f the award would be contrary to the public policy 
of that country.
 ^ See, eg, AJ van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentaiy(2003) XXVIII YBCA 562at 651; van den 
Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 265; 
Sutton and Gill, Russell on Arbitration  371; Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International 
Commercial Arbitration 459; F Davidson, International Commercial Arbitration : Scotland and the 
UNCITRAL M odel Law  (W Green & Son Ltd, Edinburgh 1991) 222; F Davidson, Arbitration  (W 
Green, Edinburgh 2000) 392; Garnett and others, International Commercial Arbitration  102; Bom, 
International Commercial Arbitration  707; E Gaillard and J Savage (eds), Fouchard. Gaillard, 
Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration  (Kluwer Law International The Hague 1999) para
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apart from the Supreme Court of Queensland,  ^ that Art. V provides an exhaustive list 
of the grounds for refiising enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. This is basically 
because Art. V states that enforcement of the award may be refused “only i f ’ the 
resisting party fiirnishes proof of existence of one of the giounds listed in Art. V(l). 
Hence relying upon other giounds is not possible, even a ground which would 
otherwise be available under the law of the state where enforcement is sought  ^ or 
under the law governing the arbitration process.
Judicial support for this position is found, for example, in the statement of the English 
High Court, in Norsk Hydro ASA v The State Property Fund O f Ukraine that:
There is an important policy interest, reflected in this country’s treaty 
obligations, in ensuring the effective and speedy enforcement of 
international arbitration awards; the corollary, however, is that the task of 
the enforcing court should be as ‘mechanistic’ as possible. Save in 
connection with the threshold requirements for enforcement and the 
exhaustive grounds on which enforcement of a New York Convention 
award may be refiised, the enforcing court is neither entitled nor bound to 
go behind the award in question, explore the reasoning of the arbitration 
tribunal or second-guess its intentions. ^
Equally, the US Court of Appeals in Karaha Bodas Co LLC v Perushahaan Minyak 
Dan Gas Bumi Negara  ^noted that:
Wliile courts of a primary jurisdiction (the country where the arbitration is 
held) may apply their own domestic law in evaluating a request to annul 
or set aside an arbitral award, courts in countries of secondary jurisdiction
251; Sanders, 'The History o f the N ew York Convention' 12; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  
international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 135.
See, eg, Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v Toys "R” Us Inc 126 F3d 15 (US Court o f  Appeals 2nd 
Circ 1997) 23; Norsk Hydro ASA v The State Property Fund O f UHaine 2002 WL 31476341 (UK 
QBD Admin Ct) para 17; Karaha Bodas Co LLC  v Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Don Gas Bumi 
Negara 364 F 3d 274 (US Court o f  Appeals 5th Circ 2004) 288; Société d'Etudes et de Commerce SA 
V Weyl B eef products BV  (2001) XXIV YBCA 827 (Netherlands Court o f  First Instance 2000) 828.
 ^ Resort Condominiums International Inc v Bolwell (1995) XX YBCA 628 (Australia Queensland 
Supreme Court 1993)
 ^ Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  
1958 135.
 ^ Norsk Hydro ASA v The State Property Fund O f Ukraine para 17.
® Karaha Bodas Co LLC  v Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara  .
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(where enforcement of the foreign arbitral award is sought) may refuse
enforcement only on the grounds specified in Article V (of the NYC), ^
Likewise, the Netherlands Court has asserted that the grounds for resisting 
enforcement are definitively listed in Art. V.
By contrast, only one court seems to have paid no attention to the exclusivity 
principle under Art. V. The Supreme Court of Queensland in Resort Condominiums 
International Inc v Bolwell et all reached the view that the Convention grounds 
were not exhaustive in the light of the Australian implementing legislation which 
reproduces Art. V ,but omits the world “only”. The Court held that the Court had a 
general discretion to refuse enforcement apart from specific gi'ounds set out in Art. V, 
obseiwing that “the omission of the word ‘only’ from the opening words of s.8(5) of 
the Act, when compared with the opening words of Art. V of the Convention, is a 
further pointer to the existence of a residual discretion”. The Court also derived 
support for this view by alleging the New York District Court had held in Dworkin- 
cosell Interair Courier Services Inc v Avraham that the defences to an application to 
enforce a foreign award were not limited to the specific matters refeiTcd to in the 
Convention.'^ Thus the Court refused to order enforcement in the exercise of its 
discretion.
This approach has been strongly criticized. This is because firstly, the Court relied 
upon the tenninology of the Australian implementing legislation, rather than the 
wording of the NYC itself. It is suggested that, despite the omission of the word 
‘only’, the Australian Legislature cannot intend to implement the NYC, while at the 
same time radically altering its whole substance by giving the court a residual 
discretion to refuse enforcement. It is a serious matter to implement the NYC in a way 
which does not make enforcement of a foreign award mandatory in all cases falling 
outside the grounds listed in Art. V. Not only is this inconsistent with the text of the
' ibid 288.
Société d 'Etudes et de Commerce SA v Weyl B eef products B V  828. 
' ' Resort Condominiums International Inc v B o lw e ll. 
ibid 643. 
ibid 642. 
ibid 649.
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NYC, but it tends fatally to undemiine its main purpose, scheme and philosophy, as 
well as its well known pro-enforcement bias. Secondly, as Prof van den Berg notes, 
the reference to case of Dworkin-Cosell v Avraham is mistaken as this case 
‘concerned the setting aside of an arbitral award and the question whether the award, 
made in new York, was final and binding under federal arbitration law’,'^ More 
importantly, the US court in that case confirmed that, as a general rule, the only 
defences against a foreign arbitral award are those enumerated in Art. V.
2.2.2 The Possibility of Indirect Exceptions.
Under Art. V(l)(e) enforcement may be refused if the award ‘has been set aside or 
suspended by a competent authority o f the country in which, or under the law of 
which, that award was made’. Does this imply that a further ground of refusal may be 
introduced when an enforcing court is asked to deal with an awards which is not made 
abroad, but which is considered as non-domestic in accordance with Art 1(1) of the 
NYC. This matter was dealt with by the US Court of Appeals in the leading case of
See, M Pryles, 'Interloctory order and Convention awards: the case o f  Resort Condominiums v. 
BolweU'(1994) 10 (4) Arb Inti 385 at 393; N  Kaplan, 'A Case by Case Examination o f Whether 
National Courts Apply Different Standards When Assisting Arbitral Proceedings and Enforcing 
Awards in International Cases as Contrasting with Domestic Disputes. Is There a Worldwide Trend 
towards Supporting an International Arbitration Culture?' (ICCA Congress Series no 8 Seoul 1996) pp 
205-07; AJ van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentaiy'( 1996) XXI YBCA 394 at; Garnett and others, 
International Commercial Arbitration  102 hi 330.
Dworkin-cosell Interair Courier Services Inc v Avraham  728 FSupp 156 (US District Court SD NY  
1989).
See, van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' (1996)' 480.
18 Dworkin-cosell Interair Courier Sei'vices Inc v Avraham  161.
Non-domestic awards may include several categories, as follows: (a) an award made in the 
enforcement countiy under the arbitration law o f anther countiy; (b) an award made in the enforcement 
country under its arbitration law, but involved a foreign or international element; (c) an award that is 
regarded as a-national in that it is not governed by any arbitration law. See van den Berg, 'Consolidated 
Commentary' (2003)' at 569; (d) an award made in the enforcement country under its arbitration law, 
but involved parties having their principal place o f business outside o f that state. See, Sigval Bergesen 
V Joseph Muller Corp 710 F2d 928 (US Court o f  Appeas 2nd Cir 1983) 932.
NYC o f 1958, Ai't. I (1) provides that “...It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as 
domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought”.
According to the legislative history o f the NYC, Art. 1(1) represents a compromise between (a) the 
common law states which adopted the teiritorial approach to determine the nationality o f an award that 
is enforceable under NYC, as adopted in the first clause o f Art. 1(1). And (b) the civil law states were 
of the opinion that factors other than the seat o f the arbitration, such as the procedural law, should be 
taken into account to determine the enforceable award under the NYC, as adopted in the second clause 
of Art. 1(1).
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Sigval Bergesen v Joseph Muller Corp. The Court took the view that there is an 
overlap between the Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act in which a non- 
domestic award rendered in the US may be reviewed. Moreover, the US District 
Court in Certain Underwriters v BCS Insurance Co stated that since Art. V(l)(e) 
permits courts to refuse enforcement of awards which have been set aside under the 
law of the country where the award was made, it permits the District Court to apply 
the FAA to vacate a non-domestic award rendered in the United States.
It is submitted in favour of this interpretation of Art. V (l)(e) that excluding an 
applicant in such circumstances from applying to the court to have the award set aside 
under domestic law would be clearly unfair. This is because there is no indication that 
the NYC intends to deprive a state which adopts it of its authority to set aside an 
award which that state regards as non-domestic. This interpretation is also consistent 
with the commonly held view that an application to set aside an award can be never 
be made under the NYC itself, but only can be sought under the law of the seat of the 
arbitration. In this way, Art. V(l)(e) may indirectly extend the giounds for refusing 
enforcement under Art. V so as to include all grounds on which an award may be 
challenged under the law of seat of arbitration, automatically enliancing the chances 
for the losing party to avoid enforcement. It may thus undermine aim of limiting the 
grounds for refusing enforcement under Art. V and restrict the degree to which the 
application of the NYC can be hannonized. This might appear to run contrary to 
the main puipose of the NYC which is to ensure the easy enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards.
See U N  Doc. E/Conf.26/L.42 p 2; U N  Doc. E/Conf.26/SR.16; van den Berg, The New York Arbitration 
Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 22; AJ van den Berg, 'Non-domistic 
Arbitral Awards Under the 1958 N ew York Convention'! 1986) 2 (3) A it  Inti 191; Davidson, 
Arbitration  403; R Meliren, 'Enforcement o f  Aititral Award in the United States'! 1998) 1 (6) Inti Arb 
L R  198 at 199.
Sigval Bergesen v Joseph Muller Corp 934 .
See, Certain Undenvriters v BCS Insurance Co 239 FSupp2d 812 (US District Court ND Illinois 
2003) 815. See also Spector v Torenberg 852 FSupp201 (US District Court SD NY 1994) pp 205-6 
and fn 4.
See, Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York 
Convention o f  1958 pp 136-37.
cf. van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation  265; D Kolkey, 'Attacking Arbitral Awards: Rights o f Appeal and Review in 
International Arbitration'! 1988) 22 Inti Lawy 693 at 694.
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Yet it might be argued that there is no real possibility of any additional grounds for 
refusing enforcement to be indirectly included under Art. V(l)(e) if the time-limits for 
making a challenge are taken into account. A distinction should be made between two 
periods of time for challenging a non-domestic award. Before the time-limit for 
challenging an award under a given national law is up, the relevant court can (if this is 
contemplated by the law) set aside a non-domestic award in the same way as a 
domestic award. But once that time-limit has elapsed, the court may not set aside such 
an award, but may only refuse to enforce it under one of the grounds listed in Art. V. 
Therefore, there is in practice no exceptional case in which giounds for refusing 
enforcement are recognised beyond those specified in Art. V. This interpretation is 
consistent with the unanimous judicial opinion that the NYC may not be invoked to 
set aside an award.
2.2.3 Further Limitation under Art. VII
Art. VII(l) of the NYC provides that:
The provisions of the present Convention shall not affect the validity of 
multilateral or bilateral agreements concerning the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards entered into by the Contracting States nor 
deprive any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of 
an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the 
treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon.
Thus, a further limitation on the grounds for refusing enforcement may be found in 
the enforcing state, in that while Art. V lays down the maximum grounds on which 
enforcement of foreigi awards may be refused, the NYC allows contracting states to 
adopt a position which is more favourable to enforcement than Art. V. By allowing 
parties to take advantage of more favourable provisions in national laws or bilateral 
and multilateral treaties, Art VII(l) stresses the pro-enforcement bias o f the NYC.
See, eg, Shenzhen Nan Da Indus v FM  Int'l Ltd  (1991) XVIII YBCA 377 (Hong Kong Supreme 
Court 1991) 381 and fhs 10 & 11; van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 ; 
Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 20.
NYC of 1958, A ll  V II(l).
See, Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York 
Convention o f  1958 170; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration
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2.3 The Burden of Proof
A significant improvement the NYC makes on the Geneva Convention of 1927 is that 
the burden o f proof of the existence of the grounds for refusing enforcement under 
Art. V (l) is placed on the party resisting enforcement o f the award. This is made clear 
by the introductory sentence o f Art. V (l) which states that “Recognition and 
enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it 
is invoked, only if  that party furnishes to the competent authority where the 
recognition and enforcement is sought, p r o o f  one or more of the grounds for 
refusing enforcement enumerated in Art V(l).^^ It may also be noted that the NYC 
presumes the validity of awards since it requires the party seeking enforcement only 
to supply the original or certified copy of both the award and the arbitration 
agreement. In relation to placing the burden of proving invalidity on the party 
resisting enforcement, the well-known commentator Prof Sanders obseiwes that “this 
again stands to reason because the giounds for reflisal deal with exceptional cases. 
Logically, these grounds should be invoked by the party who opposes the exequatur”.
Many commentators see the move away from requiring the party seeking 
enforcement to prove the validity of the award, as under the Geneva Convention of 
1927, to be one o f the key refonns made by the NYC.
pp 697-98, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Tow’ards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 81,
NYC o f 1958, Ai-t.V(l).
ibid, Al t. IV(1) provides that:
To obtain the recognition and enforcement mentioned in the preceding article, the party
applying for recognition and enforcement shall, at the time o f the application, supply:
(a) The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof;
(b) The original agreement referred to in article II or a duly certified copy thereof.
Sanders, 'The History o f  the N ew York Convention' 13.
See, eg, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 264; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration  para 1673; Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International 
Commercial Arbitration  459 fn 65; R Bishop and E Martin, 'Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards' 
(2001) <http://www.kslaw.com/library/pdf/bishop6.pdf> (13/8/2005) 9; van den Berg, 'Consolidated 
Commentary' (2003)'651.
Ch 2: Essential Characteristics o f  Art. V 20
The courts have also noted the placing of the onus of proof upon the resisting party.
So the Federal Supreme Court o f Switzerland has stated that ‘the burden of proof is 
reversed in Art. V, which lists the grounds on which recognition and enforcement 
may exceptionally be refused”. This view was confiiTned by both the US District 
Court in Henry v Murphy as well as the Supreme Appeal Court of Kuwait.
On the other hand, it should be noted that under Art. V(2) the relevant court may 
refuse enforcement of its own motion on the basis situation of non-arbitrability or 
violation of public policy. May the party against whom enforcement is sought raise 
such grounds, and if so, does he bear the burden of proof in this context? Wliile the 
NYC does not deal explicitly with such matters, it seems obvious that it must be open 
to a party to rest his defence on such grounds. Moreover, it has been held by an 
English commercial court that while the giounds for refusing enforcement under Art. 
V(2) may always be applied by the court of its own motion, if a defendant wish to rely 
upon these grounds, he undertakes the burden of proving them. Nevertheless, it 
might be argued that it sometimes occurs that defendants argue that enforcement 
would somehow be contrary to the public policy, and the court agrees to consider that 
issue without requesting them to furnish any proof.
See, A Ltd  v BAG  (2003) XXVIII YBCA 835 (Switzerland Supreme Court 2002) 841; Henry v 
Murphy 2002 WL 24307 (US District Court SD NY 2002) 3; contact party  v contract party  (1997) 
XXII YBCA 748 (Kuwait Supreme Court 1988) 751. See, also, Sanders, 'The History o f the New  York 
Convention' 13; van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentaiy' (2003)’651; van den Berg, The New York 
Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation pp 9, 264; Redfern and 
Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  460; Davidson, Arbitration  pp 391- 
392; Sutton and Gill, Russell on Arbitration  371; Garnett and others, International Commercial 
Arbitration  103; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration  para 251; G Gaja, International Commercial Arbitration: New York 
Convention (Oceana, Dobbs Feny NY 1978) para I.C.l; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  
international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 pp 133-4; S Ki'oll, 'Recognition 
and Enforcement o f  Foreign Arbitral Awards in Germany'(2002) 5 (5) Inti Arb L R 160 at 165.
A Ltd V BAG 841.
Llenry v Murphy 3.
contact party  v contract party  (Kuwait Supreme Court 1988) 751.
36 ^Y C  of 1958, A t . V(2) provides that “Recognition and enforcement o f  an arbitral award may also 
be refused if  the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds 
that”. See also, Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  459.
See, Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York 
Convention o f  1958 133.
Minmetals Germany GmbH v Ferco Steel Ltd  1999 WL 249913 (UK QBD Com Ct).
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2.4 Court Discretion.
Art. V provides the enforcing court with discretion in support of the pro-enforcement 
bias of the NYC. There is a wide discretion in favour of enforcement which allows the 
court to disregard the grounds for refiising enforcement even when proven, while 
those grounds should be naiTowly construed.
2.4.1 Wide Discretion in Favour of Enforcement.
The opening sentence of Art. V (l) provides that “recognition and enforcement may be 
refused” if the defendant fiirnishes proof of one of the listed grounds. Does the use of 
the word “may” suggest that the enforcing court has discretion whether or not to 
refuse enforcement if  the existence of one or more of the grounds is proven? And if 
so, how wide might that discretion be? No clarification appears from the NYC nor its 
legislative history regarding this matter. However, the majority of the framers of Art. 
36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which is 
identical to Art. V, intended that the discretion should be very naiTow. They argued 
that, for the sake of certainty and predictability, “may be refused” should normally 
mean “shall be refused”. So the court should have no discretion except for “some 
flexibility as regards individual reasons for refusal (e.g. exclusion of minimal or 
trivial infiractions o f procedural mles)”. Accordingly, if  the grounds are established 
the court should noiTnally refuse enforcement.'^^ Some countries go further, Germany 
for example, binding the court to refuse enforcement if the refusal grounds are 
proven''^, the word “may” being interpreted by the German courts as an absolute 
obligation which leaves no discretion.
of. UN Doc, A/CN. 9/233 , para 140; Davidson, International Commercial Arbitration : Scotland 
and the UNCITRAL M odel Law  224; RL Hunter, The law o f  arbitration in Scotland  (2nd edn, 
Buttei-worths, Edinburgh 2002) pp 374-75.
Dâvidson, Arbitration 385.
The same applies for Austria and Burgstaller. See, Kroll, 'Recognition and Enforcement o f Foreign 
Arbitral Awards in Germany' fn 44.
ibid 166.
ibid 172.
The court continued that this conclusion is quite in accordance with the pro­
enforcement bias of the NYC and the attitude of most courts around the world. In 
another case, an English High Court asserted that the court retains a residual
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 265; Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  
460; Sutton and Gill, Russell on Arbitration  371; Davidson, Arbitration  392; Davidson, International 
Commercial Arbitration : Scotland and the UNCITRAL M odel Law  224; Garnett and others, 
International Commercial Arbitration  102; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international 
arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 133; WL Craig, W Park and J Paulsson, 
International Chamber o f  Commerce arbitration  (3rd edn, Oceana Publications, Dobbs Feny, NY  
2000) 685; J Paulsson, 'May or Must under the New  York Convention: an Exercise in Syntax and 
Linguistics'(1998) 14 (2) Arb Inti 227; A Giardina, 'The Practical Abitration o f  Multilateral 
Conventions' (ICCA Congress Series no 9 Paris 1998) pp 448-49; Meliren, 'Enforcement o f A bitral 
Award in the United States' 200; Fouchard, 'Suggestions to Improve the International Efficacy o f  
Arbitral Awards' 607; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration  para 16; Kaplan, 'A Case by Case Examination' pp 187, 204; A Broches, 
Commentary on the UNCITRAL model law on international commercial arbitration  (Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers, Deventer 1990) 188. Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International 
Commercial Arbitration  707; Sutton and Gill, Russell on Arbitration  para 8-014.
Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 460.
van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation  265.
Davidson, Arbitration  392.
China Nanhai Oil Joint Sendee Corporation Shenzhen Branch v Gee Tai Ploldings Co Ltd  [1995] 2 
HKLR 215 (Hong Kong High Court 1994) 225.
ibid 226.
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By contrast, the prevailing interpretation of the word “may” under Art. V is that it 
provides a residual discretion to grant enforcement. This approach has been supported 
by most authors and courts. '''' So, Redfern & Hunter state that the court is not obliged I
to refiise enforcement even if grounds for refusal are proven to exist because “the 
opening lines of paragraph (1) and (2) of Article V say that enforcement “may” be 
refused. They do not say that it “must” be refused. The language is pennissive, not 
mandatory”. Prof. Berg, similarly asserts that even if one of the grounds is proved,
“the court still has a certain discretion to oveiTule the defence and to grant the 
enforcement of the award”, a view also shared by Prof Davidson.
Equally, the High Court of Hong Kong has stated that:
even if a gi'ound of opposition is proved, there is still a residual discretion 
left in the enforcing court to enforce nonetheless. This shows that the 
grounds of opposition are not to be inflexibly applied. The residual 
discretion enables the enforcing court to achieve a just result in all the 
circumstances.
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discretion under the NYC to enforce an award in any case, Similarly, an English 
commercial court has affmned that ‘it is clear from the terms of the statute that refusal 
to enforce a Convention award is a matter for the discretion of the Court’.
Yet, how is this discretion to be applied? It was suggested that it is for the enforcing 
judge to determine how the residual discretion should be exercised to achieve a just 
result in the circumstances, since the NYC itself gives no guidelines as to how this 
discretion is to be applied, This view may be criticized since it seems to invite 
varying inconsistent applications of the provision fiom country to country, which is, 
however contrary to the NYC’s aim of harmonising the regime governing the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in all contracting states.
In view o f the above obseiwations, it may be thought appropriate to suggest a 
compromise between the pro-enforcement bias and the protection of the rights of 
defendants. On one hand, the right of resisting party should be taken into account, so 
the enforcement court should generally refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral award if 
one o f giounds listed in Art. V (l) is properly proved. The NYC safeguards the 
defendant’s basic rights by allowing him to resist enforcement in two ways -  firstly 
by challenging the award in the courts of the country where the award was made, and 
secondly by asking the enforcing court to refuse enforcement on the very limited 
grounds o f Art. V(l). On other hand, the enforcing court should exceptionally have
a discretion to enforce the award notwithstanding the proven grounds, where strong 
reasons exist for doing so. This exception can be justified in two ways. Firstly,
Qinhuangdao Tongda Enterprise Development Co And Another v Million Basic Co Ltd  [1993] 1 
HKLR 173 (UK HC ) 175.
China Agribusiness Developm ent Corp v Balli Trading [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep 76 (UK QBD Com Ct 
1997) 79. See also, Chromalloy Aeroservices Inc v Arab republic o f  Egypt 939 F Supp 907 (US 
District Court Colu 1996) 909.
Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  
1958 134.
See, Paklito Investment Ltd  v Kloclmer East Asia Ltd  [1993] 2 FIKLR 39 (Hong Konk High Court 
1993) pp 48-49.
A common example to this effect is that in a number o f cases the courts have enforced foreign 
arbitral awards although they have been set aside in the countiy where they were made. For notable 
examples, see Chromalloy Aerosennces Inc v Arab republic o f  Egypt , where the US Court enforced 
an award that had been set aside in Egypt, and Hilmarton Ltd v Omnium de Traitement et de 
Valorisation OTV  (1994) XIX YBCA 655 (France Supreme Court 1994), where the France Court 
enforced an award that had been set aside in Switzerland.
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because of the NYC’s penuissive language as mentioned above. Secondly, due to the 
fact that the NYC, in the light of its pro-enforcement bias, ensures under Art. VII(l) 
that whenever another treaty, or the law of the enforcing states turns out to be more 
favourable to the enforcement of a foreign award than the NYC, the more favourable 
provision shall prevail over the rules of the NYC. Hence, a foreign award should be 
enforced, despite the existence of a ground for refusing enforcement under Art. V, if  it 
would otherwise have been enforceable in that state.
2.4.2 Grounds for Refusing Enforcement Restrictively Applied
Not only the grounds for refosing enforcement under Art. V are exhaustive, they are ?
generally intei-preted and applied narrowly. In the Report of the Secretary-General 
of UNCITRAL this was said to be a recognizable trend^^, while Redfern and Hunter 
have suggested that this is the intention of the NYC. Moreover, Prof van den Berg 
stated:
As far as the grounds for refusal of enforcement of the award as 
enumerated in Article V are concerned, it means that they have to be 
construed narrowly. More specifically, concerning the grounds of refusal
Another issues have bee raised such as: “when the ground was not raised at the appropriate stage in the 
arbitration, or where a party by his conduct has waived the right to object” or “where the party 
concerned had uni easonably failed to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction o f the courts where the award 
was made”. See, Davidson, Arbitration 392. AJ van den Berg, 'The Application o f  the New  York 
Convention by the Courts' (ICCA Congress Series no 9 Paris 1998) 12; Sutton and Gill, Russell on 
Arbitration  371 U  24.
NYC o f 1958, A t . V Il(l) provides that “The provisions o f the present Convention shall not affect 
the validity o f  multilateral or bilateral agreements concerning the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards entered into by the Contracting States nor deprive any interested party o f any right he 
may have to avail himself o f an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the 
treaties o f the countiy where such award is sought to be relied upon”.
See, Chromalloy Aeroservices Inc v Arab republic o f  Egypt 909; van den Berg, The New York 
Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 265; Garnett and others,
International Commercial Arbitration  103; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman 
on International Commercial Arbitration  para 267.
See, UN Doc. A/CN.9/168 p 107; van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 :
Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation  pp 267-68; Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  
International Commercial Arbitration  460; Garnett and others, International Commercial Arbitration  
102; Mehren, 'Enforcement o f  A bitral Award in the United States' 202; W Chang, 'Enforcement o f  
Foreign A bitral Awards in the People's Republic o f  China' (ICCA Congress Series no 9 Paris 1998) 
pp 474, 484, 486; RM Schwartz, 'The US Banlcruptcy Courts' Failure to Inteipret the New York 
Convention as a Treaty Obligation’(l998) 14 (2) Arb Inti 231 at 234.
UN Doc, A C N .9/168 p l07.
Redfern and Flunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  460.
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of Article V (l) to be proven by the respondent, it means that their 
existence should be accepted in serious cases only; obstruction by 
respondents on trivial grounds should not be allowed. Concerning the 
gi'ounds for refusal of Article V(2) to be applied by the court on its own 
motion, it means that a court should accept a public policy violation in 
extreme cases only.
This approach also finds support in judicial decisions. For instance, the Italian 
Supreme Court insisted that “the Convention aims at favouring recognition and its 
provisions containing positive or negative conditions must be interpreted narrowly”.
Equally the US Appeal Court held that the defences to enforcement o f foreign 
awards under the convention must be narrowly construed, stating that ‘a narrow 
constmction would comport with the enforcement-faeilitating thmst of the 
Convention. The High Court of Hong Kong has also stressed that ‘the grounds of 
opposition are not to be inflexibly applied’.
2.4.3 No Review on the Merits of the Award
An additional key prineiple which must be recognised when dealing with Art. V is the 
enforcing court may not review the merits of an award. At the stage of enforcement 
the court may not re-examine either the factual or the legal basis of a foreign award. 
The NYC contains no provision pemiitting judicial review of the merits of an award 
on the basis of a mistake o f fact or law. As the grounds on which enforcement may be 
refused under Art. V are exhaustive, such judicial review is not permitted simply 
because it is not included within the giounds listed in Art. V, which are of course 
applied restrictively. Moreover, pennitting enforcement to be refiised because of 
court disagreement with the substance of arbitrator’s award could not be allowed, as 
this would cause foreign awards to be dependent on the national legal system of the
van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation pp 267-68.
D e M aio Giuseppe e Fratelli snc v Interskins L td  (2002) XXVII YBCA 492 (Italy Supreme Court 
2 1 Jan 2000) 496.
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v RAKTA 508 F2d 969 (US Court o f Appeals 2nd Cir 1974) 
976.
“  ibid .
China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch v Gee Tai Holdings Co Ltd 225. 
Yusuf Ahmed A lghanm  & Sons v Toys "R" Us Inc .
Ch 2: Essential Characteristics o f Art. V 26
enforcing country and open for appeal there again. This would certainly deprive 
international arbitration o f one of its most significant advantages.
The principle that an award may not be reviewed on its merits has unanimously been 
confirmed by both commentators and courts. For example, the English High Court 
in the case of Norsk held that:
Save in comiection with the threshold requirements for enforcement and 
the exhaustive grounds on which enforcement o f a New York Convention 
award may be refused, the enforcing court is neither entitled nor bound to 
go behind the award in question, explore the reasoning of the arbitration 
tribunal or second-guess its intentions,
The Appeal Court of Luxembourg has also stated that enforcing courts are not 
allowed under the Convention to review the manner in which the arbitrators decided 
on the merits while the District Court of Moscow has rejected an objection because 
it was based on the merits of the award. Furthennore, the US Court of Appeal in 
Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim v Toys “R ” Us. Inc noted that many US courts have 
concluded that the grounds under Art. V ‘do not include miscalculations of fact or 
manifest disregard of the law’.
Nonetheless, although the enforcing court has no general power to review the 
substance of a foreigi award, the court might undertake a limited investigation in 
order to ascertain whether the enforcement of the foreigi award would be contrary to
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration  paras 264, 374.
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation pp 265, 269-73; Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial 
Arbitration  459; Garnett and others. International Commercial Arbitration  103; Born, International 
Commercial Arbitration  pp 797, 809; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on 
International Commercial Arbitration  paras 264, 376; R Greig and I Reznik, 'CuiTent Developments in 
Enforcement o f Abitration Awards in the United States'(2002) 68 (2) JCI A b  120 at 126.
Norsk Hydro ASA v The State Property Fund OfUlcraine para 17.
Sovereign Participations International SA v Chadmore Developments Ltd  (1999) XXIV YBCA 714 
(Luxembourg Court o f Appeal 1999) 721.
™ IMP Group V Aeroimp  (1998) XXIII YBCA 745 (Russian District Court 1997) 749.
Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v Toys "R" Us Inc 20.
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the public policy of the enforcing country. However such a review would be
limited.
2.5 The Position in Saudi Arabia
2.5.1 Exhaustive Grounds
A Saudi court has confirmed that enforcement of foreign awards may be refused only 
on limited gounds listed under the Convention, which principle was then affirmed 
by the Appeal Court. In another case, a Saudi court refused to consider a petition to 
enforce a foreigi award made against a firm that had closed down because its owner 
had died. The court believed that it could not enforce the award on the heritage of the 
losing party, since it laid outwith its jurisdiction. But the Court of Appeal voided that 
decision, on the basis that death of a party is not one of the g'ounds for refusing 
enforcement recognised by the NYC.
2.5.2 Burden of Proof
The Saudi courts follow, as a mle, the principle that the party opposing enforcement 
bears the burden of proving the existence of the gounds for refusing enforcement. For 
example, a Saudi court has dismissed a Saudi party’s petition to deny enforcement of 
an arbitral award, partly because the defendant failed to prove his claim that he was 
not given proper notice of the arbitral proceedings and therefore was absent when the 
award was made. The court went on to state that sinee notice of the arbitral 
proceedings was sent to him and his lawyer three times by registered mail, it
Sovereign Participation.^ International SA v Chadmore Developments Ltd  721. c.f. van den Berg, 
The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation  pp 265, 
267; Garnett and others, International Commercial Arbitration  103.
See, Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v Toys "R" Us Inc 19; Alcatel Space SA v Loral Space & 
Communications Ltd  2002 WL 1391819 (US District Court SD NY 2002) 4.
the 18th Subsidiary Panel, decision No. 8/D/F/18 dated 1424 H (2003) pp 4-5.
the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 36/T/4 dated 1425 H (2004) p 2.
the 2nd Review Committee, decision No. lO/T/2 dated 1419 H (1998) pp 2-3.
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considered his defence as vexatious delay. This decision was affirmed by the 
Appeal Court.
2.5.3 Court Discretion
With regard to the residual discretion implied by the use of the ward “may”, although 
the official Arabic version of the Convention whieh applies in SA does not contain a 
tenn identical to “may”, it was however drafted in permissive not mandatory 
language. The Arabic version of Ait. V provides that "It is not permissible to refuse 
recognition and enforcement of the award on the request of the party against whom it 
is invoked, unless that party furnish to the competent authority where the recognition 
and enforcement is sought, the proof that . .” This means that it is pennissible, but not 
obligatory, to refuse enforcement if one of the gounds is proven. As one can see, the
;Arabic version employs a permissive language in the same way as the word “may” in 
English version does, whereas the French text appears to demand that enforcement be 
refused if one of the gounds in Art V (l) is established.
Moreover, the Circular of the Grievance Board regarding Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgnents and Arbitral Awards makes it clear that the Saudi courts are not allowed to 
review the merits of awards nor investigate their substance seeking mistakes of fact or 
law. This principle has been subsequently affiimed by the Saudi courts. For 
example, the appeal court (the 2"  ^ Review Committee) has held that review of the 
merits of foreigi arbitral awards is contrary to Art. V of the NYC. The Appeal
the 25th Subsidiaiy Panel, decision No. 1 l/D /F/25 dated 1417 H (1996) p 7. 
the 2nd Review Committee, decision No. 208/T/2 dated 1418 FI (1997) p 4.
In contrast, it was wrongly submitted that the Arabic version o f A t . V o f  the NYC does not have a 
permissive language like the English version, but it has a mandatory language like the French version. 
See, eg, Paulsson, 'May or Must under the N ew York Convention: an Exercise in Syntax and 
Linguistics' 227.
the Circular o f the Grievance Board regarding Enforcement o f Foreign Judgments and Arbitral 
Awards, no 7 dated 15/8/1405 H (1985), A t.. 2 Art.
See, the 2nd Review Committee, decision No. 235/T/2 dated 1415 FI (1994); the 25th Subsidiaiy 
Panel, decision No. 1 l/D /F/25 dated 1417 H (1996) p 5; the 2nd Review Committee, decision No. 
208/T/2 dated 1418 FI (1997) p 3; the 2nd Review Committee, decision No. lO/T/2 dated 1419 H 
(1998) p 2; the 18th Subsidiary Panel, decision No. 8/D/F/18 dated 1424 H (2003) p 18.
the 2nd Review Coimnittee, decision No. IO/T/2 dated 1419 FI (1998) p 2.
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Court also has also nullified the decision of a lower court (10^ '^  Subsidiary Panel) 
partly because the lower court had re-examined the merits of the foreigi award. In 
addition, a eourt has held that the courts are not entitled to re-examine the merits of 
awards nor research their substance, their task being limited to checking whether the 
conditions required for enforcement are satisfied. This conclusion was confirmed 
by the Appeal Court.
2.6 Conclusion
It has been seen that Art. V of the NYC is divided into two parts. Art. V (l) contains 
five gounds on which enforcement may be resisted. These protect parties’ autonomy 
regarding arbitral procedures and the right to a fair trial. These gounds can be raised 
only by the losing party, who then has to prove them. Art, V(2) then contains two 
gounds on which enforcement may be resisted which can be raised by the court itself 
to protect the national interest of the enforcing state.
The key feature of Art. V is that the list o f gounds on which enforcement may be 
resisted is exhaustive. Art. V provides a maximum number of gounds on which the 
enforeement of foreign awards may be refused, and no other gound under which 
enforcement might be resisted under the law of the enforcing state can be invoked. In 
addition, under Art. VII (1), the seven grounds listed under Art. V can be further 
limited if the country where enforcement is sought has more liberal provisions than 
Art. V.
Another main feature is that, while the Geneva Convention of 1927 demanded that the 
party seeking enforcement prove the validity of the award, the NYC insists that the 
party opposing enforcement proves the existence of gounds for refusing enforcement. 
Those gounds must be interpreted nan owl y, and therefore enforcement should not be 
refused except in serious cases. Moreover, even where such a gound is proved, the
the 10th Subsidiary Panel, decision No. 20/D/F/10 dated 1416 II (1995), 
the 2nd Review Committee, decision No. 235/T/2 dated 1415 H (1994). 
the 25th Subsidiaiy Panel, decision No. 1 l/D /F/25 dated 1417 II (1996) p 5. 
the 2nd Review Committee, decision No. 208/T/2 dated 1418 H (1997) p 3.
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enforcing court may still have a residual discretion to g an t enforcement when it feels 
appropriate to do so.
The final key principle is that when considering a petition to enforce a foreign award, 
the enforcing court is not allowed to review the merits of that award.
The foregoing features and principles all together constitute a general policy under the 
NYC to facilitate and promote enforeement of foreign awards on the one hand, and to 
naiTOW the chances of refusing enforcement on the other hand. This general policy is 
known as “the NYC’s pro-enforcement bias”.
Most importantly, these principles have been recogiised and confinned by the Saudi 
courts.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Incapacity of Party
3.1 Introduction
The first defence to enforcement under Art. V (1) of the NYC is as follows:
(a) The parties to the ageem ent (of arbitration) ... were, under the law 
applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said ag ’eement is 
not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, 
failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the 
award was made. '
It can be observed that the above provision establishes two quite separate grounds: the 
first gound is that a party to arbitration ageem ent was under some incapacity. The 
Second gound is the invalidity of the arbitration ageem ent itself,  ^ One can also 
observe that incapacity o f a party to inter into an arbitration agreement is in fact one 
o f cause of an invalid ageement.  ^ Therefore, this chapter concerns itself with the 
question of party incapacity as a gound for refusing enforcement. General 
considerations as well as the effectiveness of incapacity defence and the law 
applicable to parties’ capacity will be outlined first. Then, it will discuss the capacity 
o f natural person to resort to arbitration. Third, it will consider the capacity o f Juristic 
person. Fourth, it will discuss the issue of authority to arbitrate. Fifth, the most 
important issue of state and state agencies’ capacity to recourse to arbitration will be 
examined. The Saudi position will finally be highlighted.
3.2 General Consideration
As a general principle, Parties to a contract or an agreement must have legal capacity 
to enter into such contract. Thus, the eontract will be invalid if one of the parties is
’ NYC of 1958, A t. V (l)(a).
 ^See, Davidson, Arbitration  199,
 ^ See, L Hu, 'Setting Aside an A bitral Award in the People’s Republic o f  China '(2001) 12 (1) Am 
Rev Inti A'b 1 at 9.
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under some incapacity. The same is also true with regard to an arbitration ageement. 
 ^ The NYC hence includes this gound and entitles the court to refuse to enforce a 
foreigi award if the party opposing the award can prove that a party to the arbitration 
agreement was under some incapacity.
As far as the arbitration agreement is concerned, it may be thought useful to mention 
that the incapacity, in general, is a lack of full legal competence to enter to an 
arbitration ageement. Accordingly, the general mle is that any natural or legal person 
who has no capacity to enter into a valid contract will equally has no capacity to enter 
into an arbitration ageement. ^
3.3 Effectiveness of Incapacity Defence?
The question that now needs to be detennined is whether the party who has entered 
into an arbitration agreement could rely on his incapacity as a ground for refusing 
enforcement? Prof Davidson states that it would appear from the wording of Art. 
V(l)(a) of the NYC “that a party may rely on his own lack of capacity, even if he has 
entered into the contract and participated in the arbitral proceeding in full knowledge 
of, but with out mentioning this disability”,  ^ However, this position may not be the 
case if  it appears to breach the principle of good faith. Therefore, some applicable 
mles intend to protect a party who is in good faith who believed that he entered into a 
contract with a person of full capacity or power to do so. For example, in the French 
private international law, a party cannot rely on his lack of capacity or on the absence 
of power of his apparent representative, where the other party could legitimately have 
been unaware of that incapacity or absence of power.  ^ Likewise, the Rome 
Convention provides that;
See, Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  144; D Wedam- 
Lukic, 'The Jurisdictional Problems o f Abitration (with special regard to the regulation in Slovenia and 
Croatia)'(1994) 1 Croatian A b  YB 51 at 57.
 ^ of. Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  144.
 ^Davidson, TAefm/ion 392.
 ^ This rale was first established in connection with a party’s capacity by the French Supreme Court in 
Lizardi case o f  1861. The position was later extended to a party’s absence o f  power in several cases. 
See Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration
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In a contract concluded between persons who are in the same country, a 
natural person who would have capacity under the law of that country 
may invoke his incapacity resulting from another law only if  the other 
party to the contract was aware of this incapacity at the time o f the 
conclusion of the contract or was not aware thereof as a result of 
negligence. ^
The enforcing courts should therefore take into account the principle of good faith 
when they examine the defence of incapacity of the parties.
3.4 Law Applicable to Parties’ Capacity
The question emerges then is that what is the required capacity for a party to enter 
into arbitration ageement? In simple terms, who may refer disputes to arbitration and 
who may not? The NYC refers the issue, under first part of Art. V(l)(a), to “the law 
applicable to them” in order to determine their capacity of entering into arbitration 
agreement.  ^The next logical question as to which law is applicable to the parties for 
determining their capacity? The NYC, however, provides no additional indication of 
what this applicable law is. Therefore, there are two different considerable 
interpretations can be found in this respect.
First and most common interpretation is that the phrase of Art. V(l)(a) “under the law 
applicable to them” appear to mean that the question of party’s capacity is govern by 
the personal law which requires to be detennined by reference to the conflict of laws 
rules of the place of arbitration or enforcement. " The conflict of laws rules can 
usually be found under the law of contract. These conflict mles, however vary
para.470; Wedam-Lukic, 'The .lurisdictional Problems o f Abitration (with special regard to the 
regulation in Slovenia and Croatia)' 58.
® Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligation o f 1980, A t. 11. Available at < 
http://www.rome-convention.org/instruments/i__conv_orig_en.htm> (10 August 2004).
^ N Y C o f 1958, A t . V (l)(a).
See, Davidson, Arbitration 393.
" See, Union de Cooperatives Agricolas Epis Centre v La Palentina SA (2002) XXVII YBCA 533 
(Spain Supreme Court 1998) 535; van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : 
Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 276; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, 
Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration  para. 454.
See, Sutton and Gill, Russell on Arbitration  81; Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  
International Commercial Arbitration  144.
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country to country and depend upon the party nature whether is a natural or a legal 
person or whether a private or a state. These generally consider the law of natural 
person’s nationality or his domicile or usual residence, and the law of place of 
incorporation or the main place of business, as well as the constitution of the state 
body or the law which regulates its activities.*^
It may be mentioned here that it was argued that there is no need for applying the 
conflict of law rules here since the letter of the phrase “under the law applicable to 
them” of Art. V(l)(a) determines the personal law of the parties to be applied in order 
to decide whether they have a capacity of entering into an arbitration agi'eement or 
not. Nonetheless, since the phrase “under the law applicable to them” does not 
gives a complete but a half-way conflict rule, the applicable personal law of parties 
still need to be determined by the conflict of laws mles of the fomm.
Second alternative inteipretation is that the phrase “the law applicable to them” can be 
taken to mean the substantive rules which relies mainly on the customs and principles 
applicable in an international commercial context, regardless any reference to national 
laws. In relation to this interpretation, it is submitted that:
However, the Convention could be interpreted differently. There is 
nothing to prevent courts from construing ‘the law applicable to them’ as 
meaning the substantive rules they deem applicable in an international 
context.
As can be observed fi*om the foregoing discussion the question o f party’s incapacity 
depends upon a number of connecting factors according to whether one is dealing 
with a natural or a legal person which both include many different aspects. However, 
discussing each one of them would go beyond the scope of this thesis. Consequently, 
the question of incapacity of parties under Art. V(l)(a) would be limited to four main
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Inteipretation  276.
''' See, P Schlosser Das Recht der International en Privaten Schiedsgerichtsbareit I  (Tubigen 1975) no, 
355, cited in ibid 277 fn 124.
See, ibid 277.
Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration  
para. 457.
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categories of physical or legal persons lacking the capacity, including: first, natural 
persons and, second, coiporate entities. Third, authority. Finally, state entities.
3.5 Capacity of Natural Person
According to the traditional and common inteipretation of Art. V (2) (a) of the NYC 
and the traditional principles of the conflict o f laws rules, the capacity of a natural 
person who wishes to conclude an arbitration agreement, is generally governed by the 
personal law of the party in question. In civil law countries, such as France and 
Germany, the personal law of the party capacity to make a reference to arbitration will 
be the law of his nationality, or if  he is a stateless or has refugee status, the law of his 
domicile or usual residence, whereas in common law countries the personal law 
applicable to a party’s capacity will be that of his domicile or nonnal residence. 
Moreover, some US jurisdictions detennine the question of party capacity by 
reference to the applicable law of the contract or under the law of the place where the 
agreement was concluded. In this context, Redfem and Hunter argued that, in 
relation to an international contract, not only the law of the party’s place of domicile 
and residence are taken into account to decide whether he has legal capacity to enter 
into an arbitration agieement as is the case in the context of a national contract, but 
the law of the contract may be necessary to be considered as well as an aspect of 
respecting the parties autonomy.
NYC o f  1958, Ai't. V (l)(a) states that “The parties to the agreement ... were, under the law 
applicable to them, under some incapacity”.
See, Union de Cooperativas Agricolas Epis Centre v La Palentina SA 535; Gaillard and Savage 
(eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldmatt on International Commercial Arbitration  para. 461.
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration para 457; van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a 
Uniform Judicial Interpretation 276.
See, Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  145; van den 
Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 276; 
Dicey, Morris and Collins, Conflict o f  Laws vol 1, pp 1101-3.
See, American Law Institute, Restatement o f  the law second : conflict o f  laws (American Law 
Institute Publishers, Minnesota 1971) § 198. See also, Fouchard Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, 
Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbiti^ation para. 457; van den Berg, The New York 
Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation  pp 276-277.
Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  145.
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However, the suggestion of considering the contract or parties autonomy to indicate 
the capacity of a natural person appears to be at least very doubtful. This for the 
reason that the natural person himself, unlike incorporation or a state, cannot confer 
capacity in himself to act legally, but this can only be done by his personal law to 
protect him (e.g. if  he is a minor or unsound mind) or to protect other party (e.g. if  he 
is a bankrupt).
On the contrary, it is submitted that the capacity of the parties may be resolved by the 
substantive mles method rather than the traditional principles o f the conflict of laws 
rules. The substantive rules method refers to the substantive law of international 
arbitration or the fundamental principles in international trade independently horn any 
reference to a system of choice of national laws. It is argued in favour of this method 
that it seems appropriate for the court reviewing an award to apply substantive 
concepts of the law applicable limited to those considered essential in an international 
context. Although applications of this position appear to be unclear, it is, however, 
suggested that several substantive mles could easily be drawn from the fundamental 
requirements of justice. For example, any natural person will be considered to have 
the capacity to conclude an arbitration agieement, if  he cames on an economic 
activity on a professional basis. In France, for instance “A minor who practises a 
profession is not entitled to rescission against undertakings which he has taken upon 
himself in the practice thereof.” In fact, this approach appear to be based on the 
principle of good faith as mentioned above.
However, some commentators react unfavourably to the substantive rules method in 
this respect, arguing that it would be difficult under the substantive law of 
international arbitration to determine technical issues as the state or age of being an 
infant or minor, or additionally when an adult should require protection in 
international trade. Yet, it is argued this is not necessarily the case because in 
practice, “cases involving arbitration agreements entered into by a minor or by a
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration  para 436.
French Civil Code, Ait. 1308.
See, H. Synvel, note following CA Paris, Dec. 17, 1991, Gatoil v National Iranian Oil Co., 1993 
REV. ARB. pp 281, 295, cited in Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on 
International Commercial Arbitration  para 466 fn 35.
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protected adult are likely to remain hypothetical for some time hence” . Moreover, 
minors or protected adults can be protected by considering a transaction included by 
them as rescission only if it constitutes an unfair bargain as this shows they were 
indeed unable to act in their own interest. This provision is applied for example in 
France in favour of minors not emancipated and legally protected adults. This 
provision has the advantage of enabling the court to examine whether the rescission of 
transactions concluded by the individual claiming protection should be applied or not. 
Therefore, this position could be transposed to the context of the international 
arbitration agreement and applied more generally.
It is further argued in favour of the substantive laws method that the question of 
whether the capacity to enter into an arbitration agreement presupposes the capacity to 
contract or the capacity to commence legal proceedings can also be decided by using 
the substantive rules method. For example, it is generally infemed from Art. 2059 of 
the France Civil Code that the capacity to contract is sufficient to enter to an 
arbitration agreement. Belgian law provides that “Whosoever has the capacity or is 
empowered to compromise may conclude an arbitration agreement”. Whereas other 
countries laws, such as Egyptian law, requires the capacity to dispose of assets. 
Therefore, it is concluded that it would be more reasonable, as far as international 
commercial business is concerned, to assume that the capacity to conclude day-to-day 
business contract is sufficient to enter into international arbitration agreement, rather 
than the capacity to dispose of assets.
Consequently, it may generally be concluded that most natural persons have the 
capacity to enter into an arbitration agi'eement the same as they do legal binding 
contracts. Nevertheless, their capacity may be disabled by some factors. For instance.
ibid para 466
French Civil Code, Art. 1305. 
ibid, Art. 491-492 .
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration Arbitration  para 466.
ibid para 467
Belgian Judicial Code o f  1998, Art. 1676(2).
Egyptian Arbitration Law o f 1994, Art. 11.
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration  para 467
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minors, as well as the mentally disordered and the bankmpt. In such case, they 
normally have a legal representative. The legal representative authority is, in 
principle, governed by the law of their source of power. For example, the law 
governing a minor protection detennines the powers of the legal representative of this 
minor.
In practice, it has been observed that the problem of incapacity as a giound for 
refusing enforcement rarely arises in international commercial arbitration. In fact, 
no case has been reported, so far to the best of knowledge, in which enforcement of 
foreign awards was challenged on the ground of incapacity of individuals.
3.6 Capacity of Juristic Person
The capacity of a juristic person, such as corporation, involves a number of relating 
factors, depending on the conflict of law rules selected. For instance, in some 
common law countries, the capacity of a juristic person is governed mainly by its 
constitution and the law of the place of incorporation or business. In other legal 
systems, especially those of civil law countries, such as France, the question of the 
capacity of a juristic person is judged by the law of the country where its headquarters 
is located or may be sometimes where its registered office is situated. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above with individual, it is argued that in relation to 
international commercial agreement it may be thought necessary to regard the law 
governing the agreement as well as a consequence for the party autonomy.
See, Sutton and Gill, Russell on Arbitration 82.
See, Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 144. c.f. Di 
Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 
138.
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Ai'bitration para 457; Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 
145; van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f 1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 276.
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration para 457.
See, J~L Delvolvâe, J Rouche and GH Pointon, French arbitration law and practice (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague ; London 2003) 59.
See, Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 145.
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On the other hand, it is submitted that the capacity of a juristic person to enter into an 
arbitration agreement is one of the areas where the issue of capacity can be easily 
resolved by the use of substantive rules. In this respect, it is argued that the 
substantive mle that would be adopted by courts with no difficulty is that all juridical 
persons involving with commercial activities are considered to have the capacity to 
enter into a binding agreement to arbitrate disputes relating to those activities.
To take an example from English law, a coiporation has, in general, full capacity to 
enter into an arbitration agi'eement unless an express provision in its constitution 
affects its capacity to do so. "** However, in the context of international trade such 
restriction would be unusual in the light of the fact that arbitration becomes the most 
favoured means for resolving international commercial disputes.
It is worth mentioning that the issue of the juristic persons’ incapacity has rarely been 
called, and if so, it appeared to be unsuccessful. For example, The Spanish Supreme 
Court has dismissed an objection based on the claimant incapacity since the defendant 
(Spain) did not prove that claimant (France) lacked the capacity to conclude an 
arbitration agi'eement under the applicable law which was the French law. On the 
other hand, the authorities or powers of their representatives are the difficulty has 
fi'equently emerged in practice. Therefore, the issue of authority will be discussed 
below.
3.7 Authority
Although it goes without saying that the Juristic person, such as a corporation, is 
operated by its directors and officers according to its constitution and its own 
governing law, it is however observed that there may be confusion in everyday 
legal language between the capacity of party and the authority to contract. Yet, they
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration para 465.
See, Sutton and Gill, Russell on Arbitirition 83.
See, Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 146.
43 See, Union de Cooperativas Agricolas Epis Centre v La Palentina SA 535.
See, Lew, Mistelis and Rrèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 141. 
See, Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f Inteimational Commercial Arbitration 145.
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are in fact different. The question of capacity would be involved when an agreement 
is concluded in a person’s own name and in his own interest, whereas the question of 
authority would appear when an agreement is entered into other than in the 
signatory’s interest, but it in the interest of another natural or Juristic person. 
Furthermore, a corporation itself, for example, may be capable to bind itself to an 
arbitration agreement by authorised agent (e.g. a director) to do so under its own 
governing law. But if such agreement is entered into by an agent who not empowered 
thereon, the question of lake such authority may be raised when a dispute turned out.
Notwithstanding the above distinction, it is generally accepted, in practice, that the 
word “capacity” in the NYC also covers the absence of the power to inter into arbitral 
agreement on behalf of other, regardless the difference between them in principle.
Authorities are, in principle, governed by the law of their source of power. Therefore, 
the powers to act legally for a Juristic person, as with the capacity of a Juristic person 
itself, may be governed under two possible methods. First, under ti'aditional method 
of the conflict of laws mles, the representative powers of a juridical person are 
generally governed by the law under which that juridical person operates. In some 
countries, especially those of civil law background such as France, the law governs 
the question of whether the person who signed the arbitration agi'eement for a 
corporation was properly authorised is the law of the country where the corporation is 
registered or where the actual headquarters are located and operate. Some other 
legal systems, such as in England, the law governs the issue of power to represent a 
corporation is the law of the incorporation place.
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration para 453.
See, Dalmine SpA v M  & M  Sheet Metal Forming Machineiy AG  (1999) XXIV YBCA 709 (Italy 
Supreme Court 1997) 710; Union de Cooperativas Agricolas Epis Centre v La Palentina SA 535. See 
also. Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard. Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration para 1695.
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration para 461.
See, Dicey, Morris and Collins, Conflict o f  Laws vol 2, pp 1101-1103; Gaillard and Savage (eds), 
Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration para 461,
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Second, under the substantive rules position, there are three related approaches which 
may be important to be taken into account when considering the question of the 
representative power of a corporation. They are as the following:
(a) It would be sufficient to have a general authorization to contract for the pui-pose of 
entering into a binding international arbitration. Consequently, there is no need for a 
specific authorization to be given by the principal to sign a particular arbitration 
agreement, as this restriction is not compatible with international commerce. An 
example of such restriction can be found in France Civil Code which provides that 
“An agent may do nothing beyond what is expressed in his agency: the authority to 
compromise does not include that to enter into an arbitration agi'eement”. Likewise, 
a specific power to inter into an arbitration agreement is required under the Austrian 
Civil Code. In the light of these provisions, if a corporation representative signs an 
agreement to submit a dispute to arbitration although he is not invested with the legal 
power to do so, it might be open to the corporation to call its representative’s power 
into question upon the gi ound of lack of capacity thereof.
However, “to guard against this possibility, it is not unusual for states to have specific 
rules of law that restrict or abrogate the doctrine of u/tra vires (i.e. acting beyond the 
powers or authority), so as to protect persons dealing in good faith with corporations”.
This is the case, for example, in the First Directive on Company Law within 
European Union. In the same line, the Paris court of appeal in Intercast v Ets . 
Peschaud et Cie. International o f 1980 adopted the so-called doctrine of apparent 
authority to international arbitration agreement. The Court held that sinee the parties 
legitimately believed that the mandate held by a company director entitled him to
French Civil Code, Art. 1989.
51 See, Austrian Civil Code, Ai t. 1008. See, H Kapfer, PL Baeck and Austria, The general civil code o f  
Austria (Published for the Parker School o f Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia University, by 
Oceana Publications, Dobbs Fen-y, N.Y. 1972) 195; Fouchard Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard. 
Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration para 468.
See, Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 146.
First Council Directive on Company Law of 9 March 1968 (68/151/EEC-I) Proposal 4.
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enter into arbitration agreements, the company was bound by the actions of its 
apparent agent even though it may not given a formal authorization to its director.
(b) Corporate representatives responsible for management are empowered to enter 
into enforceable arbitration agi'eements against the corporation, disregarding any 
restrictive provision under its regulation or laws governing its activities.
(c) In the context of the international commerce, there are no particular requirements 
of form of the power to conclude an arbitration agreement should be imposed to 
provide that the parties’ consent is certain.
Finally, the defence of the absence of the power to conclude arbitral agieement has 
also been proved to be rather ineffective in practice. For example, an objection based 
on the claimant lack of authority has been dismissed by the Spanish Supreme Court 
since the defendant did not prove that the party to the agreement lacked power to act 
on behalf of the legal entity. The same objection has bee rejected by the Italian 
Supreme Court.
3.8 Capacity of State and State Entities
3.8.1 General
Unlike the incapacity of natural person or corporations, the issue of incapacity of a 
state, a public body or public agency to enter into arbitration agi'eements with a 
foreign private party is a typical problem that occurs frequently in international 
transactions.
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Comtnercial 
Arbitration para 470 and fn 59.
ibid para 468.
Union de Cooperativas Agricolas Epis Centre v La Palentina SA 535.
Dalmine SpA v M  & M  Sheet Metal Forming Machineiy AG  709.
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 278; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f international arbitration awards : the New 
York Convention o f  1958 138,
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The essential question that needs to be detennined in this respect as to whether a State 
or a state agency has the capacity to agree to refer a dispute to arbitration? In general, 
the answer may depend effectively upon tlmee elements. In first place, it depends 
mainly on the constitution of the state body or the law that regulates its activities.^^ 
Moreover, it may, however, depend upon the law of forum where the State is sued. In 
addition to these, the issue of the State capacity to enter to arbitration agreement may 
sometimes depend upon the relevant international conventions, which have been 
adopted by that State. A direct example of such convention can be found in the 
Washington Convention of 1965 on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States. Its Art. 36(1) provides that:
Any Contracting State or any national of a Contracting State wishing to 
institute arbitration proceedings shall address a request to that effect in 
writing to the Secretary-General who shall send a copy of the request to 
the other party.
In addition, the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration 
entitles the legal persons of public law to refer their disputes to arbitration. This 
Convention provides under its Art. II the right of legal persons of public law to resort 
to arbitration as the following:
(1) In the cases referred to in Article 1, paragraph 1, of this Convention, 
legal persons considered by the law which is applicable to them as “legal 
persons of public law” have the right to conclude valid arbitration
See, Sutton and Gill, Russell on Arbitration 89; van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention 
o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 278; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  
international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f 1958 138,
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f 1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 278; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f international arbitration awards : the New 
York Convention o f  1958 138,
61 Washington Convention of 1965 was done on 19'’’March 1965 at Washington under the auspices 
of the international Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) and It entered into 
force on 14‘^’ October 1966. In the same year, the International centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) was created under the Convention. As April 2006, the Washington Convention of  
1965 has been ratified by 155 States. See, The World Bank Group, 'ICSID' 
<http;//www.worldbank.org/icsid> (accessed 21/08/2004).
Washington Convention o f 1965, Art. 36 (1).
The European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, which is commonly referred to 
as the European Convention of 1961 or the Geneva Convention of 1961, was signed on 2T' April 1961 
in Geneva under the auspices o f Conunission for Europe o f the United Nations, and entered into force 
on 26^ ’’ July 1964, See, Juris International, 'European Convention on International Commercial 
Ai'bitration' (1961) <http://www.jurisint.org/en/ins/153.html> (accessed 23/08/2004).
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agi'eements.
(2) On signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention any State shall be 
entitled to declare that it limits the above faculty to such conditions as 
may be stated in its declaration.
3,8.2 Diversity of National Laws
Consequently, Countries solve the issue of the capacity of the state or its agencies in a 
different way. Many common law countries, such as England, some Latin 
American countries such as, Bolivia and Chile, as well as some civil law countries, 
such as Germany and Switzerland, establish no limitation upon the capacity of 
state, state entity to enter into arbitration agreements. Additionally, Belgium has 
abolished the prohibition which used to be imposed upon public bodies to resort to
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961, Art. 11(1 )(2).
See, in general, R David, Arbitration in International Trade (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publications, 
Deventer 1985) 177,
See, Sutton and Gill, Russell on Arbitration 89. See also, eg, English Arbitration Act 1996, s. 106, 
which provides that the Crown has the capacity to be a party to an arbitration agreement.
Swiss Private International Law o f 1987 Art. 177(2), which states that “A state, or an enterprise held 
by, or an organization controlled by a state, which is party to an arbitration agreement, caimot invoke 
its own law in order to contest its capacity to arbitrate or the arbitrability of a dispute covered by the 
arbitration agreement”.
Belgian Judicial Code o f 1998, Ai1. 1676.2. see also, Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  
International Commetaial Arbitration 146 fn 53.
Peru General Arbitration Law No. 26572 of 20^ '’ December 1995, cited in J Tieder, 'Factors to 
Consider in the Choice of Procedural and Substantive Law in International Arbitration'(2003) 20 (4) J 
Inti Arb 393 at 402.
™ See, ibid.
-■f
arbitration.
On the contrary, some other countries impose some restrictions upon their state and 
public authorities to enter into arbitration agreement. For instance, in Peru, Art. 2 of 
General Ai'bitration Law provides that “Peruvian public agencies do not need 
government approval for domestic arbitration”. It was therefore thought that 
Peaivian public agencies are forbidden to enter into arbitration held outside the 
territory of Peai. However, it may be, in fact, infeiTed that Pemvian state and its 
public agencies are peimitted to submit its dispute to arbitration held abroad as far as 
they have prior authorization. Similarly, in some countries the state entities is obliged 
to obtain a particular permeation before entering into arbitration agreement as it the
Ch 3: Incapacity o f Party 45
case in Oman, Argentina and Venezuela. In France, whilst matters concerning 
public bodies or institutions and more generally in all matters concerning public 
policy may not be allowed to be resolved by arbitration, “however, categories of 
public institutions of an industrial or commercial character may be authorized by 
decree to enter into arbitration agreement”. Yet, the France Court of Appeal states 
that this provision not to be applicable in the context of international arbitration, but 
only in domestic arbitration. In US, although FAA put no specific restrictions upon 
states or state entities to arbitrate certain disputes, some US courts held that United 
States generally cannot enter into enforceable arbitration agreement pursuant to US 
law,
3.8,3 Effectiveness of State Incapacity Defence?
As some States or states agencies are prohibited under their national laws to resort to 
arbitration, a crucial question then needs to be answered is that whether a state or state 
agency to be entitled to rely on its incapacity under its own law to defeat an 
arbitration agieement. A negative answer appears to meet the approval of most 
commentators and courts. However, it may be appropriate to mention first the 
old approach and, second, the new approach.
Omani Board for Settlement o f commercial Disputes o f 1984, Ai t. 59, 
See, Arbitration M l.
73
74
French New Code o f Civil Procedure o f 1981, Ait. 2060.
Myrtoon SS v Ministère de la marine marchande (France Court o f Appeal 1957), cited in Davidson, 
Ai'bitration 178 . Similarly, the decision o f Paris Court o f Appeal, 17 Dec 1994, cited in Tiederi 
’Factors to Consider in the Choice o f  Procedural and Substantive Law in International Arbitration' 402 
hi 31.
See, BV Bureau WijsmuUer v United States (1978) III YBCA 290 (US District Court NY SD 1976); 
see, in general, Bora, International Commercial Arbitration 238.
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitiation Convention o f  1958 : Towctrds a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 276; Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 
146; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention 
o f  1958 139.
See, Société Arabe des Engrais Phosphates v Gemanco srl (1997) XXII YBCA 737 (Italy Supreme 
Court 1996); Société Tunisienne d'Elctrictitee et de Gas v Société Entrepose (1978) III YBCA 283 
(Tunisia Court of fïrs instance 1976); The Gov o f  Greece v Foreign Shipowner-charterer (1989) XIV 
YBCA 634 (Greece Court o f Appeal 1976).
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The old approach adopted the view that a state and its agencies can rely on their 
incapacity under the relevant national law. This approach was adopted, for example, 
by the Syrian Administrative Court in Fougerolle. In this case, the Court dismissed 
the application of enforcing two awards made by ICC arbitration in Geneva against 
the Syi'ian Ministry of Defence. The court reasoned it decision as that according to the 
law of the council of State, the Syrian party lacked the required capacity to sign the 
arbitral agreement without the preliminary approval, which must be given by the 
competent Committee of the Council of State,
On the other hand, the new international trend is that a state or state bodies may not be 
allowed to rely upon their incapacity under their own national law to repudiate 
arbitration agreement in the context of the international transaction. This approach is 
basically based upon the distinction between domestic and international contracts. It 
assumes that although, in the context of domestic case, a state or its public agencies 
may be restricted to resort to arbitration agreement under the national law, they still, 
however, bound by an arbitral clause in international commercial transactions which 
has been freely concluded.
As has been mentioned above, this approach of conceptual distinction between the 
situations of international and domestic in the present issue may be considered as the 
new international trend due to widespread supporting by commentators and courts.
In this respect, Prof. van den Berg states that this approach of distinction is 
increasingly gaining acceptance. Equally, Redfem and Hunter emphasize that “it is 
plainly unsatisfactory for a state or a state agency to be entitled to rely on its own law 
to defeat an agieement that it has freely entered into”.
Fougerolle SA v Minstiry o f  Defence o f  the Syiran Arab Republic (1990) XV YBCA 515 (Syria 
Administrative Court 1988).
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 279; Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 
146; Born, International Commercial Arbitration 238.
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Unifoivn Judicial 
Interpretation 279.
See, Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 146.
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As regarding the judicial support for the new approach, the Italian Supreme Court 
has dealt with the problem of capacity of state bodies in international commercial 
arbitration and amved to a conclusion that may be regarded as the most advanced 
approach in this issue. The dispute has arisen out between two Tunisian companies 
and an Italian company. The Tunisian companies claimed before the arbitral tribunal 
of ICC in Paris that the arbitration agreement was null and void as they were not 
allowed to conclude an arbitration agreement under Tunisian law. However, their 
objection was dismissed and an award was rendered in favour of the Tunisian 
defendants. Then, the Tunisian companies sought enforcement of the award before the 
Italian Court of Appeal against the Italian company. At the outset, the Court reftised 
to enforce the award in the basis that the two Tunisian companies were public bodies 
which were not allowed to resort to arbitration under Tunisian law. However, The 
Italian Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision, holding that;
We consider that, under the law applicable to international commercial, 
which necessarily governs the arbitration clause in present case, legal 
persons of public law may, unless the parties have explicitly agieed 
otheiwise, undoubtedly agree to arbitration, independent of domestic 
prohibitions, by expressing their consent and sharing in the international 
marketplace, the conditions common to all operators.
The same approach was earlier adopted in several cases. An example of these is a 
decision of a Court of first instance of Tunis. The court rejected the defence of a state 
body which claimed that the arbitration agreement was not binding as it was 
forbidden to refer dispute to arbitration under its national law. The court holds that 
such prohibition should be applied only in domestic context, but not in relation to 
international commercial arbitration. The court made reference to French case law in 
which French public bodies may not refer to arbitration in domestic connection, but 
are bound by an arbitration agreement in international relation. Likewise, the 
Appeal Court of Athens states that the Greek Ministry of Trade bound by 
international arbitration agreement, Since the conditions required for the Greek State 
to conclude arbitration agi’eements, are only concerned with domestic application and
Société Arabe des Engrais Phosphates v Gemanco srl (1996) . 
ibid 742.
Société Tunisienne d ’Elctrictitee et de Gas v Société Entrepose 283.
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cannot be an obstacle for the State to conclude an international arbitration 
agreement.^^
3.8.4 Incapacity or Arbitrability
It may be worth mentioning that it has been argued that restrictions imposed upon a 
state’s capacity to include an arbitration agreement should be treated as matter of 
arbitrability rather than as issues of capacity. This is for the reason that this restriction 
is not a true limitation on capaeity, sueh as the case of mental disability, but in fact it 
is self-inflicted as it could be waived at any time by the state concerned. Moreover, it 
has been suggested that it appears to be at the very least that the capacity and the 
arbitrability may merge as the Swiss Law, Art. 177(2), refers to the two concepts in 
the same section. However, making a brief distinction between the issue of capacity 
and the issues of arbitrability, might be helpful to decide the above issue. The issue of 
capacity concerns mainly with the parties as to whether they are legally capable to 
enter into an arbitration agreement, while the issue of arbitrability is particularly 
concerned with the subject matter of the disputes as to whether it is capable of 
settlement by arbitration. In the light of this distinction, it might appear to be clear 
that the restriction imposed by a state on its capacity to enter into an arbitration 
agreement should be treated as a matter of capacity as far as it concerns with parties’ 
ability to go to arbitration.
3.8.5 State Immunity
Although the defence of a state immunity from jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal or 
from the enforcement of foreign arbitral award may somehow be discussed under the 
public policy defence, it appears, however, to be more appropriate to be discussed 
here under the state capacity. This is because the issue of state immunity is often
The Gov o f  Greece v Foreign Shipowner-charterer pp 634-635.
Swiss Private International Law of 1987 Ai1.177(2),
See, Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 147 fn 60.
^ See, eg, Di Pietro and Platte, Enfoi'cement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York 
Convention o f  1958 190.
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considered with the issue of a state capacity by both courts and authors. Besides, a 
state may, as occuned in some cases, argue that it is not bound by an arbitral 
agi'eement even though it was signed by its state agent or representative that have 
capacity to arbitrate, they are however not empowered to waive its state immunity. 
This would, in fact, mean that the representative lacks the proper capacity to waive 
the state immunity from arbitration or enforcement of arbitral award.
Instead of relying on its incapacity, a state may rely on its immunity to reject 
enforcement of foreign arbitral award against its interest. Thus, the key question needs 
to be raised is that whether the NYC is applicable to disputes between states and 
private party, notwithstanding the sovereign immunity of states?
Although, the NYC provides in Art. 1(1) that the Convention shall apply to arbitral 
award arising out of disputes between persons, whether physical or legal, the 
question, however, still remains uncertain as to whether states can be also included in 
the category of legal persons. Therefore, two doctrines have risen regarding the issue 
of states immunity from the arbitration and enforcement.
First doctrine is called as absolute immunity, In this approach a state enjoy a full 
immunity fr om arbitration or enforcement of arbitral award. This approach has been 
granted by a US District Court in BVB Bureau WijsmuUer v Unites States. In this 
ease, the Court rejected to enforce an agi'eement for arbitration in London between a 
Dutch salvage company and the US directing defendant, holding that no officer or 
representative has the requisite authority to remove armour of the sovereign’s 
immunity from suit, but this can be only done by the Congi'ess. Finding no sueh 
waiver, the court concluded that it has “no hesitation in holding that the present
See, Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 147; van den 
Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f 1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 280.
See, eg, BV Bureau WijsmuUer v United States .
See, in general, for the question o f state immunity from suit and execution, H Fox, 'State Innnunity 
and Enforcement o f Arbitral Awards: Do We Need an UNCITRAL Model Law Mark II for Execution 
Against State Property?'(1996) 12 (1) Aib Inti 89; M Blessing and T Burckliardt, 'Sovereign Immunity- 
A Pitfall in State Arbitration' in E Bucher, C Reymond and A International Council for Commercial 
(eds) Recueil de travaux suisses sur l ’arbitrage international : Congres intérimaire : Papers 
(Schulthess, Zurich 1984) pp 107-123; NB Turck, 'French and US Courts Define Limits o f Sovereign 
Immunity in Execution and Enforcement o f Arbitral Awards'(2001) 17 (3) Aib Inti 327; Di Pietro and 
Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f 1958 pp 190- 
195.
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arbitration agreement, contained in the LOF contract, is “null and void” in respect of 
the United States because of the sovereign immunity principles”.
BV Bureau WijsmuUer v United States 291.
SPP Ltd V The Arb Republic o f  Egypt 22 ILM 752 (International Chamber o f Commerce Court of 
Arbitration 1983).
ibid 772.
”  SPP Ltd V Egypt (1985) X YBCA 487 (Netherlands District Court 1984 ) 489.
E g y p tv S P P L td {m 5 )  X Y B C A \ \ 3  (France Court of Appeal 1984) 117.
” ibid 119.
Egypt V SPP Ltd (1988) XIII YBCA 152 (France Supreme Court 1987) pp 154-155.
Another example for supporting the absolute immunity can be found in the well
known case o f SPP Ltd v Egypt. In this case the arbitral tribunal rendered its award
against Egyptian Government entity of tourism, finding that the agreement in question
had been signed by the Minister of Tourism using the wording “approved, agreed and
ratified by the minister”, and such a phrase was adequate to prove the consent of the
minister to be bound by the agreement. The tribunal expressly stats that there should
be no doubt that such an agreement to arbitrate should be regarded as a waiver of any f
immunity and that therefore international or municipal rules granting sovereign
immunity should not be applied. The award was then upheld by the District Court
of Amsterdam. However, it was set aside afterwards by the French Court of Appeal.
The Court made its decision in the ground that no presumption of waiver of the 
Egyptian State's immunity from jurisdiction can be infoned from Egyptian Law, nor 
its agi'eement to submit to the arbitration clause contained in the contract between 
SPP and EGGTH. Moreover, the ratification which follows the signatures of SPP 
and EGGTH constitutes, not a solemn commitment by the State to enter into the 
contraet, but specifieally the material manifestation of approval by the supervising 
authority mentioned in the Statement. The French Supreme Court later affii'med this 
decision.
Second doctrine is known as restricted immunity. This approach intends to make a 
distinction between acts of a state for govenunental purpose (known as acta jure 
imperil), and its acts for commercial pui'pose (known as acta jure gestionis). In the 
case of governmental activities, the state has the benefit of absolute immunity from 
enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards, but in the case of commercial
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activities, the state has no immunity from enforcement of an arbitral agreement, and 
might be from enforcement of an award, in which the state is engaged in the same
99manner as private person.
This approach of restricted immunity has gained widespread support in the scholarly 
work of commentators on the Convention ****^ and in the judicial decisions of the States 
signatories to the NYC, In this regard, Prof. van den Berg expresses that the defence 
of immunity fr om suit has proven to be rather unsuccessful due to the increasingly 
accepted distinction between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis.
With regard to the judicial support, this doctrine has also been applied in many cases. 
For example, the Dutch Supreme Court in SEEE v Yugoslavia discarded the 
defence that the Dutch Court would have no jurisdiction over Yugoslavia because the 
latter enjoyed immunity from suit. The court holds that there is a worldwide heading 
to restrict a state’s immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign courts where the state
It may appear to be difficult to identify which acts are acta jure imperii and which acts are acta jure  
gestionis. Nonetheless, it may be worthwhile to refer to European Convention on States Immunity of 
1972, especially Ait, 26. See also, Banca Carige SPA Cassa di Risparmio di Genova E Imperia v 
Banco Nacional de Cuba and Anothe [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 147 (UK Ch D 'Companies Cf), where the 
English Court hold that:
On the other hand BNC and BCC entered into what was in form a private law contract 
and completed it as such. There is no evidence that the sale was pursuant to any 
legislative or executive direction. In this respect the agreement is in a quite different 
position from the rest o f the reorganization which was effected by legislation. In the 
language of Lord Wilberforce in The I Congresso del Partido at p. 373; p. 263, 
eveiytliing was done as between vendor and purchaser: there was no exercise and no 
need for exercise o f sovereign powers. The private law character of the transaction is not 
discoloured by the context in which the agreement was executed i.e. the fact that the 
parties to it regarded the transfer o f the shares to BCC as an obvious and necessary 
sequel to the statutory reorganization. Nor is its private law character controverted by the 
puipose or motive behind the transaction o f serving the interests o f the state.
See, L Cappelli-Perciballi, 'The Application of the New York Convention to Disputes Between 
States and Between Entities and Private Individuals: The Problem of Sovereign Immunity'(1978) 12 (1) 
Inti Lawy 197; van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f 1958 : Towards a Uniform 
Judicial Interpretation 279; Bom, Inteimational Commercial Arbitration 238; Redfem and Hunter, 
Law and Practice o f International Commercial Arbitration 147; Fox, 'State Immunity and Enforcement 
of Arbitral Awards: Do We Need an UNCITRAL Model Law Mark II for Execution Against State 
Property?'QC 90; Blessing and Burckhardt, 'Sovereign Immunity- A Pitfall in State Arbitration' 108; 
Turck, 'French and US Courts Define Limits o f Sovereign Immunity in Execution and Enforcement of 
Arbitral Awards' 327; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New 
York Convention o f 1958 pp 190-195.
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation pp 279-280. See also, Blessing and Burckhardt, 'Sovereign Immunity- A Pitfall in State 
Arbitration' 108.
102 SEEE V Yugoslavia (1976) I YBCA 195 (Natherlands Supreme Court 1973).
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entering into relation with private parties in areas governed by private law. In such 
case a state cannot enjoy the immunity from suit because the private party should 
have the same legal protection as if it dealt with another private party. Similarly, J 
Tillinger from the Swedish Court of Appeal expressly stresses in this relation that:
It has become even more common during recent years that States and 
State-owned organs act as parties to agieement of a commercial nature. If 
such agreement provide for arbitration, it is shocking per se that one of the 
contracting parties later refuses to participate in the arbitration or to 
respect a duly rendered award. Wlien a State party is concerned, it is 
therefore a natural interpretation to consider that said party, in accepting 
the arbitration clause, committed itself not to obstruct the arbitral 
proccdings or their consequences, by invoking immunity.
Moreover, a US district court has rejected a plea of state immunity made by Nigeria 
against award rendered in Switzerland, holding that the conclusion of an arbitral 
agreement indicates an implicit waiver of immunity.
3.8.6 Applicability of the NYC to a State Dispute with a Private Party?
In addition, the approach of restricted immunity may find a further support from the 
legislation history of the NYC as the problem of states was mentioned in the report of 
ECOSOC. The report observed that:
Article 1 provides that the Convention would apply to arbitral awards 
arising out of differences “between persons, whether physical or legal”.
The Representative of Belgium had proposed that the article should 
expressly provide that public enterprises and public utilities should be 
deemed to be legal persons for purposes of this article if their activities 
were governed by private law. The Committee was of the opinion that 
such a provision would be superfluous and that a reference in the present 
report would suffice.
ibid 197.
American Oil Company v Socialist People's Arab Republic o f  Libya (1981) 20 International Legal 
Materials 893 (Sweden Appeal Court 1980) pp 895-896.
Ipitrade International SA v Nigeria 465 FSupp 824 (US District Court of Columbia 1978) 826.
UN Doc. E/2704: UN Doc. E/AC. 42/4/Rev. 1, para 24 p 7.
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It may be concluded from the foregoing report that it appears without shadow of a 
doubt that the drafters of the NYC intended to include state bodies in the category of 
legal persons. This interpretation is generally accepted in the context of states 
commercial activities ***^
3.8.7 No Immunity from Suit only or from Enforcement as well?
Yet, It may be vital to note that although it is well settled and accepted, under the 
doctrine of restricted immunity, that by submitting to arbitration, a state is waiving its 
immunity from jurisdiction, it may, however, not be the case regarding the immunity 
ft'om execution. It is submitted that a state immunity from execution should be 
deemed to be absolute in order to avoid delicate political situations. In this respect, 
The Washington Convention of 1965 would clearly lend support to this view. The 
Convention sets up under Art. 55 that;
Nothing in Article 54 (which concerns the enforcement of an award) shall 
be construed as derogating from the law in force in any Contracting State 
rdating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State fr om execution.
In contrast, a number of courts have recently applied the doctrine of restricted 
immunity from execution. For example, in 2000 the French Supreme Court in 
Creighton Ltd v Qatar holds that by submitting a dispute to ICC arbitration, a state 
(Qatar) imply that it intend to waive its immunity from execution since the rules of 
arbitration of ICC plainly states that by submitting their dispute to ICC arbitration, the
See, Cappelli-Perciballi, 'The Application of the New York Convention to Disputes Between States 
and Between Entities and Private Individuals: The Problem of Sovereign Immunity' 198; van den Berg, 
The New York Arbitration Convention o f 1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 279. P 
Contini, 'International Commercial Arbitration: The United Nations Convention on the Recognition an 
Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards'(1959) 8 (3) Am J Comp L 283 at 294.
See , Davidson, Arbitration 177; van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f 1958 : 
Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 281; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international 
arbitration awat'ds : the New York Convention o f  1958 139.
Washington Convention of 1965, Art. 55.
See, Ipitrade International SA v Nigeria 826; Creighton Ltd v Qatar (2000) XXV YBCA 458 
(France Supreme Court 2000). See also, Turck, 'French and US Courts Define Limits o f Sovereign 
Immunity in Execution and Enforcement of Ai'bitral Awards’ 327.
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parties undertake to carry out the award without delay and that the arbitral award is 
final.
In fact, there seems to be little justification for the distinction between immunity from 
jurisdiction and immunity from execution. Indeed, it is highly likely that there is no 
significant merit for arbitration if by submitting to arbitration, a state waives its 
immunity from arbitral proceeding, but preserves immunity from enforcement of 
arbitral award. Indeed the above opinion, that a state enjoys immunity fiom 
enforcement of foreign award, would lead to produce negative consequences, 
threatening the value of international commercial arbitration with state and state 
agencies, and would disturb the NYC applications on such arbitration. This because 
the question of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is a very important aspect in 
international arbitral process and one of the primary concerns in the decision to 
choose arbitration as a method of solving international commercial disputes.
3.9 The Position in Saudi Arabia
3.9.1 Capacity of Natural Person
It may be thought important to mention here the Saudi position regarding the capacity 
of a natural person to resort to arbitration because of the fact that most, if not all, 
foreign arbitral awards which brought before the Saudi competent court for 
enforcement are against Saudi parties. Therefore, the Saudi laws will be applied to 
determine the Saudi parties’ capacity if they try to oppose the enforcement on the 
gi ound of their lack of capacity to conclude arbitration agreement.
Under the Saudi law, a fiill legal capacity of a party is required to conclude a valid 
arbitration agieement. The SAL provides that “an agi’eement to arbitrate may not be 
made except by those who have capacity to act”. ' This provision is also continued
' ' ' Creighton Ltd v Qatar 459. 
SAL o f 1983, Art. 2.
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by the IRSAL which states that “The agi'eement to arbitrate shall only be valid if 
entered into by persons of full legal capacity to act” . *
The above requirement of full capacity immediately raises the question of what is the 
full capacity of acting? Both The SAL and IRSAL neglect to deal with the question of 
determination the required capacity or the legal age to enter to an arbitral agreement. 
Also, there is no Saudi law detennines, in general, the legal age of competence to 
enter into a legally binding agreement. Some writers submitted that the age of frill 
legal capacity of a Saudi person to enter into contracts is the age of 18 years according 
to The ATShura Council’s (Saudi parliament) earlier decree However, this view 
appears to be at least doubtful because this decree of The Al-Shura Council has not 
been given the Royal assent, whereas The Al-Shura Council's resolutions or bills 
cannot come in force as law in themselves without being given the Royal assent. 
Therefore, the Shari 'ah law must be recalled in this respect and the standards given 
by Shari 'ah law will be applied as far as the Saudi laws give no precise age of the ftill 
capacity to enter into arbitration, as well as due to the fact the Shari 'ah is the general 
foundation of all Saudi regulations.
According to Shari'ah law, the capability of the parties to contracts is of prime 
importance for the validity of the contract. Thus, no person can validly conclude a 
legal transaction without first having attained physical and intellectual maturity that 
being the equivalent of majority to enjoy full capacity.
With regard to the arbitration agi'eement, ahliyyat al-ida is the full capacity 
required to enter into such agreement. The question come up then as what is the legal 
age of ahliyyat al-idal Unlike other legal systems, the Shari 'ah law gives no precise
"URSAL of 1985, Art, 2.
' Saudi Al-Shura Council decree no 114 dated 5/11/1374 H (1955).
Saudi Al-Shura Council Law o f 1992, Art. 17.
Saudi Basic Law o f Governance o f 1992, A t. 7 Provides that “rule in the kingdom o f saudi A abia  
draws its athourty from the HOLY Qur’an and the Prophet’s Sunnah which both rule over this 
regulation and all other State Laws”.
The capacity in Shari’ah mling is o f tow categories. First, Ahliyyat Al-Wujub, which means that the 
capacity to dispose o f rights. In other words, the receptive legal capacity that is good for receiving but 
eamiot incur. Second, ahliyyat a lid a , which means that the capaeity to exercise rights. In simple terms, 
the capacity that can incur rights as well as obligations, ahliyyat al-ida therefore presumes the 
existence of Ahliyyat Al-Wujub, but not the conversely as the latter is granted for a person since he is 
pom.
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age for ahliyyat al-ida because it differ from person to another and may a young 
person have reached a stage of both mental and physical development characteristic of 
an adult although he is still below the legal age such as 18. On the other hand, the 
Shari ’ah sets out certain standards for granting ahliyyat al-ida for a person when he 
(a) attains physical puberty (bulugh) and (b) enjoys sound judguent, known also as 
prudence in his judgnent [rushd] as well as (c) he is not sequestrated or interdicted. 
This standard was also confirmed by the Law of Commercial Court which states that 
every one become mature or reach the maturity age has the right to apply all kinds of 
commercial vocations.
While the above position may be regarded as a disadvantage, it may be read however 
to compose an important aspect for facilitating enforcement of arbitial awards and 
protecting the party who deals fairly or with good faith with young parties, since this 
position enables the relevant court to have a wide discretion to constrict the 
applications of the defence of incapacity. Nevertheless, it appear to be appropriate to 
suggest that Saudi legislator should indicate that a Saudi person gains a full legal 
capacity of acting by two ways: (a) reaching the age of 18 years with no disabilities, 
or (b) by attaining physical puberty and enjoying sound judgnent if the person is 
under 18 years.
In addition, it may be useful to mention that according to the SAL, a guardian of 
minor as well as a giardian of a person, whom eapacity has been affected by any 
negative factor such as mentally illness and bankruptcy, cannot in general refer 
disputes to arbitration except when he is empowered to do so by relevant court. In this 
regard, the IRSAL lays down that “A guardian of minors, appointed giardian or 
endowment administrator may not resort to arbitration unless being authorized to do 
so by the competent court”.
3.9.2 Capacity of Juristic Person
Saudi Commercial Court Law o f 1931, Art. 4.
"MRSAL o f 1985, Art.2.
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It submitted that, under the Saudi position, the capacity of a juristic person is 
generally governed by its constitution and the law of the place of its headquarters. 
However, it is argued that the place of the headquarter has to be the same as the place 
of incorporation or business to apply the law of that place upon the legal capacity of 
juristic person as it mentioned under Art. 14 of the Saudi Regilation of Companies of 
1965. ™
In principle, companies can hind themselves to arbitration agreement, unless their 
constitutions affect their capacity to do so. Furthermore, a company is also bound by 
an arbitration agreement concluded by its director.
3,9.3 State and State Entities
According to The SAL, the Saudi state entities and public authorities are restricted 
from resorting directly to arbitration without prior approval from the President of the 
Council of Ministers. Art. 3 of the SAL expressly provides that:
Government Agencies are not allowed to resort to arbitration for 
settlement of their disputes with third parties except after having obtained 
the consent of the President of the Council of Ministers.
It may appear to be helpful to out line the background of the above provision in order 
to fully understand the genuine motivations of including Art. 3. The position of the 
capacity state bodies to refer their disputes to arbitration has gone through five 
different historical stages. They are as follows:
3.9.3.1 First Stage
Since the beginning of oil exploration until the 1950s, the Saudi State or its public 
entities used to employ arbitration as the primary means of resolving disputes between
See, M Al-Jaber, Saudi Commercial Law (4 edn, 1996 'in Aabic') pp 213-214.
See, A Salamah, Intermediate in Saudi International Private Law (King Saud University, Riyadh 
1998 ' in Aabic') pp 440, 444.
Saudi Companies Law of 1965. Art. 29.
SAL o f 1983, Art.3.
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them and foreigi private parties. This approval of Saudi State for arbitration can be 
illustrated by several practices in that time. For example, Saudi State included 
arbitration clauses in concession ageements with foreign companies for the 
exploration and transportation of oil, such as the concession ageement with the 
Arabian American Oil Company known as ARAMCO. Moreover, SA adhered in 
1954 to the Arab Leagie Convention on Enforcement of Judgments and Awards of 
1952, which imposes an obligation upon the contracting States to enforce any arbitral 
award made in the other contracting States. This Convention was designed primarily 
to facilitate the enforcement of fo re ig  judgments as well as fo re ig  awards between 
only the member States of the Arab leagie. In addition, Saudi Government took 
the initiative and proposed to resolve a dispute with an American company by 
arbitration in the ARAMCO case of 1958.
3.9.3.2 Second Stage
The Saudi State affinnative attitude toward arbitration changed fundamentally after 
the famous ARAMCO arbitration case of 1958 and the arbitration therefore lost
See, G Sayen, 'Abitration, Conciliation, and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi Arabia'(1987) 9 
Univ Pennsylvania J Inti Econ L 211 at 214; N  Turck, 'Saudi A abia ' in AJ van den Berg and P 
Sanders (eds) International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law and Taxation, 
Deventer 1994); J Paulsson and others (eds), International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law International The Hague ; London 1994)9.
The convention o f Enforcement o f Judgments, which known as The A a b  League Convention on 
Enforcement of Judgments o f 1952 or sometimes as The Cairo Convention of 1952, was established on 
14'*' September 1952 at Cairo under the auspices o f The league o f A ab  States, and entered into force 
on 28"' June 1954. It was signed at first by seven A a b  Countries. This Convention was designed 
primarily to facilitate the enforcement o f foreign judgments as will as foreign awards between only the 
States o f the A ab  league, it also provide a number o f grounds for refusal o f enforcement‘s^  which are 
regarded as a similar to those indicated in the Geneva Convention of 1927; in particular, if  the award 
has not yet become final in country in which was made.This convention, however, no longer exists due 
to the fact that it was replaced by the Riyadh Convention o f 1983. See, W Rifat, National and 
International Commercial Arbitration in the Kingdom o f  Saudi Arabia (Jeddah Chamber of Commerce 
and Industi-y, Jeddah 1998 'in Arabic')206; N Turck, 'Abitration in Saudi A abia '(1990) 6 (3) A b  Inti 
281 at 289. For a full text of the Convention, see, Paulsson and others (eds), International Handbook 
on Commercial Arbitration suppl 17.
Saudi Arabia v Arabian American Oil Co (ARAMCO) (1963) 27 ILR 117. The facts o f this case is 
briefly as the following:
On 20 April 1954, Mr. A istotle Onassis signed an agreement with the Saudi Govermnent, according to 
which Mr. Onassis was pennitted to form a Saudi local company called Satco (Saudi Aabian Tanker 
Company). Satco was granted a quasi-monopoly for all transport o f crude oil from the Kingdom at 
rates which were rather favourable for Mr. Onassis. The agreement was ratified by Royal Decree No. 
5737 of 1954. Aramco refiised to comply with the Onassis agreement, asserting that according to a 
concession agreement o f 1933 between it and the Saudi Govermnent, it had the absolute right to choose
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dramatically the previous approval of Saudi Government, This raises the question as 
to whether this negative conversion toward arbitration, as some writers have 
suggested, was an indignant reaction because of the fact it lost the case. This seems 
to be quite inaccurate answer due to the fact that to every arbitrations case, there is 
almost always a clear winner and loser. This fact did not appear to be absent from the 
consideration of Saudi Government since it took the initiative and proposed to resolve 
the dispute with ARAMCO by arbitration. Moreover, it is submitted that the dispute 
matter of the AIMMCO case, which is about the Onassis agreement, was not really 
very advantageous for SA.
Therefore, it is very probable that this change of Saudi Government’s attitude toward 
arbitration was not plainly because it lost the ARAMCO case, but there should be 
another factual factors led the Government to reconsider the question of the validity 
of the international commercial arbitration and whether it would meet the 
requirements of the Kingdome regarding the most important natural resource (i.e. oil). 
Such factor can be easily found within some findings made by the arbitral tribunal. 
For example, the arbitral tribunal repeatedly stated that;
The regime of mining concession, and, consequently, also of oil 
concession, has remained embryonic in Moslem law ... (and) Hanbali law 
contains no precise rule about mining concessions and a fortiori about oil 
concession ... (and) the law in force in Saudi Arabia did not contain any 
definite rule relating to the exploitation of o il ... (thus) the interpretation of 
contracts is not governed by rigid rules (i.e. Shari’ah law); it is rather an 
art, governed by principles of logic and common sense, which puiports to 
lead to an adaptation, as reasonable as possible, of the provisions a 
contract to the facts of a dispute.
In the light of above findings, the Saudi government’s dissatisfaction with the award 
can be better explained by the way in which the arbitral tribunal excluded the Saudi 
law based upon the Shari'ah ml es, even though they were the applicable law
the means of transport o f crude oil. Aiamco and the Saudi Government agreed to submit their dispute 
to arbitration in Geneva by Mr. Von Sauser-Hall.
See, Turck, 'Saudi Ai'abia "Saudi Ai'abia’ 9; Sayen, 'Arbitration' 214 fn 14.
See, Saudi Arabia v Arabian American Oil Co (ARAMCO) .
See, Sayen, 'Arbitration' 214 fn 14; Turck, 'Saudi Arabia ' 9.
See, Saudi Arabia v Arabian American Oil Co (ARAMCO) pp 162-3, 167-8, 171- 2.
Ch 3: Incapacity o f Party 60
according to Art. 4 of the arbitration agreement. The refusal of the tribunal to 
apply the national law based on the Shari’ah, regardless parties’ autonomy was 
similarly applied in the famous Abu Dhabi case of 1951 and again in Qatar case of 
1953. Such awards, as it is observed, caused a significant reticence and a certain 
distrust regarding international commercial arbitration in Arab Countries. Taking 
these awards into account, the ARAMCO arbitration emerged to give good 
justification for the impression that international arbitration was in fact a western 
device meets only with the interest of western parties. It has been noted that the 
Saudi Government was dissatisfied due to the fact that arbitrations were frequently 
conducted under non-Saudi mles, both inside and outside of SA.
The Ai'bitration Agreement between the Saudi Government and ARAMCO, Art IV. It determens the 
applicable law as follows:
“the Arbitration Tribunal shall decide this dispute
in accordance with the Saudi Arabian Law as hereinafter defined in so far as matters within the 
jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia are concerned;
in accordance with the law demand by the Arbitration Tribunal to be applicable, in so far as matters 
beyond the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia are concerned;
Saudi Arabian law, as used herein, is the Moslem law;
as taught by the school o f Imam Alrmed ibn Hanbal;
as applied in Saudi Arabia".
See, ibid 153.
It was stated in the award that:
If a national law must be applied, it is that o f Abu Dhabi. But no such law can reasoirably 
be said to exist. The Sheikli administers a purely discretionary justice with the assistance 
of the Koran; and it would be fanciftil to suggest that in this very primitive region, there 
is any set or body o f legal principles applicable to the construction o f modern 
commercial instruments.
See, A El-Ahdab, ' Why Create the Ar'ab Association for International Arbitration? '(1992) 9 (3) J Inti 
Alb 29 at 30.
It was held in the award that:
I need not set out the evidence before me about the origin, history and development of 
Islamic Law as applied in Qatar or as the legal procedure in that country. I have no 
reason to suppose that Islamic Law is not administered there strictly, but I am satisfied 
that the Law does not contain any principles which would be sufficient to inteipret these 
particular contacts.
See, ibid 30.
See, HJ Brown and AL Marriott, ADR principles and practice  (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1993) pp 
81-83; El-Ahdab, ' Why Create the Arab Association for International Arbitration? ' 30.
See, Sayen, 'Arbitration' 216.
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With the foregoing background in mind, the Saudi Government in 1963 released a 
ministerial decree no 85 by which it forbade any Saudi governmental body to refer its 
dispute with a private party to arbitration. On the other hand, the decree imposed the 
Saudi governmental bodies to submit their disputes to the Saudi combatant court (i.e. 
the Board of Grievances) and must be subject to Saudi laws as well.
It may observe that this restriction is applicable to the both national and international 
since the decree was general and gave no distinction between them. However, the 
decree provided two exceptions to this restriction: (a) Concession contracts of 
extreme interest to the Saudi State, (b) Technical disputes. In these cases, the board of 
Grievances is entitled to appoint the third arbitrator, if the other arbitrators fail to 
agree upon one. The award may be appealed before the board of Grievances both in 
fonn and merit.
3.9.3.3 Third Stage
As the need of international arbitration became more essential to resolve international 
commercial disputes, the Saudi Government reconsidered its attitude towards 
arbitration and started to decrease the scope of the prohibition upon state bodies to 
conclude arbitration agreement made under the above decree no 85. This not only 
because the Saudi state agencies have accepted arbitration elauses on its international 
contracts, but also because Saudi State has adhered important international 
conventions. In this regard, the first step to reduce such prohibition was in 1976, when 
the Saudi State made an agreement with the American Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) including a clause to submit to arbitration any disputes may rise 
out between the Saudi State or its Agencies and any American investor insured by 
OPIC. This agreement may be considered as a significant step, dispute its limited
Saudi Council o f Ministers Resolution No 58 dated 17/1/1383 H (1963).
An example for the first exception can be seen in an agreement concluded in 1969 between the 
Petromin Company, which is state agencies, with French Company. This agreement included an 
Arbitral clause to ICC Arbitration at Lausamie in Switzerland. Additionally, an example for the second 
exception can be found in an agreement between Saudi State and the United States Army Coips of 
Engineers to submitting teclmical disputes arising out of the contracts executed in Saudi Arabia to 
Ai'bitration. See, El-Alidab, Arbitration in Arab Countries vol 2 pp 192; A El-Alidab, Arbitration with 
the Arab countries (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer; The Netherlands 1990) pp 602-3; 
A Len'ick and QJ Mian, Saudi business and labor law : its interpretation and application (Graham & 
Trotraan, London 1982) 178,
Ch 3: Incapacity o f Party 62
scope as it is applied only on disputes between Saudi and American investor. The 
same agieement was also held between Saudi State and Germany.
In addition, the Saudi State ratified, in 1980, the Washington Convention of 1965 on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States.
Saudi State however made two reservations where the Convention is not applied 
to: (a) all matters of petroleum (b) all matters of national sovereignty. Consequently, 
Saudi State and a foreign party may consent in writing to submit their disputes to the 
International centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
Indeed, this step appears to be a fundamental development which may limit the 
prohibition imposed upon Saudi State agencies to resort to international arbitration. 
Some writer goes further to submit that after the ICSID Convention, the authorization 
of governmental agencies to arbitration became the rule and whereas prohibition 
became the exception.
It is argued, however, that the Saudi Movement has never approved an ICSID 
arbitration clause. This argument seem to be without merit due to the fact that the 
Saudi State petroleum Company (Petromin) has entered into contracts with foreign 
companies including arbitral clause referring to ICSID.
3.9.3.4 Fourth Stage
As suspicions concerning international arbitration remain somehow in effect in SA, 
the SAL of 1983 came to reconfirm allow Saudi state agencies to inter into arbitration 
agreement with third parties after having the permission hum the President of the 
Council of Ministers to do so. In this regard. Art. 3 of the SAL states that:
See, El-Alidab, Arbitration in Arab Countries vol 2 p 194; Lerrick and Mian, Saudi business and 
labor law : its interpretation and application 181,
See, The World Bank Group, 'List o f Contracting States and other Signatories o f the Convention ' 
<http://www.worIdbank.org/icsid/constate/c-states-en.htra> (accessed 12/07/2003).
See, A El-Ahdab, 'Arbitration in Saudi Ai’abia under the New Arbitration Act, 1983 and its 
Irapleraentation Rules of 1985: Part T(1986) 3 (5) J Intl Arb 27 at 42.
See, Sayen, 'Arbitration' 215; Turck, 'Saudi Ai’abia '10.
142 See, El-Alldab, Arbitration in Arab Countries vol 2 p 199.
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Government Agencies are not allowed to resort to arbitration for 
settlement of their disputes with third parties except after having obtained 
the consent of the President of the Council of Ministers. This ruling may 
be amended by resolution of the Council of Ministers.
In the same way, the IRSAL affirms the above provision, and establishes some 
required procedures if State Agencies wish to resort to arbitration. It provides in Art. 8 
that:
In disputes where a government authority is a party with others, such a 
government authority shall prepare a memorandum with respect to 
arbitration in such a dispute, stating its subject matter, the reasons for 
arbitration and the names of parties. Such a memorandum shall be 
submitted to the council of ministers for approval of arbitration. The 
prime minister may, by a prior resolution, authorize a government 
authority to settle the disputes arising h'om a particular contract, through 
arbitration. In all cases, the council of ministers shall be notified of the 
arbitration awards adopted.
According to the letter of the above Articles, it may be observe that the requirement of 
obtaining the consent of the President of the Council of Ministers is a general mle 
including all Government Agencies as well as all kind of disputes whether regarding 
petroleum or not.
However, this may be not the case as some positive factors can be noted in the way of 
drafting Art. 3 of the SAL and Art. 8 of the IRSAL: First, these Articles entitle the 
President of the Council of Ministers, without the need to the approval of the Council 
of Ministers, to grant State agencies the permission to refer their disputes to 
arbitration. Likewise, the president himself is also empowered to authorise a State 
agency in particular contract to conclude an arbitration clause before disputes arise 
out rather than a submission agreement. Furthermore, the last sentence of Art. 3 of 
the SAL grants the Council of Ministers to amend the provision of prohibition without 
the need of a Royal decree, although Saudi regulations, as a general rule, are approved 
and amended by Royal decree. In addition, it is almost unusual, in Saudi statutes.
SAL o f 1983, Ai-t.3.
144
145
IR SA Lof 1985, Ai-t,8 
ibid.
Saudi Basic Law of Governance o f  1992, Art. Art. 70 provides as follows:
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that an Article to be immediately followed by such provision of possible amendment. 
Having these factors in mind, it may be concluded that there is a strong possibility 
that the Saudi legislator intend to repeal the prohibition in the future or at least to 
confine its field of application.
In addition, It may useful to mention that it has been submitted that the farther the 
Saudi state agencies get away from administrative rules and fi'om the laws on public 
servants and the closer they come to the commercial laws, the closer they com to 
arbitration. Also, it is alleged that a Saudi agency no longer needs authorization for 
arbitration, if its administrative and financial autonomy is important and the tutelage 
of the Ministry over it is weak. However, such suggestions do not stand on firm 
giounds since the requirement of obtaining the authorisation h'om the President of the 
Council of Ministers made under The SAL and IRSAL include all state agencies by 
using a general terms such as “Government Agencies are not allowed to resort to 
arbitration” and “a government authority” and makes no distinction between 
govermuental and non- governmental activities. However, it may be more appropriate 
to try another interpretation here by stating that the prohibition imposed by the SAL 
upon Saudi State agencies to refer to arbitration is only applicable as far as national 
contexts is concerned, but not to international commercial contexts. This is 
because the SA has adopted to various international conventions, such as the 
Washington Convention of 1965 and The NYC, and such adoptions may imply that 
the SA intend to eliminate the restriction on state agencies in the context of 
international commercial agreements.
3.9.3.5 Fifth Stage
International treaties, agreements, regulations and concessions are approved and 
amended by Royal decree.
See, El-Alidab, 'Arbitration in Saudi Arabia under the New Arbitration Act, 1983 and its 
Implementation Rules o f 1985: Part T p 43,
SAL of 1983, An. 3.
IRSAL o f 1985, Ai-t.8.
See, Rifat, National and International Commercial Arbitration in the Kingdom o f  Saudi Arabia 
105; El-Ahdab El-Ahdab, 'Arbitration in Saudi Arabia under the New Ai'bitration Act, 1983 and its 
Implementation Rules o f  1985: Part 1' 32.
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A significant development took place in 1994, when Saudi State acceded to the NYC.
Indeed, this step is deemed as a central shift in the Saudi attitude relating to 
international commercial arbitration since the NYC is considered to be the most 
succèssftil international instrument in the field of arbitration, and the most effective 
instance of international legislation in the entire history of commercial law.
Yet, the question needs now to be decided as to whether the NYC may contribute to 
reduce the restriction imposed upon Saudi government agencies? It appears to be 
difficult to have a straightforward answer. However, a relevant factor may be thought 
helpful to be considered in this sense. As has been seen above, the NYC is generally 
considered to be applicable to differences between a state or a state body and a private 
party since the states or their agencies are included under the category of legal persons 
according to Art. 1(1) of the NYC. Taking this consideration into aceount as well as 
the Saudi acceding to the Washington Convention of 1965, it ean be then infeiTed that 
by ratifying the NYC, SA intended to restrict if not waive the prohibition upon the 
state and state agencies in the field of international arbitration.
3.9.3.6 Present Position of Saudi State Entities
To sum up, it may thus be concluded that there is no clear-cut answer regarding the 
present position of the capacity of Saudi state agencies to arbitrate abroad. Yet, the 
restriction appears to be the rule and arbitration is the exception as to national 
arbitration, whereas the contrary may be held time in the context of international 
arbitration, i.e. the restriction imposed upon Saudi State agencies might only be 
applicable in relation to national commercial, and could have no effectiveness in the 
context of international arbitration. However, SA must recognise the important of 
international arbitration and take step forward to clarify the capacity of Saudi state 
entities to refer to international arbitration, and limit the restrietion made under Art. 3 
of the Saudi Arbitration Law to state entities that deal with sensitive and vital public 
issues, such as the state security or the main source of national income (i.e. matters of 
petroleum or national sovereignty).
Saudi Royal Decree No. M /ll dated 16.7.1414 H. (1994) for ratification o f the New York 
Convention of 1958.
See, Mustill, 'Arbitration: History and Background'.
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3.7.8.6 Case Law
As far as the international commercial arbitration is concerned, the key question 
which needs to be highlighted is whether a Saudi state agency can rely on its 
incapacity according to the national laws or rely on its immunity to avoid enforcement 
of arbitral agi’eement an award? In the light of above conclusion, they might not be 
entitled to do so.
This approach was affirmed by the Saudi enforcing court (the 9“’ Administrative 
Panel) in a recent ease in 1997 between a University {Saudi public body) and Dutch 
party. in this case, the Saudi court rejected a defence that the arbitral agreement is 
invalid since the Saudi University lack the proper capacity to recourse to arbitration 
according to the Council of Ministers Resolution no 58 (1973) which prohibits 
government ageneies to do so. At the outset, the Court regarded the contract as to 
involve with administrative or governmental activities and not commercial because 
the contract is included for a public service. The court went on to assert that although 
resorting to arbitration by public agencies is forbidden under national law, the validity 
of the arbitral agreement must be granted, regardless the prohibition since the parties 
had agi’eed to submit any dispute to binding arbitration as it mentioned in Art. 9 of the 
contract. The Court held that it based its decision upon the principles of Shari ’ah to 
achieve a just result: first, the Shari ’ah law emphatically upholds the moral obligation 
to fulfil one’s contracts and undertakings, as expressed in the Qur’an: “O you who 
believe! Fulfil all obligation”. Second, the principle adopted by the majority of 
Muslim scholars is that the arbitral award is binding. As a consequence, the Court 
gi'anted the foreign Company’s petition to enforce the arbitral award against the Saudi 
State agency, and denied the latter defences.
This conclusion of the Saudi Court is a landmark case in the pro-enforcement bias. It 
constructs a very advanced approach regarding the issue of a state capacity to 
arbitration and a state immunity from suit and enforcement. This because of that, as 
has been seen above, the doctrine of disregarding national prohibitions upon a state 
agencies or the waiver of state immunity from execution by submission to arbitration
the 9th Administrative Panel, decision No. 32/D/A/9 dated 1918 H (1997). 
The Qur'an, Al-Ma'idah [5:1].
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is recognized only for the disputes where the state may be regarded as a private 
person acting for commercial puipose. However, the Saudi court goes beyond this 
doctrine and gi'anted the enforcement of the arbitral award against the Saudi State 
agency even though it is regarded as public body acting for governmental activities 
{acta jure imperii). In addition, the court’s relying on the Shari’ah principles, which 
allow enforcement against state agencies, rather than the Saudi laws, which do not 
allow such enforcement, would constitute a practical example for the principle of 
more-favorable-provision to enforcement set forth in Art. VII(l) of the NYC.
3.10 Conclusion
Following the examination of this chapter, it may be concluded that although the 
incapacity of party is the first defence to enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
mentioned under Art. V (1) of the NYC it rarely turns up in practice apart from state 
agencies cases. Also, although the wording of Art. V(l)(a) of the NYC would appear 
to provide that a party may rely on his own lack of capacity, this, however, was 
proven to be hardly successful, and particularly if it appears to breach the principle of 
good faith.
The first part of Art. V(l)(a) refers to “the law applicable to them (parties)” in order 
to deteimine their capacity of entering into arbitration agieement. The applicable law 
to the party is commonly intei*preted to mean the personal law which requires to be 
determined by reference to the conflict of laws rules of the place of arbitration or 
enforcement. These generally include the law of natural person’s nationality or his 
domicile or usual residence, and the law of place of incorporation or the main place of 
business, as well as the constitution of the state, state body or the law regulates their 
activities. Alternatively but not commonly, it is submitted that the phrase “the law 
applicable to them” can be taken to mean the substantive rules which relies mainly on 
the customs and principles of the international commerce, regardless any reference to 
national laws.
See, supra para 3.8.5.
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According to the common inteipretation of first part of Art. V (1) (a) of the NYC, the 
capacity of a natural person to arbitrate, is generally governed by the personal law of 
the party which is the law of his nationality (e.g. in civil laws) or the law of his 
domicile or normal residence (e.g. in the common laws). On the contrary, it is 
submitted that the capacity of the parties should be resolved by refemng to the 
substantive customs of international trade, independently from any reference to 
national laws. So, any natural person mns an economic activity on a professional 
basis should be considered as capable to conclude a valid arbitration agreement.
In SAL, a full legal capacity of a party is required to conclude a valid arbitration 
agreement. According to Shari’ah law, ahliyyat al-ida (i.e. puberty and enjoying 
sound judgment) is the ftdl capacity required to enter into arbitration agreement.
The capacity of a juristic person, in some common countries, is governed mainly by 
its constitution and the law of the place of incorporation or business. On other legal 
systems, the question of the capacity of a juristic person is judged by the law of the 
country where its headquarters is located or may be sometimes where its registered 
office is situated. The law governing international commercial agreement may be 
regarded as well. On the other hand, under the substantive rules method, all juridical 
persons involving with commercial activities should be considered to have the 
capacity to enter into a binding agi'eement to arbitrate relating to those activities.
The representative powers for a juridical person, under the traditional method of the 
conflict of laws rules, are generally governed by the law under which that juridical 
person operates. But under the substantive rules method, (a) It would be sufficient to 
have a general authorization to contract for the purpose of entering into a binding 
international arbitration, (b) Coiporate representatives responsible for management 
are assumed to have power to enter into binding arbitration agreements, (c) in the 
context of international commerce, no particular requirements of form of the power to 
conclude an arbitration agreement should be imposed to provide that the parties’ 
consent is certain.
In SA, the capacity of a juristic person is generally governed by its constitution and 
the law of the place of its headquarters. Companies can, in general, bind themselves to
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arbitration agi'eement and it is also bound by an arbitration agreement concluded by 
its director.
The capacity of state or state body to refer a dispute to arbitration depends mainly on 
the constitution of the state body or the law which regulates its activities. Some 
establish no limitation upon the capacity of state or state entities to enter into 
arbitration agreements, whereas some other countries impose some restrictions upon 
their state and public authorities to enter into arbitration agi'eement. Moreover, the 
capacity of state or state body to agree to arbitration may also depend upon the law of 
forum where the State is sued, or sometimes depend upon the relevant international 
conventions, which have been adopted by that State.
The question of the capacity of Saudi State authorities or agencies to refer their 
disputes to arbitration have gone through, generally, five different historical stages. 
(1) Since the beginning of oil exploration until the 1950s, the Saudi State or its public 
entities used to employ arbitration as the primary means of resolving disputes between 
them and foreign private parties. (2) In 1963, the Saudi Government forbade any 
Saudi governmental body to refer its dispute with a private party to arbitration. This 
restrietion was a hostile reaction of the Saudi government against arbitration after the 
famous ARAMCO arbitration case of 1958 because the arbitral tribunal excluded the 
Saudi law and the Shari ’ah law, even though they were the applicable law according 
the arbitration agreement. (3) In 1976, the SA started to decrease the scope of the 
prohibition on state agencies by concluding agreements with foreign patties which 
included a clause to submit to arbitration any disputes may rise in future. The 
prohibition was further reduced in 1980 when the SA ratified the Washington 
Convention of 1965 on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States. (4) The Saudi Arbitration Regulation of 1983 came to allow 
Saudi state agencies to resort to arbitration but after having obtained the consent of 
the President of the Council of Ministers. However, this restrietion appears to be 
applicable to national arbitrations, but not to the international commerce as a result of 
adhering to some international convention such as the Washington Convention of 
1965. (5) In 1984, the SA ratified the NYC, which may imply that the Saudi State 
intended to be more open for international arbitration.
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In the context of the international transaction, the new trend supported by most courts 
and commentators is that a state or state bodies may be not allowed to rely upon their 
incapacity under their own national law to repudiate a previous arbitration agreement.
Also, the common approach adopted by courts and scholars regarding the immunity 
of state or perhaps its bodies ftom arbitration or enforcement of arbitral award is as 
the following: In the case of governmental activities, the state has the benefit of 
absolute immunity hom enforcement of arbitral agieements and awards, but in the 
case of commercial activities, the state has no immunity from enforcement of an 
arbitral agreement, and should be from enforcement, in which the state is engaged in 
the same manner as private person. However, the Saudi court in its landmark case 
goes beyond this doctrine and granted enforcement of the arbitral award against the 
Saudi State agency even though it is regarded as public body acting for govermuental 
activities, relying on Shari ’ah principles.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Invalid Agreement
4.1 Introduction
The second part of the first giound for refusing enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
is that the arbitration agreement is invalid. Of course, it goes without saying that the 
arbitration agreement is almost the foundation stone of international and domestic 
commercial arbitration. This is in view of the fact that the arbitration, unlike the 
litigation, has a contractual nature and composes an alternative voluntary means of 
disputes settlement, which therefore depends solely upon a valid consent of each 
party. Thus, if a valid agi'eement to arbitrate is lacking, there can be, in general, no 
basis for effective arbitration and there can be also no valid arbitral award. 
Consequently, most if not all conventions and national laws of arbitration include the 
invalidity of the arbitration agreement as a gi'ound for refusal of enforcement of 
arbitral award. In this context, the second part of Art. V(l)(a) of the NYC provides 
that it will be a giound for refusing enforcement to an award that:
[T]he said agi'eement is not valid under the law to which the parties have 
subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country 
where the award was made” (emphasis added). '
This chapter is concerned with the invalidity of the arbitration agi'eement as a g ’ound 
for refusing enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under Art. V(l)(a) of the NYC. 
The laws to be applied to the question of the validity of the arbitration agreement are 
firstly considered. This involves examining the law applicable to substantive validity 
and, then law applicable to formal validity. Secondly, it deals with the grounds of 
invalidity of the arbitration agreement. These include the formal g  ounds of invalidity 
on the one hand, and the substantive gi'ounds of invalidity on the second hand. The 
Saudi position thereof will be finally focused upon.
‘ NYC of 1958, Art. V (l)(a).
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4.2 Law Applicable to the Validity of the Arbitration Agreement
Extensive considérations both in theory and practice have been, generally, given to 
the question of the law applicable to the validity of arbitration agreement. Yet, this 
question remains unclear in the context of international arbitration  ^ and thus it has 
given rise to various approaches. This difficulty is caused via several reasons. The 
validity of the arbitration ageement is affected by many different factors which may 
each be governed by different laws, while the question of the validity may occur at 
different stages of the arbitral procedures. Moreover, the scope of application of the 
NYC regarding the validity of arbitration agreement is not clear,  ^ since the wording 
implied by Art. V (l)(a) is ambiguous. In addition, most commentators discuss the 
issue of the validity in considerable detail in the context of enforcement of the 
arbitration agreement, whereas in the context of enforcement of the arbitral award, 
they give the issue just a brief consideration and refer back to the earlier discussion. 
Yet, as mentioned before, these tow stages suffer noticeably different treatments 
under the NYC. Likewise, certain commentators, when discussing the issue of the 
applicable law under the NYC, make no clear distinction between formal validity and 
substantive validity. ^
To avoid the above confiisions and to have a better perception, the question of the 
applicable law to the validity of the arbitration agreement at the stage of enforcement 
of arbitral award will be discussed first in the context of the law applicable to 
substantive validity, and secondly in the context of the law applicable to formal 
validity.
 ^ See, Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration para 6-26; Di 
Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 
144; Bora, International Commercial Arbitration 95; VV Veeder, 'Summary o f Discussion in the First 
Working Group' (ICC Congress Series no 9 Paris 1998)45.
 ^ See, Lew, Mistelis and Ki'èoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 108.
See, eg, Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 463; Bora, 
International Commercial Arbitration 849; Davidson, Arbitration 393; Sutton and Gill, Russell on 
Arbitration 371; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration 985; M Mustill and S Boyd, The Law and Practice o f  Commercial Arbitration 
in England (2nd edn, Butterworths, London 1989) 424 fn 14.
 ^See, eg, Sutton and Gill, Russell on Arbitration 371.
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4.2.2 Law Applicable to Substantive Validity of the Arbitration Agreement.
4.2.2.1 General
Unlike the case of incapacity, Art. V (l)(a) of NYC provides  ^ choice of law rules to 
govern the question of invalidity of arbitration ageement. The second part of Art. V 
(l)(a) states that it will be a gound for refusing enforcement to an award that:
[t]he said ageement is not valid under the law to which the parties have 
subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country 
where the award was made”(emphasis added). ^
At first glance, this provision appears to contemplate only two possible applicable 
laws. The first is the law chosen by the parties to govern the validity of the arbitration 
agreement. Thus the parties are free to ehoose the applicable law, and their choice 
prevails over any other provisions. Thus, it has been said that this provision reflects 
“the supremacy of party autonomy over the territorial concept of arbitration”, ® while 
a noted authority has stated that Art. V (l) “places sigiificant emphasis on party 
autonomy and the ability to be able to settle their dispute as they choose”.  ^However, 
it may be obseiwed that it is not only unusual, but also not recommended for the 
parties to subject the arbitration ageement to a law which differs from the law of the 
main contract or perhaps the law of the arbitral seat. ” Lord Mustill and Boyd have 
noted that “it must be unusual for an arbitration clause in a contract to stipulate for a 
choice of law which is to apply to the clause and nothing else”.
 ^ See, Bom, International Commercial Arbitration 95; van den Berg, The New York Arbitration 
Convention o f 1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 282.
^NYC o f  1958, Art. V(12)(a),
® J Lew, 'The Law Applicable to the Fonn and Substance o f  the Ai'bitration Clause’ (ICCA Congress 
Series no 9 Paris 1998)142.
 ^Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration para 26-144.
See, ibid para 6-24; Sutton and Gill, Russell on Arbitration 68; Mustill and Boyd, Commercial 
Arbitration in England 62 fn 12. Davidson, Arbitration 368; Born, International Commercial 
Arbitration 109.
“ See, XI Insurance Ltd v Owens Corning [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep 500 (UK QBD Com Ct) 507; van den 
Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation pp 
146,282,291-92.
Mustill and Boyd, Commercial Arbitration in England 62 fn 12.
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Secondly, where the parties have failed to give any indication regarding the law 
applicable to the arbitration agreement, the applicable law will then be the law of the 
country where the arbitral award was made which is broadly deemed to be the law of 
the seat of the arbitration.
However, the question of determining the applicable law to the validity of the 
arbitration ageement under the provision of Art. V(l)(a) is actually more difficult 
than it first appears. A second look at this provision brings a significant difficulty to 
light, as will be seen below.
4.2.2.2 Implied Choice
While it is clear that Art. V(l)(a) gives primary effect to an express choice of law by 
the parties, it is not clear, in the absence of such expressed choice, whether the 
alternative law will immediately be the law of the seat, or will be any implied choice 
by the parties i.e. the law of the main contract, leaving the law of the seat as the third 
alternative. In other words, it is not clear whether the choice of law by parties as 
mentioned in Art. V(l)(a) includes only the expressed choice, or extends to imply 
choices, such as the choice of law governing the main eontract. This question 
particularly appears when the parties have indicated a law to govern the main 
eontract. Is the application of this law limited to the merits of the main contract, or it 
is applicable to the arbitration ageement as well, unless ageed otherwise? There are 
several views on this matter. However, the two main approaches as well as the French 
approach will be examined below;
First View: The Law of the Seat of the Arbitration
The first view is that in the absence of the expressed choice by the parties, the 
arbitration ageement is governed by the law of seat. This approaeh adopted by
See, eg, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration 226; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 107 fn 
28; Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 157.
See, eg, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f 1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 293; van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' (2003)'at 654; Gaja, International 
Commercial Arbitration para I.C.2; C Reymond, 'Where is an Aibitral Award Made'(1992) 180 LQR 
1 p 3,
See, eg, Isaac Glecer v Moses Israel Glecer & Estera Glecer-Nottman (1996) XXI YBCA 635 
(Neterlands Court o f  First Instance 1994) 524; X  v X  (1998) XXIII YBCA 754 (Switzerland Court of 
first Instance 26 May 1994)at 756,7; Insurance Company (Sweden) v Reinsurance Company 
(Switzerland) (1997) XXII YBCA 800 (Switzerland Supreme Court 21 Mar 1995)at 805; Concerta 
GDe Maio & F snc v EMAG AG  (1996) XXI YBCA 602 ( Italy Supreme Court 20 Jan 1995) at 604; X  
V A  (1999) XXIV YBCA 645 (Geimany Court of Appeal 17 Sep 1998) 646; Activai International SA v 
Conservas E l Pilar SA (2002) XXVII YBCA 528 (Spain Supreme Court 1996) 530; Dalmine SpA v M  
& M  Sheet Metal Forming Machinery AG  ; XI Insurance Ltd v Owens Corning [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
500 (QBD Com Ct); Planavergne S.A v Kalle Bergander i Stockholm AB (2002) XXVII YBCA 554 
(Sweden Court o f Appeal 2001) 555.
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation pp 293- 94.
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several authors and courts. The view is based upon the doctrine of autonomy or 
separability of the arbitration agreement. One important consequence of this doctrine 
is that the arbitration ageement may be governed by a different law to the main 
contract, since the law governing the arbitration ageement is determined by 
considerations which are different from those involved in deteimining the law 
applicable to the main contract. This approach considers the arbitration ageement as 
a wholly separate ageement from the main contract, and therefore not governed by 
the law of the main contract, in the absent of the expressed choice. So, when the 
parties have chosen a particular place for the arbitration, unless otherwise ageed, they 
are deemed to intend to choose the law of that place to govern the arbitration 
agreement.
Furthennore, it is argued that even though the primary choice of law by the parties, as 
envisaged by Art, V(l)(a), might be thought to include an implied choice of law 
governing the arbitration ageement, the strongest connecting factor which indicates 
the parties intention must be the place of arbitration. Thus, as Prof van den Berg states 
“if a contract contains a general choice of law clause and provides in the arbitration 
clause that the arbitration is to be held in a country with a different law, the latter 
indication must be deemed to prevail over the fonner”. He goes on to note that in the 
few reported cases where the possibility of an implied choice of law under Art.
V(l)(a) was considered, the applicable law was found to be the law of the country 
where the award was made. Thus, the possibility of an implied choice of law by the 
parties existed only in theory. It was further said, in this context, that:
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When one says that London, Paris or Geneva is the place of the 
arbitration, one does not refer solely to a geogaphical location. One 
means that the arbitration is conducted within the framework of the law of 
arbitration of England, France or Switzerland, or, to use an English 
expression, under the curial law of the relevant country. The geogaphical 
place of arbitration is the factual connecting factor between that 
arbitration law and the arbitration proper, considered as a nexus of 
contractual and procedural rights and obligations between the parties and 
with the arbitrators.
This view has been also adopted by several courts. For example, In XL Insurance Ltd 
V Owens Corning the parties chose the English Arbitration Act of 1996 to govern the 
arbitral proceedings, while ageeing that the main contract would be subject to the law 
of the State of New York. In detennining the law applicable to the validity of the 
arbitration ageement, the English Commercial Court held that “by stipulating 
arbitration in London under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996 the parties ... 
by implication chose English law as the proper law of the arbitration clause”. In 
supporting its judgnent, the Court quoted Lord Mustill in Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. 
& Others v Balfour Beatty Construction:
Certainly there may sometimes be an express choice of a curial law which 
is not the law of the place where the arbitration is to be held: but in the 
absence of an explicit choice of this kind, or at least some very strong 
pointer in the agreement to show that such a choice was intended, the 
inference that the parties when contracting to arbitrate in a particular place 
consented to having the arbitral process governed by the law of that place 
is irresistible.
The Court then went further to express its observation that “It is by no means 
uncommon for the proper law of the substantive contract to be different from the lex 
fo ri’, and it does happen, although much more rarely, that the law governing the 
arbitration ageement is also different from the lex fo r f  \
Similarly, a Netherlands court of first instance in Petrasol BV v Stolt Spur Inc 
observed that since New York was chosen as the arbitration place, this implies the
Reymond, 'Where is an Arbitral Award Made'at 3.
XI Insurance Ltd v Owens Corning 500.
Channel Tunnel Group Ltd and Others v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd and Others [1993] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 291 (UK HL) 304.
XI Insurance Ltd v Owens Corning 507.
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choice of the New York law as the law governing the arbitration, including the 
question of the validity of the arbitration ageement. Likewise, a Swiss court of first 
instance has stated that:
It is the prevailing doctrine, and it also corresponds with Art. V(l)(a) of 
the New York Convention, that, in the absence of a choice of law 
provision, the validity of the arbitration clause must be decided according 
to the law of seat of the arbitral tribunal.
Thus, according to the above-mentioned view, if there is no explicit choice of law by 
the parties to govern the validity of the arbitration ageement, the law of the 
arbitration seat will be deemed as the applicable law thereof.
Second View: The Law of the Main Contract
The second view is that the law chosen by the parties to govern the main contract is 
also applicable to the arbitration ageement, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. 
This view is also adopted by several authors and courts.
In supporting of this view, it has been argued that it is unusual for the parties to 
specify the law governing the arbitration ageement when making a choice of law for 
the main contract, particularly when the arbitration ageement is part of the main 
contract. So, it would appear peculiar to suggest that the law chosen to cover the main 
contract will govern all its provisions except the arbitration clause, since the choice of
Petrasol BV v Slolt Spur Inc (1997) XXII YBCA 762 (Netherlands Court of First Instance 1995) 
765.
X v  X  (Switzerland Court o f  first Instance 26 May 1994) 756,7.
See, eg, Mustill and Boyd, Commercial Arbitration in England 63; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration para 6-24; Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice 
o f  International Commercial Arbitration pp 157-58; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international 
arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 144; Davidson, Arbitration 291; Sutton and 
Gill, Russell on Arbitration 68; Dicey, Morris and Collins, Conflict o f Laws vol 1, 592
See, eg, Italin Company v German F  R firm  (1980) V YBCA 262 (Germany Court of First Instance 
24 Apr 1979) 264; Cia Maritima Zorroza SA v Sesostris SAE [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 652 (UK QBD Com 
Ct) 652; German assignee o f  a German Shipping Company v Japanese Shipyard (1990) XV YBCA 
455 (Gemiany Court of Appeal 17 Feb 1989) 457; Adda Officine Elettromeccaniche v Alsthom 
Atlantique SA (1996) XXI YBCA 580 (Italy Court o f First Instance 13 Feb 1991) 582; Union o f  India 
V McDonnell Douglas Corporation [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 48 (UK QBD Com Ct) 50; Owerri 
Commercail Inc v Dielle S rll (1994) XIX YBCA 703 (Netherlands Court o f  Appeal 1993).
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law and arbitration clauses are usually adjoining or at least close neighbours. In this 
regard Lord Mustill and Boyd state;
The starting point is to be detennine the proper law of the contract in 
which the arbitration is embodied. As a general rule the arbitration 
agreement will be governed by the same law, since it is part of the 
substance of the underlying contract. ... The presumption [that the law 
governing the validity of the arbitration ageement is the law of the state 
where the award is to be made] would we submit readily be rebutted in 
favour of the proper law of the underling contract”.
In addition, parties to international arbitration agreement usually choose a “neutral” 
seat that has no connection with either themselves or their commercial relationship. 
Consequently, the law of that place is not necessarily intended to be chosen by the 
parties to govern their relationship. In fact, they may well choose that place on basis 
of considerations, such as geogaphical convenience, that have no connection with the 
governing law of the arbitration ag eem en t.In d eed , the seat may be chosen long 
after the arbitration ageement has come into existence, and sometimes it is not
chosen by the parties.
Furthennore, while under the principle of the autonomy the parties may subject the 
arbitration ageement to a different law ftom the law of main contract, if this is not 
done explicitly, it is generally assumed that the arbitration clause is governed by the 
law of the main contract in which it is included. This because of the fact that it is 
not meant by the separability of the arbitration ageement that it is totally independent 
ftom the main contract “as evidenced by the fact that acceptance of the contract 
entails acceptance of the clause, without any other fonnality”. In the same manner, 
one leading authority has stated that:
See, Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 157. See also, 
Davidson, Arbitration 368.
Mustill and Boyd, Commercial Arbitration in England 63,
See, Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 78; Gaillard 
and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration para 433, 
1695.
See, Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration pp 157-58; 
Davidson, Arbitration 291.
Y Derains ‘The ICC Arbitral Process: Choice of the Law applicable to the Contract and International 
Ai'bitration’ (1996) 6 The ICC International Court o f Ai'bitration Bulletin pp 16-17, cited in Lew, 'The 
Law Applicable to the Form and Substance o f the Arbitration Clause’ 143.
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There is a very strong presumption in favour of the law governing the 
substantive agreement which contains the arbitration clause also 
governing the arbitration ageement. This principle has been followed in 
many cases. This could even be implied as an agreement of the parties as 
to the law applicable to the arbitration clause.
This approach has also been supported by several courts. For example, in the early 
case of Italian Company v German Firm the German Court of Appeal held that “the 
law applicable to the main contract also governs, in principle, the validity of the 
arbitral clause contained therein, since it must be assumed that parties wish a uniform 
legal regime applicable to both”. '^ Similarly, the Dutch Court of Appeal in Owerri v 
Dielle stated that it goes without saying that submitting the validity of the arbitration 
clause to the same law to which the parties submitted the main contract in which the 
arbitration ageement is embodied would be, in general, preferable by the parties.
Equally in Union o f India v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, the English 
Commercial Court held that:
An arbitration clause in a commercial contract like the present one is an 
agreement inside an ageement. The parties make their commercial 
bargain ... The parties may make an express choice of the law to govern 
their commercial bargain and that choice may also be made of the law to 
govern their ageement to arbitrate. In the present case it is my view that 
by art. 11 the parties have chosen the law of India not only to govern the 
rights and obligations arising out of their commercial bargain but also the 
rights and obligations arising out of their ageement to arbitrate.
In addition, the above-mentioned citation by the English Commercial Court in XL v 
Owens Corning of the views of Lord Mustill in the Channel Tunnel case to support its 
approach of applying the law of the seat of the arbitration is open to 
counterarguments. First, there is an essential difference between the two cases, as
ibid 143.
Italin Company V German F R firm  264.
Owerri Commercail Inc V Dielle S rll 706.
Union o f  India v McDonnell Douglas Corporation 50.
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common principles of French and English law were chosen to govern the contract in 
the Channel Tunnel case, rather than the law of a specific jurisdiction. By contrast, a 
particular law (i.e. New York law) was chosen in the XL case. Likewise, the law 
governing the arbitration ageement should not be mistaken for the law governing the 
arbitral process. Lord Mustill refers to the latter, which was obviously governed by 
English Arbitration Act 1996 as chosen by the parties. Moreover, Lord Mustill plainly 
refers to the implied choice of law of the seat of arbitration only in the absence of (a) 
an explicit choice or (b) some very strong pointer in the ageement. The stipulation of 
common principles of two different laws can hardly be considered as a strong pointer, 
whereas the precise choice for New York law to govern the main contract sensibly 
appears to be a very strong pointer for the parties’ common intention to have the 
whole agreement, including the arbitration agreement, governed by this law. 
Finally, Lord Mustill, as just mentioned, expressed his support in favour of the law of 
the main contract approach.
Yet, It may be observed that the above arguments either make no clear distinction 
between the two forms of the arbitration ageement (i.e. an arbitral clues and a 
submission ageement) or concern one of them (particularly, the arbitral clause) while 
addressing the issue of the law governing the validity of the arbitration agreement. 
Presumably it makes a big difference whether the arbitration ageement takes the fonn 
of an arbitration clause in a contract or a free standing agreement not forming part of 
another contract (a submission ageement). Therefore, it would appear important to 
make a distinction between the two forms of the arbitration ageement while 
detennining the law governing the validity of each fonn of the arbitration agreement, 
as the following:
First, as regards the arbitral clause in a contract, the approach of applying the law of 
the main contract appears to be more favorable, since an additional support for this 
approach can be found in the words ''any indication" in Art.V (l)(a), which is subject 
to a broad interpretation. Indeed, as Prof Davidson obseiwes, “the reference to 
‘indication’ of the chosen law suggests that the provision may embrace an implied
See, Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York 
Convention o f  1958 147.
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choice of law”. Therefore, Art.V(l)(a) refers to the law of the place of arbitration 
only when “failing any indication” of the applicable law by the parties. This 
indication may include an express choice of law or an implied choice in the form of 
the law of the main contract. In light of the above broad interpretation, it may be also 
argued that when the parties expressly indicate the law governing the whole contract, 
this would be deemed as an express choice of law to govern the arbitral clause. 
Besides, where the choice of the seat of arbitration has not been made by the parties 
themselves, but by the arbitral tribunal or an institution, the seat is surely entirely 
unconnected to the parties’ intention regarding the law applicable to the arbitration 
agreement.
Second, with regard to the separate ageement not foniiing part of another contract 
(i.e. submission ag'cement), applying the law of the arbitration seat appears to be 
more convincing sine there is a less obvious connection between this fonn of arbitral 
ageement with the main contract.
Another observation that should be made is that the foregoing argiments relates to the 
case where the parties have not expressly ehosen the law governing the arbitration 
clause itself, but have chosen the law governing both the main contract and the seat of 
arbitration. In other circumstances, the question of the law applicable to the 
arbitration agreement is less difficult. Thus, it may be suggested that where the 
arbitration fomm has not been chosen by the parties, but they have chosen the law 
governing the main contract, the latter is highly likely to be the governing law of the 
arbitration ageement, as it appears to be the law most closely related to that 
agreement. In contrast, where the law governing the main contract has not been 
chosen by the parties, but they have chosen the arbitration forum, the law latter of the 
latter appears to be the law applicable to the arbitration ag'cement, since it is the most 
connected factor to the underlying question. Finally, where neither the arbitration 
forum nor the law governing the main contract have been chosen by the parties, the 
enforcing court should strive to consider all connecting factors and suiTounding 
circumstances to demonstrate the common intention of the parties regarding the 
applicable law to the arbitration agreement.
Davidson, Arbitration 393.
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Third View: The French Approach to the Substantive Rule Method
The two foregoing views are just the most common approaches. However, there are 
other approaches to the question of the law applicable to the validity of the arbitration 
agreement. It may be worth mentioning the French approach. The French approach is 
called the substantive rule method, which was developed by the French Supreme 
Court in Comite popidaire de la municipalité de Khoms El Mergeb v Dalico 
Contractors of 1993. The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal decision of 
rejecting the argument of a Libyan respondent that Libyan law was the law applicable 
to the contract, and that the arbitration ag'cement was invalid thereunder, finding that 
the parties ageed to arbitration without choosing the law governing the arbitration 
agreement. The Supreme Court justified its decision in the following words:
By virtue of a substantive rule of international arbitration, the arbitration 
agreement is legally independent hom the main contract containing or 
referring to it, and the existence and effectiveness of the arbitration 
agreement are to be assessed, subject to the mandatory rules of French law 
and international public policy, on the basis of the parties’ common 
intention, there being no need to refer to any national law.
This approach has been followed by other French courts and supported by several 
legal writers. It is argued that applying a choice of law approach to determine the 
applicable law is not very helpful, since there must be great uncertainty in 
determining the relative importance of each of the various connecting factors. Thus, 
David states:
Legal writers are divided as to the answer to be given to this problem 
(applicable law), nor is it possible to deduce principles of much certainty 
hom the cases. The occasional pronouncements of the courts in this 
respect cannot be interpreted as an adhesion to a given doctrine and are 
only meant in general to explain in a convenient manner how the court has 
anived at a solution in the particular case.
This uncertainty is without doubt one of the gounds why the traditional choice of law
Comite populaire de la municipalité de Khoms El Mergeb v Dalico Contractors (France Supreme 
Court 20 Dec 1993), cited in Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration para 437.
ibid para 426,
Arbitration in International Trade 219.
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methods has been replaced by the substantive rules method in France. In addition, it 
is argied that the principle of the autonomy of the arbitration ageement should be not 
limited to autonomy from the main contract, but should be extended to mean 
autonomy from all national laws.
However, this approach has attracted strong criticism from several commentators. It is 
said, for example, that the arbitration ageement cannot be entirely independent from 
national law. It cannot be seriously suggested that an arbitration ageement can never 
be void or invalid for lack of capacity or consent. Likewise, an arbitration ageement 
is only valid if it frilfills the relevant formal and substantive conditions under the 
applicable law. Such conditions may be liberal, but they cannot be absent. It may be 
added that under this approach the arbitration agreement is still subject to French 
public policy, which appears to run contrary to the essential premise of the substantive 
rules method that the validity of the arbitration ageement is independent from any 
national law. Indeed, as has been noted, “the French courts stopped short of a 
complete delocalization of the arbitration ageement”. Indeed, it is not clear how 
this approach operates.
4.2.3 The Law Applicable to the Formal Validity of the Arbitration Agreement.
The question of the law applicable to the arbitration agreement seems to be even more 
difficult in the case of the formal as opposed to substantive validity. While there is no 
difference about the applicability of Art.Y(l)(a) to substantive validity, so that 
argiments are limited to its inteipretation, there is however a diversity as to whether 
Art. V(l)(a) or Art. II applies to the question of the fonnal validity of the arbitration 
agreement at the stage of enforcement of the arbitral award. The problem stems from 
the fact that although Art.V(l)(a) provides guidance regarding choice of law rules to
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration para 434.
Gatoil V National Iranian Oil Co (Paris Court of Appeal 17 Dec 1991), cited in David, Arbitration 
in International Trade 229 fn 140. see also. Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman 
on International Commercial Arbitration para 419.
Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration 
para 438. for criticizing the approach o f  international standard independent from any national laws, see, 
A Redfern, 'Commercial Ai'bitration and Transnational Public Policy' (ICCA Congress Series no 18 
Montreal 2006); Reisman, 'Law, International Public Policy (so-called) and Arbitral Choice in 
International Coimnercial Ai'bitration'.
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govern the question of the invalidity of arbitration agreement, and makes no 
distinction between fonnal validity and substantive validity, the opening of this 
provision makes an ambiguous reference to Art.II, which provides a standard of 
formal requirements for the arbitration agi'eement at the stage of its enforcement. Art. 
V(l) (a) states that;
The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were. ... or the said 
agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it 
or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the 
award was made (emphasis added).
This unclear reference leads to the question as to whether the formal validity of the 
arbitration agi’eement at the stage of enforcement of the award is governed by 
Art.V(l)(a) or Art II. Two main views will be considered below:
First View: Art. II is Applicable
The prevailing view is that the formal validity of the arbitration agreement is to be 
detemained under the requirements of Art. II at both stages of enforcement of the 
arbitral agreement and the arbitral award. This approach has been strongly supported 
by Prof van den Berg and adopted by several authors and almost every court.
NYC of 1958, Alt. V (l)(a).
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 284; P Sanders, 'Consolidated Commentai7'(1981) VI YBCA 202 at 206, 211; Garnett 
and others, International Commercial Arbitration 104. See also, Ki'oli, 'Recognition and Enforcement 
o f Foreign Arbitral Awards in Gennany' at 166.
See, eg, PAG (Zurich) v V (Vienna) (1976) I YBCA 183 (Austria Supreme Court 17 Nov 1971) 
183; Czechoslovakian Export Organization v Greek Shipping Co (1989)XIV YBCA 636 (Greece 
Court o f Appeal 1982 ) 636; Isaac Glecer v Moses Israel Glecer & Estera Glecer-Nottman 524; 
Charterer (Norway) v Shipowner (Russian Federation) (2002) XXVII YBCA 519 (Noiivay Court of 
Appeal 16 Aug 1999) 522; Manufacturer (Slovenia) v Exclusive Distributor (Germany) (2004) XXIX 
YBCA 687 (Germany Court of Appeal 24 Jan 1999) 690; De Maio Giuseppe e Fratelli snc v 
Interskins Ltd  pp 497-99; Austin John Montague v Commonwealth Development Corporation (2001) 
XXVI YBCA 744 (Queensland Supenne Court 27 Jun 2000) 748; Smita Conductors Ltd. v. Euro 
Alloys Ltd (2002) XXVII YBCA 482 (Indan Supreme Court 31 Aug 2001) 483; Forwarding agent v 
Dealer (2004)XXIX YBCA 747 (Geimany Court o f Appeal 13 Jan 2002) 750; Pulsarr Industrial 
Research BV v Nils FI. Nilsen AS (2003) XXVIII YBCA 821 (Norway Enforcement Court 10 Jul 
2002) 824; Empresa Colombiana de Vias Fen-eas v Drummond Ltd (2004) XXIX YBCA 643 
(Colombia Council o f State 2004) 651.
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This approach is mainly based on ground that there is a specific reference in the 
beginning of Art. V(l)(a) to Art. II which sets down a uniform mle regarding the 
formal requirements of arbitration agreement. Therefore, this reference indicates that 
issues of the fonnal validity of the arbitration agreement are excepted from being 
governed by the provision of Art. V(l)(a), and are in fact only subject to the formal 
requirements of Art. 11(2). Prof Sanders has argued that Ait. 11 thus provides a 
unifonn rule as to the form of the agreement, and no room is left for the application of 
different requirements under national laws which may require more, or less than that 
agreement be “in writing” as defined in Art. 11. Hence, the reference in Art.V(l)(a) to 
the law of the country where the award is made defining the validity of the arbitration 
agi'eement, only applies to deficiencies other than those of fonn. That is to say “when 
enforcement of the award is sought, no other criteria apply to the form of the 
agreement than those laid down in Art. II, to which Art. V(l)(a) itself refers”.
Furthennore, it was argued that this approach draws further support from the 
legislative history of Art.V(l)(a). The Dutch delegate at the last session of the NYC 
conference noted that the proposed text of Art.V(l)(a) would include express 
agreements as well as tacit agi'eements. In order to exclude the latter, he put forward 
the addition of “the agi'eement refeired to in article 11” which was finally accepted by 
the conference. So, despite the fact that the above amendment is awkwardly worded, 
since it does not clearly indicate its real function, the legislative history however 
makes it clear that the hamers of the NYC intended that the invalidity of the 
arbitration agreement under Art. II would be also a gi'ound for refusing enforcement 
of the arbitral award.
In addition, it is submitted that limiting the application of Art. II to the pre-award 
stage (i.e. the enforcement of the arbitral agi'eement) and not to the post-award stage 
(i.e. the enforcement of the arbitral award) is contrary to the internal consistency of
See, Foi-warding agent v Dealer (Gennany Court o f Appeal 13 Jan 2002) 750; P Sanders,
'Consolidated Conunentary'(1981) VI YBCA 202211; van den Berg, The New York Arbitration 
Convention of 1958 ; Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 287; van den Berg, 'Consolidated 
Commentai-y' (2003)'at 586.
Sanders, 'Consolidated Commentary' (1981)' 211. See also, Kroll, 'Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Ar bitral Awards in Geimany' 166.
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 285; Sanders, 'Consolidated Commentaiy (1981)' 211.
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the NYC. This because limiting the application of Art. II to the pre-award stage would 
lead to the conclusion that an arbitration agreement could be held valid under the 
governing law at the stage of the enforcement of the arbitral award, although the same 
agreement would have to be held invalid at the stage of the enforcement of the arbitral 
agreement as it does not meet the formal requirements of Art. II, (and the opposite is 
also tme). The NYC must be applied in a manner that leads to as much uniformity as 
possible in governing international commercial arbitration at all stages of the 
arbitration process.
Finally, it is argued that, apart fiom the Italian Supreme court, all courts adopt the 
view that Art. 11 is also applicable at the stage of the enforcement of the arbitral 
award. Prof van den Berg further submits that Art.V(l)(a) has scarcely ever been 
invoked on the basis that the arbitration agi’eement is invalid under the law applicable 
to it, and never successfully. By contrast. Art. V(l)(a) has been successfully invoked 
on the basis that the agreement did not comply with fonnal requirements of Art. 
11(2 ). “
As regards the judicial support, a German court of appeal has, for instance, held that:
The obligation to recognize foreign arbitral awards hirther requires that 
the award be issued on the basis of a valid agi’eement between the parties 
according to Art. 11 Convention. This ensues in particular from the 
wording of the grounds for rehisal in Art. V(l)(a) Convention, which 
provides that the parties must have concluded an agroement within the 
meaning of Art. 11 Convention.
Moreover, the Austrian Supreme Court underlined that the formal requirements for 
the arbitration agi’eement must be exelusively judged under Art. 11 of the NYC since 
Art. V does not deal with such requirements.
See, Sanders, 'Consolidated Commentaiy' (1981)' 211; van den Berg, The New York Arbitration 
Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 286.
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 287.
ibid 282.
X  (UK) v X  (Germany) (2004) XXIX YBCA 732 (Germany Court of Appeal 22 N ov 2001) 736,
PAG (Zurich) v V(Vienna) 183,
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Second View: Only Art. V(l)(a) is Applicable
The other view is that the formal validity at the stage of enforcement is not governed 
by Art. II, but only by the applicable law as mentioned in Art.V(l)(a). This view has 
strongly been supported by several authors as well as some Italian Courts. In 
supporting this view, it is submitted that Art V(l)(a) states clearly that the validity of 
the arbitration agreement at the post-award stage is to be governed by the law chosen 
(expressly or implicitly) by the parties or, falling such choice, by the law of the 
arbitration seat, and by nothing else. Therefore, the reference in the opening of 
Art.V(l)(a) to Art. 11 is no more than “a superfluous additional description”. 
Alternatively, this reference may have another function, since the aim of Art. 11 is not 
only to require that the arbitration agi'eement be in writing, but more importantly to 
oblige the courts of contracting states to refer parties to such agieement to arbitration, 
and to giant to arbitration clauses the same treatment as submission agreements.
Furthermore, the legislative history far from makes clear that it was the intent of the 
NYC drafters that Art. II also be invoked at the stage of enforcement of the award. 
The legislative history in fact indicates no more than the Dutch delegate was womed 
that awards based upon implied ageement might be enforceable if a reference to Art. 
II was not included. Thus, there is no clear explanation why this reference was 
included in Art. V(l)(a).
Moreover, the NYC as with other treaties “shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose”. Indeed, the main object of the 
NYC is to advance the effective use of international commercial arbitration in general
See, Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York 
Convention o f  1958 pp 83-87; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration para 62-77.
Lanificio Walter B and S.a.S v Bobbie Brooks Inc (1981) VI YBCA 233 (Italy Supreme Court 
1980); X v X  (Germany Court o f  Appeal 17 Sep 1998) .
See, Lew, Mistelis and Ki'èoil, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration para 26-77
See, UN Doc E/CONF.26/SR.24 p 2; El-Alidab, Arbitration with the Arab countries p 2; Di Pietro 
and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 pp 84- 
85; van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 285.
Viemia Convention on The Law o f Treaties Between States And International Organizations or 
Between International Organizations of 1986, Art. 31.
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and to facilitate the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in particular. Thus, 
inteipreting Art. V(l)(a) as allowing reliance on non-compliance with Art. II to deny 
enforcement to awards would be at odds with the NYC’s primary puipose and good 
faith, since this would give the losing party a further chance of resisting the 
enforcement of arbitral award. It is almost eertain that promoting enforcement of 
arbitral awards is more important than achieving a uniform standards in various 
national arbitration laws or than the internal consistency of the NYC. Furthemaore, 
Applying the formal requirements of Art, II (2) in the context of the enforeement of 
the foreign award would be not consistent with the pro-enforcement policy of the 
NYC only if its requirements are less demanding than the applicable national law 
pursuant to Art. V (l)(a). However, this is hard to be the case, as most national 
arbitration laws today require less strict fonnal requirements than Art. 11(2).
In addition, as mentioned early, Art. V provides an exhaustive list of gounds for 
rehisal of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and should be interpreted and 
applied narrowly. The key purpose of Art. V is to make the opportunities for resisting 
enforcement of the foreign awards much more restricted, than the opportunities for 
resisting enforcement of the arbitration ageement according to national laws. It is 
further submitted that the losing party may only rely on the gound of invalidity of the 
arbitration ageement at the post-award stage if he has raised a plea of that gound in 
the arbitral proceedings. If he has failed to do so with no legitimate excuses, he might 
be not pennitted to invoke that objection at the post-award stage, or at least there is 
indeed a very little chance of him being permitted to do so. Therefore, allowing the 
losing party to rely on Art. II to oppose enforcement of the award would appear to be 
contrary to the foregoing restricted regime of Art. V.
This approach was earlier adopted by the Italian Supreme Court in 1980 in the 
Lanificio Walter v Bobbie Brooks case. In enforcement proceedings the Italian Court 
of Appeal rejected a defence that the arbitral clause was not in writing as required by 
Art. II, holding that the clause was valid under the law of the place where the award
See, supra Cli 2 para 2.2.
See, in general, G A Pap KG Hotzgrosshandlung v Ditta Giovanni G Pecoraro (1981) VI YBCA 
228 (Italy Appeal Court 13 Feb 1978) pp 228-29; Davidson, International Commercial Arbitration : 
Scotland and the UNCITRAL M odel Law 86; Davidson, Arbitration 368; Di Pietro and Platte, 
Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 86; Lew, 
Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration para 26-79.
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was made (i.e. the US), which was the applicable law according to Art. V(l)(a). This 
decision was then upheld by the Italian Supreme Court, which stated that a 
preliminary observation should be made as to the relationship between Arts. II and V 
of the NYC. Art. II regulates the derogation fiom the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
Contracting States and recognizes the exclusive jurisdiction of the foreign arbitrator 
by obligating the courts to refer the dispute to arbitrator, on the basis of an arbitral 
clause provided in writing as prescribed in Art. II. On the other hand, Art. V(l)(a) 
operates on a completely different level, since it regulates the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards. Hence, Art. V (l)(a) and not Art. II must be applied in cases 
concerning enforcement of foreign awards.
Similarly, a Germany court of appeal has had affirmed the validity of an arbitration 
agreement under the English law because the arbitration was held in England, on 
whieh the parties ageed.
To sum up, it seems to be very difficult to decide which view is preferable, since both 
can marshal strong argiments. Therefore, it may be appropriate to put foi*ward a 
compromise suggestion by proposing that Art. II constitutes only a maximum 
standard for the formal requirements of the validity, which does not prevent any 
reliance upon more favourable law that may be applicable under Art. V(l)(a). To 
put it another way, formal validity, like substantive validity, is generally governed by 
the applicable law as provided by Art. V(l)(a) (i.e. the law chosen (expressly or 
tacitly) by the parties, or othei*wise the law of the seat of the arbitration seat), unless 
the formal requirements of the applicable law are stricter than those of Art. II. In that 
case. Art. II should apply and supersede the fonnal requirements of all other laws. 
This compromise has the advantage of relying on the provisions most favourable to 
the formal validity of the ageement, whether this is the applicable law under Art. 
V(l)(a) or the provisions of Art. II. Indeed, this appears to be much more in line with 
the NYC’s pro-enforcement bias and arrives at the same conclusion of Art. VII (1) of 
more-favourable- provision to enforcement.
Lanificio Walter B and S.a.S v Bobbie Brooks Inc pp 234-35.
X v X  (Germany Court o f  Appeal 17 Sep 1998) .
See in general, Kroll, 'Recognition and Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards in Gennany’ 
Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration para 26-77.
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4.2.4 Art. VII (1) of the NYC
It is worth mentioning here that, whatever the law governing the validity of the 
arbitration ageement under Art. V(l)(a) might be, Art. VII(l) of the NYC allows 
the party who seeks the enforcement of arbitral award to rely upon any more 
favourable provision provided by the national laws and treaties available at the 
enforcing country. This is a veiy important provision which places significant 
emphasis on the pro-enforcement bias of the NYC. Accordingly, If an arbitration 
agreement is held to be invalid under the applicable law as indicated by Art.V(l)(a) or 
Art. II, but is regarded as valid under the law of the enforcing state, the award would 
still be enforceable.
4.3 Grounds of Invalidity
Having seen that Art. II of the NYC is, according to the prevailing view, applicable to 
both stages of enforcement of arbitral ageement and award, it may be thought 
necessary to examine its requirements that the arbitration agreement has to flilfil to be 
valid, and vice versa. In other words, lacking one or more of these requirements may 
constitute a ground for invalidity of the arbitration agreement and subsequently a 
refusal ground for enforeement of the arbitral award. In this context, the formal 
gounds of invalidity will be first discussed below. The substantial gounds of 
invalidity will be secondly examined.
4.3.1 Formal Grounds of Invalidity
4.3.1.1 General
The NYC as well as most conventions and national laws require certain conditions for 
the formal validity of the arbitration ageement. In particular, the arbitration 
agreement shall be in writing. The next logic question is why is that? In principle, this 
is because of the fact that, unlike the jurisdiction of national courts, refening any 
dispute to arbitration can only be done where there is consent by the parties to do so.
NYC of 1958, A t. VII (1).
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Therefore, having such ageement in wnting is self-evident fact without any need of 
flirther evidence or explanation that the parties have ageed to resolve their dispute by 
arbitration outside the primary right of the jurisdiction of the national courts. Besides, 
the main aim of the formal requirements is to make sure that both parties are totally 
aware that they are entering into an agreement of arbitration.
Therefore, Art. II (1) of the NYC requires that an ageement to arbitrate shall be “in 
writing”. It provides that:
Each Contracting State shall recogize an agreement in writing under 
which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences 
. . . .  (emphasis added).
In this manner, it can be considerably observed that most common ground regarding 
the invalidity of the arbitration ageement invoked in practice at the stage of 
enforcement of the arbitral award is that the agreement does not comply with the 
formal requirements under Art. II. Thus, the Kay question needs to be concentrated on 
now is what constitutes agreement in writing? But, in order to hilly understand this 
question, it may be helpful to start first with the question of whether the fonual 
requirements of Art. 11(2) are deemed as a uniform rule or a maximum requirement?
4.3.1.2 Is Art. II (2) a Uniform Rule or a Maximum Requirement only?
While it is unanimously accepted that Art. 11(2) places a unifonn of a maximum 
formal requirement which supersedes any more demanding fonnal requirement under 
national laws, different views, however, exist as to whether the definition of what 
constitutes a written arbitration ageement given in Art. 11(2) eould be considered as a 
uniform of a minimum formal requirement as well.
See, Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 141; van den 
Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 171; 
Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration para 7-7; Merkin, 
Arbitration law para 3.8; N Kaplan, 'Is the Need for Writing as Expressed in the New York 
Convention and the Model Law Out of Step with Commercial Practice?'! 1996) 12(1) Arb Inti 27 at 29.
‘’^ N Y C of 1958, Art. A t. II (1).
However, the Italian Courts used to rely on the Italian Civil Code (A ts. 1342 and 1342) which 
requires more restrict requirement for the fonnal validity than those laid down in A t. 11(2). See, for 
more details, van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' (2003)’ 591.
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The old prevailing view is that the Art. 11(2) establishes both a maximum and a 
minimum of international uniform rule for the formal validity of the arbitration 
ageement which prevails over any provision of national laws thereon. Prof Sanders 
and Prof van den Berg earlier emphasised that:
Article 11(2) must in principle be considered to be both a maximum and a 
minimum requirement: a court may not require more, but may also not 
accept less than is provided by Article 11(2) for the fomi of the arbitration 
agreement.
So, no enforcement can be sought under the application of the NYC if the arbitration 
agreement is not in accordance with the written form as required by Art. 11(2) such as 
the implied or oral ageement. In supporting this approach, it was a rg ed  that since 
the text of Art. 11(2) appears to be comprehensive and does not leave any room for 
the application of national law, the unifoi-m rule character would apply to its fullest 
extent. Besides, this approach can find additional support under the legislation history 
of the NYC. The legislation history would indicate that the drafters had in mind that 
the definition of “ageement in writing” in Art. 11(2) was to be all-inclusive, not only 
because they declined a suggestion of deleting Art. 11(2) altogether, but also because 
they declined a suggestion to add the non-objection to a confirmation including an 
arbitral clause(i.e, tacit agreement) to the definition of the arbitration ageement in
•. • 69writing.
This view has also been adopted by several national courts. For example, a Swiss 
court of appeal stated that:
Art. 11 sets not only a maximum but also a minimum requirement. 
Obviously, a contracting State may not set stricter requirements as to 
form, nor can it accept less far-reaching formal requirements ... That
van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation pp 178-79; Sanders, 'Consolidated Commentai^' (1981)' 211.
See, van den Berg, The New Yoidc Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation pp 178, 196; van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' (2003)'589; Di Pietro and 
Platte, Enforcement o f international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f 1958 76.
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Unifonn Judicial 
Interpretation 179.
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provision dose not allow for acceptance of the validity of an arbitration 
clause which does not meet the said requirements.
Besides, the Austrian Supreme Court earlier held that “the requirement of the written 
fonn of the arbitration ageement is exclusively governed by the New York 
Convention.
However, the current common trend is that Art. 11(1) does not constitutes a minimum 
requirement for the formal validity of the arbitration ageement, but rather it 
establishes only a maximum requirement thereof. This approach is increasingly 
supported by authors and courts. Even Prof Berg, who has been long supporting 
the old view, seems to have abandoned recently his previous view and came too close 
to the contemporary trend.
This view can be justified upon the ground that the formal requirements of Art. 11 not 
any longer in line with the needs of international trade practise. Indeed, after more 
than 48 years of adopting the NYC, Art. 11(2) definition of what constitutes “an 
ageement in writing”, and particularly an exchange in writing, has been found to 
reflect the means of communication used in 1958 , but not the means of contemporary 
days, where the letters and telegams used in Art. 11(2) are broadly replaced by new 
means of commercial con*espondences, such as fax, emails and digital technologies. 
Consequently, instead of amending Art. 11(2) which seems to be significantly difficult, 
its requirements of written form need to be inteipreted liberally, rather than literally, 
to meet the cuiTent practice and needs of international trade communications. This is
™ DIETFLtd V RFAG  (1996) XXI YBCA 685 (Switzerland Court o f Appeal 1994) 688.
PAG (Zurich) V V (Vienna) 183.
See, eg, K Mbaye, 'Abitration Agreements: Conditions Governing Their Efficacy' (ICCA Congress 
Series no 9 Paris 1998 ) 94 at 100; Veeder, 'Summary o f Discussion ' 44; G Alvarez, 'A ticle 11(2) of 
the New York Convention and the Courts’ (ICCA Congress Series no 9 Paris 1998)71; Di Pietro and 
Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 pp 81-83; 
Kaplan, 'Is the Need for Writing as Expressed in the New York Convention and the Model Law Out of 
Step with Commercial Practice?'. Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration para 6-39.
See, eg, Tradax Export SA v Amoco Iran Oil Co (1986) XI YBCA 532 (Switzerland Supreme 
Court 1984) pp 534-535; Compagnie de Navigation et Transports SA v MSC  - Mediterranean 
Shipping Company SA (1996) XXI YBCA 690 (Switzerland Supreme Court 16 Jan 1995) 696; Jiangxi 
Provincial M etal and Minerals Import and Export Corp v Sulanser Co Ltd  (1996) XXI YBCA 546 ( 
Hong Kong High Court 1995) 549.
See, van den Berg, 'Consolidated Conmientary' (2003)'pp584-87; van den Berg, 'The Application of 
the New York Convention by the Courts' 32.
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to say that Art, 11(2) still survives and breathes the present-day air since the phrase “an
ageement in writing” does not mean at the present what it meant in 1958. 75
4.3.1.3 How should the Formal Requirement of Art. 11(2) be Interpreted?
The critical question needs to be highlighted then is that how exactly or to which 
extent a liberal inteipretation for Art. 11(2) could be performed to be consistent with 
present day practise of international trade. Different approaches have been adopted 
regarding this question, which essentially as follows:
First, the modern conespondence by means not mentioned in Art. 11(2) can be 
allowed in the light of an expansive interpretation of Art. 11(2) for the justifications 
mentioned above and particularly since the English text of Art. 11(2) uses the word 
“shall include” which means “shall include, but not be limited to”. Accordingly, an 
implicit acceptance of a contract including arbitral clause can be deemed to be in 
conformity with the writing requirement. Besides, there is no justification to submit 
arbitration ageement to stricter fonn requirement than other contractual provision 
since referring to arbitration has become the natural forum for international 
commercial disputes rather than a risky waiver of the primary right of litigation at the 
national court. Indeed, restrict form requirements may appear to be a source of 
additional disputes, rather than promoting legal certainty. Consequently, the written 
agreement requirement of Art. 11(2) should liberally be interpreted in the light of 
modem means of communications.^^
This approach has been followed by the Swiss Supreme Court in Tradax Export SA v 
Amoco Iran Oil Co where the Court held that:
[T]his provision [of Art. 11(2) of the NYC] has to be interpreted in
accordance with its object, and with a view to the interests it is clearly
See, Veeder, 'Summaiy o f Discussion ' 44.
See, for more details regarding these approaches, van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentaiy (2003)' 
pp 584-87; T Landau, 'The Requirement of a Written Fonn for an Abitration Agreement: When 
"Written" Means "Oral"' (ICC Congress Series no 11 London 2002) pp 67-80.
See, Landau, 'The Requirement of a Written Fonn' 68; van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' 
(2003)' 585.
See, Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration paras 7-9, 7-10.
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designed to protect. The purpose of the Convention is to facilitate the 
resolution of disputes through arbitration, taking particular account of the 
needs of international commerce.
Second, a liberal interpretation for Art. 11(2) can be done in the light of Art. 7(2) of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Arbitration which contains a wider 
functional definition of the written ageement requirement, despite the fact that it does 
not resolve the question of whether an arbitration clause contained in a contract that 
has tacitly been accepted by the other party can be considered to meet the written 
fonn requirement. Art. 7(2) furnishes the following:
The arbitration agreement shall be in writing. An agreement is in writing 
if it is contained in a document s ig ed  by the parties or in an exchange of 
letters, telex, telegams or other means o f telecommunication which 
provide a record o f  the agreement, or in an exchange of statements of 
claim and defence in which the existence of an agreement is alleged by 
one party and not denied by another. The reference in a contract to a 
document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration 
agreement provided that the contract is in writing and the reference is such 
as to make that clause part of the contract (emphasis added).
This approach was taken, for example, by the Swiss Supreme Court in Compagnie de 
Navigation v MSC. The Court has interestingly ruled that according to the prevailing 
view Art. 11(2) of the NYC must be interpreted in the light of Art. 7(2) of the model 
law established by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 
whose authors intended to adopt the regime of the New York Convention to present 
needs without modifying it. Equally, a Hong Kong high court has noted that if one 
looks at the definition of “agreement in writing” in Art. 11(2), one can obseiwe that 
definition is not exclusive and is not a bar to the application of Art. 7(2) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law.
Tradax Export SA v Amoco Iran Oil Co pp 534-35.
See, Landau, 'The Requirement o f a Written Form' 72; van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary’ 
(2003)’585.
UNCITRAL Model Law o f 1985, Art.7(2).
Compagnie de Navigation et Transports SA v MSC - Mediterranean Shipping Company SA 696. 
Jiangxi Provincial Metal and Minerals Import and Export Corp v Sulanser Co Ltd  549.
Ch 4: Invalid Agreement 96
Third, a liberal interpretation for Art. 11(2) can be made by applying the provision of 
Art. VII(l) which gants a party to rely upon more liberal provisions available at the 
enforcing country which demands less restrictive formal standard for the arbitration 
agreement. This approach of more-favourable-right-provision of Art. VII(l) was 
followed by several courts. For example, the French Court of Appeal in Bomar Oil 
N V V Entreprise Tunisienne d'Activités Pétrolières held that:
As the States of both parties have adhered to the [1958 New York 
Convention], that Convention would govern the recogition and 
enforcement of the award in dispute ... It follows [from Art. VII (1) of the 
New York Convention] that a French court, when faced with an 
application to set aside an arbitral award, may have to put aside the 
provision of the Convention if French Domestic law is more favourable 
than the New York Convention”.
Fourth, according to the prevailing view, as has already been addressed, the 
enforcement court has a marginal discretion to confirm enforcement in some 
circumstances even if refusal gounds are proven to exist. This approach is based 
upon the gound that “the opening lines of paragaph (1) and (2) of Article V say that 
enforcement “may” be refrised. They do not say that it “must” be refused. The 
langage is permissive, not mandatory”. Prof Davidson asserts that the court has 
such discretion to enforce in any ease.
This approach has been followed by many courts. For example, it was taken by the 
Supreme Court of Hong Kong which held in a straight line that:
NYC o f 1958, A t.V II (1).
See, eg, Seller (Demnaric) v Buyer (Germany) (1996) XXI YBCA 535 (Gennany Court o f Appeal 
16 Dee 1992) 537; Gas Authority o f  India Ltd v Nippon Kohan Corporation (1998) XXIII YBCA 688 
(India High Court 1993) pp 698-99; American Bureau o f  Shipping (ABS) v Copropriété Maritime Jules 
Verne (2004) XXIX YBCA 657 ( France Court o f Appeal 2002) 660.
Bomar Oil NV  v Entreprise Tunisienne d'Activites Pétrolières (1992) XVII YBCA 488 (France 
Court of Appeal 1991)490,
See, subra ch 2 para 2.4,1
See, Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  Internationa! Commercial Arbitration 460.
See, Davidson, Arbitration 392.
See, eg, China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch v Gee Tai Holdings Co Ltd 
225; China Agribusiness Development Corp v Balli Trading pp 78-80; Chromalloy Aerosennces Inc v 
Arab republic o f Egypt 914.
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Even if a gound of opposition is proved, there is still a residual discretion 
left in the enforcing court to enforce nonetheless. This shows that the 
gounds of opposition are not to be inflexibly applied. The residual 
discretion enables the enforcing court to achieve a just result in all the 
circumstances.
The court then went further, in support of its view, to hold that this conclusion is in 
accordance with the NYC pro-enforcement bias and most courts’ attitude of pro­
enforcement worldwide. Similarly, the UK Commercial Court affirmed in a recent 
case that “It is clear from the terms of the statute (Arbitration Act 1975 s. 5(2)(e) ) 
that refusal to enforce a Convention award is a matter for the discretion of the 
Court”. ”
Fifth, as already mentioned above, at the stage of enforcement of the arbitral award, 
the fornial validity of the arbitration ageement may be deemed to be totally not 
governed by the formal requirement of Art. II. Contrary to the prevailing view, this 
approach is supported by some authors '^ "^ and the Italian Supreme Court in Lanificio 
Walter v Bobbie Brooks, The Court ruled that Art. II aims chiefly to promote the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the foreign arbitrator by obligating the courts to refer the 
dispute to arbitrator, on the basis of an arbitral clause provided in writing as 
prescribed in Art. II. On the other hand, Art. V(l)(a) operates on a completely 
different level sense it regilates the actions for the enforcement of fo re ig  arbitral 
awards. Hence, Art. V (l)(a) and not Art. II must be applied in the case concerning 
enforcement of the foreign arbitral award.
4.3.1.4 What Constitutes an Agreement in Writing?
Having seen the general character of Art. 11(2), the critical question need now to be 
considered is that what constitutes ageement in writing under Art. II? It can be
China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch v Gee Tai Holdings Co Ltd 225. 
‘^ Ubid 226.
China Agribusiness Development Corp v Balli Trading 79.
see, Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York 
Convention o f  1958 pp 83-87; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration para 62-77.
Lanificio Walter Band S.a.S v Bobbie Brooks Inc ) pp 234-35.
Ch 4: Invalid Agreement 98
observed that the judicial intei-pretations differ considerably as to some aspects of the 
written agreement requirements under Art. 11(2) as a result of the difference in 
national laws about what satisfies the writing requirement and as a reflection of 
different attitudes of the national courts towards arbitration.
Nevertheless, Art. II (1) generally requires the arbitration ageement to be in writing, 
and Art. II (2) subsequently comes to provide an identification of the concept of the 
writing requirement as follows:
The term “ageement in writing” shall include an arbitral clause in a 
contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in 
an exchange of letters or telegrams.
Art. 11(2) sets out two alternative form requirements. The first alternative form 
requirement is an arbitration clause in contract or a separate arbitration agreement 
both signed by the parties. The second alternative form requirement is an arbitration 
clause in contract or a separate arbitration ageement contained in exchange letters or 
telegrams potentially without signatures. In this sense, the Swiss Supreme Court in 
Compagnie de Navigation v MSC has point out the definition of ageement in writing 
under Art. 11(2) as follows:
According to the formal requirements applicable in casu, arbitration 
clauses are valid which are either contained in a signed contract or in an 
exchange of letters, telegrams, telexes and other means of communication.
In other words, a distinction should be made between ageements 
resulting fiom a document, which must in principle be sigied, and 
agreements resulting from an exchange of written declarations, which are 
not necessarily signed.
Similarly, a US district court in Czarina LLC v WF Poe Syndicate has outlined the 
definition of "agreement in writing" under Art. 11(2) as the following:
A majority of courts persuasively conclude that the Convention's 
definition of "ageement in writing" requires either (1) a signed contract
See, Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration paras 7-19, 7-20; 
van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 . Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 170.
Compagnie de Navigation et Transports SA v MSC - Mediterranean Shipping Company SA 697. 
Czarina LLC v WF Poe Syndicate 254 FSupp2d 1229 (US District Court M D Florida 2002).
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that includes an arbitral clause, (2) a sigied arbitration ageement, or (3) 
an exchange of letters or telegrams demonstrating consent to arbitrate.
Thus, the key questions that needs to be considered next are firstly, what documents 
have to be s ig ed  and, secondly, what kind of exchanges is satisfied and, finally, 
whether modem means of communication can be entered under “an exchange of 
letters or telegam s”.
4.3.1.5 Signatures
One may ask where the sigiatures are necessary? If the same document of the 
arbitration ageement (whether an arbitration clause or a submission ageement) is 
signed by both parties, it will plainly satisfy the first alternative fonn requirement of 
Art. 11(2). Yet, it may be noted that the arbitral clause need not to be specifically 
signed, signing the contract containing the clause as a whole is deemed to be 
sufficient.
On the other hand, although the parties’ sigature for an arbitral clause or ageement 
in a contract would appear to be necessary according to the letter of the first limb of 
Art. II (2), the US Appeal Court in Sphere Drake Insurance PLC v Marine Towing 
Inc concluded clearly that an arbitral clause in a foreigi contract does not have to be 
s ig ed  by the parties to constitute an "ageement in writing" pursuant to Art 11(2) of 
the NYC. This approach has been followed by many courts, including a US district 
court in recent case in GregJLannes III v Operators International et al, as well as 
by the Swiss Supreme Court that has noted that “we should not forget that, with the 
development of modem means of communication, unsigned written documents have
''Ubid 1236.
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 192; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New 
York Convention o f 1958 71.
Sphere Drake Insurance PLC v Marine Towing Inc 16 F3d 666 (US Court of Appeals 5th Cir 1994) 
669.
Greg J  Lannes III v Operators International et al 2004 WL 2984327 (US District Court E D La 
2004) 6.
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an increasing importance and diffusion, that the need for a sigiature inevitably 
diminishes, especially in international commerce”.
On the contrary, a number of courts adopted the view that both arbitral clauses in 
contracts and submission ageements must be signed by the parties if  they are not 
contained in an exchange of letters or telegams in accordance with Art. 11(2), i.e. “an 
arbitration clause is enforceable only if it is found in a signed writing or an exchange 
of letters”.
With regard to the exchange of letters or telegams, a question has arsine as to 
whether the signature is also required where the arbitration ageement has been 
subject to an exchange of letters in writing between the parties. According to the 
second alternative form requirement of Art. 11(2), it is sufficient that the arbitration 
agreement contained in exchange of letters or telegrams without being necessary that 
any of these documents be signed by the parties. In this line, a Swiss court of appeal 
expressly held that:
The second (part of Article 11(2) ) broadens the meaning of ‘in writing’, 
by adding the agreements which have been concluded by an exchange of 
letters and teleg'ams ... The signature of the parties is not necessary in 
this case ... It is sufficient that the parties express their intent in writing.
4.3.1.6 Exchange of Documents
Having seen that the signatures of the parties is not required with regard to exchange 
of documents, the next question is what kinds of exchange of documents can be 
considered to be in accordance with Art. 11(2). The “Exchange of documents” phrase 
may seem to suggest in general that there must be a written offer by one party
Compagnie de Navigation et Transports SA v MSC - Mediterranean Shipping Company SA 697.
See, Sen M ar Inc v Tiger Petroleum Corp AT 774 FSupp 879 (US District Court S D NY 1991) 
882; Kahn Lucas Lancaster INC v Lark International Ltd  186 F3d 210 (US Court o f Appeals 2nd Cir 
1999) pp 216-19. See also, van den Berg, 'Consolidated Conuuentary' (2003)'586; van den Berg, The 
New York Arbitration Convention o f 1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 191.
105 £)jp;pf K d  y p p  6 8 6 . Similarly, Tracomin SA v Sudan Oil Seeds Co Ltd  (1987) XII YBCA 
511 (Switzerland Supreme Court 1985) 513.
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including an arbitral clause, and a written subsequent acceptance by the other party as 
well, Yet, this question, indeed, has been a subject of wide debates.
Some are of the view that the document itself should be returned back by the party 
who received it to the sender. This view has been earlier adhered to, for example, 
by an Italian court of appeal. However, this view is indeed over restricted 
iiitei*pretation because it imposes extra conditions which are not indicated in Art. II 
and thus it is contrary to the object of the NYC of promoting enforcement of 
international awards.
On the other hand, the common view is that it suffices when a reference is made to the 
document in subsequent correspondence by the party to whieh the document was sent, 
such as a letter, facsimile, invoice, etc. This view has been followed, for example, 
by an Italian court of appeal in Bobbie Brooks Ins v Lanificio Walter B ancif^
It may be noted that, whatever the case may be, the acceptance need not to be concern 
the arbitration clause specifically, but it is sufficient that the contract containing the 
clause be accepted. Thus, the written requirement would be deemed to be met 
where the acceptance is a written notice, or by returning back the offer second copy or 
the order acknowledgement. '
4.3.1.7 Reference to Arbitration Clause in Standard Conditions
See, Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York 
Convention o f 1958 70.
See, van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' (2003)'pp 587-88.
Ditie Frey Milota Seitelberger v Ditte F Cuccaro e fig li (1976) I YBCA 193 (Italy Court of Appeal 
1974).
See, van den Berg, 'Consolidated Coimnentai-y' (2003)'588.
Bobbie Brooks Ins v Lanificio Walter B and SAS (1979) IV YBCA 289 (Italy Court of Appeal 
1977) pp 290-91.
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 588; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New 
York Convention o f 1958 71.
See, Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York 
Convention o f  1958 71.
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The next complex question need to be demonstrated regarding the exchange of 
documents is that whether reference to standard terms and conditions containing 
arbitration clause is sufficient? Arbitration clauses are frequently used in business 
practises as a clause printed with other conditions on the back of a standard contract 
or printed in separated document to which the contract refers to.
Following the prevailing trend of intei*preting Art. 11(2) broadly to meet need of 
international commercial practices, it may generally consider such reference is 
sufficient as far as the other party appears to be able to check the existence of an 
arbitration clause. Yet, this issue may vary from case to another, depending on 
several connecting factors which can indicate whether the parties had been aware that 
they were entering into an arbitration agi'eement. This can, in particular, be inferred 
from surrounding circumstances, such as, “how conspicuous the arbitration clause is, 
how experienced the parties are, whether there have been previous relationships 
between them, the customs in the trade, etc”. In this sense, the Swiss Supreme 
Court in Compagnie de Navigation v, for example, has put it in expressed words as 
follows:
We must add that, in particular situations, a certain behaviour can replace 
compliance with a fonnal requirement according to the rules of good faith. 
... The parties ... have a long standing business relationship, ... the 
caiTier had the right to believed in good faith that the shipper, its business 
partner since several years, approved of the contractual document which it 
had filled in itself (although did not sign it), including the general terms 
and conditions on the back, among which the arbitration clause. ... Thus, 
the Court of Appeal did not violate federal law by declaring the arbitration 
clause valid, considering the whole circumstances of the case. '
In addition, the French Court of Appeal in Bomar Oil NV v Entreprise Tunisienne 
d ’Activites Pétrolières held that in the light of the NYC’ aim to facilitate the 
resolution of disputes by means of arbitration in the field of international trade, it 
appears that the said Convention admits the adoption of an arbitration agi'eement by 
reference as far as the agreement of the parties does not involve any ambiguity. Thus,
* See, Tradax Export SA v Amoco Iran Oil Co .
See, Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York 
Convention o f  1958 70.
Compagnie de Navigation et Transports SA v MSC - Mediterranean Shipping Company SA 698.
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the arbitration clause in the present case contained in the ETAP standard contract, to 
which reference is made in the main contract concluded by an exchange of telexes, is 
valid and binding on the parties, in that the defendant, being conversant with the 
operation of the oil trade, cannot assert to have not been of the usual clauses in 
contracts concluded in this sector of activity. Further, it was the defendant’s duty to 
consult the standard contract to which the telex of the seller referred expressly, before 
giving his definite consent to the seller’s offer. ' Similarly, an arbitration clause with 
standard conditions included in the back of a contract, a general reference clause in 
the contract has been held to be sufficient in principle. '
With respect to the question of standard conditions including arbitral clause printed in 
a separate document, tow categories of such standard conditions should be 
distinguished in this connection: first, if a specific reference is made to the arbitration 
clause in the standard conditions, this has bee held to be sufficient as the other party 
can be deemed to be able to check it. ' Second, if only a general reference is made to 
the arbitration clause in the standard conditions, this, however, has been held 
fiequently to be not in accordance with the formal requirement of Art. 11(2). Yet, a 
general reference would be usually deemed sufficient if the standard conditions have 
been communicated to the other party, or continuingly used in a long commercial 
relationship between the parties.
4.3.1.8 Arbitration Clause in Purchase or Sales Confirmation
The arbitration clause is fi'equently concluded in sales or purchase confirmations that 
are often used in international commercial practice. Thus, it is submitted that such
Bomar Oil NV v Entreprise Tunisienne d'Activites Pétrolières (1988) XIII YBCA 466 (France 
Court o f Appeal 1987) pp 469-70.
See, Bobbie Brooks Ins v Lanificio Walter B and SAS 288-289; Kukje Sangsa Co Ltd  v Int’l 
Trading Ltd (1992) XVII YBCA 568 (Korea Supreme Court 1990).
I I S
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S.r.l Unione Italiana Proteine v EPCHAP (1985) X YBCA 473 (Italy Supreme Court 1983 ) 475. 
Raina and Nikolay and Junakovic v Seagull Shipping (1977) II YBCA 249 (Italy Supreme Court
1976) 249. See also, van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentaiy' (2003)' 590.
Swiss and German buyers v German seller (1985) X YBCA 427 (Gennany Supreme Court 1984).
See, eg, Bomar Oil NV  v Entreprise Tunisienne d'Activites Pétrolières (1990) XV YBCA 447 
(France Supreme Court 1989) 448; Compagnie de Navigation et Transports SA v MSC - 
Mediterranean Shipping Company SA .
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arbitration clause will comply with the formal requirement of Art. 11(2) if the 
confirmation signed by both parties, or its carbon copy is sent back signed or not, or 
it is accepted in subsequent means of other written con espondence.
4.3.1.9 New Means of Communication
Since the NYC was established in 1985, Art. 11(2) sets down means of communication 
(i.e. letters and telegi'ams) that commonly used in that time. However, as the time 
went on, the letters and telegi’ams have been almost replaced by new means of 
communication, such as telex, fax, e-mail, e-contract which provide the same basic 
functions, but with much more advanced features. Thus, the definition of written 
agi’eement under Art. 11(2) presents a tangible and significant obstacles in the way of 
including such modern means. Consequently, several Italian courts, before the 
enactment of the Italian Law no 25 of 5 Jan 1994, regarded arbitration agreements 
reached by an exchange of faxes as null and void.
Nevertheless, according to the prevailing trend mentioned above, it is generally 
accepted that the new means of correspondence, such as telex, fax, e-mail and other 
means of e-communication would be taken to meet the requirement of writing under 
Art. 11(2). ™
In this context, it is worth mentioning that UNCITRAL attempted, when drafting 
Art.7(2) of the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, to extend the 
naiTOw definition of “agieement in writing” of Art. 11(2) of the NYC as far as 
possible. Thus, it was suggested, at the UNCITRAL Working Group on 
Arbitration on the work of its 32"  ^ session in 2000, that a liberal intei’pretation of the 
writing requirement of Art 11(2) of the NYC in the light of Art. 7(2) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law should be encouraged as it has been followed by some
See, van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentaiy' (2003)'589.
See, Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 114 fn 48.
See, E Lee, Encyclopedia o f  international commercial arbitration (Lloyd's of London Press, 
London 1986) 27; Veeder, 'Sunamary o f Discussion ’ 44.
See, ?  Sanders, The work o f  UNCITRAL on Arbitration and Conciliation (2nd and expanded edn, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2004) 68.
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courts. One of the leading cases in this field has been seized by the Swiss Supreme 
Court in Compagnie de Navigation v MSC. The Court has put this meaning in 
expressive words as follows:
According to a majority opinion, the said provision (of Article 11(2) of the 
NYC) must be interpreted in the light of [the UNCITRAL Model law Art.
7(2) ], the authors of which wished to adopt the regime of the New York 
Convention to modem needs without modifying it.
Thus, the new methods of commutation, such as telexes, have been often regarded as 
satisfying the requirement of the writing under Art. 11(2). By way of example, the 
Swiss Court of Appeal in Carbomin SA v Ekton Corporation has brought the modern 
means of communications in general, and the telex in particular under the expression 
of “contained in an exchange of letters of telegi'ams”. The Court held that:
It is clear that by treating an arbitration clause contained in an exchange of 
telegrams as an ‘agi'eement in writing’. Art II New York Convention 
contemplates in a general way the transmission by telecommunication of 
messages which are reproduced in a lasting foimat. In this respect a telex 
produces messages whose senders and receivers can be identified in a 
batter manner than was the case for the traditional telegrams.
In addition, the US Court of Appeals in Genesco Inc v T KaJduchi & Co Ltd has 
arrived to the conclusion that Arbitration clause valid under Convention because 
contained in exchange of telexes, some of which were signed, to which the parties did 
not object.
4.3.1.10 E-Contract
The question as to whether an arbitration agi'eement eoncluded via E-mail or more 
generally by electronic digital contract meets the written requirement of Art. 11(2) is
UN Doc. A/CN.9/468 para 94.
Compagnie de Navigation et Transports SA v MSC - Mediterranean Shipping Company SA 696.
See, eg, Carbomin SA v Ekton Corporation (1987) XII YBCA 502 (Switzerland Court o f Appeal 
1983) 504; Scheepvaartkantoor Holwerda v SpA Esperia di Navigazione (1982) VII YBCA 337 (Italy 
Court of Appeal 1979) 338; PAG (Zurich) v V (Vienna) 183.
Carbomin SA V Ekton Corporation 504.
Genesco Inc v TKakiuchi & Co Ltd 815 F2d 840 (US Court of Appeals 2nd Cir 1987).
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similar to the question of new means of communication mentioned above. However, 
the question of e-contract would appear to be vital and more significant than other 
new means of communication. The reason for this is that the e-contract is considered 
as the most modern means of communications and its use in the context of 
international trade significantly keeps increasing day after day. Thus, the issue E- 
commerce has been subject of noteworthy dissection by the UNCITRAL Working 
Group on Arbitration on the work of its 32"^ ’ session in 2000 which satisfied that the 
written requirement of Art. 11(2) should reinterpreted dynamically to cover the 
modem means of electronic communication. The report includes that:
There was general agreement in the Working Group that, in order to 
promote the use of electronic commerce for international trade and leave 
the parties fi'ee to agree to the use of arbitration in the electronic 
commerce sphere, article 11(2) of the New York Convention should be 
interpreted to cover the use of electronic means of communication as 
defined in article 2 of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce and that it 
required no amendment to do that.
Accordingly, it may submit that the arbitration agreement fulfils the written form 
requirement of Art. 11(2) if it is concluded by e-email or e-contract, giving that Art. 6 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce of 1996 provides that:
Wliere the law requires information to be in writing, that requirement is 
met by a data message if the infonnation contained therein is accessible so 
as to be usable for subsequent reference.
Moreover, Art. 6(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures of 2001 
furnishes that:
Where the law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is met in 
relation to a data message if an electronic signature is used that is as 
reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for which the data message 
was generated or communicated, in the light of all the circumstances, 
including any relevant agreement.
UN Doc. A/CN.9/468 para 101.
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment o f 1996, A t. 6(1). 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures with Guide to Enactment o f 2001, Art. 6(1).
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In addition, many national laws consider electronic communications to be equal to 
written documents.
The foregoing approach can draw further support from a technical point of view that 
an exchange of e-mails, for example, can be deemed as analogous to an exchange of 
telegrams. This is based upon the fact that the essential features of an exchange of 
telegrams can be reproduced through appropriate use of e-mail. On the other hand, it 
is indeed difficult to see much difference between telegrams, telex, facsimile and e- 
mail, notwithstanding some technical difference between them which, however, 
would not appear to be significant for the purposes of the NYC. “For eaeh technology, 
a message is converted to a digital fonnat, transmitted over a telecommunieations 
network, and then converted to a human-readable form”.
Furthennore, a US district court has recently construed the definition of the written 
requirement of Art. 11(2) widely to cover an arbitration agi'eement made by 
arbitration clause included in an online contract.
In contrast, a Noi*wegian court of appeal denied an application to enforce a foreign 
award based on an arbitration agieement concluded by e-mail, providing that e-mail 
does not satisfy the basic requirements of “agreement in writing” set up by Art. II of 
the NYC and Art, IV( 1 ( 1 )(2) for enforcement. ‘
To sum up, although many courts might have not yet get use to the online and digital 
technology of communication, the current time is, however, witnessing an 
extraordinary inereasing of using sueh means in national and international trade 
practice. Thus, interpreting the written requirement under Art. 11(2) widely and 
dynamically to include the modem means of commutation in general and e-contract 
and e-mail in particular must be followed since Art. 11(2) does not set forth an 
exhaustive list of acceptable recording means. It rather provides an example of what is 
commonly used in 1958, and dose not include any explicit or implicit indication to
See, Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 132 fn 11.
R Hill, 'On-line Abitration; Issues and Solutions'll999) 15 (2) A b  Inti 199 at 200-203.
Michael Lieschke v RealNetworks Inc 2000 WL 198424 ND 111 (US District Court ND 111 2000). 
Charterer (Norway) v Shipowner (RussianFederation) (Norway Court o f  Appeal 16 Aug 1999)522.
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exclude the new means that provide the same basic function of recording evidences 
with much more advanced features, and the end justifies the means.
4.3.1.11 Arbitration Agreement not in Writing
Having seen that almost all means of written communication are considered to be, as 
a mle, consistent with the fonnal requirement of Art. 11(2), the next cmcial question, 
which seems to be much more difficult, is whether an arbitration agreement 
concluded tacitly or orally can be sufficiently valid in the light of the above liberal 
and wider interpretation of Art. 11(2)? A tacit agreement and an oral agreement will be 
highlighted in turn:
4.3.1.12 Tacit Agreement
With regard to the question of the tacit agi'eement, it frequently occurs in international 
trade that a buyer, for example, receives an offer containing an arbitration clause. He, 
then, acts according to it without objecting to the arbitration clause, although he dose 
not sign the contract nor exchange documents with the seller in relation to contract. 
In this issue, the main contract is flatly considered as valid and binding upon the 
parties. However, this may be not the case regarding the arbitration clause as national 
courts and commentators are divided in their views regarding such agi’eements.
The general view is that a tacit acceptance does not suffice to enter into a valid 
arbitration agieement, although such acceptance is normally sufficient to enter into 
a nonnal contract, since it fails to fulfil the written requirement of Art. 11(2) of the 
NYC. Interestingly, this is the other aspect of the principle of the separability of the 
arbitration clause from the main contract of which is fornis part. The main reason 
for this approach is that the requirement of the writing is contained in most
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f 1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 196; van den Berg, 'Consolidated Cominentaiy' (2003)' 589, 591; Di Pietro and Platte, 
Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 76; Kaplan, 'Is 
the Need for Writing as Expressed in the New York Convention and the Model Law Out of Step with 
Commercial Practice?'.
See, Kaplan, 'Is the Need for Writing as Expressed in the New York Convention and the Model Law 
Out of Step with Commercial Practice?' 29; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international 
arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 76.
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international and national arbitration laws to ensure that the parties actually agreed on 
arbitration. Thus, tacit agreement is not sufficient for the lack of the certainty. 
Accordingly, Art. 11(1) expressly requires that the arbitration agreement to be in 
writing and Art. 11(2) particularly specifies that an agieement in writing should be 
understood as an arbitration clause or a submission agreement (a) signed by both 
parties or (b) contained in exchange of documents. Notably, an exchange in writing is 
required in all cases. Thus, such tacit agreement cannot be validly brought under the 
provision of Art. 11(2) since there is no a signed arbitration agreement nor an 
exchange of document thereon. Moreover, it is argued that the legislation history 
of the Art, 11(2) shows that the NYC’ drafters intended to exclude any tacit or oral 
acceptance to conclude a valid arbitration agi'eement under the application of the 
NYC. In this connection, the Dutch delegate suggestion of adding “Confirmation in 
writing by one of the parties which is kept without contestation by the other party” 
to Art. 11(2) was rejected in the final draft.
This approach has been generally followed by national courts. By way of example, 
the French Supreme Court has ruled that Art. 11(2) is not satisfied by tacit acceptance 
of letter asserting that contract was subject to certain standard condition, which 
incorporated arbitration agieement. Likewise, the Italian Supreme Court in 
Robobar Ltd v Finncold sas in which one party preformed the obligation of an order 
containing arbitration clause which sent by other party, although he did not sign that 
contract or send back any document in response to the order. The Court held that the 
agreement to arbitrate is an independent clause of a contract containing it and its 
validity must be ascertained independently of the validity of the main contract. The
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 196; van den Berg, 'The Application of the New York Convention by the Courts' 31; Di 
Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 
76.
UN Doc. E/CONF.26/L.54.
See, Kaplan, 'Is the Need for Writing as Expressed in the New York Convention and the Model Law 
Out o f Step with Commercial Practice?' pp 29-30; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international 
arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 76.
See, eg, Activai International 8A v Consetwas E l Pilar SA pp 529-30; Kahn Lucas Lancaster INC 
V Lark International Ltd 211; DIETF Ltd v RF AG  686; Gaetano Butera v Pietro & Romano 
Pagnan (1979) IV YBCA 296 (Italy Supreme Court 1978) 300; Robobar Ltd  v Finncold sas (1995) 
XX YBCA 739 (Italy Supreme Court 1993); Ditte Frey Milota Seitelberger v Ditte F Ciiccaro e fig li ; 
Ste Confex v Ets Dahan (1987) XII YBCA 484 (France Supreme Court 1986) pp 484-85,
Ste Confex v Ets Dahan 485,
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petitioner’s argument that it would be contrary to good faith to contest the validity of 
the arbitration clause after having performed the obligations contained in the contract 
in which the clause was contained must be denied, as it is not possible to derogate 
from the formal requirement.
Similarly, an Italian court of appeal has refused to enforce tow arbitral awards in 
favour of tow Austrian sellers against an Italian buyer, providing that these awards 
were based on contracts which have not been signed and returned by the buyer and 
therefore did not comply with the foimal requirement of Art. 11(2), although it deemed 
the main two contracts have been validly concluded.
Moreover, a US court of appeals in KAHN v LARK held that:
Arbitration clauses contained in purchase orders which were signed only 
by buyer did not constitute an "agreement in writing" sufficient to bring 
parties' dispute within the scope of the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and thus subject matter 
jurisdiction could not properly be premised on statute implementing the 
Convention.
On the other hand, there is a gi'owing support for the view that where the tacit 
acceptance is sufficient to enter into a nonnal international commercial contract, it 
should be also sufficient to enter into a valid arbitration agreement. In supporting 
this view, it is argued that there are no adequate justifications why should impose a 
higher degi ee of proof on the arbitration clause included in a contract than the basic 
contractual terms themselves. Besides, it is argued that the requirement of an 
exchange in writing no longer meets the need of international commereial practice
Robobar Ltd v Finncold sas 741.
M6
147
Ditte Frey Milota Seitelberger v Ditte F  Cuccaro e fig li 193. 
Kahn Lucas Lancaster INC v Lark International Ltd 211.
See, G Herrmaiin, 'The Ai'bitration Agreement as the Foundation o f Arbitration and Its Recognition 
by the Courts' (ICCA Congress Series no 6 Bahrain 1993) 45; Kaplan, 'Is the Need for Writing as 
Expressed in the New York Convention and the Model Law Out of Step with Commercial Practice?' 
29; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration para 7-8; A Singhvi, 
'Article 11(3) o f the New York Convention and the Courts' (ICCA Congress Series no 9 Parise 1998 ) 
pp 210-11; Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 142; Di 
Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 
pp 77- 78.
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where tacit acceptance are frequently applied to conclude contracts. In this manner, 
Prof. Kaplan stated that.
Giving all these developments, it is not unreasonable to propose that the 
time has come for another look at Article 11(2). In my view, its emphasis 
on writing or exchange is outmoded. It would be helpful to see a general 
reconsideration of Article 11(2) in the light of existing commercial 
practices and also in the light of the many developments which have 
occurred since 1985 in the field of international commercial arbitration.'^^
Consequently, it is argued that it appears reasonable to assume that if an arbitration 
clause included in one party’s correspondences, such as an offer, was not 
affirmatively accepted in writing by the other party, who however contributes to the 
contract without raising any objection against the arbitration clause contained in that 
contact, the latter party may be estopped from denying the arbitration clause the same 
as he may be not able to deny the rest of main contract conditions and clauses.
This view has been also adopted by a number of courts. For example, the German 
Supreme Court has held that trade usages can lead to a tacit conclusion of an 
arbitration clause in standard conditions even in the absence of an explicitly reference 
as far as the parties are regularly active in particular trade. Likewise, a Dutch Court 
of first instance has held that Art. 11(2) would be satisfied where the seller sent the
See, Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration para 7-9; 
Kaplan, 'Is the Need for Writing as Expressed in the New York Convention and the Model Law Out of 
Step with Commercial Practice?' 29; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration 
awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 pp 77- 78; van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' 
(2003)' 584.
Kaplan, 'Is the Need for Writing as Expressed in the New York Convention and the Model Law Out 
of Step with Commercial Practice?' 44.
Se, Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f international arbitration awards : the New York 
Convention o f  1958 pp 77-78; Kaplan, 'Is the Need for Writing as Expressed in the New York 
Convention and the Model Law Out o f  Step with Commercial Practice?’ 29.
See, eg, Zambia Steel & Building Supplies Ltd v James Clark Æ Eaton Ltd  [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
225 (UK CA 1986); Israel Chemicals and Phosphates Ltd v N Y Algemeene Oliehandel (1976) I 
YBCA 195 (Netherlands Court of First Instance 1970); Seller (Denmark) v Buyer (Germany) 
(Germany Court o f  Appeal 16 Dec 1992) 539; Buyer v Seller (1995) XX YBCA 666 (Germany 
Supreme Court 1992) 668.
Buyer v Seller (Germany Supreme Court 1992) 668.
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buyer a written sales contract, containing an arbitration clause, and the buyer did not 
object until months after taking delivery of goods.
Yet, it may be useful to suggest that it is important in this concern to distinguish 
between two kinds of the tacit acceptance. First, where a contract containing an 
arbitral clause is kept without objection by a party who acts according to the contract, 
that party may be deemed to have accepted the arbitration clause. Second, where the 
arbitral clause is not mentioned at the time of concluding the contract, but it appears 
later in the confoimation of sales or purchase that is sent to party who also acts under 
the contract without objection, it may appear difficult here to consider the silent party 
to have accepted to arbitrate.
4.3.1.13 Oral Agreement
With regard to the question of the validity of arbitration agi’eement concluded orally, 
it appears to be even more difficult to prove the existence of the arbitration agreement 
where it is made by a complete oral way. Thus, national courts and commentators 
differ on whether an oral acceptance can be deemed sufficient to conclude a valid 
arbitration agieement.
According to the prevailing view Art. 11(2) of the NYC dose not extend to the oral 
acceptance for the same reasons of excluding the tacit acceptance as addressed 
above. In this light. Prof van den Berg stated earlier that:
It is essential for the exchange requirement that both the proposal to 
arbitrate and the acceptance thereof are communicated between the 
parties. The text of article 11(2) does not leave any doubt on this point 
either: an exchange of letters or telegi'ams cannot mean anything else than 
that they are forwarded and replied to in written fonn. It means that an
Israel Chemicals and Phosphates Ltd v NVAlgemeene Oliehandel 195.
cf. van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 198.
ibid 196; Kaplan, 'Is the Need for Writing as Expressed in the New York Convention and the Model 
Law Out o f Step with Commercial Practice?' 32; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international 
arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f 1958 77.
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arbitration agreement which is proposed in writing and accepted orally or 
tacitly dose not constitute an exchange of letters or telegrams.
This approach has also been adopted general by courts. For example, a Swiss court 
of appeal has ruled that:
By requiring the written fonn, Art. 11(2) of the NYC means to exclude 
arbitration agreements concluded orally or tacitly. ... Art. 11(2) sets not 
only a maximum but also a minimum requirement. Obviously, a 
contracting State may not set stricter requirements as to fonn, nor can it 
accept less far-reaching fonnal requirements ... that provision dose not 
allow for acceptance of the validity of an arbitration clause which dose not 
meet the said requirements.
Another example can be found in Sen Mar Inc v Tiger Petroleum Carp where a US 
district court dealt with an arbitration agreement concluded orally. The Court 
expressly noted that:
The Convention actually defines what will satisfy its writing requirement.
An arbitration clause is enforceable only if it is found in a signed writing 
or an exchange of letters. Because the Convention controls in case of any 
conflict between the Convention and the Act, this Court will enforce the 
arbitration clause only if it satisfies the Convention's more stringent 
requirement.
The court therefore denied the appellant petition to compel arbitration, finding that the 
arbitration clause was orally concluded and consequently fails to satisfy the 
Convention's writing requirement.
In contrast, there is strong support for the view that an oral arbitration agreement 
should be sufficient. In supporting this view, it is argued that excluding oral arbitral 
agreement would defeat commercial practice in which parties often rely on oral 
agreement in certain areas of trade. Besides, in view of the fact that arbitration is no 
longer regarded as a risky waiver of primary right of litigation but rather the natural
van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 196.
ibid.
DIETF Ltd vR F  AG  688.
Sen Mar Inc v Tiger Petroleum Corp NV 882. 
ibid 884.
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forum for international commercial disputes, there is no good reason to subject 
arbitration agreements to stricter form requirements than other contractual 
agreements. Consequently, it has been criticised that how a multi-million dollar 
contract concluded orally will deemed to be valid and party can enforce the 
substantive conditions of the contract, whereas being able to wash his hands from the 
arbitration agi*eement concluded in the same contract.
In addition, it is argued that the strict fonual requirements of the NYC has 
disappeared in the modern laws of arbitration where there has in effect been a triumph 
of substance over fonn. Redfern and Hunter argue that in the English Arbitration Act 
of 1996 an oral arbitration agi'eement will consider as evidenced in writing if it is 
made “by reference to ternis which are in writing” or “recorded by one of the 
parties, or by a third party, with the authority of the parties to the agreement”. 
Therefore, “as long as there is some written evidence of an agreement to arbitrate, the 
fonn in which that agi eement is recorded is immaterial”.
This approach has been upheld, for example, by the English Court of Appeal in 
Zambia Steel <& Building Supplies Ltd v James Clark & Eaton Ltd . The Court held 
that “if it is established that a document with an arbitration clause in writing forms 
part of a contract between the parties, the assent by one party orally to the contract is 
sufficient”. The Court further concluded that:
The evidence clearly establishes ... that the oral contract which the parties 
entered into .,. was a contract which was made including the terms which 
are set out in the endorsement on the two quotations. Those terms include 
the arbitration clause. The arbitration clause became ... as the result of the 
oral agi'eement, part of the temis of the contract between the parties, and it 
is a statement of that term in writing. In consequence of that sequence of 
events, the contract was, in my view, a contract partly unwritten and 
partly in writing, and I think that on the facts of this case the agi'eement to
See, Herrmann, 'The Arbitration Agreement as the Foundation of Arbitration and Its Recognition by 
the Courts' 46; Landau, 'The Requirement o f a Written Foim' 44; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration paras 7-8, 7-9.
English Arbitration Act 1996, s. 5(3).
ibid 5(4).
See, Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 142- 143; 
Kaplan, 'Is the Need for Writing as Expressed in the New York Convention and the Model Law Out of 
Step with Commercial Practice?'.
Zambia Steel & Building Supplies Ltd v James Clark & Eaton Ltd 299
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arbitrate was a tenu in writing, a written term, of the agreement which the
parties entered into.
Yet, some observations can be made on the latter approach of supporting the oral 
agieement. First, the argument that oral arbitration agi'eement is frequently concluded 
in international practice seems to be without merit, but in fact oral agi'eement is rare, 
or at least not common, in most modern commercial contexts. Moreover, the 
argument that oral agi'eement is recognised under English Act is doubtful. In contrast, 
it is generally obsei*ved that although common law still recognises an oral agreement, 
it however cannot be consider an arbitration agreement under English Arbitration Act 
of 1996. In addition, this provision does not appear to support the oral agi'eement 
in general, but in fact it concerns limited applications of oral agreement, such as 
written offers accepted orally or oral offers accepted in writing both with conduct. 
Nevertheless, the vital question that has yet to be settled is that whether a purely oral 
arbitration agreement (i.e. there is no writing at all) will be also considered, under the 
second view, fonnally valid. So, can an arbitration agi'eement be proven merely by 
oral evidence such as voice recorder or witnesses? The formal validity of such 
arbitration agi'eement is likely to be very doubtful.
4.3.2 Substantial Grounds of Invalidity
ibid 236.
See, Sutton and Gill, Russell on Arbitration pp 45-46; S Rajoo, Law, practice and procedure o f  
arbitration (LexisNexis, Kuala Lumpur 2003) 65; R Bernstein and others. Handbook o f  Arbitration 
Aractice (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London 1998) para 2-85; Landau, 'The Requirement o f a Written 
Form' 55.
See, Bernstein and others, Handbook o f  Arbitration Aractice paras 2-85, 2-86; Lew, Mistelis and 
Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration para 7-6 fn 2;Sutton and Gill, Russell on 
Arbitration 45-46 “[the Arbitration Act 1996] makes it difficult to participate in arbitration 
proceedings arising out o f an arbitration agreement which is alleged to be oral without it being 
construed as an agreement in writing. ... Where the whole o f  the contract, including the agreement to 
arbitrate, is oral, the existence and the validity of the entire contract may also be in doubt”. See 
also,Alvarez, 'Article 11(2) o f the New York Convention and the Courts' 75 fn 29.
Even under the model law and English Arbitration Act 1996. see H Sm al Ltd v Goldroyce Garment Ltd 
[1994] FIKLY 70 (Hong Kong HC 1994), where the court dismissed the plaintiffs application, finding 
that the evidence relating to the signing o f the purchase order by the plaintiff was hearsay and did not 
meet the necessaiy threshold requirement of Model Law Ai1. 7.
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The substantial gi'ounds of invalidity have not created noticeable problems since most 
of them are rarely invoked in practices as grounds for non-enforcement of the award. 
Unlike the formal validity, the substantial validity of the arbitration agreement at the 
context of enforcement of the arbitral award is not governed under the provision of 
Art. II, but instead it is solely governed under the law chosen (explicitly or implicitly) 
by the parties to govern the arbitration agi'eement or, failing any indication thereon, 
under the law of the country where the award was made according to the provision of 
Art. V(l)(a). Interestingly, there is a strong argument in favour of applying the same 
provision of conflict rules laid down in Art. V(l)(a) at the stage of enforcement of the 
arbitration agreement as well to govern the substantial g'ounds of invalidity contained 
in Art. 11(3) (i.e. null and void, inoperative or incapable of being perfoimed).
Art. V (l)(a) gives no guidance concerning what makes the arbitration agieement 
invalid, but rather it only refers to the law governing the arbitration agreement 
thereof. Thus, it may be generally submitted that since the arbiti'ation agreement has 
the contractual natural, its substantial grounds of invalidity are equivalent to those 
invalidate the contract in general. Yet, such substantial giounds invoked in practice 
are found to be often taken from Art. 11(3). This Art obligates the court of a 
contracting state, at request of one of the parties, to refer the parties to arbitration, 
“unless it finds that the said agi'eement is null and void, inoperative or incapable o f  
being/;er/brmed”(emphasised added).
This text has been inteipreted narrowly in the light of the NYC’ spirit. For example, a 
US court of appeals has held that:
See, eg, Insurance Company (Sweden) v Reinsurance Company (Switzerland) (Switzerland 
Supreme Court 21 Mar 1995) 804 “although substantive validity is not regulated by the New York 
Convention, the issue should be examined by applying the conflict rules o f Art. V (l)(a), in order to 
avoid conflicting decisions in the referral and enforcement phases.”; Della Sanara v Fallimento Cap 
Giovanni Coppola srl (1992) XVII YBCA 542 (Italy Court o f  Appeal 1990) 543. See, also, van den 
Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' (2003)'pp “as regards the exception ‘null and void, inoperative or 
incapable o f  being performed’ in Art. 11(3), most courts apply by analogy the conflict inles contained in 
Art. V (l)(a)” ; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration para 6- 
55.
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The parochial interests of the Commonwealth, or of any state, cannot be 
the measure of how the "null and void" clause is intei-preted. ... Rather, 
the clause must be intei-preted to encompass only those situations- such as 
fraud, mistake, duress, and waiver- that can be applied neutrally on an 
international scale.
Besides, the US District Court in Bautista v Star Cruises has recently given a similar 
interpretation by holding that “Under the Convention, an agreement to arbitrate is null 
and void only when it is subject to internationally recognized defences such as duress, 
mistake, fraud or waiver, or when it contravenes frindamental policies of the forum 
nation”. The Court went on to express that “The ‘null and void’ language of the 
Convention must be read naiTowly, because the signatory nations have declared a 
general policy of enforceability of agreements to arbitrate”.
Consequently, the substantial grounds of invalidating the arbitration agreement are 
hardly to be successful in practice. For example, a Japanese district court has granted 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, dismissing the defendant’s argument that the 
arbitration agi'eement had been in fact terminated since he failed to discharge the 
burden of proving thereon. The Spanish Supreme Court also has affinued 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award since the defendant did not prove his 
allegation that the arbitration agreement was inoperative.
An addition example can be found in a case held by a Swiss court of first instance. 
Although the Court denied enforcement of a foreign arbitral award for other reasons, 
it rejected a defence that the arbitration agreement was a sham. The court held that the 
defendant argued that the arbitration agi'eement is feigned. By examining this 
allegation, the court found that the simulation results in the nullity of the feigned 
agreement which is invalid on the sense of Art. V(l) of the NYC. The court however, 
concluded that:
This would not do justice to the system of the New York Convention. In 
proceeding of arbitral awards, the New York Convention intends to limit
Ledee v Ceramiche Ragno 684 F2d 184 (US Court o f Appeals 1st Cir 1982),
Bautista v Star Cruises 286 FSupp2d 1352 (US District Court SDFla 2003) 1365.
Seller (China) v Buyer (Japan) (2002) XXVII YBCA 515 (Japan District Court 1999) 517.
Consmaremma -  Consorzio v Hermanos Escot M adrid SA (2001) XXVI YBCA 858 (Spain 
Supremen Court 2001)861.
X v  X  (Switzerland Court o f  first Instance 26 M ay 1994) pp 757-58.
Overseas Cosmos Inc v NR Vessel Corp 1997 WL 757041 (US District Court SDNY 1997) 3 .
Société Arabe des Engrais Phosphates v Gemanco srl (1997) XXII YBCA 737 (Italy Court o f  
Appeal 1993).
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drastically the jurisdiction of the enforcement court to procedural aspects, 
and to avoid that the proceeding on the merits unfold once again. In so far 
a prima vista formally valid arbitral clause exists, and decide differently 
would mean to break open international arbitration as it would lead the 
enforcement court once again to examine the merits of the contractual 
relationship on a regular basis.
The same result was reached by a US district court in Overseas Cosmos Inc v NR 
Vessel Corp where the Court rejected the respondent’s petition to refuse enforcement 
of a foreign award on two bases. “First, the agreement fails to satisfy the Statute of 
Frauds. Second, a disposition of property made by an agent without the authority of 
the principal is not binding on the principal”. The court reasoned that the respondent 
has failed to prove that the agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties 
have subjected it.
On the other hand, an example of successful objection based on null and void can be 
found in Société Arabe des Engrais Phosphates v Gemanco srl held by an Italian |
court of appeal. In this case, contract containing arbitral clause at the ICC 
arbitration in Paris was signed by two Tunisian companies and an Italian company.
The Italian party resorted to the ICC when a dispute turned out. The Tunisian parties 
denied the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, arguing that they are public body which 
not allowed to refer to arbitration under the applicable law (i.e. Tunisian law). The 
tribunal dismissed the objection and rendered its arbitral award in favour of the 
Tunisian parties, holding that such bar is not applicable in the context of international 
contract.
The Tunisian parties then sought enforcement of the award before the Italian Court of 
Appeal. The Italian party opposed enforcement, contending that the arbitration clause 
was null and avoid on tow gi'ound. First, because of the absence of making an attempt 
to resolve the difference amicably which the arbitration was subjected to, and thus it 
was inoperative. Second, the Tunisian Parties are not allowed under Tunisian law to 
enter into arbitration agreement, as they are public body. Thus, the Italian party
ibid pp 738-40.
Société Arabe des Engrais Phosphates v Gemanco srl (1996) pp 740-43. 
IRSAL o f 1985, Art.39.
Ch 4: Invalid Agreement 119
argued that the enforcement request should be disallowed since the requirements of 
Art. 11(3) and V(l)(a) of the NYC were not met. The Court of Appeal agreed with 
the Italian objection that the bar in Tunisian law is applicable to the Tunisian parties 
because the contract signed in Tunis by Tunisian public companies and thus the Court 
refused to enforce the foreign award. However, the Italian Supreme Court reversed 
the Court of Appeal’s decision and remanded the dispute to another Court of Appeal, 
finding that the lower court’s decision did not show that the Italian party fulfilled the 
requirement of Art. V of the NYC to prove that the Tunisian Companies as public law 
body were forbidden under Tunisian law to enter into arbitration agreement in 
international context, and thus the arbitral clause was null and void under the Tunisian 
law and the relevant provision applied.
In the above case, the Italian Courts should enforce the arbitral award and dismiss the 
objection that is clearly contrary to good faith, even if the Italian party could prove 
that the Tunisian does not allow the Tunisian parties to arbitrate. This because the 
Italian defendant who alleged that the arbitration agreement is null and void at the 
sage of pro-award, he himself had argued that the arbitration agreement is valid and 
binding at the stage of post-award.
4.4 The Position in Saudi Arabia
4.4.1 Law Applicable to the Validity of the Arbitration Agreement
The SAL provides no guidance as to the question of the law governing the validity of 
the arbitration agreement in international context, nor such question has been directly 
dealt with by the Saudi enforcing courts. Yet, it was said that the Saudi Courts would 
apply only the Saudi laws and the Shari'ah rules to govern the various aspects of 
arbitration, since SA strictly applies the provision of Shari’ah and the Implementation 
Rules of 1985, in particular, obligates that the award shall made under the
Ch 4: Invalid Agreement 120
provisions of Shari'ah rules and the Saudi applicable regulations. Yet, this opinion
seems to have no sound reasons as it is commonly obsei*ved that the application of the 
SAL is limits to the domestic arbitration in SA. Besides, the Saudi relevant Courts 
recognise the rules of private international law as long as they are not contrary to the 
most fundamental principles of the Shari'ah (i.e. Saudi public policy). 
Consequently, the Saudi enforcing Courts have consistently been confinning the 
validity of the arbitral agi'eements and awards in the context of international 
arbitration where the parties agi'eed on foreign laws (noimally western laws) to be the 
applicable law, rejecting the Saudi parties’ objection that the arbitration agreement is 
invalid because it is governed by non- Islamic law.'^"' This clearly shows that the 
Saudi Authorities, as a mle, uphold the parties’ autonomy in international arbitration 
by giving their choice of law a priority over national laws.
But, what is the position of the Saudi Authorities if the parties have not explicitly 
chosen the law governed the validity of the arbitration agi'eement? Will the law of the 
main contract be applied or the law of arbitration place? No clear-cut answer can be 
made since there is no case in which a Saudi court has expressed an opinion on this 
specific question. Yet, a Saudi court (the 18^ '^  Subsidiary Panel) has recently applied 
the Egyptian civil and commercial procedure law to confirm the validity of the 
arbitration agreement and consequently it confimied enforcement of foreign arbitral 
award made under that agi'eement. ' In this case the arbitration took place in Egypt 
and the arbitral award made there as well. Moreover, the place law of the contract 
performance is general applied by the Saudi competent Courts in relation to private
See, Lee, Encyclopedia o f  international commercial arbitration para 1106; El-Alidab, Arbitration 
in Arab Countries vol 2 pp 242-43; W Ballantyne and W Ballantyne, Commercial law in the Arab 
M iddle East : the G ulf States (Lloyd’s o f London, London 1986) 157.
See, Sayen, 'Arbitration' at 220; S Jarvin (Arbitration Symposium Cairo 1986), cited in El-Ahdab, 
Arbitration in Arab Countries vol 2 p 186; El-Ahdab, 'Saudi Arabia Accedes to the New York 
Convention' 88.
See, A Yamani and others, 'Saudi Arabi' in R David and others (eds) International Encyclopedia o f  
Comparative Law  (JCB Mohr Dordrecht 1987) Vol 1-S, 21; J Lew, 'The Recognition and Enforcement 
o f  Arbitration Agreement and Awards in the Middle East'(1985) 1 (2) Arb Inti 161 at 175.
the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 187/T/4 dated 1413 H (1992); the 4th Review Committee, 
decision No. 156/T/4 dated 1413 H (1992); the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 155/T/4 dated 
1415 H (1994); 15/T/3 the 3rd Review Committee, decision No. 15/T/3 dated 1423 H (2002).
the 18th Subsidiai-y Panel, decision No. 8/D/F/18 dated 1424 H (2003).
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international cases. Thus, it may be assumed that the Saudi Courts will apply the 
law of the arbitration seat.
Whatever the applicable law will be, it is vital to find out whether the Saudi Courts 
would apply a more favourable provision than the applicable law as provided by Art. 
VII(l). An affirmative answer can be seen in a case where a Saudi public body 
appealed against an arbitral award in favour of a foreign company on the giound that 
the arbitration agieement is invalid under the applicable law (i.e. the Saudi laws) 
which prohibits the government agencies to arbitrate without prior consent of the 
President of the Council Ministers. A Saudi court (The 9^ '^  Administrative Panel) at 
outset agreed that the arbitration agieement is invalid under the Saudi law. 
Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the validity of the arbitration agreement on the basis 
of the Shari’ah provision which is more favourable than the Saudi Laws, since the 
Shari'ah law emphatically upholds the moral obligation to fulfil one’s contracts and 
undertakings, as expressed by the Qur’an: “O you who believe! Fulfil (your) 
obligation” and by the Prophet Mohamed (PBUH): “The Muslims are bound by 
their stipulations”. Besides, the principle adopted by the majority of Muslim 
scholars is that the arbitral award is binding. As a consequence, the Court granted the 
foreign Company’s petition to enforce the arbitral award against the Saudi public 
body. This case illustrates clearly that the Saudi enforcing Court has friendly 
attitude towards enforcement of awards.
4.4.2 Formal Grounds of Invalidity
It may be thought important to address the Saudi position regarding the formal 
requirements for the validity of the arbitration agreement not only because the Saudi 
laws may be chosen by the parties to be the applicable law, but also the Saudi laws
the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 155/T/4 dated 1415 H (1994).
TAe Qur'an. [5:1].
Narrated by M Al-Tirmidhi, Sunan Al-Tirmidhi No. 1403; S Abu Daoud, Sunan Abi Daoud No. 
3596; Maalik ibn Anas, Al Muwatta (in Arabic)No. 1447; M Al-Hakem, Al-Mustadrak ala Al- 
Sahihayin (in Arabic) No. 2269; and others.
the 9th Administrative Panel, decision No. 32/D/A/9 dated 1918 H (1997).
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:.2:may be applied as a more favourable provision than the formal provision of Art. 11(2) 
of the NYC.
I
4.4.2.1 Writing Requirement
The key question need to be addressed is whether the SAL requires the arbitration 
agreement to be in writing. Unlike like the NYC and most of national and 
international arbitration laws, the SAL does not expressly require the arbitration 
agi’eement to be in writing as a condition for its validity. Yet, Art. 5 of the SAL 
stats somehow ambiguous provision as follows:
The parties to the dispute file the arbitration instrument with the Authority 
originally competent to hear the dispute. The instmment shall be signed 
by the parties or their authorized attorneys, and by the arbitrators, and it 
must state the details of the dispute, the names of the arbitrators and their 
acceptance to hear the dispute. Copies of the documents relating to the 
dispute shall be attached.
This text has led many commentators to reach different conclusions. Some 
commentators thought that the SAL requires all kinds of arbitration agreements must 
be in writing and signed by all parties to be valid and biding, whereas other 
commentators are of the view that the above fonual requirement is only applicable to 
the submission agi'eement (i.e., the agreement referring an already existing dispute to 
arbitration), but not to the arbitration clause (i.e., the agieement referring friture 
disputes to arbitration),
However, both approaches appear to be not convincing. In contrast, it may conclude 
that all kinds of arbitration agi'eements are valid and binding without any need of 
writing and signatures under SAL for following justifications. First, the wording used 
in Art. 5 “The parties to the dispute file  the arbitration instrument with the Authority
See, Lew, The Recognition and Enforcement o f  Arbitration Agreement and Awards in the Middle 
East' 174.
See, eg, S Saleh, Commercial arbitration in the Arab Middle East : a study in Sharai'a and statute 
law  (Graham & Trotman, London 1984) pp 304-7; Sayen, 'Arbitration'218.
See, Turck, 'Arbitration in Saudi Arabia ' pp 287-88; Turck, 'Saudi Aiabia ' pp 6-7; El-Ahdab, 
Arbitration in Arab Countries vol 2 pp 200-202.
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originally competent to hear the dispute”(emphasis added) is equal to the fonn of the 
simple present tense which does not constitute any obligatory order, but it seems to be 
permissible. Second, even assuming that filing the arbitration instrument with the 
competent court in writing is obligatory, Art. 5 does not deal with the validity of 
arbitration agi'eement and how to be binding, it rather deals with the first step of 
arbitration proceeding and thus it requires even the arbitrators’ signatures and the 
details of the dispute which without a doubt have nothing to do with the validity o f the 
arbitration agreement. Third, Art. 7 of the SAL goes to the heart of the problem and 
stats that:
I f  the parties have agreed to arbitrate before the occurrence o f  the 
dispute, or if the arbitration instmment relating to a specific existing 
dispute has been approved, then the subject matter of the dispute shall be 
heard only according to the provisions of this Regulation, (emphasis 
added)
This provision puts it clear that the ai'bitration clause is general valid and binding 
without being approved by the competent court through the fonnal requirements of 
Art. 5. Finally and more important, this approach can be frirtlier supported by a 
decision of the appeal court (the 4''^  Commercial Review Committee). The Court dealt 
with the question that when one party refused to agi’eed to arbitrate, although he 
previously concluded an arbitration agi’eement. The Court held that, in such case, it is 
sufficient that the other party submits the arbitration agi'eement to competent Court. 
Then, if the party refnsing arbitration also insists not to sign the submission, the Court 
however will approve the submission to arbitrate. This approach has been also 
adopted, as a principle, by the Commercial Courts. This decision shows clearly 
that absence of the formal requirement of Art. 5 does not affect the validity of the 
arbitration agieement.
In the light of the above observations, it may conclude that there are no fonnal 
requirements such as writing for the validity of the arbitration agreement under the
SAL o f 1983, Art. 7.
the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 150/T/4 dated 1413 H (1992).
195 I Al-Ajlan, Compilation o f  Judicial principles confirmed by the Commercial Review Committee in 
the Board o f  Grievances from  1407 H  (1987) to 1419 H  (1999) (the Board o f Grievances Riyadh 2004 
'in Aiabic' unpublished)56.
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SAL. This is because all Saudi laws are influenced by the Shari’ah rules which does 
not stipulate the contract, in general, to be in writing although it recommends to do so. 
In this regard, the Q ur’an says:
O you who believe! When you deal with each other, in transactions 
involving future obligations in a fixed period of time, record it in writing.
... You should not become weary to write it (your contract), whether it be 
small or big, for its fixed tenn, that is more just with Allah; more solid as 
evidence, and more convenient to prevent doubts among yourselves, 
except when it is a present trade which you carry out on the spot among 
yourselves, then there is no blame on you in not writing it down. But make 
witnesses whenever you make a commercial contract, (emphasis added)
This verse indicates that although the Qur ’an highly recommends, not obligates, the 
writing method to be used general in transactions (e.g. privet or civil transactions), the 
same verse, however, makes an exception for the commercial cases. This may be for 
the reason that commercial transactions are generally run by experienced businessmen 
how are familiar with trade customs and the practical implications of their oral 
agreements. Thus, requirements of a written contract might sometimes become at 
odds with the need of speed and flexibility which play a key role in the success of 
trade activities.
4.4.2.2 Legitimate Ways for Concluding Arbitration Agreement
The next question is that how the arbitration agreement can validly be concluded 
under the SAL? Since the SAL requires no specific fonnality to conclude an 
arbitration agreement, this means that the Saudi legislator intended to leave this 
question to be solved under the umbrella of the Shari 'ah mles. In general, the Saudi 
Courts follow the view that the Shari’ah requires no special fonnality for an 
expression of offer and acceptance to be valid and binding. So, the arbitration 
agreement can be, just as otber contracts, formed by the linking of an offer and 
acceptance and is binding once it has been accepted. These can generally be made
The Qur'an, Al-Baqarah [2:282].
Ch 4: Invalid Agreement 125
either in writing or orally or to be implied by conduct and other appropriate means of 
coiTespondence.
As strongly explained by Ibn Taymiyya and other Hanbali scholars, the root 
principle is that no certain form is required and thus any verbal agi'eement, conduct, or 
act that indicates beyond a reasonable doubt the desires of the parties is sufficient to 
conclude a valid contract. He sent forth the reasons that Allah (SWT) states in the 
Q ur’an that “O you who believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves unjustly, 
except that it be trading amongst you by your mutual consent”, so he makes the 
parties’ mutual consent as the basis of the legitimacy of the sale without requiring a 
specific word or action to indicate such consent. Thus, any way (writing, oral or 
implied by conduct) applied in practice and recognised by the applied custom is 
sufficient to indicate the consent of the parties to enter into binding contract should be 
also satisfactory under the Shari’ah. Moreover, a strict formality would create 
inordinate difficulties and hardships, since contracts have been concluded without any 
word of mouth since the time of the prophet Mohamed (PBUH). Thus, it can be 
concluded that under the Shari’ah law, the intention of the parties rather than the 
specific formula should be enforced regarding arbitration agi’eement.
4.4.2.3 Modern Means of Communications
Having seen that written, implied and oral ai'bitration agieement is sufficient under 
Shari’ah and should be so under Saudi laws, it should be followed by the question 
that can one presume therefore that the arbitration agieement can also be validly made
See, A Al-Qaradaghi, 'The General Principles o f  Arbitration in Islamic Fiqh ' (Symposium of  
Arbitration in Islamic Shariah, Dubi 2001 'in Aiabic') 15; S Rashid, 'Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
the Context o f Islamic Law '(2004) 8 Vindobona J Inti Comm L & Arb 95 at 105; N  Majeed, 'Good 
Faith and Due Process: Lessons from the Shari'ah'(2004) 20 Arbitration International 97at 109 fn 22; C 
Childress, 'Saudi-Arabian Contract Law: A Comparative Perspective'(1990) 2 St Thomas L F 69 at 80- 
81.
A well-known Muslim Hanbali scholar ( b .l263- d. 1328).
Hanbali is one o f the four Sunni schools o f law, found by Alimad ibn Hanbal. The other principle 
Sunni schools are the Hanafi, the Maliki and the Shaffei. They do not differ in fundamentals but 
disagree in several points o f detail.
A  Ibn Taymiyya, Majmau Fatawaa Shaykh Alistam Ahmed ibn Taymiyya (1980 'in Arabic')vol 29 
pp 5-21; A Ibn Qudamah, ATMughnai; wa yalihi Alsharh Alkkabir (Dar Alhadith, Cairo 1996 'in 
Arabic') vol 5 pp 246-49; A Ibn Qasim, Haashiyat A lrrawd Almurbi: shark Zaad Al-mustaqni (Foaad 
Bauno Bayrut 1996 'in Arabic')vol 4 pp 329-31 and fn 1.
In addition, the main reason of fomial requirement is to be self-evidence. Thus, 
proving the existence of the arbitration agreement via modern means of 
correspondence should be considered sufficient since the Saudi Courts also adopt a 
very flexible view regarding the proof principles which has been earlier clarified 
under the Shari’ah provision by Ibn Al-Qayyim. He put it in strong words as 
follows:
The term of evidence is a name for any thing brings the truth or facts to 
the light. Those who limit the evidence to certain canonical methods of 
evidence (essentially, testimony of witnesses, confession, and the oath), 
and forgo other sensible, practical methods of proof, such people do not 
give the evidence its proper meaning since the evidence is never 
mentioned in Qur ’an and Hadith to mean only the testimony, but in fact 
to mean the proof in general which include other kinds of proofs and signs 
that sometimes are stronger in establishing the genuine facts. ... Thus, 
the judge should not cling mechanically to technical fiqh  mles (i.e the
See, A Al-Ssalmi, T heoiy o f the Contract' (Session o f the Shari’ah and law Principles o f 
Arbitration, Riyadh 2002 'in Aiabic' )pp 18-19; Al-Qaradaghi, 'The General Principles o f Arbitration in 
Islamic Fiqh ’ 15.
See, A Ibn Taymiyya, Alsiyasa Alshariyya f i Islah Alrai wa Airaiyya (Dar Alma'rifah 'in 
Arabic') 133. see also, M Ibn Al-Qayyim, I'lam Almuwaqqin an Rab Alalamin (Dar al-Kutub al-ilmiyah, 
Beimt 1991 'in Arabic')vol 1 pp 259-62.
See, Ibn Taymiyya, Majmau Fatawaa Shaykh Alislam Ahmed ibn Taymiyya vol 29 pp 17-21.
A well-known Muslim Hanbali scholar (b .l292- d .l350).
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via one of the modem means of communication, such as fax and email and the like, 
under in Saudi laws. In the light of the above-mentioned principle that no certain 4
fomiality is required but it depends on the applied costume, the answer would clearly 
be yes. This for the explanations pointed out above, and also for the following 
grounds. The principal that, as explained by Ibn Taymiyya, of all matters of worldly 
affairs which people have need, the only one that they are prohibited are those the 
prohibition of which the Q ur’an and Hadith indicate, just as, of all the worships by 
which people draw near God, the only ones that are lawful for the people are those the 
lawflilness of which the Qur’an and Hadith indicate. In other words, in matters of 
worship, God’s silence implies prohibition, while in matters of worldly affairs, God’s 
silence implies permission. Thus, since concluding contracts are matters of worldly 
affairs and since no certain fonn is imposed by Qur ’an and Hadith, any new method 
of communication not mentioned in traditional Islamic book can therefore be validly 
used to enter into contracts.
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science of Islamic jurisprudence) of evidence, but should seek to know the 
truth by any means available since the justice sought by the Shari ’ah 
cannot be found just in doctrine with no concern for reality and practical 
implementation. Shari 'ah demands justice realized in the world, as far as 
human capacities allow. Shari 'ah justice, if  properly understood, cannot 
conflict with right reason, obvious fact, or practical justice.
In addition, the merit of using modem means of communications to conclude 
agreements in general is particularly legalized by the Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA) in 
Jeddah which convenes most of the highest contemporary Muslim scholars in the 
world, and highly recognized by Saudi Courts. The Islamic Fiqh Academy has 
ruled the following:
First, if  the agreement is made between parties who are not present in one 
place, and one cannot directly see and hear another, and the 
communication means between them is the writing, letter, messenger, 
telegram, telex, fax, or computers (i.e. e-contract), in such case the 
agreement would be validly concluded once the offer is accepted by the 
offeree after it anives to him.
Second, if the agreement is made in one time between parties who are not 
present in one place, but can hear each one another in the same time, such 
as by the telephone and wireless, in such case it is just like concluding the 
agreement between attending parties, and thus it takes the general rule 
concluding a normal contract.  ^ ^
As to judicial practices, the Saudi relevant Courts, for example, adopt the principle 
that when the fax massage containing the sender name and the fax number, it becomes 
sufficient without need of the sender signature or stamp. Furthermore, in a recent 
case, a Saudi party has opposed enforcement of a foreign award, contending that there 
is no arbitration agreement between the parties as the formal requirements were not
Ibn Taymiyya, Alsiyasa Alshariyya f i  Islah Alrai wa Airaiyya pp 16-20. see also, FE Vogel, Islamic 
law and legal system : studies o f  Saudi Arabia (Studies in Islamic law and society ; v 8, Brill, Leiden 
2000) pp 144-45.
206 Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA) is formed under the auspices o f the organization o f  the Islamic 
Conference (QIC) that represents all Muslim Countries around the world.
See, eg, the 2nd Review Committee, decision No. 235/T/2 dated 1415 H (1994).
The Islamic Fiqh Academy, 'Decision No. 52 (3/6) about Concluding Contracts by Modem Means 
o f Communications'(1990) 2 (6) Islamic Fiqh Academy Journal 785.
See, Al-Ajlan, Compilation o f  ju dicia l principles 205; the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 
187/T/4 dated 1413 H (1992).
..
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satisfied. However, the Saudi enforcing Court (18"’ Subsidiary Panel) dismissed the 
Saudi objection, providing that the arbitral tribunal in Cairo has already and rightly 
decided that there was a valid and binding arbitration agreement between the parties, 
and thus the arbitral award is also valid and binding on the Saudi Party. Thus, the 
Court finally granted leave to enforce the foreign arbitral award. This decision was 
then upheld by the Appeal Court (the 4"’ Review Committee). '
In the light of the foregoing considerations, it may conclude that the formal 
requirement of Art. 11(2) of the NYC should be dynamically interpreted in the light of 
the Shari ’ah principles to uphold the validity of the arbitration agreement whether it is 
included in writing (explicitly or implicitly), orally, implied by conduct or by new 
means of communication. This extraordinarily liberal approach leads, in practice, to 
nanow down the effectiveness of the formal invalidity of the arbitration agi'eement as 
non-enforcement ground in SA, which comes in line with the main intended purpose 
of the NYC.
4.4.3 Substantial Grounds of the Invalidity
With regard to the substantial gi'Ounds of invalidity of the arbitration agreement, the 
SAL, like other arbitration laws, gives no details thereon, and thus it to be governed 
by the general rules of the Shari'ah, The arbitration agreement under the Shari'ah 
law will not be considered binding if there are materials affect its validity. Such 
defects include duress, misrepresentation, mistake, incapacity and undue influence. 
However, the Saudi courts appear to nanow the effectiveness of such ground in the 
light of emphatic policy of Shari 'ah for fulfilling all obligations in general. This can 
be seen in the above-mentioned case where the enforcing court (the 9'" Administrative 
Panel) granted leave to enforce arbitral award in favour of the foreign party against 
the Saudi public entity, although the Court agreed with the defendant objection that 
the arbitration agreement was invalid under the SAL which forbids the Saudi 
government bodies to enter into arbitration agieement without the previous consent of 
the President of the Council of Ministers. However, the Court applied the less strict
the 18th Subsidiai'y Panel, decision No, 8/D/F/18 dated 1424 H (2003). 
the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 36/T/4 dated 1425 H (2004),
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provision of Shari’ah over the applicable law (i.e. SAL) in favour of binding 
arbitration agieement and award. The Court supported its approach by three grounds: 
first, the Qur’an obligates that “O you who believe! Fulfil (your) obligation” 
similarly, the Prophet Mohamed (peace be upon him) emphasized that “The Muslims 
are bound by their stipulations”. Finally, the principle adopted by the majority of 
Muslim scholars is that the arbitral award is binding.
In this case the Saudi Court exercised its discretion to restrict the application of the
substantial invalidity of the arbitration agreement as aground for refusal of
enforcement. This liberal approach is certainly consistent in general with the NYC 
policy of pro-enforcement bias and particularly with Art. VII(l) provision of more- 
favourable-laws to enforcement.
4.4 Conclusion
The following conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing discussion:
The applicable law to the substantial validity of the arbitration agieement is to be 
decided under the provision of conflict mles laid down in Art. V(l)(a) which is as 
follows:
(a) The law chosen by the parties to govern the arbitration agreement. In the 
absence of such choice;
(b) If the parties themselves have chosen both the law governing the main 
contract as well as the arbitration place, two main approaches exist as to which 
law should be applied to the arbitration agreement; first, the law of the
arbitration place; second, the law of the main contract. Yet, it may be
suggested a distinction between (a) the Arbitral clause (in a contract) where 
with the law of the main contract has more obvious connection than the law of 
the arbitration seat, and (b) the submission agreement (not forming part of
212 The Qur'an, Ai-Ma'idah  [5:1],
Nairated by Al-Tinnidhi, Sunan Al-Tirmidhi No. 1403; Abu Daoud, Sunan No. 3596; Maalik ibn 
Anas, Al Muwatta No. 1447; Al-Hakem, Al-Mustadrak No. 2269; and others.
the 9th Administrative Panel, decision No. 32/D/A/9 dated 1918 H (1997).
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another contract) where the law of the seat of arbitration has more obvions 
connection.
(c) If the arbitration fomm has not been chosen by the parties, but they have 
chosen the law governing the main contract, the latter is highly likely to be the 
governing law of the arbitration agreement.
(d) If the law governing the main contract has not been chosen by the parties, but 
they have chosen the arbitration forum, the latter should be the applicable law 
to the arbitration agi'eement.
(e) Wliere both the law governing the main contract and the arbitration seat have 
not been chosen by the parties, the enforcement court then should strive to 
demonstrate the common intention of the parties regarding the applicable law 
to the arbitration agreement by examining the closest connecting factors and 
surrounding circumstances.
With regard to the law governing the formal validity of the arbitration agreement, 
there is strong argument to apply the provision of Art. V (l)(a) just like the case of the 
substantial validity mentioned above, whereas the prevailing view is that the provision 
of Art. II (2) governs the formal validity. However, the compromising suggestion that 
appears to be more suitable is to apply the law applicable according to the conflict of 
laws rules of Art. V (l)(a), unless the applicable law requires stricter fonnality than 
Art. II, the latter then should be applied.
Whatever the applicable law will be. Art. VII(l) of the NYC allows parties to rely on 
the inore-favorable-provisions for enforcement of the foreign award. Thus, any more 
favorable law or treaty available at the enforcing country may be applied over the 
applicable law according to Art. VII(l) of the NYC.
In SA, the enforcing Courts are found to recognise the law chosen by the parties. In 
the absence of such choice, the applicable law seems to be the law of the arbitration 
seat. With regard to the application of Art. VII(l), the Saudi Courts are also found to 
apply the Shari 'ah when its provision is less demanding than the applicable law.
As regards the fonnal gi'ounds of the invalidity of the arbitration agi'eement , Art. II 
requires the arbitration agreement to be in written form either signed by the parties or, 
contained in exchange of letters or telegi'ams without signatures. Thus, lacking such
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fonnality may constitute a ground of non- enforcement. Yet, the provision of Art. 
11(2)) is, according to the contemporary trend, deemed as a maximum (not minimum) 
fonnal requirement that supersedes more demanding fonnal requirements by national 
laws. Thus, Art. 11(2) must be interpreted widely in the light of NYC’s spirit of pro­
enforcement bias to conclude other modem means of contracting in international trade 
practices.
As regards the signature requirement, there is no need to specifically sign the arbitral 
clause in contract, but signing the main contract as whole is sufficient. However, there 
is a strong support for the view that the arbitration agi'eement (whether arbitral clause 
or submission agreement), does not have to be signed by the parties to constitute an 
agreement in writing.
As regards an arbitration agi'eement in exchange of documents, the common view is 
that the document itself need not to be returned back by the party who received it to 
the sender, but it is suffices when a reference is made to the document in subsequent 
correspondence, such as a letter, facsimiles, letter of credit, invoice or purchase 
confirmation, etc, by the party to which the document was sent.
The reference to arbitration clause in standard conditions, according to the prevailing 
trend, is sufficient as far as the other party appears to be able to check the existence of 
an arbitration clause.
National enforcing courts generally have held the spirit of the NYC to prevail over its 
technical and tenninological limitations and thus intei-preted Art. II (2) broadly to 
include many different fonus of modem communications in satisfaction of the writing 
requirement, such as telex, fax, e-mail and other means of e-communication.
A non-written agreement such as a tacit and oral agi'eement, according to the general 
view, does not satisfy the written requirement of Art. 11(2) of the NYC, and has led to 
refusal of enforcement of the foreign awards in several cases. Yet, there is a growing 
support for the view that where the tacit or oral agreement is sufficient to enter into a 
nonnal intemational commercial contract, it should be also sufficient to enter into a 
valid arbitration agi'eement.
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In SA, unlike like the NYC and most of national and intemational arbitration laws, the
SAL does not require the arbitration agreement to be in writing to be validly |
concluded. In contrast, it is open to rely on the liberal provisions of the Shari 'ah
which allow the arbitration agreement to be made by writing, tacit, oral, fax, e-mail 3and the like, as far as such means of communication are used in trade practice and L
Irecognized by commercial customs.
The substantial grounds o f invalidity of the arbitration agreement such as fraud, 
mistake, duress and inoperative have not created noticeable problems since most of 
them are rarely invoked in practice as grounds for non-enforcement of the award.
Finally, national Courts have generally been reluctant to reflise enforcement of the 
arbitral award on the ground that the arbitration agi’eement is not valid, respecting the 
general policy of the NYC of pro-enfbrcement bias. The same can be held true in SA. |
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Violation of Due Process
5.1 Introduction
Art. V(l)(b) of the NYC set out the second giound in which enforcement of foreign 
awards may be blocked. It provides that enforcement of a foreign award may be 
refused if:
The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice 
of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or 
was otherwise unable to present his case. '
This ground is considered as the most important giound for refusing enforcement 
under Art. V of the NYC, because its purpose is to ensure that certain basic standards 
of “due process” or fair trial are observed throughout the arbitration.  ^ Here the 
principle of due process covers two different aspects: first, the party’s right to be 
given proper notice of the time and place of the arbitral proceedings, and second, his 
right to be given a proper chance to present his case. Breach of such due process may 
lead the enforcement of the arbitral award being refused under Art. V.(l)(b) of the 
NYC. Thus, this chapter deals first with preliminary issues, including the law 
governing violation of due process, and the relation between Art. V(l)(b) (violation of 
due process) and Art. V(2)(b) (i.e. breach of public policy). Secondly, a number of 
issues regarding lack of proper notice will then be addressed. Thirdly, several 
questions concerning inability to present one’s case will be discussed, followed by 
issues of estoppel and waiver as well the position if the violation of due process has 
no effect on the arbitration outcome. The Saudi position will finally be highlighted.
5.2 The Law Governing Violation of Due Process
' N Y C o f 1958, Art.V(l)(b).
 ^ See, Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  463.
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When violation of due process is raised as a gi’ound for refusing enforcement o f a 
foreign award, will this matter be governed by the law of the arbitration seat, the law 
of the enforcement court, or only by the provisions of Art. V(l)(b)? Although the 
NYC provides little or no guidance for the way in which an arbitration should be 
conducted to meat its requirement of due process, some commentators suggest that 
Art. V(l)(b) is a genuinely international substantive rule on violation of due process, 
which supersedes over any domestic laws thereon. Thus, breaching this mle is 
deemed to be sufficient in itself to open the door to resisting enforeement, since Art. 
V(l)(b) is expressed not in choice of law terms, but rather in terms of substantive 
rules. ^
Nevertheless, the general view of commentators and courts  ^ appears to be that Art. 
V(l)(b) establishes no international rule or standard of due process. Under this view, 
different approaches emerge as to the law governing the benchmark of due process, 
including the law chosen by parties to govern the arbitration,  ^ or the law of the 
arbitration seat,  ^or the law applied in the enforcing Court. ^
However, the prevailing judicial trend seems to be that the enforcing court will 
naturally have its own concept of what constitutes a violation of the requirements of 
due process, so that Courts will judge violation of due process according to their own 
national laws.^ However, this does not mean that all of the requirements of due
 ^ See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration  para 1696. See also, Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration  para 26-81, who consider this approach to be also convincing.
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation  298; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 
para 26-81; Red fern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  46; 
Dicey, Morris and Collins, Conflict o f  Laws 639.
 ^ See, eg. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v RAKTA 975; Paklito Investment Ltd  v Kloclcner East 
Asia L td  47.
 ^ See, Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration  para 26-81
’ See, ibid para 26-81; Minmetals Germany GmbH  v Ferco Steel Ltd , “were the court held that “By 
agreeing the place o f a foreign arbitration, a party not only agreed to submit all contractual disputes to 
arbitration but also agreed that the conduct o f the arbitration should be subject to the supervisoiy 
jurisdiction o f the courts o f  that place.”
® See, Gaja, International Commercial Arbitration  vol 1 pt 1 para I.C.4 ; van den Berg, The New York 
Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 298.
® See, eg. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v RAKTA (US Court o f  Appeals 2nd Cir 1974) 975; 
Firm P  (US) v Firm F  (Germany) (1977) II YBCA 241 (Germany Court o f Appeal 3 Apr 1975); 
Carters Ltd  v Francesco Ferraro  (1979) IV YBCA 275 (Italy Court o f  Appeal 1975) 276; Biotronik
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process under national law will automatically apply to international arbitration. What 
may constitute a violation of due process under national law is not necessarily so 
regarded under the NYC, the latter is more limited than the former. For example, a 
US court of appeals has recently in Karaha Bodas Co LLC  v Perusahaan 
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara confirmed the customary approach that 
the provision of Art. V(l)(b):
[EJssentially sanctions the application of the forum state's standards of 
due process. In this case. United States standards of due process ... (Yet) 
the right to due process does not include the complete set of procedural 
rights guaranteed by the Federal Rules o f Civil procedure, (citations 
omitted) ' '
In addition, many courts have given weight, beside their own law, to the law 
governing the arbitration (i.e. lex arbitri) in deciding whether there has been violation 
of due process. For example, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Hebei Import 
& Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd examined the laws chosen by the parties 
to govern the arbitration (i.e. the CIETAC Arbitration Rules and the PRC Arbitration 
Law) and found that there was no breach of these provisions with regard to the 
requirements of due process.
5.3 The Relation between Art. V(l)(b) (i.e. due process) and Art. V(2)(b) (i.e. 
public policy).
M ess-Und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co v Medford M edical Instrument Co 415 FSupp 133 (US 
District Court New Jersey 1976) 140; Renault Jacquinet v Sicea (1979) IV YBCA 284 (Italy Court o f  
Appeal 1977) 286; German Buyer v English Seller (1979) IV YBCA 266 (Germany Court o f Appeal 
27 Jul 1978) 267; Dutch Seller v Swiss Buyer (1979) IV YBCA 309 (Switzerland Court o f Appeal 
1971) 310; Paklito Investment Ltd v Klockner East Asia Ltd  47; Generica Ltd  v Pharmaceutical 
Basics Inc 125 F3d 1123 (US Court o f  Appeals 7th Cir 1997) 1130; Karaha Bodas Co LLC  v 
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara 299-300.
See, eg, Firm P  (US) v Firm F  (Germany) (Germany Court o f Appeal 3 Apr 1975) ; Presse Office
SA V Centro Editorial Hoy SA (1979) IV YBCA 301 (Mexico Court o f First Instance 1977 ) 301-302;
Malden Mills Inc v Llilaturas Lourdes SA (1979) IV YBCA 302 (Mexico Court o f Apeal 1977) pp 
303-4; Generica L td  v Pharmaceutical Basics Inc 1130; Consorcio Rive SA D e CV v Briggs O f  
Cancun Inc 134 FSupp2d 789 (US District Court ED Louisiana 2001) 796; Karaha Bodas Co LLC  v 
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara pp 299-300.
’ ‘ Karaha Bodas Co LLC  v Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara pp 299-300,
See, eg, Ulawneshprom State Foreign Economic Enterprise v Tradeway Inc 1996 WL 107285 (US 
District Court SD N Y  1996) 5; Hebei Import Æ Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd  [1999] 1 
HKLRD 665 (Hong Kong Court o f Final Appeal 1999) 685.
Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd  685,
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It may be thought important to address the question of the relationship between Art. 
V(l)(b) (due process) and Art. V.(2)(b) (public policy) since the principles o f fairness 
and obseiwance of due process are often regarded as a part of the public policy of the 
enforcing state. The significance of this question stems from the fact that the grounds 
set forth in Art. V (l) can only be raised by the respondent, who bears the burden of 
proving the existence of such grounds, whereas the gi'ounds under Art. V(2) can be 
raised by the court of its own motion. Thus, the key question is whether the NYC 
intends to exclude violation of due process ftom Art. V(2)(b), which concerns public 
policy in general, because it specifically treats the violation of due process under Art. 
V(l)(b), so that the court cannot of its motion refuse enforcement on the basis of 
violation of due process?
Most of commentators and courts are of the view that the ground of violation of 
due process mentioned under Art. V(l)(b) may overlap with public policy defence 
mentioned in Art. V(2)(b), so that the issue may be raised by either the respondent or 
the court o f its own motion without need to be invoked by a respondent. So, the 
gi'ound of violation of due process may fall either under Art. V(l)(b) or Art. V(2)(b).
In addition, it can be obseiwed that in practice, respondents often base their objection 
on violation of due process upon both Art. V(l)(b) and Art. V(2)(b), as they probably 
believe that the invocation of public policy defence of the forum under Art. V(2)(b) is 
more effective than the invocation of lack of due process under Art. V(l)(b). 
Besides, in contrast to Art. V(l)(b), invoking Art. V(2)(b) may not require the 
resisting party to bear its p roof.
See, van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentaiy (2003)' at 654-55; van den Berg, The New York 
Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation  pp 299-300; Gaillard and 
Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration  para 1697; Lew, 
Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration  para 26-82. Di Pietro and 
Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 149.
See, eg. Presse Office SA v Centro Editorial Hoy SA pp 301-2; Malden M ills Inc v Hilaturas 
Lourdes SA pp 303-4; Saint Gobain v Fertilizer Corp o f  India L td  (1976) I YBCA 184 (Franc Court 
o f Appeal 1971) 185; Biotronik M ess-Und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co v M edford M edical 
Instrument Co ; X  (Syria) v X  (2004) XXIX YBCA 663 (Germany Court o f Appeal 1998) 668.
See, eg, Presse Office SA v Centro Editorial Hoy SA pp 301-2; Malden M ills Inc v Hilaturas 
Lourdes SA pp 303-4; Rice Trading L td  v Nidera Handelscompagnie B V  (1998) XXIII YBCA 731 
(Netherlands Court o f Appeal 1998 ) pp 733-34; Generica Ltd v Pharmaceutical Basics Inc 1996 WL 
535321 (UN District Court N D  111 1996) 3. See also, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration  
Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 300.
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Many courts have also relied on both provisions in deciding whether an award has 
been affected by a violation of due process. For instance, in Rice Trading Ltd v 
Nidera Handelscompagnie BV, a Dutch defendant objected to enforcement of a 
foreign award on the ground that Art. V(l)(b) and Art, V(2)(b) of the NYC had been 
violated, as the defendant was not allowed to react to evidence submitted to the 
tribunal. The Dutch Court of First Instance upheld the objection and refused 
enforcement of the foreign award under both p ro v is io n sw h ich  decision was then 
affinned by the Dutch Court of Appeal.'^ Likewise, a Gennan court of appeal has 
rejected an allegation of breach of due process as unfounded under both Art. V(l)(b) 
and Art. V(2)(b). Similarly, before a Swiss court of first instance, a respondent 
argued that enforcement of a foreign award should be refused for denial of due 
process not only under Art. V(l)(b) but also Art. V(2)(b). The Court held that the 
denial of due process is in principle a violation of public policy, and thus it examined 
the objection of violation of due process under both Art. V(l)(b) and Art.V(2)(b). 
More specifically, a German court of appeal stated that:
The violation of due process in the arbitral proceedings alleged by the 
defendant is not only a ground for refusal of enforcement pursuant to Art. 
V(l)(b) of the Convention; it is also a violation of public policy which, 
pursuant to Art. V(2)(b) of the Convention, must be examined ex officio.^^
Yet, with respect, the above approach appears to be doubtful, and should be not 
followed for the following reasons. First, although the fundamental requirements of 
fair trial or due process are part of national and international public policy, they 
should not be so in the context of Art. V. Allowing the violation of due process 
defence to be raised either by the respondent or the court is at variance with the 
NYC’s scheme of limiting the possibility of non-enforcement defences. Nor does it
See, eg, Presse Office SA v Centro Editorial Hoy SA pp 301-2; Malden Mills Inc v Hilaturas 
Lourdes SA pp 303-4; Saint Gobain v Fertilizer Corp o f  India Ltd  185; Biotronik Mess-Und 
Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co v M edford M edical Instrument Co ; X  (Syria) v X  (Germany Court o f  
Appeal 1998) pp 668, 695, 825-29; Italian Party v Swiss Company (2004) XXIX YBCA 819 
(Switzerland Court o f First Instance 2003) pp 825-29; Manufacturer (Slovenia) v Exclusive 
Distributor (Germany) 695.
Rice Trading Ltd  v Nidera Handelscompagnie BV pp  732-33.
ibid 733-34.
Manufacturer (Slovenia) v Exclusive Distributor (Germany) 695.
Italian Party v Swiss Company pp 825-29.
X (Syria) v X  (Germany Court o f Appeal 1998) 668.
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accord with the general trend of interpreting Art. V narrowly in line with the NYC’s 
pro-enforcement bias. Furthermore, by listing violation of due process among the 
grounds which have to be invoked and proven by the party resisting enforcement, it is 
almost certain that the NYC intended to exelude this ground ftom the public policy 
provision of Art. V(2)(b), and therefore to prevent the enforcing court refusing 
enforcement of its own motion on the gi'ound of violation of due process. This is 
made clear by the opening words of Art. V (l) which state:
Recognition and enforcement o f the award may be refused, at the request 
o f the party against whom it is invoked, only i f  that party furnishes to the 
competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, 
prnn/that.[emphases added]
Finally, to the best of knowledge, no case has been reported where a court has refused 
to enforce a foreign arbitral award of its own motion upon the basis of violation of 
due process. Thus, in the cases mentioned above Art. V(2)(b) was not invoked 
initially by the courts, but by the respondents.
Accordingly, it may be suggested that Art.V(l)(b) should be deemed to exclude the 
possibility that violation of due process might also fall under the public policy 
provision of Art. V(2)(b). A court cannot of its own motion refuse enforcement of an 
award for violation o f due process on the basis of Art. V(2)(b). Such a defence can 
only be raised by the losing party, who then bears its burden of proof.
5,4 Lack of Proper Notice
5,4.1 General
It is vital that all parties to arbitration be given proper notice of the appointment of the 
arbitrator and of the arbitration proceedings. Thus, enforcement of the award may be 
resisted for lack of proper notice, or where notice of the proceedings was received 
after the award had been rendered. One can observe that the party's lack of awareness 
of the appointment of the arbitrator or o f the arbitration proceedings is treated
"  NYC of 1958, Ai-t.V(l).
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separately from issue of inability to present the case in Art. V(2)(b), even though it is 
one of the situations in which a party is “unable to present his case”. Surely, this 
separation demonstrates the seriousness of proper notice in arbitration. Also, it is said 
that there is a historic reason for this separation, because it appears in the Geneva 
Convention of 1927, and the framers of the NYC did not wish to abandon it.
The legislative history of the NYC indicates that the word “proper” was inserted in 
the phrase “not given proper notice” in Art. V(l)(b) as result of a proposal by the 
Norwegian delegate. He has set forth his proposal because the Conference had 
decided to delete fium Art. V(l)(b) the express provision contained in the Geneva 
Convention of 1927 to the effect that ‘being under a legal incapacity, the respondent 
was not properly represented’ on the grounds that such cases seldom arose in practice. 
Thus, the insertion of the word “proper” before “notice” should provide for that 
remote contingency of improper representation in the arbitration proceedings.
Given the tendency to inteipret the refusal grounds of Art. V narrowly, the courts 
have generally looked for a gi’ave and prejudicial lack of proper notice, such as no 
notice at all, or notice being received after the award has been rendered. Thus, 
although the objection of lack of proper notice is often relied upon to oppose 
enforcement, the courts rarely accepted this ground in practice. Yet, an example of 
successful objection can be found in a US district court case of Sesostris SAE v 
Transportes Navales SA, where the Court denied the plaintiffs motion to confinn 
enforcement of a foreign award, since the respondent presented evidence that it 
received no notice of the arbitration proceedings, rejecting the plaintiffs argument 
that that respondent was not a proper party to the arbitration proceedings and
Geneva Convention o f  1927, Art.2(b).
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration para 1696.
See, UN Doc. E/CONF.26/SR. 17 pp 9, 14. See also, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration 
Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 303.
See, eg, Malden Mills Inc v Hilaturas Lourdes SA pp 301-2; Presse Office SA v Centro Editorial 
Hoy SA pp 301-2; Dutch Seller v Swiss Buyer (Switzerland Court o f  Appeal 1971) 310; Bobbie 
Brooks Ins v Lanificio Walter B an d SAS 290; Carters Ltd v Francesco Ferraro  276; SpA Nosegno e 
Morando v Bohne Friedrich & Co (1979) IV YBCA 279 (Italy Supreme Court 1977) 280. Renault 
Jacquinet V Sicea 286.
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consequently should not have received notice of the arbitration. Likewise, a 
German court of appeal refused an application to enforce an award rendered in 
Russia, finding that the respondent had actually received no notice of the arbitration 
until the award was made. The Court held that although Russian arbitration law 
applied by tribunal provides that a communication made to the defendant’s last known 
address suffices if no other address can be found after making a reasonable inquiry, 
there was no evidence here that any attempt had been made to find the conect address 
of the Gennan defendant, which in any case had not changed since the conclusion of 
the contracts.
5,4.2 The Standard of Proper Notice
When can notice of the appointment of the arbitrator and the arbitral proeeedings can 
be considered to be “proper notice”? This matter is mostly a question of fact in the 
sense that the notice must be adequate. Yet, it is vital to mention that it is generally 
accepted that the notice need not to be in a particular fonn as required under domestic 
arbitration laws or civil procedure, since international arbitration is a private 
method o f dispute resolution. This interpretation has generally been confirmed by 
national courts and commentaries. For example, the US Court o f Appeal in 
Generica Ltd v Pharmaceutical Basics Inc has laid emphasis on the doctrine that by
Sesostris SAE v Transportes Navales SA 727 FSupp 737 (US District Court D Massachusetts 1989) 
741.
Seller (Russian) v Buyer (germany) (2002) XXVII YBCA 445 (Germany Court o f  Appeal 16 Mar 
2000) pp 448- 49.
However, in order to avoid the risk of claiming that no notice was received, it may be recommended 
to send notices by registered mail or return receipt service which provides a mailer with evidence o f  
delivery (to whom the mail was delivered and date o f delivery), and after delivery, the return receipt is 
mailed back to the sender. See, van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' (2003)’655.
See, Italian Party v Swiss Company (2004) XXIX YBCA 819 (Switzerland Court o f  First Instance 
2003) 827.
See, eg, Generica Ltd  v Pharmaceutical Basics Inc 1130; Karaha Bodas Co LLC v Perusahaan 
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara  pp 299-300; Consorcio Rive SA De CV  v Briggs O f  
Cancun Inc 796; Presse Office SA v Centro Editorial Hoy SA pp 301-2; Malden Mills Inc v 
Hilaturas Lourdes SA 304; Bobbie Brooks Ins v Lanificio Walter B an d  SAS 292; Trans Chemical 
Ltd  V China National Machinery Import And Export Corp 978 F Supp 266 (US District Court SD 
Texas 1997 ) 310.
See, eg, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation  303; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration  para 
26-84.
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choosing to remedy their disputes through arbitration rather than litigation, parties 
should not expect the same procedures they would find in the judicial arena. 
Likewise, a US district court has held that:
The right to due process (under Art. V(l)(b) of the NYC) does not include 
the complete set of procedural rights guaranteed by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. By agreeing to arbitration (a party) subjected itself to its 
advantages and disadvantages.
A similar approach also was taken by a Mexican court of appeals and a Mexican 
Ccourt of first instance, where Mexican respondents objected to enforcement of 
foreign awards on the gi*ound that they had not been properly notified of the 
arbitration proceedings since all notices including the summons were served by mail, 
while the first notice of summons should be served personally upon the respondents 
pursuant to Mexican procedural law. Both courts expressly refeiTed to Art, V(l)(b) of 
the NYC in dismissing both objections, holding that by submitting their disputes to 
arbitration, the parties agieed tacitly to waive the foraial requirement of summons 
established by Mexican Civil Procedure. In this regard, the Mexican Court of First 
Instance held that:
The summons, to which the petitioner objects, was actually served in a 
correct manner, because by inserting the arbitral clause in the contract, the 
parties tacitly waived the fonualities established by Mexican procedural 
legislation ... in order to subject themselves to the Arbitration Rules of the 
ICC.
The abovementioned cases illustrate that notice would be deemed adequate if it, for 
example, complies with the requirements set by the applicable arbitration rules and 
not necessarily with national law.
34
35
Generica Ltd v Pharmaceutical Basics Inc 1130.
Trans Chemical Ltd v China National Machinery Import And Export Corp 310.
Malden Mills Inc 3^ Hilaturas Lourdes 54  pp 301-2,
Presse Office SA v Centro Editorial Hoy SA pp 301-2.
Malden Mills Inc v Hilaturas Lourdes SA pp 303-4; Presse Office SA v Centro Editorial Hoy SA 
pp 301-2.
Presse Office SA v Centro Editorial Hoy SA pp 301-2. The same was adopted by Mexico Court o f  
Apeal in Malden Mills Inc v Hilaturas Lourdes SA 303.
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5.4.3 Shortness of Time Limits
Another important issue is whether the notice was timely? This issue includes the 
shortness of time limits for appointing the arbitrators and preparing defences, and the 
notice period to appear at hearings. It appears that the question whether such time 
limits or notice periods did in fact obstruct a party from appointing its arbitrator, 
preparing its defence or appearing for hearing is again a matter of fact to be judged by 
enforcing courts. However, the courts generally have considered mere shortness not to 
be by itself a violation of due process under Art. V(l)(b), as short time limits are 
regarded as a common feature in arbitration proceedings, the speed of arbitration 
playing a central ftmction in the effectiveness of international arbitration. Thus, the 
Swiss and Italian Courts of appeal, for example, have held that a request to 
appoint an arbitrator within seven days does not amount to a denial of due process 
under Art. V(l)(b). The same conclusion was also reached by the Italian Supreme 
Court in respect of time limit of 12 days."^  ^ Similarly, a time limit of 15 days for an 
appointment to be made and a time limit of 48 hours allowed to invoke the inferior 
quality of the goods were held by an Italian Court of Appeal not to be a violation of 
due process.
5.4.4 Disclosure of the Arbitrator’s Name
It to be observed that the concept of proper notice is not limited to the issues of lack 
of notice and untimely notice, but extends to such matters as disclosure of the names 
of arbitrators. Thus, in an exceptional case the German Court o f Appeal found lack
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 304; van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' (2003)' 655; Di Pietro and Platte, 
Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 150; Lew, 
Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commet^cial Arbitration para 26- 83; Garnett and 
others. International Commercial Arbitration  105,
Dw/c/î 5É?//i?r 3^ (Switzerland Court o f Appeal 1971) 310.
Carters Ltd V Francesco Ferraro 276.
SpA Nosegno e Morando 3; Bohne Friedrich Æ Co 280.
Renault Jacquinet V Sicea 286.
See, P Sanders, 'Consolidated Commentary'(1979) IV YBCA 231 at 248; van den Berg, The New  
York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation pp 305-6; Di Pietro 
and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 pp 
151-52; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration  para 26-85.
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of proper notice in failing to disclose the name of the arbitrators to be serious enough 
to justify refxisal of enforcement of an award under Art. V(l)(b). In this case, the 
award was made under the Arbitration Rules of the Copenhagen Grain and Food Stuff 
Trade Association, which allowed no disclosure of the names of actual arbitrators to 
the parties, instead giving them the right to delete undesirable names from the list of 
arbitrators presented by the institution in advance. Since the award was signed only by 
the president of the institution’s arbitration committee, the parties were not given a 
chance to ascertain whether or not undesirable people had been appointed as 
arbitrators. The rationale of this provision was that the persons on the list of 
arbitrators were members of a small circle of professionals acting in the same 
industry, who regularly do business with each other. If name of the arbitrator is 
known to a party in the same trade, this may tempt the party to seek to influence the 
arbitrator. Nevertheless, the Gennan Court of Appeal declined to enforce the award, 
finding that the parties’ right to know the arbitrators’ names and the right to challenge 
them are fundamental to a fair trial. The Court therefore considered the above 
deprivation of such right to be a violation of the principle of due process and refused 
enforcement of the award.
5.4.5 The Language of Notice
The concept of “proper notice” may also cover the issue of the language of the notice, 
such as where, for example, the request for arbitration proceedings is drafted in a 
foreign language. Where a Japanese defendant asserted that the notice sent to it was 
written in Chinese with no Japanese translation, and CIETAC (i.e. the Chinese 
Arbitration Commission) had never arranged for Chinese legal attorneys for the 
defendant. Consequently, the defendant argued that the award should be vacated for 
violation of Art. V(l)(b), but the Japanese District Court rejected this objection, 
holding that the parties had agreed to CIETAC arbitration, and Art. 75(10) of the 
Arbitration Rules stipulated that the language of the arbitration should be Chinese, 
unless otherwise agreed between the parties. In the absence of evidence that the 
parties had expressly agreed to a language of arbitration other than Chinese, and 
relying on the fact that the contract was written in Chinese and English, the Court
46 Danish Buyer v German Seller (1979) IV YBCA 258 (Gennany Court o f  Appeal 1976 ) pp 259-60.
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concluded that the parties had agreed to conduct the arbitral proceedings in Chinese.
Likewise, the Swiss Court of Appeal has found that drafting a request for 
arbitration in a foreign language does not constitute a breach of due process.
5.5 Inability to Present One’s Case
5.5.1 General
The broad wording .. or was otherwise unable to present his case” laid down in Art. 
V(l)(b) was adopted by the drafters of the NYC upon a proposal o f the Dutch 
delegate ( Prof. P Sanders). Basically, this provision aims to cover any serious 
unfairness in the arbitral proceedings other than lack of proper notice, and to establish 
the principle of an equal right to be heard, taking into consideration the possibility 
that, although notice had been given in adequate time, the respondent might have been 
unable to appear before the arbitral tribunal due to a cause beyond reasonable control 
(e.g., government aetion, refusal to grant a visa, war, fire, explosion, flood, etc) or, 
when appearing before the tribunal, he might have not been given an adequate 
opportunity to present his case.
A clear interpretation of the defence that a party “was unable to present his case” is 
furnished by the US Court of Appeal in Generica Limited v Pharmaceutical Basics 
INC:
[T]hat defense basically corresponds to the due process defense that a 
party was not given the oppoitunity to be heard at a meaningftil time and 
in a meaningful manner. ... Therefore, an arbitral award should be denied 
or vacated if the party challenging the award proves that he was not given 
a meaningfiil opportunity to be heard as our due process jurisprudence 
defines it. ... It is clear that an arbitrator must provide a ftindamentally 
fair hearing. ... A fundamentally fair hearing is one that meets the
Seller (China) v Buyer (Japan) (Japan District Court 1999) pp 517-18. 
N Z v I  (1992) XVII YBCA 581 (Switzerland Court o f Appeal ) 583.
UN Doc. E/CONF. 26/SR.23 at 15.
50 P Sanders ‘The New York Convention’ in P Sanders (ed) International Commercial Arbitration (the 
Hague 1960) vol II, 293 at 315, cited in van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : 
Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 306.
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minimal requirements of fairness - adequate notice, a hearing on the 
evidence, and an impartial decision by the arbitrator, (citations omitted)
However, it may be important to stress again that the standards of fair hearing in 
international arbitration are not to be judged exactly according to the enforcing court’s 
national standards of what amounts to a fair hearing. Rather, the enforcing court 
should take into account the private nature of international arbitration and its practices 
of fairness when considering the required standards of due process. Thus in Parsons 
(Sc Whittemore Overseas Co INC  v Société Generale de L'industrie du Papier (Rakta) 
the US Court of Appeal states:
By agreeing to submit disputes to arbitration, a party relinquishes his 
courtroom rights - including that to subpoena witnesses - in favor of 
arbitration 'with all of its well known advantages and drawbacks.
More pertinently, the US Supreme Court in Grand Medical PC  v New York State 
Insurance Department, observes that:
The procedural safeguards required by due process are flexible and vary 
with the circumstances and type of proceeding. Arbitration is intended to 
be a more efficient and less expensive alternative to dispute resolution 
than a formal court procedure. To achieve this goal, arbitrators are 
peimitted to provide relief without observing all of the rules that the court 
would be bound to, (citations omitted)
Equally, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Hebei Import Export Corp v 
Polytek Engineering Co Ltd expressly held that it is critical, in approaching the 
question whether there has been a violation of due process, to take into account the 
fact that the parties agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration under the CIETAC 
Arbitration Rules and the PRC Arbitration Law. “The fact that the parties agreed to
Generica Ltd V Pharmaceutical Basics Inc pp 1129-30.
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co 3^ RAKTA .
Grand M edical PC v New York State Insurance Department 787 NYS2d 613 (US Supreme Court 
NY Sup 2004) 615. Similarly, Hoteles Condado Beach 3^ Union De Tronquistas Local 763 F2d 34 (US 
Court o f Appeals 1st Cir 1985) 38.
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procedures which differ ftom those which would ordinarily apply in Hong Kong is a 
circumstance of which the Court must take account”.
5.5.2 Default by a Party
It is important to bear in mind that the requirements of due process are generally 
considered to be satisfied where each party has been given an opportunity to present 
and explain his case and evidence, regardless whether or how he actually makes use 
of that opportunity. So if a party refuses to appear before the tribunal, after being 
given proper notice, or if  he refuses to participates or remains inactive in the 
arbitration procedures after being granted an equal opportunity to present his side, he 
is generally considered to have deliberately forfeited the opportunity. Indeed, a party 
cannot simply refuse to participate in proceedings so as to obstruct the arbitration. 
Thus, the inability to present one’s case under Art. V(l)(b) cannot in general result 
ft'om a party’s own conduct. In other words, a party who fails to appear for a hearing 
or to present his case at any stage of the proceedings, cannot without extraordinary 
circumstances plead that he was unable to present his case in order to resist 
enforcement of an award pursuant to Art. V(l)(b). This principle has been generally 
confinned by commentators and courts. For example, in Minmetals Germany 
GmbH V Ferco Steel Ltd, a defendant opposed enforcement o f an award rendered in 
China on the basis that it had been denied an opportunity to present its case. The 
English Commercial Court rejected this defence, finding that although the arbitrators 
had not acted in accordance with Art. 53 of the CIETAC rules (i.e. the lex arbitri) on 
fairness and reasonableness in making the first award, the Beijing court had ordered a 
resumed hearing and the respondent not taken this opportunity to challenge the
Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd 6 9 2 .
”  See, eg, Dicey, M o i t i s  and Collins, Conflict o f  Laws 639; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, 
Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration para 16; van den Berg, The New York 
Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation  306; Garnett and others, 
International Commercial Arbitration  105; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International 
Commercial Arbitration para 26-88; G Soo, 'International Enforcement o f  Aibitral Awards'(2000) 11 
Inti Comp & Comm L Rev 253 at 255.
See, eg, Biotronik Mess-Und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co v Medford M edical Instrument Co pp 
140-41; German Buyer v English Seller (Germany Court o f Appeal 27 Jul 1978) 267; Geotech Lizenz 
AG  V Evergreen Systems Inc 697 FSupp 1248 (US District Court ED NY 1988 ) 1253; Fitzroy 
Engineering Ltd Flame Engineering Inc 1994 WL 700173 (US District Court ND Illinois 1994) pp 5-
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evidence relied on by the arbitrators at the first hearing. It had to be concluded that it 
was clear that the respondent failed to avail itself of the opportunity given to it to 
present its case. The Court concluded that:
[t]he inability to present a case to arbitrators ... contemplates at least that 
the enforcee has been prevented from presenting his case by matters 
outside his control. This will normally cover the case where the procedure 
adopted has been operated in a manner contrary to the rules of natural 
justice. Where, however, the enforcee has, due to matters within his 
control, not provided himself with the means of taking advantage of an 
opportunity given to him to present his case, he does not ... bring himself 
within that exception to enforcement under the Convention. In the present 
case that is what has happened.
The same principle has been also confirmed by a US district court in Fitzroy 
Engineering Ltd v Flame Engineering Inc, In this case, a respondent contended that it 
was unable to present its case pursuant to Art. V(l)(b) because Bell Gully (its legal 
representative ) had an apparent conflict of interest. The Court rejected this allegation, 
finding that:
Having received proper notice of the pending arbitration proceedings, (the 
respondent) failed to appear to present its case. As noted above, (the 
respondent) has failed to show that it did not appear at Bell Gully's urging 
or even that Bell Gully's counsel had anything to do with (the 
respondent)’ failure to appear. A party cannot fail to appear at a 
proceeding, offer no satisfactory explanation for its absence, and then 
expect to prevent enforcement of the resulting award on the gi'ounds that it 
was unable to present its case.
These cases show that inability to present the case as ground for resisting enforcement 
under the NYC is to be narrowly interpreted, so as to embrace only an inability caused 
by matters outside the party’s control, and not to include an inability caused by a 
party’s own failure to take advantage of an opportunity properly given to him.
Having seen how the defence of inability to present a case should be generally 
construed, it may be appropriate to address some examples of specific issues which 
are often invoked in practice under the defence of the inability to present one’s case.
Minmetals Germany GmbH v Ferco Steel L td . 
Fitzroy Engineering Ltd  v Flame Engineering Inc 6.
Ch 5: Violation o f  Due Process 148
5.5.3 Denial of the Right to Introduce Evidence
Under the principle of due process, each party must be given a reasonable opportunity 
to argue his case by adducing evidence on fact and law. Thus, it might amount to a 
gi'ound for challenging enforcement of an award on the basis of a denial of due 
process, if the arbitrator did not give a party the chance to adduce his evidence to the 
arbitral tribunal. Yet, such defence is proven to be rarely successful in practice.
An example of an unsuccessfnl attempt to use this defence can be seen in the 
Ukrvneshprom State Foreign Economic Enterprise v Tradeway Inc case, where the 
respondent asserted that the arbitrator had refused to hear and consider relevant 
material and evidence it had presented. The US District Court did not agi'ee with the 
respondent’s assertions, holding that the award had been carefully reviewed and no 
such determination was reflected in it. The Court went on to state that the defendant 
also chose not to follow the applicable procedures, and thus had no claim of being 
denied an opportunity to present its evidence in a meaningful manner.”  Another 
example can be found in the Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation S.A. v. 
Hilmarton Ltd case, where the respondent sought to resist an award rendered in 
Geneva being enforced in England, arguing that he had been unable to present his 
case because the arbitrator had refused to hear oral evidence and only held a short 
hearing to take closing submissions fiom both sides. However, the English 
Commercial Court found that all the witnesses both sides wished to call had been 
heard on two separate days by the first arbitrator, who took notes of the evidence. 
After the second arbitrator was appointed, no request for supplementary evidence was 
made by either party, nor did either advance new contentions of fact regarding the 
substance of the case. The Court quoted the following findings o f the Second 
arbitrator:
In the case in question the facts of the main issue have already been 
examined in detail by the first arbitrator, then by the Court of Justice of 
Geneva and the Swiss Supreme Court. Before the undersigned arbitrator, 
the Parties waived their right to submit new evidence. The procedure on 
the main issue is therefore so advanced that from the point of view of 
procedural economy and the efficiency rule that characterises the
59 Ukiwneshprom State Foreign Economic Enterprise v Tradeway Inc 5.
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arbitration process, postponement of the decision on the merits to a later 
stage cannot be justified . . . .
And
In a Procedural Order of 28 October 1991, the Arbitrator considered that 
he had sufficient knowledge of the decisive facts and rejected the 
Defendant's request for the re-hearing of the whole matter. The Parties 
having not required the taking o f new evidence, it therefore clearly 
appeared that, because of the nature of the issues to be determined as they 
resulted ftom the Parties written pleadings and exhibits and minutes filed 
in this matter, starting the hearing of the case aftesh would have been a 
pointless measure and contrary to the Arbitrator's duty to proceed with 
diligence and to settle disputes referred to him.
The Court entirely agreed with the approach of the arbitrator, concluding that there 
was nothing in the suggestion that respondent was unable to present its case, and 
hence there was no violation of due process giound on which the enforcement o f the 
award could be reftised. Thus it rejeeted the objection and confirmed the leave to 
enforce the award. In the same way, many US Courts have confinned the principle 
that “an arbitrator is not bound to hear all of the evidence tendered by the parties ... as 
long as he give each of the parties an adequate opportunity to present its evidence and 
arguments”.
On the other hand, an example of a successful defence to enforcement based on denial 
an opportunity to introduce evidence can be seen in the Iran Aircraft Industries v 
Avco Corp case held by a US court of appeals. In this case, the court found that a 
dispute between Iranian and American parties was submitted to the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal for binding arbitration. In order to save time and cost, the Tribunal allowed 
during the pre-hearing conference voluminous and complicated evidence of invoices 
to be presented through summaries, tabulations, charts, graphs or extracts prepared by 
independent audit. Later a new arbitrator was appointed who did not accept the ex­
arbitrator’s method of presenting proof, and when he questioned the respondent's 
proof produced by the early method, he never infonned the respondent that the early
Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation S.A. v. Hilmarton Ltd  [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep 222 (UK QBD  
Com Ct) pp 225-26.
See, eg, Generica Ltd  v Pharmaceutical Basics Inc 1130; M aiy Decker Slaney v The International 
Amateur Athletic Federation  244 F3d 580 (US Court o f Appeals 7 Cir 2001) 592; Karaha Bodas Co 
LLC  V Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara 300.
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method of producing proof is no longer aecepted. Thus, the respondent was not made 
aware that the Tribunal now required the actual invoices to substantiate its claim. 
Having led the respondent to believe it had used a proper method to substantiate its 
claim, the Tribunal then rejected that claim for lack of proof. The US Court of 
Appeals concluded that, by misleading the respondent, the tribunal denied it the 
opportunity to present its case in a meaningful manner, so that it was “unable to 
present its case” within the meaning of Art. V(l)(b), and enforcement of the award 
was therefore denied.
5.5.4 Denial of the Right to Hear the Other Party’s Argument or Evidence
Under the principle of due process, each party must be given a reasonable opportunity 
to hear the argument and evidence of his opponent. Failure to comply with this 
requirement may render enforcement of the award subject to challenge under Art. 
V(l)(b). An unsuccessfid example of such defence is provided by the Hehei Import & 
Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd case, where an award was rendered in 
China in favour of a buyer, who was then gianted leave to enforce the award in Hong 
Kong by the enforcing court. The seller appealed to the Court of Appeal to set aside 
that leave on the giound that it did not have the opportunity of hearing what was 
presented to the chief arbitrator by the buyer’s employees during the inspection of the 
goods, since it had not been notified of that inspection, and hence was not able to 
present its side of the case. The Court of Appeal found it is quite clear as a matter of 
fact that the seller was not able to present its side of the case, since it did not have the 
opportunity o f hearing what was presented to the chief arbitrator by the plaintiffs 
employees during the inspection. Thus, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the 
leave to enforce. Yet, that decision was in turn set aside by the Court of Final 
Appeal. This Court insisted that, in approaching the question whether the seller was 
unable to present its case due to its inability to hear what was said during the 
inspection, the fact that the parties agi'eed to arbitration under CIETAC Arbitration 
Rules and the PRC Arbitration Law must be taken into account. Consequently, the 
parties had agreed to procedures that differ from those which would ordinarily apply
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in Hong Kong. The Court felt that although it was true that the seller did not attend 
the inspection because it had not been notified of it, in all the circumstances it could 
not be said that it had been unable to present its case. This is because the Court found 
the seller was given a copy o f the experts' report which followed the inspection, and 
an opportunity to deal with it, and thus was in a position to explore the significance of 
what had happened. However, the seller never indicated that it wished to contest any 
part of the report, or to call its own expert witnesses, or to question the experts, or 
present a case that goods were capable of appropriate modification. It simply 
proceeded with the arbiti ation as if nothing improper had happened.
5.5.5 Denial of the Right to Controvert Other Party’s Argument or Evidence
The inability of a party to present his case also covers the fact that he has been denied 
the right to controvert or comment on the other party’s argument or evidence. Again, 
in practice, such defence are rarely successful. For example, in confirming the 
enforcement of an ICC award made in Zurich, a Gennan court of appeal has rejected 
an objection that the defendant had been given no opportunity to react to a claim for 
compensation for the period subsequent to 29 October 1992, which claim was made 
for the first time in a late-filed statement by the claimant on 31 October 1995. The 
Court dismissed the defendant’s allegation of violation of due process, finding that it 
was clear that the issue referred to in the statement was discussed in the course of the 
arbitral proceedings, and the defendant has undoubtedly been given the opportunity to 
comment on the late-filed statement and thereby compel the arbitral tribunal to 
examine the possibility of a new hearing.
With respect to the right of cross-examination, in Generica Ltd v Pharmaceutical 
Basics Inc a respondent alleged that the arbitrator denied it due process when it 
limited the cross-examination of the plaintiffs witness. The US District Court 
rejected this objection, finding that the limitation of cross-examination by the 
arbitrator did not deprive the respondent of a fair hearing, since the right to cross- 
examine is not absolute and the due process defence to enforcement of arbitral awards
ibid 692.
65 X  (Syria) v X  (Germany Court o f Appeal 1998) 668.
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must be naiTowly construed. The Court of Appeals affinned the lower Court’s 
conclusion, finding that “The arbitrator’s curtailment of cross-examination of (the 
witness) was not such a fundamental procedural defect that it violated our due process 
jurisprudence and therefore the New York Convention”.
On the other hand, an example of an unusual successful defence to the enforcement of 
a foreign award based on denial of the right to comment on other party’s argument 
and evidence is provided by the decision of a Dutch court of first instance. In this 
case, the respondent argued that Art. V(l)(b) had been violated because the arbitral 
tribunal violated due process by not allowing it to react to evidence submitted in the 
arbitral proceedings. The Court upheld the objection, finding that the arbitral tribunal 
allowed the plaintiff to submit new documents without giving the respondent the 
opportunity to comment thereon either orally or in writing. Consequently, the Court 
found the tribunal had violated the fimdamental right to contradictory proceedings in 
this case to the respondent’s disadvantage. The Court therefore denied enforcement of 
the award. The Dutch Court of Appeal confirmed the lower Court’ decision.
5.5.6 Adjournment to Introduce Evidence
An allegation that the arbitral tribunal has refused to postpone the arbitration hearing 
because a witness for the respondent was unable to appear at the given time has 
generally been held not to be a violation of the principle of due process.™ For 
example, in the famous case of Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co INC  v Société 
Generale de L'industrie du Papier (Rakta) the losing party argued that there was a 
violation of due process in the arbitral tribunal denying it an adequate opportunity to 
present its case, in particular by refusing to delay proceedings so that one of its 
witnesses, who was temporarily unavailable, eould be heard. The US Court of Appeal
Generica Ltd Pharmaceutical Basics Inc pp 4-6. 
Generica Ltd v Pharmaceutical Basics Inc pp 1129-31. 
Rice Trading Ltd  3; Nidera Handelscompagnie B V 132. 
”  ibid 734.
70 See, eg, Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co 3; RAKTA 976; Glencore Ltd  3; Agrogen SA de CV 36 
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rejected the argument, holding that the inability of a party to produce its witnesses
before the arbitral tribunal at the due time is a risk inherent to arbitration. By
submitting to arbitration, a party waives his courtroom rights, including that of 
witness summons. Thus, the alleged obstacle that the losing party’s key witness was 
prevented from attending the hearing before the tribunal due to a prior commitment to 
lecture at an American university was one could not be taken into account in order to 
postpone the arbitration proceedings as a matter of fundamental fairness to the losing 
party. The Court also held that the losing party eannot protest that the tribunal reached 
its decision without considering its witness that is critical to its defence because the 
tribunal had already heard before them an affidavit from the witness in question. The 
Court concluded that:
The arbitration tribunal acted within its discretion in declining to
reschedule a hearing for the convenience of an Overseas (respondent)
witness. Overseas’ due process rights under American law, rights entitled 
to full force under the Convention as a defense to enforcement, were in no 
way infringed by the tribunal’s decision.
Similarly, the Italian Supreme Court has affinned the Court of Appeal’s finding that a 
failure by the arbitral tribunal to giant a further postponement for hearing a 
respondent witness was not a violation of due process under Art. V(l)(b).
5.5.7 Inability to Participate for Reasons outwith a Party’s Control
A party may oppose enforcement of an award on the ground that he has been 
prevented from participating in the arbitration process by reasons out o f his control, 
and he thus was unable to present his case in tenns of Art. V(l)(b). Yet, once more 
this kind of allegation has proved in general to be unsuccessful in practice. For 
example, in Consorcio Rive SA De CV v Briggs O f Cancun Inc an American 
respondent objected to enforcement of an award made in Mexico on the ground that 
Mexican criminal proceedings had been initiated against its representative, who was 
therefore precluded, by fear of anest, from entering Mexico to participate in the 
arbitration. Thus, the respondent concluded that it was unable to present its case
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v RAKTA 976.
Dalmine SpA v M  & M  Sheet M etal Forming M achinery AG  713.
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pursuant to Art. V(l)(b). The US District Court rejected this objection, holding that 
the respondent had ample opportunity to participate in the arbitration by alternative 
means, such as sending other representatives or its attorney, or having the individual 
in question participate by telephone. The Court concluded that fear of arrest and 
extradition do not constitute an inability to attend an arbitration hearing. This 
decision was later affirmed by the US Court of Appeals. ™ Similarly, a US district 
court in National Development Com v Adnan M  Khashoggi held that the defendant’s 
decision not to attend arbitration proceedings in England, because he was afraid of 
being taken into custody for extradition to face criminal charges in the United States, 
did not constitute inability to attend the proceedings.
In another case, a Russian respondent objected to enforcement of an award rendered 
in Stockholm on the ground that there was a breach of Art. V(l)(b) because he was 
unable to appear in the final arbitral hearing in Stockholm, due to of problems with 
entry visas. The Russian District Court dismissed this allegation as unfounded.
A quite unusual objection can be seen in Mangistaumunaigaz Oil Production 
Association v United World Trade Inc, where the respondent resisted enforcement of 
an award under Art. V(l)(b), asserting that it had not been permitted to participate 
frilly in the arbitration proceedings due to their excessive cost. The US District Court 
found the defendant’s assertion without merit, “especially giving the extensive 
litigation expenses that the respondent has clearly expended in attempting to keep this 
litigation in its home court”. The Court further held that “if  this Court was to accept 
the argument, that where litigation is expensive a party has established that it was 
unable to present his case, it would be difficult to imagine when this defense would 
not exist”. Finally, the Court found that the defendant refused to participate in the 
arbitration, instead choosing to defend its position through letters and coiTcspondent 
to arbitral tribunal, so that the respondent could not argue it has received no notice of
Consorcio Rive SA D e CV v Briggs O f Cancun Inc 797; National Development Com v Adnan M  
Khashoggi 781 FSupp 959 (US District Court SD NY 1992) 962.
Consorcio Rive SA D e CV  v Briggs o f  Cancun Inc 82 FedAppx 359 (US Court o f  Appeals 5th Cir 
2003) 364.
National Development Com v Adnan M  Khashoggi 962.
Paul Wurth 3; V/O Tyazhpromexport (1998) XXIII YBCA 738 (Russia District Court 1996) p 740-
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the appointment of the arbitrator or the arbitral proceedings. The Court consequently 
found the respondent was able to present its case, but chose not to. It is very 
important that the high cost of arbitration be held not to render a party to be “unable 
to present his case” pursuant to Art. V(l)(b), since parties freely refer their disputes to 
arbitration, and thus they should be aware of its costs in advance.
5.6 EstoppelAVaiver
Raising an objection timeously is an essential duty of the parties. This may imply that 
objection based on the violation of due process should be made first to the arbitral 
tribunal during the arbitration itself, if the relevant facts were known to the party 
objecting. Otherwise, an enforcing court might consider such party as has waived his 
right o f such objection and thus estop him from raising it later at the stage of 
enforcement of the arbitral award. It is submitted that the justifications behind this 
approach are to avoid undermining the effectiveness of international arbitration and, 
in particular, to not breach the central purpose of the NYC of promoting enforcement 
of foreign awards. To allow a party to raise a complaint for the first time at the stage 
of enforcement of the award would be as unfair as the pemiitting deficiencies of due 
process in the arbitral process. This approach may be reinforced where parties are 
allowed to apply to the court during the arbitration to remove an arbitrator for lack of 
impartiality or misconduct and no such application has been made.
The above approach of waiver has been confinned in several court decisions. For 
example, a US district court in La Société Nationale Pour La Recherche v Shaheen 
Natural Resources Co Inc declared:
”  Mangistaumunaigaz OU Production Association  v United World Trade Inc (1999) XXIV YBCA  
806 (US District Court D Colorado 1997) 810.
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[The defendant] had an opportunity to contest the invocation of the 
arbitration provision clause at the time that the panel held its hearing. Its
failure to do so before the ICC panel waives this ground.
The Court went on to conclude that;
To deny recognition and enforcement to the arbitration award ... at this 
stage (of enforcement) would be to violate the goal and the purpose of the 
Convention, that is, the summary procedure to expedite the recognition 
and enforcement of arbitration awards. [The defendant] had an 
opportunity to raise its objections to the arbitration proceedings before the 
panel and did not do so. ... Thus, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is 
denied, and the arbitration award is hereby confirmed.
The above decision was then affinned by a US Court of Appeals.
However, the principle of waiver was rejected by a Hong Kong high court in the 
Paklito Investment Ltd  v Kloclcner East Asia Ltd case. In this case, the plaintiff argued 
that the Court should exercise its discretion to peimit enforcement, even if it was 
satisfied that a ground for non-enforcement had been made out, relying on the fact
that that the defendants had taken no steps to set aside the award before the court of
the arbitration seat, and this failure was a factor upon which the Court could rely. 
Nevertheless, the Hong Kong High Court disagi*eed, stating:
There is nothing in s. 44 nor in the New York Convention which specifies 
that a defendant is obliged to apply to set aside an award in the country 
where it was made as a condition of opposing enforcement elsewhere. ...
(thus) the defendants were entitled to take this stance. It is clear ...that a 
party faced with a Convention award against him has two options. Firstly, 
he can apply to the courts o f the country where the award was made to 
seek the setting aside of the award. If the award is set aside then this
FSupp 57 (US District Court SD NY 1983) 64; China Nanhai Oil Joint Seiwice Corporation Shenzhen 
Branch v Gee Tai Holdings Co Ltd  225; AAOT Foreign Economic Association (Vo) 
Technostroyexport v International Development and Trade Sendees Inc 139 F3d 980 (US Court o f  
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becomes a ground in itself for opposing enforcement under the 
Convention.
The High Court therefore affinned the decision to refuse enforcement of the award on 
the ground that the defendants were denied a fair and equal opportunity of being heard 
which constituted a serious breach of due process.
5.7 If Violation of Due Process has no Effect on the Arbitration Result?
It may be thought important to consider the question as to whether the enforcing court 
might exercise its discretion to enforce an award if the decision of the arbitration 
tribunal would have been the same in the absence of a serious breach of due process? 
The pennissive word used in the opening paragraph of Art. V (l) of the NYC: 
“enforcement of the award may be refused . . .” might indicate that the enforcing court 
still has marginal discretion in some circumstances to enforce the award even if the 
non-enforcing grounds are proven to be existing. Thus, it seems to be accepted, at 
least in theory as Prof van den Berg has earlier stated, that:
Only if it is beyond any doubt that the decision could have been the same, 
would a court be allowed to ovenide the serious violation (of due 
process). A court before which enforcement of a Convention award is 
sought may ... not go further as this would amount to an extensive 
examination as to how an arbitrator would have decided if the violation 
had not occun*ed. The latter would yield to a review of the merits of the 
arbitral award which is excluded under the Convention.
This principle has bee accepted by a Hong Kong Court of first instance in Apex Tech 
Investment Ltd v Chuang's Development. Although the Court found that there had 
been an inegularity in arbitration procedures which prevented the defendant from 
presenting its case before the tribunal, it exercised its discretion to order enforcement 
of the award on the basis that on the materials before it, the result o f the arbitration 
could not have been different even if the opportunity to be heard had been granted. 
Yet, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal, while agi'eeing with the principle upon which
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the lower Court had acted in exercising its discretion, noted that that the lower court 
should meticulously avoid any consideration of the merits of the award. The Court of 
Appeal went on to conclude that it could not be said that, if the defendant had been 
given the opportunity to make further representations to the arbitral tribunal, it could 
have not affected the outcome of the case. Therefore, it allowed the appeal and 
refused to giant enforcement. Similarly, a Dutch court of appeal rejected the 
principle that if violation of due process has no effect on the arbitration result, the 
court should still enforce the award, reasoning that answering such a question would 
lead to an examination of the merits of the award, which has no place in the 
proceedings for obtaining enforcement of an arbitral award.
Yet, a distinction between the public policy and other grounds on the underlying 
question has been made by a Hong Kong court of appeal in Hebei Import & Export 
Corp V Polytek Engineering Co Ltd. In this case, the party opposing enforcement 
alleged that there had been a breach of natural justice since it had been denied an 
opportunity to present its case during inspection of goods and there was apparent bias 
as communications had been reviewed in its absence, whereas the wining party 
argued that even if the court was satisfied that the due process had been violated, it 
still had a discretion to enforce the award, and should indeed do so since the result of 
the arbitration could not have been affected, as the inspection did not affect the 
tribunaTs detennination. The Court held that while s.44 of the Hong Kong Arbitration 
Ordinance (implementing the NYC) uses the word “may”, which indicates that the 
court is granted a discretion to order enforcement even if a Convention ground is 
proved, this does not mean that such discretion could come into play in relation to all 
of the gi'ounds. The Court distinguished between the public policy and other grounds, 
suggesting that a court should not exercise its jurisdiction to order enforcement if it 
was contrary to public policy to enforce an award. On the other hand, in the case of 
breach of the other grounds the court could still exercise its discretion and enforce an 
award, if  it took the view that the decision of the arbitration tribunal would have been 
the same in any event. The Court concluded that, in the present case, it would be
”  Apex Tech Investment Ltd  v Chuang's Development [1996] 2 HKLR 155 (Hong Kong Court of  
Appeal 1996) pp 158-59.
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difficult to say that the result would have been the same if the defendant had been 
properly enabled to present its case before the tribunal. The burden to satisfy the court 
that this was so rested on the party seeking enforcement.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, it may be accepted in theory that the 
enforcing court may be entitled to order enforcement of an award, regardless of a 
violation of due process if such violation has no effect on the arbitration decision. But, 
in practice, the courts appeared to be very eautious and hesitant in deciding that the 
result would be the same if the violation had not occurred, and consequently in 
exercising their discretion to confirm enforcement. This hesitant attitude seems to be 
caused by the conflict between two important interests: the requirement of equal and 
fair treatment in arbitral proeedure on the one hand, and the need to deal with 
enforcement sensibly and realistically in a practical way rather than theoretical 
considerations. Yet, it would seem to make no sense to reflise enforcement, if it is 
beyond a shadow of a doubt that breach of due process would have not affected the 
outeome of the arbitration. Allowing such discretion in such circumstance should 
ensure the efficient function of international arbitration and seiwe, in particular, the 
general pro-enforcement bias manifested in the NYC.
5.8 The Position in Saudi Arabia
As has been seen above, the violation of due process as a giound for resisting 
enforcement under Art. V(l)(b) is considered essentially according to the standards 
of due process of the forum in which enforcement is sought. Thus, it may be thought 
important to outline at the outset the requirements of due process during the 
arbitration proceedings under Saudi Laws and Shari 'ah provision.
5.8.1 The Requirements of Due Process under the Saudi Arbitration Law
Generally speaking, arbitral procedure in SA is quite infonnal due to the fact that the 
SAL contains no provision in connection with arbitral procedure. Besides, the final
Hebei Import & Export Carp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd  [1998] 1 HKLRD 287 (Hong Kong 
Court o f  Appeal 1998) pp 300-1,
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text of the SAL has omitted the proposed provision that “arbitrators shall hear the 
dispute according to the procedures followed by the Authority originally competent to 
hear the dispute”. Having omitted this provision in the final text, the legislators 
apparently intended to maintain the generally prevailing informality as practised in 
arbitration proceedings in SA.
The IRSAL however gives some guidance as to the requirement of the principle of 
fair trial throughout the arbitral proceedings. Accordingly, its Art. 36 provides:
The arbitration panel shall obseiwe the principles of litigation, so as to 
include confi’ontation in proceedings, and to permit either party to take 
cognizance of the claim proceedings, to have access to its material papers 
and documents in reasonable periods of time, and to give him a sufficient 
opportunity to present his documentation, defences and contents in the 
hearing, either orally or in writing and to record them in the minutes.
Although the words “shall obseiwe the principles o f litigation'''’ might lead one to think 
that arbitrators are required to conduct the arbitral proceedings in complianee with the 
civil procedure ad es, this is however not the ease, because the following words of the 
provision plainly give a further explanation of what is meant by that phrase, in an 
attempt to include only the most fimdamental rights of natural justice to ensure that a 
reasonable opportunity must be given to each party to enable him to present his case 
tliroughout the arbitration proceedings. This can be further supported by the provision 
of Art. 39 of the IRSAL which lays down that:
The arbitrators shall issue their awards without being bound by legal 
procedures, except as provided for in the arbitration regulations and its 
ml es of implementation.
The above provision plainly frees in general the arbitral tribunal from any formal 
procedure required by the civil procedure rules.
5.8.2 The Requirements of Due Process under Shari’ah Law
See, Turck, 'Saudi Arabia ' 18. 
‘^ fyRSALof 1985, Art.36.
ibid Art. 39.
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The above requirement of the due process under Art. 36 of the IRSAL is essentially 
based upon the Shari’ah rules where the requirement of fair trial is of particular 
significance. Although, under the Shariah  law, there is no fonnal mandatory 
requirement concerning the structure of the arbitral hearing, the Shari'ah provsion 
requires the tribunal to eonduet the arbitral proceedings in eompliance with the 
fundamental rules of natural justice. The Shari’ah lays generally great stress upon 
twin prineiples of fair trial to be observed by arbitrators from the very outset of the 
arbitration. They are as the following:
5.8.2.1 First: Treating Parties in Equal Manner
The first main principle is that of effecting strict equality of treatment for both parties, 
regardless of their social or economic status or any other state of difference between 
them. Equality should be maintained fi'om the very beginning of the proceedings to 
the announcement of the verdict. No priority should be given to anyone (expect 
possibly travellers who may be harmed by undue delay or to women, eg, required to 
stay at home for nursing baby). The parties should be treated equally in all aspects of 
the arbitration, including seating and speaking. Their confidence must be maintained. 
They must have a feeling of equality and fairness whilst presenting their case. This 
obligation is basically based upon the fact that the concept of Justice in Islam is 
extremely important and it is something which the judge and arbitrator must apply in 
all matters without exception. Justice means to give each the right he deseiwes: 
Muslim or non-Muslim, relative or stranger, friend or enemy. This principle is 
emphasized by many verses of the Q ur’an and Hadith. The Q ur’an generally enjoins 
that:
O you who believe! Stand out firmly for Allah as just witnesses, and let 
not enmity hatred of a people incite you not to act equitably; act justly, 
that is nearer to piety, and be careful of (your duty to) Allah; surely Allah 
is Aware of what you do.
See, Ibn Qudamah, Al-Mughnai vol 13 pp 577-82; Ibn Qasim, Haashiyat A lrrawd  vol 7, 526. See 
also, N  Majeed, 'Good Faith and Due Process: Lessons from the Shari'ah'(2004) 20 (1) Arb Inti 97 at 
106.
The Qur'an, AJ-Maidah [5: 8],
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The Q ur’an similarly enjoins:
O you who believe! Be persistently standing firm for justice, witnesses for 
Allah's sake, even though it be against yourselves, or your parents, or your 
relatives, whether one is rich or poor, Allah is a Better Protector to both 
(than you). So follow not the lusts (of your hearts), lest you avoid justice; 
and if you distort (your witness) or decline to (give it), verily, Allah is 
Ever Well-Acquainted with what you do.
The Q ur’an also confinns the justice condition by stating that “Verily! Allah 
commands that you should render back the tmsts to whom they are due; and that 
when you judge between people, you judge with justice”; “And if you judge, judge 
with justice between them. Verily, Allah loves those who act justly”.
In addition, prophet Mohamed (PBUH) has frequently put significant emphasis on the 
obligation of fair trial in many occasions. By way of one example, He held that:
The doers of justice will be on pulpits of light at the right side of Merci M , 
Exalted and Glorious, and both of Allah's Hands are Right Hands, (the 
doers of justice are) those who were just in their mling, with their families 
and in all that over which they were given authority. * '
In Particular, Prophet Mohamed (PBUH) expressed further details that form the 
essence of the Shari’ah natural justice in the trial. He states that “Whoever is put to 
the ordeal of judging between Muslims, let him then be justice between them in his 
expression, gesture, looking and seating, and not to raise his voice against one of the 
party more than then the other”. In addition, Omar Ibn Al-khattab, according to 
his judicial instructions letter sent to one of his judges, enjoins the judge to adopt fair
ihxd An~Nisa{4\ 135].
M d  Al-Nisa [4; 58]. 
ih \d A l-M a ed a [5 \A 2 l
Reported by Muslim, Sahih Muslim (in Arabic) no 1827; A Ibn Hanbal, Musnad Al-Imam Ahmad 
bin Hanbal (in Aiabic) no 6632; M Ibn Hibban, Sahih ibn Hibban (in Arabic) no 4561; A Al-Bayhaqi, 
Al-Sunan Al-Kubra  (in Aiabic) no 18515.
Reported by A Al-Bayhaqi, AhSunan ATSuqra (in Arabic) no 3284; Al-Bayhaqi, Al-Sunan Al- 
Kubra no 18796;A Al-Ddarqutni, Sunan Al-Ddarqutni (in Arabic) no 3909.
The Second Caliph o f Islam (b. 581, d. 644)
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attitudes toward the parties. He, in particular, stated that “and treat the parties equally 
in your court and in your regard, so that the noble shall not aspire to your partiality, 
nor the humble despair of your justice”.
S.8.2.2 Second: Hearing both Parties
The second principle is to allow both parties to be heard. So, the judge or arbitrator is 
bound under the Shari'ah provision to give equal opportunity to both parties to 
present their case. In this regard, the Prophet Mohamed (PBUH) sent Ali ibn Abi 
Talib to be a judge in Yemen and said to him that:
Oh Ali, Wlien two litigants sit in fi'ont of you, do not decide till you hear 
what the other has to say as you heard what the first had to say; for it is 
best that you should have a clear idea of the best decision.
Also, it is reported that a man has came to Omar Ibn Al-khattab to complain against 
somebody who had knocked out his eye, but Omar said to him that: “bring your 
opponent (first before me) ... as you might have knoeked his both eyes”.
This means that the judge or arbitrator is obliged under the Shari’ah provision to give 
each party a fair opportunity to put its case as well as to rebut the ease made against 
him. Consequently, the judge or arbitrator is not authorized to make a decision 
without having given such opportunity to both parties. Yet, if  one of the parties has 
been given a proper chance to present his ease but he refuses to participate in 
arbitration, the hearing may however take place and the tribunal has the power to 
proceed in arbitration and passed its award according to the majority of Muslim 
scholars. This is because of the fact that the obligation upon the tribunal to allow to 
parties to present their respective cases corresponds to the obligation upon the parties
Reported by Al-Ddarqutni, Sunan no 3914; Al-Bayhaqi, Ai-Sunan Al-Kubra no 18872.
The fourth caliph o f  Islam (b. 598, d. 661).
Reported by Ibn Hanbal, no 868; Abu Daoud, no 3164; A  Al-Sunan Al-
Kubra (in A abic) no 7192; Al-Hakem, Al-Mustadrak no 7125.
Reported by A Ibn Hazm, Al-Muhalla bi Al-Athar (Dar al-Kutub al-ilmiyah, Beimt 'in A abic' 'in 
A ’abic') vol 8, 436.
See, eg, Ibn Qudamah, Al-Mughnai vol 13 pp 633-34; Ibn Hazm, Al-Muhalla vol 8, 434; Ibn 
Qasim, Haashiyat A lrrawd  vol 7 p 557.
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to follow the rules of conduct in proceedings in good faith, and thus indulging in 
dilatory tactics by the parties is not tolerated. Giving each party a fair oppoiiunity 
to be heard is an important aspect of natural justice, but, in contrast, allowing one of 
the parties (typically the respondent) to employ the right to be heard for the purpose 
of dilatory tactics would defeat the natural justice itself and the efficient functioning 
of the arbitration process too.
5.8.3 Case Law
The next emcial question to be clarified is what the attitude of Saudi enforcing courts 
toward the application of the violation of due process as a non-enforcement ground 
under Art. V (l)(b) of the NYC? Do the Saudi courts, like most other national eourts, 
construe Art. V(l)(b) narrowly so as to accept the objection of violation of due 
process only in serious cases?
In a case brought before a Saudi enforcing court (the 25 '^’ Subsidiary Panel), an 
application was made by a foreign claimant to enforce a ICC award in SA. The Saudi 
respondent objected to enforcement on the gi'ounds that the award had been made 
through proceedings that were not in compliance with the procedural ml es of the 
Board of Grievances (the Saudi competent court). He further argued that the award 
was rendered in default, as no notices for the arbitral hearings have been given to it 
nor to its lawyer. But, the claimant produced documents to prove the respondent and 
its lawyer were continually given notices for all arbitral proceedings from the 
beginning by registered mail. The respondent replied that notices by registered mail 
were not sufficient since they did not contain his signatures. ' * ' The Court however 
rejected the respondent’s objections, holding that registered mails were sufficient to 
assume that the losing party was properly informed. The Court went on to hold that 
the respondent’s allegation that such document is not sufficient as a proof of proper 
notice, was considered to be a frivolous allegation and tactic to delay enforcement of 
the award with no legal justification. Thus, the respondent was duly summoned and
See, Majeed, ’Good Faith' 107-108 
the 25 th Su 
ibid pp 3-4
t bsidiary Panel, decision No. 1 l/D/F/25 dated 1417 H (1996).
enforcement of the foreign award. 13
ibid pp 7-8.
the 2nd Review Committee, decision No. 208/T/2 dated 1418 H (1997). 
the 18th Subsidiary Panel, decision No. 8/D/F/18 dated 1424 H (2003). 
ibid pp 3, 5.
the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 36/T/4 dated 1425 H (2004).
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given a proper opportunity to defend its ease before the tribunal and to adduce 
evidence in support of its case, but had intentionally or tlirough recklessness missed 
the opportunity given to it. The Court also dismissed the respondent’s objection that 
the award has been made through proceedings not in compliance with the procedure 
mles of the Board of Grievances (the Saudi competent court). The Court therefore 
gianted leave for enforcement of the award. The Saudi respondent then appealed 
before the appeal court (the 2"  ^ Review Committee) from the lower Court decision, ,1but the Review Committee dismissed the appeal and affirmed the leave of 1
In another case, a foreign plaintiff submitted a request before a Saudi enforcing court 
(the 18^ *^  Subsidiary Panel) to obtain enforcement of a foreign award in SA, but the 
Saudi respondent objected the enforcement on several grounds, one of which was that 
the award was rendered in default and the plaintiff had failed to prove that the 
respondent had been properly infonned about the award. The Court rejected the 
respondent’s objection, holding that, according to the documents produced by the 
plaintiff, the award was not rendered in default and the respondent was informed 
about the award by diplomatic means. The lower Court’s decision was later 
affirmed by the Appeal Court (the 4^ ’^ Review Committee).
The above cases illustrate the Saudi Courts’ refusal to dismiss an arbitral award on the 
basis of violation of due process, as they interpret this ground narrowly in favour of 
enforcement of foreign awards. The first case makes it clear that non-compliance with 
civil procedure mles in arbitral proceedings constitutes no breach of due process. It 
also demonstrates that, unless a party proves otherwise, seiwing notice by registered 
mail is sufficient to assume that he has been duly summoned, without need to have his 
signature on the receipt retuned back to the sender. It further makes it clear that if a 
party, who is duly notified of the arbitration proceedings, fails to appear at a hearing 
without valid exeuse, sueh default would form no serious violation of the principle of
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the due process and would not lead to refusal of enforcement of an award under Art. 
V (l)(b ) of the NYC.
The unsuccessful attempts to oppose enforcement of foreign awards under the 
provision of Art. V (l)(b) in SA, as mentioned above, shows that such opposition 
would appear to have a very limited chance of success , which reflects the Saudi 
Courts’ friendly attitude towards the enforcement of foreign arbitral award. This 
positive trend adopted by the Saudi Courts is consistent with the common tendency of 
other national courts of construing the defence of Art. V(l)(b) namowly in an attempt 
to accept a violation of due process, as resisting ground of enforcement, in serious 
eases only, whieh at the end fulfils the NYC pro-enforcement policy. Therefore, it can 
be concluded the violation of due process defenee of Art. V(l)(b) does not constitute 
a serious threat to the enforcement of foreign awards in SA or other contracting 
States, since such defence is found to be rarely sueeessful in practice.
5.9 Conclusion
The violation of due process is, aeeording to the prevailing view, judged under the 
national law of the enforcing court. Yet, what is considered as a violation of due 
process under domestic law is not necessarily so in cases falling under the NYC, as 
the latter is limited to serious inegularities. The courts may also take into account the 
law governing the arbitration (i.e. lex arbitri). The latter is followed by Saudi courts.
It is generally accepted that violation of due process under Art. V(l)(b) may also be 
raised under the public policy provision of Art. V(2)(b). Nevertheless, by listing the 
violation of due process under the defences of Art. V (l), the framers of the NYC 
apparently intended to exclude this violation from the defences to be recognised under 
Art. V(2) (i.e. pubic policy).
The lack of proper notice defence is often invoked in practice, but the courts generally 
insist on only a grave lack of proper notice, such as actual lack of notice or notice 
being received after the award had been rendered, which rarely occur in arbitration 
practice. Also, it is generally accepted that the notice need not to be in the particular
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fonn required under the domestic laws, in order to be deemed adequate. The same 
position is adopted by Saudi courts.
The eourts generally have considered the shortness of time limits for arbitral 
proceedings not to be by themselves a violation of due proeess under Art. V(l)(b), as 
speed is a central function in international arbitration.
The wording “or was unable to present his case” covers any serious breaeh of the 
principle of due process or fair trial in arbitral proceedings, whieh is different from 
the lack of proper notice. This defence is regularly invoked in practice as where the 
defendant, for example, alleges that he was denied a proper chanee to put his ease and 
evidence before the arbitral tribunal, or to hear the argument and evidence submitted 
by other party, or to hear and rebut an expert report, or was unable to participate in 
arbitration for reasons outwith his control. Yet, such defences have generally been 
dismissed by the courts, except in cases of serious irregularity.
It is generally accepted that the inability to present a case cannot in general result 
fi'om a party’s own conduct. So, if a party, who is duly notified of the arbitration 
proceedings, fails to appear at hearing without valid excuse, such default would form 
no serious violation of due process under Art. V (l)(b). The same concept is adhered 
to by Saudi courts.
Some courts take the view that objections based on the violation of due process 
should be made first during the arbitration itself, if the relevant facts were known to 
the party objecting. Otherwise, he may be estopped from raising this defence later at 
the stage of enforcement of the arbitral award.
Some courts also are of the opinion that a court could still exercise its discretion and 
enforce an award if it is certain that the decision of the arbitral tribunal would have 
been the same in the absence of serious violation of due process.
The non-enforcement ground of Art. V(l)(b) creates no serious obstacles in the way 
of enforcement of foreign awards in contracting Countries including SA.
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CHAPTER SIX 
Excess of Jurisdiction
6.1 Introduction
The third giound for recourse against enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under 
Art. V of the NYC turns on the issue of jurisdiction scope. As has been seen, an 
arbitral tribunal, unlike a court, lacks authority to resolve a particular dispute unless 
the parties have confeiTed that authority by agreement, since international commercial 
arbitration is essentially consensual. This fimdamental principle is adopted by the 
NYC and most national and international laws, so that enforcement of a foreign award 
is subject to denial if the award goes beyond the scope of the parties’ submission to 
the arbitration. Thus, Art. V(l)(c) of the NYC provides that enforcement of an arbitral 
award may be refused if the resisting party proves that:
The award deals with a differenee not contemplated by or not falling 
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions 
on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided 
that, if  the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated 
from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains 
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognised and 
enforced. *
Several issues related to the abovementioned gi'ound are discussed in this chapter: 
first, the scope of application of Art. V(l)(c); secondly, determining the scope of 
disputes submitted to arbitration; thirdly, extra petita (i.e. the award falls outside the 
scope of the arbitration agreement); fourthly, ultra petita (i.e. some parts of the award 
fall outside the scope of the arbitration agreement); fifthly, partial enforcement; 
finally, the position in SA on such issues.
6.2 The Scope of Art. V(l)(c)
NYC o f 1958, A-t.VCl)(c).
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It has been observed that it is beeoming increasingly common in practice for the 
parties resisting enforcement of foreign awards to raise the issue of jurisdiction as a 
first line of defenee, arguing either that there was no valid arbitration agieement or 
that the tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction.  ^ However, one should note that Art. 
V(l)(c) does not address the situation where the whole jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal is disputed because of the lack of a valid arbitration agreement. The invalidity 
of the arbitration agreement is, as already seen,  ^ governed by Art. V(l)(a). By 
contrast. Art. V(l)(c) assumes that there is a valid arbitration agreement, but the 
arbitral tribunal has either (i) aeted beyond its authority by rendering an award dealing 
with a dispute or disputes not submitted to it {extra petita), or (ii) has exceeded its 
mandate in some respects but not all {ultra petita). In this context, the English 
Commercial Court in Dardana Ltd. v Yukos Oil Co  ^ suggested that s 103(2)(d) of the 
Arbitration Act  ^ ( which implements Art. V(l)(c)) did not extend to the situation in 
which there has been no agreement at all, but rather applied only to the situation in 
which there has been an undoubtedly valid arbitration agreement, and something had 
gone wrong thereafter.
For the foregoing observations, it may be eoncluded that Arts. V(l)(a) and V(l)(c) are 
similar in nature, the latter complementing the former,  ^ because in both Articles the 
ground of refusal is concerned with the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. Nevertheless, 
there is still an essential difference between them, in the sense that under Art. V(l)(a) 
a party is allowed to attack the arbitration itself on the giound that it is based upon 
invalid or inexistent agreement to arbitrate, whereas Art. V(l)(c) does not allow a 
party to attack the arbitration itself, as there is a valid agreement to arbitrate, but
 ^ See, Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  464.
 ^ See, supra Ch 3.
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 312; van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' (2003)' at 656; Lew, Mistelis and 
Krèoll, Comparative International Comtnercial Arbitration para 26-91; Di Pietro and Platte, 
Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 pp 158-59; 
Merkin, Arbitration law  para 19.54.
 ^ Dardana Ltd v Yukos Oil Co [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 225 (UK QBD Com Ct) para 20-22. See also, 
Merkin, Arbitration law  para 19.54.
 ^English Abitration Act 1996, s, 103(2)(d).
 ^ Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration 
para 1700,
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rather to attack the outcome of arbitration, in the shape of a declaration that the award 
contains decisions in excess of the terms of the submission to arbitration.
Another question which should be addressed is whether Art. V(l)(c) applies to an 
award in which the arbitral tribunal has not settled all matters submitted to it by the 
parties (known as an incomplete award or an award infra petita). Where a party 
resisted enforcement on the gi'ound that the arbitral tribunal had not decided all the 
points submitted to it, the Luxembourg Court of Appeal dismissed the objection, 
holding that:
This ground, even if established, could not hinder the recognition (and 
enforcement) of the awards, as an infra petita decision is not sanctioned 
by the New York Convention. ^
It can be suggested that this decision is coiTect and that an award infra petita should 
not lead to a refusal of enforcement under the NYC. This approach would be based on 
the well-settled principle that the available gi'ounds for refosing enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards under the NYC are exhaustively listed in Art. V, and gi'ounds 
from other laws can not be invoked as a basis for resisting enforcement. ^
A frirther related issue to be noted is that Art. V(l)(c) is not to be extended to cover 
procedural violations, such as where the arbitrators are alleged to have relied on 
evidence not led before them, or where arbitrations are wrongfully consolidated, 
since such matters are covered by Art. V(l)(b). Likewise, Art. V(l)(c) does not 
address en'ors of law, such as where the arbitral tribunal is alleged to have failed to 
apply the substantive law chosen by the parties, ” since the judicial review of a 
foreign award on its merits for an eiTor of law or fact is, in principle, not allowed as 
such gi'ounds are not included in the grounds for refusing enforcement listed 
exhaustively in Art. V, and we have seen that this provision is strictly interpreted.
Kersa Holding Co v Infancourtage (1996) XXI YBCA 617 (Luxembourg Court o f  Appeal 1993) 
625. See, in general, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f 1958 : Towards a Uniform 
Judicial Interpretation pp 320-21.
 ^See, supra Ch 2 para 2.2.
See, Minmetals Germany GmbH  v Ferco Steel Ltd  ; Davidson, Arbitration  394; Merkin, 
Arbitration /aw para 19.54.
" See, Karaha Bodas Co LLC  v Ferusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara  [2003] 
HKEC 511 (Hong Kong Court o f First Instance 2003) paras 46-47; Merkin, Arbitration law  para 
19.54.
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Finally, it may be thought interesting, at least theoretically, to mention that although 
the expression “submission to arbitration” is used in Art. V(l)(c), this does not mean 
that the provision is intended to be limited to submission agreements (i.e. refemng 
existing disputes to arbitration) and does not cover arbitration clauses (i.e. refeiring 
future dispute to arbitration), Art. V(l)(c) is applicable to both submission agreements 
and arbitration clauses. This inteipretation is clearly supported by the French text of 
Art. V(l)(e) which refers to ‘a differenee not contemplated by the submission 
agreement or not falling within the terms of the arbitration clause’.'^ . Moreover, as 
will be seen below, Art. V(l)(c) has been applied in practice to both kinds of 
arbitration agr eement, and no court has suggested otherwise.
6.3 Determining the Scope of Disputes Submitted to Arbitration
It may be worth obseiwing that both the present question (i.e. whether or not a certain 
matter is covered by the terms of the arbitration agreement) as well as the question of 
arbitrability are commonly included under the general heading of ‘the scope of 
arbitration agreement’. Yet, the present question should be distinguished from that of 
arbitrability, since the latter concerns the position of both the applicable law and Art. 
11(3) of the NYC as to whether or not they allow the subject matter of the dispute to 
be resolved by arbitration. By contrast, the present question concerns the position of 
the parties as to whether or not they agreed that certain disputes will be settled by 
arbitration. Therefore, it may suggested that it might be more accurate to limit the use 
o f the phrase ‘the scope of arbitration agreement' to the question whether or not a 
certain matter was submitted by the parties to arbitration according to their agreement, 
while using phrase ‘the scope of arbitration’ without the word ''agreement' to cover 
both the present question and the question whether a certain dispute is arbitrable.
Generally speaking, the arbitral tribunal derives its jurisdiction, competence and 
authority from the ag'eement of the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration, 
since arbitration, unlike litigation, depends upon the contract between the parties. As a 
consequence, there is an obligation upon the arbitral tribunal to settle only the 
disputes falling within the scope of its jurisdiction as ganted by the parties’
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation pp 314-15.
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agreement. If it does not, there is a risk that the award may be refused enforcement 
by the enforcing court according to the provisions of Art. V(l)(c). While, it is 
increasingly accepted by national legislations that an arbitral tribunal has power to 
detennine the scope of its own jurisdiction, the arbitral tribunal’s decision on its 
jurisdiction is nonetheless subject to review by the enforcing court.
Therefore, it is necessary for the enforcing court, when dealing with an objection 
based on Art. V(l)(c), to examine the precise teims of the arbitration agi'eement to 
detennine whether or not a particular claim or claims have been submitted by the 
parties to be resolved by the arbitral tribunal. Yet, the intention of the parties as to the 
scope of the disputes submitted to arbitration tends to be more obvious in the case of a 
submission agi’eement than in the case of an arbitration clause. When the arbitration 
agreement takes a form of arbitration clause (refemng future dispute to arbitration), it 
is often drafted in general terms and sometimes in a very short form (e.g. ‘disputes 
arising out of this contract shall be resolved by arbitration’), due to the fact that the 
parties do not yet know the nature and circumstances of their dispute, since it has not 
arisen yet. ' ^  Therefore, the mandate of the arbitral tribunal may, in certain cases, be 
narrowed or extended if the parties explicitly or tacitly agi’ee to submit to arbitration 
matters that are naiTower or wider than the scope of the actual arbitration clause. On 
the contrary, deteimining the matters submitted to arbitration is usually much easier 
where the arbitration agi’eement takes the form of a submission agreement. In such a 
case, the arbitration agieement is usually lengthy and tends to detail the claims being
See, in general, Sutton and Gill, Russell on Arbitration 374; Redfem and Hunter, Law and Pf^actice 
o f  International Commercial Arbitration 260; Minmetals Germany GmbH v Ferco Steel Ltd  , in which 
the English Commercial Court held that “ the question whether the tribunals decision was inside or 
outside the scope o f  the submission ... to be defined by reference to the issues to be resolved by the 
arbitrators”.
See, NYC of 1958, A t. V (l)(c).
See, in gemaral, Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corp v Banque Arabe Inti d'investissements 
(1997) XXII YBCA 643 (Beligan Court o f  Appeal 1997); Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  
International Commercial Arbitration 264; Davidson, Arbitration 187; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration  para 14-12.
See, in general, Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  264; 
Davidson, Arbitration  187; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration  para 14-28.
See, Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration  paras 6-3; 
Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 136.
See, van den Berg, 'Consolidated Conunentaiy' (2003)' pp 656-57.
Ch 6: Excess o f  Jurisdiction 173
submitted to arbitration, because the parties know exactly the circumstances of their
dispute, since it already exists. 19
See, Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  136; Lew, 
Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration para 6-4.
See, M inistry o f  Defense o f  the Islamic Republic o f  Iran v Gould Inc 969 F2d 764 (US Court o f  
Appeals 9th Cir 1992) 770; CBS Corp v WAK Orient Power & Light Ltd  168 FSupp2d 403 (US 
District Court E D Pa 2001) 415.
See, Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v RAKTA 976; Management & Technical Consultants SA 
V Parsons-Jurden International Corp 820 F2d 1531 (US Court o f Appeals 9th Cir 1987) 1534. See 
also, Bom, International Commercial Arbitration  850; Soo, 'International Enforcement o f  Abitral 
Awards’ at 256; Bishop and Martin, 'Enforcement o f Foreign Abitral Awards' p 21.
See, Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 160
Management & Technical Consultants SA v Parsons-Jurden International Corp 1534. Similarly, 
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v RAKTA 976,
Yet, it may be observed on the other hand, that drafting arbitration clauses in broad 
teims can help both arbitral tribunals and courts to interpret the seope of the 
arbitration agreement as widely as possible in favour of the jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal. Tribunals and courts have con’espondingly less discretion to assert
jurisdiction in favour o f the arbitral tribunal, if  the parties drafted their agreement in 7
'irestricted terms, so as to refer only certain kinds of claims to the jurisdiction of the |
arbitrator (as under a submission agreement).
Enforcing courts have, in general, been unwilling to differ significantly from the 
mlings of arbitral tribunals as to the seope of their own jurisdiction. Substantially, a 
party opposing enforcement of a foreign award has to prove beyond doubt that the “|
award exceeded the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction. Most enforcing courts have
invoked, wherever possible, a powerfril presumption that arbitral tribunals have acted 
within the authority gi'anted by the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, rather than 
seeking to naiTow the scope of the arbitration agi eement in an attempt to maintain the 
authority of the court. This due to the fact that arbitration is regarded by most national 
courts at present time as an appropriate way of resolving international commercial 
disputes. So, a US court of appeal, for example, has held that “we construe arbitral 
authority broadly to comport with the enforcement facilitating thrust of the 
Convention and the policy favoring arbitration”. Another US court of appeal has 
refeiTed to,
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[The] general rule, recognized in a Convention case, that whenever the 
scope of an arbitration clause is in question, the eourt should construe the 
clause in favour of arbitration.
A further US court of appeals has held “that any doubts concerning the scope of 
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration”. (Citation omitted)
6.4 Extra Petita
The first part of Art. V(l)(c) indieates that it is gi'ound for refiising enforcement if 
“the award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms 
of the submission to arbitration”. This may be described as an 'extra petita' because it 
refers to the situation where the eomplaining party alleges that the arbitral tribunal has 
exceeded its authority, and given an award that altogether falls outwith the scope of 
the arbitration agreement between the parties. It has also been said that this issue is 
one of “private arbitrability”, as the question whether or not the subject matter o f the 
dispute can be settled by arbitration depends on the private regulation of the parties 
in question, as they may agree to exclude certain disputes from arbitration, although 
they may be arbitrable under the applicable law. Therefore, this defence applies 
generally to cases where the arbitral award deals with a matter or matters that were 
not submitted to arbitration.
However, it is important to reveal that this defence has been pleaded unsuccessfully in 
most cases, largely because the courts believe that Art. V(l)(c), like the other 
gi’ounds of Art. V, should be construed narrowly, while the arbitration agi’eement
Ernesto Francisco v Stolt Achievement Mt 293 F3d 270 (US Court o f  Appeals 5th Cir 2002) 278. 
see also, Sedco Inc v Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat Oil Co 767 F2d 1140 (US Court o f Appeals 
5th Cir 1985) 1145.
D avid L Threlkeld & Co Inc v M etallgesellschaft Ltd 923 F2d 245 (US Court o f Appeals 2nd Cir) 
248.
See, Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York 
Convention o f  1958 159.
See, eg, Jiangxi Provincial M etal and M inerals Import and Export Corp v Sulanser Co L td  551; 
Management & Technical Consultants SA v Parsons-Jurden International Corp ; Avraham v Shigur 
Express Ltd. 1991 WL 177633 (US District Court SD NY 1991) 4; American Construction Machineiy 
& Equipment Corp Ltd v Mechanised Construction o f  Pakistan Ltd  659 FSupp 426 (US District Court 
SD NY 1987) 429; Canadian National Railway Com v Southern Railway o f  British Columbia Ltd  
(2004) XXIX YBCA 590 (Canada Supreme Court o f British Columbia 1998) 592-594; X  (Syria) v X  
(Germany Court o f  Appeal 1998) pp 668-69.
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should, on the other hand, be interpreted broadly in accordance with the NYC’s 
general policy of pro-enforcement bias. Besides, many objections raised under Art. 
V(l)(c) have turned out to relate to the merits o f the award, whereas enforcing courts 
have no jurisdiction to re-examine. An example of unsuceessfril objection can be 
seen in a case where a Gennan court of appeal rejected a defendant’s argument 
against enforcement on the basis that the arbitrators had rendered a decision in excess 
of the amount claimed. The eourt reasoned that the parties had already agi'eed that any 
dispute arising between the parties concerning the contract were covered by the 
arbitration agieement, and accordingly the arbitral tribunal could decide the entire 
subject matter before it in connection with the underlying contract. Thus, the entire 
activity of the claimant and the payment due to the claimant in respect thereof were 
the subject matter of the arbitral proceedings, so that the defendant’s objection based 
on Article V(l)(c) was unfounded.
This defence also tends to be relied upon where a party seeks to argue that the 
arbitrator has exeeeded his authority because he has awarded damages, although the 
arbitration agi’eement agreed upon by the parties expressly excluded this sort of 
damage. An unsuccessful example of such a defence comes from the well-known 
case of Parsons &. Whittemore Overseas Co INC v Société Generate de L'industrie 
du Papier (Rakta). In this case the respondent pleaded that the arbitral tribunal had 
gi’anted damages for loss of production, which was in excess of its power, since the
See, eg, Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v RAKTA 976; Management & Technical Consultants 
SA V Parsons-Jurden International Corp 1534; American Construction Machinery & Equipment 
Corp Ltd  V Mechanised Construction o f  Pakistan Ltd  429; M inistjy o f  Defense o f  the Islamic Republic 
o f  Iran v Gould Inc 770; The M inistty O f Defense And Support fo r  The Armed Forces o f  The Islamic 
Republic o f  Iran V Cubic Defense Systems Inc 29 FSupp2d 1168 (US District Court S.D Cal 1998) pp 
1171, 1173.
See, eg, American Pacific Corp v Sydsvensk Produktutveckling AB & Jan Andersson (2002)XXVII 
YBCA 551 (Sweden Court o f Appeal 2001) 553; Bank A v Bank B (2000) XXV YBCA 710 (Germany 
Court o f First Instance 1997) 713; Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v RAKTA 977; Fertilizer Corp 
o f  India v IDI Management Inc 517 FSupp 948 (US District Court SD Ohio 1981) pp 958-61.
In contrast, an Italian Court o f  Appeal had earlier stated that “an Italian judge deciding on the 
enforcement o f  a foreign award is not allowed to examine the merits o f the decision. However, this 
principle dose not apply to the examination as to whether the foreign arbitrator has exceeded the limits 
o f the merits to be decided by him, and in particular not to the examination o f question pertaining to the 
arbitrator’s competence which have to be examined by the Italian judge in an autonomous and 
independent manner”. See, General Organization o f  Commerce and Industrialization o f  Cereals o f  the 
Arab Republic o f  Syria v S.p.a SIMER (1983) VIII YBCA 386 (Italy Court o f Appeal 1981) 387.
X  (Syria) v X  (Germany Court o f  Appeal 1998) pp 668-69.
See, eg. Fertilizer Corp o f  India v IDI Management Inc ; Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v 
RAKTA .
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contract provided that “neither party shall have any liability for loss o f production”. 
The US Court of Appeal at the outset held that Art. V(l)(c), like other grounds of Art. 
V, should be construed naiTowly, which “would comport with the enforcement- 
facilitating thrust of the Convention”, so that the resisting party, in invoking Art 
V(l)(c), must overcome a powerful presumption that the arbitral tribunal acted within 
its authority. The Court fLirther held that:
Although the Convention recognizes that an award may not be enforced 
where predicated on a subject matter outside the arbitrator's jurisdiction, it 
does not sanction second-guessing the arbitrator's constmction of the 
parties’ agi’eement. (Nor would it be proper for the court to) usurp the 
arbitrators’ role.
The Court therefore rejected the respondent’s objection, finding that this clause was a 
matter of construction of the contract for the arbitrator and that it was not apparent 
that the scope of the submission to arbitration had been exceeded. Similarly, in 
Fertilizer Corp o f India v IDI Management Inc a respondent opposed a request for 
enforcement of a foreign award, arguing that the arbitrators exceeded their power by 
awarding consequential damages, while the contract between the parties expressly 
excluded such damages. A US district court stated that without engaging in an in- 
depth review of the law of contract the court could not state with certainty whether a 
breach of contract would abrogate a clause which excluded consequential damages. 
However, it pointed out that “the answer, however, is irrelevant. The standard of 
review of an arbitration award by an American court is extremely narrow”. 
Accordingly, the Court rejected the respondent’s defence and ordered enforcement of 
the award.
So far, there is only one exceptional case in which enforcement of the award was 
refused on account of excess of jurisdiction. In that case, it was alleged that the 
arbitral tribunal had rendered an award on the issue of non-payment, which was not 
submitted to arbitration, and the phrase ‘or other dispute arising under these contract 
regulations’ used in the clause was not wide enough to cover claims for non-payment. 
A Hong Kong high court rejected the respondents’ objection, reasoning that,
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v RAKTA pp 976-77. 
Fertilizer Corp o f  India v IDI Management Inc pp 958-61.
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The arbitration clause ... was wide enough to cover the dispute. Payment 
was a cmcial element in all contracts for the sale of goods and it was 
inconceivable that it was intended that quality claims should be arbitrated 
but that claims for non-acceptance and non-payment should be litigated 
with all the delay that that would entail in certain jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, the high court’s decision was reversed on appeal. The Hong Kong Court 
o f Appeal gave several justifications, including the following:
(1) the court was not entitled to ignore any . . words (of the arbitration 
clause), nor was it entitled to write a fresh arbitration clause for the parties 
on the basis that doing so would render it more efficacious from a 
business point of view, and enable all disputes arising under one or more 
of the agreements to be dealt with by the same tribunal. Any presumption 
that the parties so intended was rebutted by the express language which 
they had adopted; (2) parties were entitled to provide for restrictive 
reference ... and ... the courts were only concerned with interpreting the 
words which the parties chose to use in their contract. A court was often 
entitled to add to a written contract by implying a term if it was satisfied 
that reasonable men in the position of the parties would have agi'eed to it 
if  their attention had been directed to the point and that the term should be 
implied. But that was supplementing the words which the parties had used 
- not contradicting them; (3) the arbitrators made their purported awards 
in excess of jurisdiction.
For the reasons mentioned above, the Appeal Court allowed the appeal and refused 
enforcement of the foreign award altogether on the ground of excess of the arbitral 
tribunal’s authority as gi'anted by the arbitration clause.
6.5 Ultra Petita
The second part of the ground for reftising enforcement under Art. V(l)(c) concerns a 
situation in which the tribunal’s award partly exceeds its jurisdiction. In such a case, 
only a part or parts of the award are outside the mandate of the arbitral tribunal, 
whereas other parts of the award are within the scope of that mandate. This defence, 
like the other available under Art. V, has been unsuccessfully invoked in most cases. 
Courts have dealt with this defence in favour of the arbitral tribunal wherever
Tiong Huat Rubber Factoiy Bhd v Wah Chang International co Ltd [1991] HKLY 50 (Hong Kong 
High Court 1990) ,
ibid .
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possible, in the light of the powerful presumption that the tribunal has not exceeded 
its jurisdiction, but rather acted within its authority. For example, in a case before 
the Luxembourg Court of Appeal, a party resisting enforcement contended that the 
arbitral tribunal decided ultra petita. The court however rejected this contention, 
holding that:
If founded, this allegation would still not lead to denying recognition of 
the awards, as the decision attacked can be dissociated from what has 
been referred to arbitration. However, the allegation is not justified.
In another case, where arbitrators had been asked to determine the division of an 
estate, a party alleged, in resisting enforcement, that the arbitrators had not complied 
with their jurisdiction, in that they had done more than was requested from them, 
because they have awarded part of the estate to his children. A Dutch court of first 
instance rejected the respondent’ allegation, since it was clear that the respondent 
himself had requested the arbitrators during the arbitral proceedings to award part of 
his share o f the estate to his children.
Moreover, in Fiat S.p.A. v Ministry o f Finance and Planning o f Republic o f  Suriname, 
the losing party (ONYX) contended that the whole award should be vacated since it 
exceeded the arbitrator’s jurisdiction as part of the award included decisions against a 
third party (FIAT) who was not a party to the arbitration agieement. A US district 
court refused to vacate the award whole, holding that the part of the award rendered 
against resulted from issues properly submitted to arbitration, since Onyx was a party 
to the arbitration agi'eement and had participated in the arbitral proceedings.
See, eg. Fiat SpA v M inistty o f  Fmance and Planning o f  Republic o f  Sutdname 1989 WL 122891 
(US District Court SD NY 1989) 5; Kersa Holdm g Co v Infancourtage 624; Isaac Glecer v M oses 
Israel Glecer & Estet'a Glecer-Nottman 640. See also, Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative 
International Commercial Abitration para 26-93.
See, eg. Parsons & Whittemore Ovet'seas Co v RAKTA 976; Mattagement <& Technical Consultants 
SA V Parsons-Jurden International Corp 1534; American Construction M achinety & Equipment 
Corp Ltd  V Mechanised Construction o f  Pakistan Ltd 429; Ministry o f  Defense o f  the Islamic Republic 
o f  Iran v Gould Inc 770; The Ministr}> O f Defense And Support fo r  The Aianed Forces o f  The Islamic 
Republic o f  Iran V Cubic Defense Systems Ittc pp 1171, 1173. see also, Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, 
Cotnparative International Commet'cial Arbitration  para 26-93; Bishop and Martin, 'Enforcement o f  
Foreign A bitral Awards’ 21.
Kersa Holding Co v Infancourtage 624.
Isaac Glecer v Moses Ist'ael Glecer & Estera Glecer-Nottman 640.
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Therefore, the court enforced the part of the award against Onyx, as it was separable 
from that against concerning FIAT.
6.6 Partial Enforcement
The question arising in Ultra Petita objections is whether enforcement o f the whole 
award must be denied or only those parts falling outside the scope of the arbitration 
agreement? In answering this question, the second half of Art, V(i)(c) declares that:
... if  the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated 
from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains 
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognised and 
enforced.
Thus, enforcement of the whole award may be refused where those parts which fall 
outside the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction cannot be separated from the parts that 
are within its power. Yet, partial enforcement of an award, to the extent that it deals 
with matters within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, is possible if they are 
separable from the rest of the award. As a result of its pro-enforcement bias, the NYC 
attempts at least, if enforcement of the whole award is impossible, to safeguard the 
parts of the award which have not been tainted by the ultra petita objection. The view 
is taken that such parts have been properly rendered within the arbitrators’ authority, 
and to refrise enforcement of such parts would lead to an undesirable waste of time, 
money and effort. The legislative history of the NYC provides further justification. 
The Indian delegate said, in supporting the provision of the partial enforcement, that:
[I]n a commercial arbitration, the extraneous matter introduced by the 
arbitrator into the award might be of a very incidental nature. If the 
enforcing court was not authorized to sever that matter from the remainder 
of the award and was obliged to refuse enforcement altogether merely
Fiat SpA V Suriname 5.
'" N Y C o f 1958, Art.V(l)(c).
See, Lew, Mistelis and Ki'èoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration para 26-93; Di 
Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 
160.
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because a small detail fell outside the scope of the arbitral agreement, the 
applicant might suffer unjustified hardship.
The Italian delegate also agreed that:
[I]t would be unfair to refuse enforcement solely because some secondary 
particulars in the award went beyond the scope of the submission to 
arbitration. If the proviso (of the partial enforcement) was deleted, the 
award might be invalidated even by a very minor defect, for example, if 
the arbitrator had made an unauthorized order as to costs.
A rare example in which the court divided an award into enforceable and 
unenforceable sections can be seen in a case came before an Italian court. The court 
found that the parties had agi'eed to refer non- technical disputes arising out of the 
contract to local arbitration in Syria and to refer technical disputes to an international 
arbitration according to the ICC Rules. Disputes arose and the plaintiff resorted to a 
local arbitration in Syria requesting compensation for the damages resulting from the 
delay in performance and for the ensuing loss of profits. The defendant opposed the 
jurisdiction of the local arbitral tribunal in Syria and refused to appoint its arbitrators, 
alleging that the disputes concerned technical matters which had to be refeiTed to 
international arbitration under the ICC Rules. The Syrian local tribunal nevertheless 
proceeded with the arbitration, and made an award in favour of the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff sought enforcement in Italy, but the Italian Court found that the arbitral 
tribunal had decided on both non- technical and technical matters. The court therefore 
granted the award only partial enforcement for the rewards that fell into the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, and denied enforcement of the remaining 
elements, since separation was possible.
Another application of partial enforcement may be found in practice where the award 
is made partly against a third party. One example already mentioned above is Fiat 
S.p. A. V Ministry o f  Finance and Planning o f Republic o f  Suriname. A dispute arose 
between Onyx and Suriname regarding a supply of goods by Suriname, and ONYX
UN E/CONF.26/SR.17 p 9. 
ibid pp 9-10.
General Organization o f  Commerce and Industrialization o f  Cereals o f  the Arab Republic o f  Syria 
V S.p.a SIMER pp 386-88.
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initiated arbitration proceedings according to the arbitration clause in their contract. 
The arbitral tribunal rendered its award in favour of Suriname against not only Onyx 
but also FIAT, which was not a party to the arbitration agreement. Suriname asked a 
US district court to enforce the award, while Onyx and FIAT applied to vacate it. The 
Court found that the arbitral tribunal exceeded its authority when it purported to bind 
FIAT, who was not a party covered by the arbitration agreement. The court therefore 
vacated part of the award against FIAT, while confirming the remainder against 
Onyx, as separation was possible. The court reasoned that:
[VJacatur may be granted if the arbitrators “have awarded upon a matter 
not submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits o f the 
decision upon the matter submitted.” ... It is usually not within the 
discretion of the arbitration panel to detennine whether a non-signatory to 
an arbitration agreement should be bound by the arbitrators when that 
issue is not before the panel.
The court went on to make a distinction between the situation before it and situations 
where a third party may be bound by the award, in order to counter Suriname’s 
argument based upon the DiGhello v case where another US district court confiimed 
an award in which the arbitrator awarded against four non-signatory corporations. The 
Court held that there was a difference between DiGhello v and the instant case. In the 
DiGhello v case, the Court had found that the four corporations were DiGhello's alter 
egos as they were clearly owned, dominated and controlled by DiGhello, and they 
therefore executed or directly benefited from the parties' agreements. The court then 
noted that the arbitrator may be allowed to extend his jurisdiction when the issues are 
“inextricably tied up with the merits of the underlying dispute”. More significantly, 
the Court in DiGhello v found that the arbitration agreement itself purported to bind 
any entities owned by DiGhello. Thus, the arbitral tribunal in DiGhello v did not act 
beyond its power in deciding on the corporations, as they were bound in fact by the 
arbitration agieement. In the case in question, by contrast, although there were some 
connection between Onyx and FIAT and they clearly benefited from each other's 
business deals, they were not intertwined nor was the connection as close as that
Fiat SpA V Suriname 4.
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between DiGhello and his four sub-coi*porations. Besides, there was no evidence that 
FIAT intended to be bound by the arbitration clause.
It may be also worth mentioning that the issue whether an arbitrator is allowed to 
extend his jurisdiction to make an award against a third party who did not sign the 
arbitration agi'eement has been “regarded as lying in a borderline zone between the 
gi'ound for rehisal of enforcement as regulated by Article V(l)(c) and the grounds 
provided by Article V (l)(a)”. Perhaps the non-signatory party might invoke Art. 
V(l)(a) to resist enforcement of the award by arguing that there is no valid arbitration 
agreement binding him to the arbitrator’s decision, since he was not a party to the 
arbitration agi eement.
A further linked question to be addressed is whether the partial enforcement can be 
granted when the court finds the other part of the award is unenforceable according to 
a gi'ound of Art. V other than Art. V(l)(c)? On a literal reading, no giound other than 
Art. V(l)(c) includes provision for partial enforcement. However, a desirable 
approach toward this question has been adopted by a Hong Kong high court in a case 
under Art. V(2)(b) (public policy). In this case, a G AFTA arbitral tribunal rendered an 
award ordering the Indian defendant (Texuna) to pay damages (in US dollars) for 
non-delivery of Chinese gi een mung beans and to return the Indian mpee deposit to 
the Indian Plaintiff (Agi'o). The plaintiff sought enforcement of the award in Hong 
Kong, but proceedings were pending before the Hong Kong Court concerning the 
alleged kidnapping of a witness in India. By separate proceeding, the plaintiff sought 
enforcing part of the award concerning the returning of the Indian deposit. The 
question before the court was whether this severable part of the award could be 
enforced, although there is no specific reference to separability under the public 
policy provision of Art. V(2)(b) of the NYC. The high court stated that this was 
possible by analogy with Art. V(l)(c) of the NYC. The court went on to conclude 
that:
ibid pp 4-5.
Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  
1958 \ ( i \ .
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It would ... be contrary to the whole spirit of the Convention and the 
Ordinance if enforcement were to be refused in respect of a severable part 
of an award which has never been in issue.
In supporting its approach, the Hong Kong high court held that its view was 
consistent with the view of at least two courts in the US, A US district court has 
declared an ICC award enforceable against a US defendant, with the exception of that 
portion of the award in which the arbitral tribunal in accordance with a French statute 
imposed an additional 5% interest p.a. after two months had elapsed from the date of 
the award. The US court considered this as “penal rather than compensatory and bears 
no reasonable relation to any damage resulting from delay in recovery of the sums 
awarded” and therefore contrary to the public policy. Consequently, this part of the 
award was not capable of enforcement under US law and Art. V(2)(b) of the NYC.
A third connected question is whether a partial enforcement of an award can be 
requested by the winning party himself. The decision of the Hong Kong high court 
and the US Domestic Court mentioned above would lend support to the admissibility 
of such a request. In this regard, Prof van den Berg has stated that:
Such a request may be desirable for example in case where the award 
contains several decisions of which one or more require a rectification by 
the arbitral tribunal for arithmetical eiTors. Pending rectification, a party 
may have an interest in enforcement of the other decisions in the award 
without awaiting the outcome of the rectification proceedings.
It may be suggested that a party should be not forbidden from requesting partial 
enforcement, as no reason to the contrary can be discerned under the NYC. Allowing 
such a request would appear to be consistent with the general policy of the NYC of 
facilitating enforcement whether entirely or partly.
6.7 The Position in Saudi Arabia
JJ Agro Industries Ltd  v Texuna International Ltd  (1993) VXIII YBCA 396 (Hong Kong High 
Court 1992) pp 399-402.
Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens SA v Southwire Co & Southwire International Corp 484 
FSupp 1063 (US District Court ND Georgia 1980) 1069. See also, for a similar approach, JJ Agro 
Industries L td  v Texuna International Ltd pp 401-2.
van den Berg, 'Consolidated Cominentaiy' (2003)' 658.
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The SAL of 1983 and the IRSAL of 1985 do not indicate that the arbitral award may 
be challenged or refused enforcement on the ground that the arbitrators have exceeded 
their jurisdiction, since these provisions allow either party to challenge the award 
before the court without laying down specific grounds of challenge. However, such 
a defence is well known under Islamic jurisprudence and the mles of the Saudi courts. 
As regards Islamic jurisprudence, there is no disagi'cement between the Muslim 
scholars of Shari’ah that the authority of the arbitrator comes horn the voluntary 
agreement of the parties to settle their dispute by that arbitrator. Accordingly, the 
arbitration agreement, like the official appointment of the judge, detennines the 
arbitrator’s power regarding the subject matter and the parties to arbitration. 
Therefore, the arbitrator’s award would be, as a general mle, not binding if it 
contained matters falling outside the disputes submitted to arbitration.^^ The Saudi 
court has also adopted the principle that the arbitral tribunal has to make its award 
within the limitation of its authority according to the arbitration agreement.
Likewise, the scholars of Islamic Jurispmdence unanimously agree that the arbitral 
award would not bind a third party who did not agree to arbitrate, but if the third party 
is one of the owners of a business, he could be bound by an award made against his 
partner who entered into arbitration. Art. 1842 of the Majallah al-Ahkam al- 
'Adliyyah (the civil code of the Ottoman Empire of 1876, which was the first 
codification of the Islamic civil law) states:
See, Y Al-Samaan, 'The Settlement o f Foreign Investment Disputes by Means o f Domestic 
Arbitration in Saudi Ai'abia’(1994) 9 Arab L Q 217 at 234.
" See, eg, Z Ibn Nujaym, AlBahr Alra'iq shark Kanz Aldaqa'iq (Dar al-Kutub al-iimiyah, Beirut 1997 
'in Arabic') vol 7 p 41; S Al-Sarkasi, Al-M absout (Dar al-Kutub al-ilmiyah, Beirut 1993 'in Arabic') vol 
16 p 111; Ibn Qudamah, Al-Mughnai vol 13 p 629; Ibn Qasim, Haashiyat A lrrawd  vol 7 p 521. See 
also, for contemporaiy scholars, M Al-Sartawy, 'The Scope o f Arbitration and the Power o f  the 
Arbitrator' (Symposium of Arbitration in Islamic Shariah, Dubi 2001 'in Arabic')pp 9-11 ; M Aag Beeg,
'Arbitration in Islamic Shari'ah and Islamic Fiqh ' (Symposium o f Arbitration in Islamic Shariah, Dubi 
2001 'in Arabic')pp 23-24; E Gattorah, Arbitration in the Light o f  the Islamic Shari'ah (Jeddah 
Chamber o f Commerce and Industry Jeddah 1994) 84.
See, the 4th Review Committee, decision No 33/T/4 dated 1414 H (1994); Al-Ajlan, Compilation o f  
judicia l principles 58.
See, O Al-Nashmi, 'International Arbitration and Ahitrating in Islamic Shari'ah' (Symposium o f  
Arbitration in Islamic Shariah, Dubi 2001 'in Arabic') 20; Ibn Nujaym, AlBahr Alra'iq shark Kanz "j
Aldaqa'iq  vol 7 p 47; Aag Beeg, 'Arbitration in Islamic Shari'ah and Islamic Fiqh ' 25.
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The arbitrator’s award is applied and enforced for the litigants who 
appointed him in a specific matter. His award is not valid for other 
litigants.
In addition, it is generally accepted by Scholars of Islamic Jurispmdence that if  the 
award contains decisions outside the scope of arbitration agi*eement, and other within 
its scope, then the latter are binding and enforceable as far as they can be separated 
from the rest of the award.
As regards the context of international arbitration, the Circular of the Grievance 
Board regarding Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards of 1405 
emphasizes that a foreign award has to be made within the arbitrators’ authority 
aceording to the arbitration agreement and its eonditions in order to be enforceable in 
SA.
As regards the application of Art. V(l)(c) of the NYC by the Saudi courts, only one 
case can be found where this defense was raised before a Saudi enforcing court (the 
9^ '^  Administrative Panel). In this case, a Saudi defendant alleged, in resisting 
enforcement of an arbitral award, that the arbitral tribunal acted beyond its authority 
and included in its award some decisions on a matter of supplying laboratory 
equipment, which the parties had not agreed to submit to arbitration. The defendant 
argued that the arbitration agreement refened to arbitration disputes arising under a 
contact for constmcting prefabricated buildings in the university, and made no 
mention of a contract to supply laboratory equipment. That contract could not be 
covered by the arbitration agi'eement, since it was utterly independent and separate 
from the construction contract. The Dutch plaintiffs argued that under the arbitration 
agreement construed as a whole the parties authorised the arbitral tribunal not only to 
settle disputes arising out of the main construction contract, but to deal with sub­
disputes emerging from subcontracts for supplying laboratory equipment. The
Majallah al-Ahkam al-Adliyyah o f  1876, Ait. 1842.
”  See, eg, Ibn Nujaym, AlBahr Alra'iq sharh Kanz Aldaqa'iq vol 7 pp 45-47. See also, for 
contemporary scholars, Al-Nasluni, 'International Arbitration and Arbitrating in Islamic Shari'ah' 20; 
Al-Sartawy, 'The Scope o f  Aibitration and the Power o f the Arbitrator' 11 ; Aag Beeg, 'Arbitration in 
Islamic Shari'ah and Islamic Fiqh ’ 25; Gattorah, Arbitration in the Light o f  the Islamic Shari'ah 85.
the Circular o f the Grievance Board regarding Enforcement o f Foreign Judgments and Arbitral 
Awards, no 7 dated 15/8/1405 II (1985), A il  5 .
the 9th Administrative Panel, decision No. 32/D/A/9 dated 1918 H (1997).59
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plaintiffs added that the defendant had participated in the arbitration in relation to 
disputes arising from both contacts and had not raised this jurisdictional objection 
during the arbitral proceedings. They argued that this should be deemed as a new 
agreement or a modification of the scope of the original agreement so as to embrace 
disputes arising under both contacts. The Saudi Court interpreted the arbitration 
agreement and the parties’ attitudes during the arbitral proceedings broadly and 
concluded that all disputes in connection with these contracts fall into the scope of 
arbitration agi'eement, so that the decision on damages for breach of the contract to 
supply laboratory equipment did not exceed the authority of the arbitral tribunal. 
Thus the Court rehised the Saudi respondent’s objections and granted leave to enforce 
the award.
The above-mentioned case illustrates that the Saudi Court has construed arbitration 
agreements broadly, in order to confer the widest possible jurisdiction on arbitrators. 
This attitude is plainly consistent with the approach adopted by most national courts 
of the contracting States that the party resisting enforcement has to prove beyond any 
doubt that the award exceeded the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, othei'wise there is a 
powerful presumption the arbitral tribunal has acted within its authority gi'anted by the 
arbitration agi'eement. This case might also show implicitly that the Court deemed the 
defendant has waived his right to rely on a jurisdiction issue as a refusal ground at the 
stage of enforcement since he failed to raise it previously, in particularly, at the stage 
of the arbitration procedures.
No case has yet arisen in which a Saudi court has gi'anted partial enforcement of a 
foreign award according to Art. V(l)(c). However, like the Hong Kong and US 
courts, in several cases the Saudi courts have gi'anted partial enforcement of foreign 
awards under the public policy defence (i.e. Art. V(2)(b)). For example, a Saudi 
enforcing court (the 25^ Subsidiary Panel) has gi'anted leave to execute an ICC 
award, except for the decision of bank interest, which the court considered to be 
eontrary to the Shari’ah Islamic mles (i.e. Saudi public policy). In this case,
ibid pp 3, 8, 10, 12-13.
61 See, the 25th Subsidiaiy Panel, decision No. ll/D /F /25  dated 1417 H (1996); the 2nd Review  
Committee, decision No. 208/T/2 dated 1418 H (1997); the 18th Subsidiary Panel, decision No. 
8/D/F/18 dated 1424 H (2003); the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 36/T/4 dated 1425 H (2004).
the 25th Subsidiary Panel, decision No. 1 l/D/F/25 dated 1417 FI (1996).
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although Art. V(2)(b) includes no provision for partial enforcement, the Saudi court 
granted partial enforcement in respect o f those parts of the award which were not 
contrary to the Saudi public policy, and did not accept the defendant’s motion to 
refuse enforcing the whole of the award.
6.8 Conclusion
From the discussions in this chapter, it has been seen that Art. V(l)(c) is concerned 
with the situation where the arbitral tribunal has exceeded its authority in all or some 
decisions of the award. It does not deal with the situation in which the whole 
jurisdiction of the tribunal is disputed because of the lack o f a valid arbitration 
agreement, as such an issue is covered under Art. V(l)(a). Likewise, Art. V(l)(c) does 
not concern issues of procedural violations nor eiTor of law. An incomplete award is 
not bar to enforcement under Art. V(l)(c) nor under any other grounds of Art. V of 
the NYC. Regardless of the use of the expression “submission to arbitration”. Art. 
V(l)(c) applies to both kinds o f arbitration agi eements (i.e. submission agreements 
and arbitration clause).
The question whether a certain dispute was submitted to arbitration is determined 
essentially according to the terms of the agi'eement of the parties to arbitrate. It is also 
generally accepted that the arbitral tribunal has power to detenuine the scope of its 
own jurisdiction, which however subject to review by the enforcing court if  the 
arbitral tribunal is alleged to exceed its authority. Yet, courts have generally construed 
the arbitration agi'eement broadly to confer, wherever possible, the widest jurisdiction 
for the arbitrators, as there is a general presumption that the arbitrators have acted 
within their granted power.
The first part of Art. V(l)(c) covers a situation where the whole award deals with 
matters not submitted to arbitration, whereas the second part concerns the situation in 
which a part (but not all) of the award dealt with matters fall out of the submission to 
arbitration. Both defences have been proven to be rarely successful, as Art. V.(l)(c), 
like the other grounds o f Art. V, is to be intei'preted naiTowly and should not lead 
courts to re-examine the merits of the awards to comport with the facilitating policy of 
enforcement under the NYC.
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Like most national courts, the Saudi Courts inteipret arbitration agi'eements broadly in 
favour of the tribunal’s jurisdiction, and constme the defence of jurisdiction narrowly. 
Thus it has repelled an objection that a foreign award contained some issues falling 
outside the arbitrators’ authority.
.Art. V(l)(c) provides the enforcing court with discretion to grant partial enforcement 
as respects those parts falling within the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction if they can 
be separated from that outside its jurisdiction. Partial enforcement might be applied to 
other grounds of Art. V by analogy with Art. V(l)(c). This has been applied by 
several national courts including the Saudi courts.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Defective Composition or Procedural Irregularity
7.1 Introduction
Under its Ai1.V(l)(d), the NYC lays down the fouilh gi'ound for refusing enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards. It provides, like most modem international and national 
arbitration laws, ’ that enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be refused if the 
arbitral procedure including the composition of the arbitral tribunal deviated from the 
will o f the parties or the law of the seat of arbitration. Accordingly, Art.V(l)(d) states 
that enforcement of a foreign award may be declined if the aggiieved party can prove 
that:
The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not 
in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such 
agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the 
arbitration took place. ^
Accordingly, this chapter will start with (1) general observations regarding 
Art.V(l)(d). It will then discuss (2) the unpopularity of Art.V(l)(d), (3) the difference 
between Art.V(l)(d) and Art. V(l)(b), (4) the applicable law under Art.V(l)(d), (5) 
the scope of the autonomy of the parties, (6) criticisms of Art.V(l)(d), (7) 
irregularities in the composition of the arbitral tribunal, and (8) irregularities in the 
arbitral procedure. (9) Finally, the position in Saudi Arabia regarding the underlying 
issues will be examined.
7.2 General Remarks
Although Art.V(I)(d), on the face of it, establishes two separate non-enforcement 
gi'ounds in the shape of iiTegularities; (a) the composition of the arbitral tribunal and
' See, eg, UNCITRAL Model Law o f 1985, Ai't.36(l)(a)(iv); European Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration o f  1961, Art,IX(l)(d); English Aibitration Act 1996, s .I03(l)(e).
^NYC of 1958, Art.V(I)(d).
Ch 7: Defective Composition or Procedural Irregularity 190
(b) the arbitral procedure. These two grounds are relatively close, because the 
question of the composition of the tribunal is a kind of procedural matters, which 
emerges at the beginning of the arbitral proceedings. Thus, specifically mentioning 
the issue of the composition of the tribunal separately from the arbitral procedure 
under Art. V(l)(d) indicates that the NYC pays particular attention to defective 
composition of arbitral tribunals.
7.3 The Unpopularity of Art. V(l)(d).
It may be worth mentioning, as a preliminary point, that Art. V(l)(d) is not as 
frequently resorted to as the other gi'ounds of Art. V.  ^ A number of reasons may be 
advanced for this:
(Firstly), in an effort to advance the goals of the convention, courts will 
often be very sceptical of broad-based assertions of bias, not raised before 
the arbitral panel itself, but subsequently raised to block enforcement of 
the award. Courts may even characterize these attempts as made in bad 
faith. (Secondly), the agreement on the arbitral procedure is usually 
embodied in Arbitration Rules of a specific arbitral institution, which 
generally affords wide discretionary power to arbitrators as to the conduct 
of the arbitral procedure. It is therefore rare that the arbitral procedure has 
not been conducted in accordance with the agreement of the parties. ^
A third reason may be added is that as far as an inegular procedure may be confused 
or overlapped with a lack of due process, the party contesting enforcement would 
usually rely on Art.V(l)(b) (violation o f due process) or Art.V(2)(b) ( breach of 
public policy) which may appear to be more effective than Art. V (I)(d). ^
7.4 The Difference between Art. V(l)(d) and Art. V(l)(b)
 ^ Bishop and Martin, 'Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards' 22; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration para 26-95; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  
international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 163.
D Richard, 'Enforcement o f Foreign Ai'bitral Awards under the United Nations Convention o f 1958: 
A Survey o f Recent Federal Case Law'(1987) 11 Maiyland J Inti L & Trade 13 at 32 ; Bishop and 
Martin, 'Enforcement o f Foreign Aihitral Awards' 22.
 ^ van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 323.
 ^ See, supra Ch 5 para 5.3.
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It may also be important to note that an overlap between Arts. V(l)(b) and V(l)(d) 
may frequently arise, since both articles relate to alleged procedural breaches in 
arbitral proceedings. Notwithstanding this close relationship, there is an important 
distinction between them that should be borne in mind. Art. V(l)(b) deals in particular 
with breach of basic standards of due process (e.g. procedural fairness or fair hearing), 
as applied in the country of the enforcing court. By contrast, Art, V(l)(d) focuses on 
non-compliance with aspects of arbitral procedure other than due process, which are I
agreed upon by the parties or, failing such agreement, laid down by the law of the seat i
of arbitration, even if such regularities do not constitute a violation of due process.
Consequently, an award which may not be challenged under Art. V(l)(d) may yet 
offend against the fundamental requirements of due process. For example, if the 
agreement of the parties provides that one of parties has no right to be heard or to put 
his case, or that the names of the arbitrators will not be disclosed to the parties, this is /
unquestionably contrary to the essential requirements of due process, and thus Art. t
V(l)(b) or even V(2)(b) may be invoked against enforeement o f an award resulting 
from such a case. ^
7.5 The Applicable Law
Under the Geneva Convention of 1927, the composition of the arbitral tribunal and 
the arbitral procedure were required to be in compliance with both, in the same time, 
the agreement of the parties and the law of the country where the arbitration took 
place. Therefore, enforeement might be refused under the Geneva Convention if  the 
arbitral award resulted from an arbitral procedure which offended against the law of 
the seat of the arbitration, even if that procedure were agreed upon by the parties. This 
essentially meant that the parties were unable to agree on a procedure which 
conflicted with the law of the seat of the arbitration.
This is not the case under the NYC. Its Art. V(l)(d) goes along a way towards 
establishing the domination of the autonomy of the parties over the law of the
 ^ See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation  pp 298, 301; Bom, International Commercial Arbitration 833 fh 83; G Kaufmann- 
Kohler, 'Identifying and Applying the Law Governing the Arbitration procedure - The Role o f Law of 
the Place o f Arbitration' (ICCA Congress Series no 9 Paris 1998) 337.
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arbitration seat with regard to the composition of the arbitral tribunal and the arbitral 
procedure. In this regard, the drafters of the NYC intended to reduce the impact of 
the law of the country where the arbitration was held on the arbitration procedure 
when enforcement of foreign awards is sought.  ^Accordingly, after extensive debates 
at the NYC conference. Art. V(I)(d) came to lay down that:
The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not 
in accordance with the agreement o f the parties, or, failing such 
agreement, was not in accordance with the law o f  the country where the 
arbitration took place, (emphasis added) ^
This provision obviously establishes two alternative rules, which embody a 
compromise between those delegates who wanted the arbitral procedure to be subject 
to the law of the seat of arbitration, and those who desired to free the parties to 
arbitration from any national law. It can be seen that priority is given to the 
agreement of the parties, and therefore issues o f tribunal composition and arbitral 
procedure are governed exclusively by the parties’ agreement if  they have agreed on 
these matters. Hence, Art. V(l)(d) does not require that the composition of the 
tribunal and the arbitral procedure must comply with any particular national law. 
However, if the parties fail to agi'ee on the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the 
arbitral procedure, then and only then the law of the country where the arbitration was 
held will govern such matters. ' * Therefore, that law plays a subsidiary role, if the 
parties have failed to agi'ee on provision for these issues, but a complementary role if 
the parties fail to agree on certain aspects of the composition of the arbitral tribunal or 
the arbitral procedure, thus filling the gaps in the agreement of the parties.
7.6 The Scope of Party Autonomy
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 323.
^NYC o f l9 5 8 , Ai-l.V(l)(d).
See, Dicey, Morris and Collins, Conflict o f  Laws 639.
See, Osuuskunta METEX Andelslag V.S v Turkiye Electrik Kurumu Genel Mudurlugu General 
D irectorate (1997) XXII YBCA 807 (Turkey Court o f Appeal 1996) pp 811-12.
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation pp 324-25. See, for an example o f complementaiy role, S.A Pando Compania Naviera 
V SaS Filmo (1978) III YBCA 277 (Italy Court o f  Appeal 1976) pp 277- 78.
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After discussing the applicable law, it seems logical to ask whether, according to Art. 
V(l)(d), the parties are free to agree upon the composition of the arbitral tribunal and 
the arbitral procedure independently from any municipal law? Several commentators 
are of the view that the parties are not free to do so, their freedom being limited to 
selecting national laws applicable to the arbitral procedure. Nevertheless, this 
approach imposes a limitation on the parties’ autonomy that does not reflect the tenus 
o f Art. V(l)(d). Besides, attempts to impose limits upon the parties’ autonomy in 
such matters were clearly unsuccessful at the conference of the NYC.
However, there is growing tendency to allow parties to create their own rules, free 
fr om the restrictions of any national law. This approach is characterised in the theory 
of international arbitration as “de-localised” or “de-nationalised” or “floating” 
arbitration. Accordingly, the Dutch Supreme Court has interpreted Art. V(l)(d) as 
entitling the parties to choose procedural mles which are independent fi'om the law of 
any country. This approach may appear in some aspects to serve the main goal of 
Art. V(l)(d) of reducing the influence of the law of the country where the arbitration 
was held, by making the agreement of the parties the cornerstone for the arbitral 
procedure.
Yet, the latter approach invites a further question as to whether the autonomy of the 
parties granted under Art. V (l)(d) is absolute? While under Art. V(l)(d) the 
agi'eement of the parties would seem to prevail even over fundamental procedural 
mles, and consequently would not be subject to restricted requirements of due 
process, ' ^  many argue that party autonomy must be constrained by mandatory
See, in general, Gaja, International Commercial Arbitration  para I.C.3, and references quoted there 
in fn 69; van den Berg, 'Consolidated Cominentary' (2003)' at 659; Garnett and others, International 
Commercial Arbitration  106.
Gaja, International Commercial Arbitration  .
See, UN E/CONF.26/SR.3; UN Doc. E/CONF. 26/SR.4. See also, Gaja, International Commercial 
Arbitration  para I.C.3.
See, in general. Dicey, M om s and Collins, Conflict o f  Laws 604.
SEEEv Yugoslavia 198.
See, Ministry o f  Public Works o f  Tunisia v Société Bee Freres (1997) XXII YBCA 682 (France 
Court o f  Appeal 1994) pp 688, 690. In this case, the French court o f appeal has rejected challenge to 
enforcement o f foreign award based on the fact that the arbitration agreement provided for two 
arbitrators, which violated the mandatoiy mles o f the arbitration seat (i.e. Tunisia law). See also, UN  
Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.42 p 92 fn 5; Davidson, Arbitration 394; Bom , International Commercial 
Arbitration  847.
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requirements of the procedural laws of both the seat of the arbitration and the place of 
enforcement, if enforcement of the award is not to be denied under Art. V(l)(b) 
(breach of due process) or Art. V(2)(b) (breach of public policy). It is surely 
legitimate for the Convention to achieve a balance between party autonomy and the 
adequate protection of due process and public policy. It appears to be proper to 
subject the will of the parties to the fundamental requirements of procedural law of 
the country where enforcement is sought (and not the law of the seat o f arbitration) 
under Art. V(l)(b) or Art.(2)(b), because, as has already been mentioned, the 
enforcing court will naturally have its own concept of what constitutes a violation of 
the requirements of due process, so that such courts will judge violation of due 
process according to their own national laws, and not the law of the country where the 
arbitration took place. Secondly, not all mandatory procedural requirements should be 
considered to be fundamental. Thus, the freedom of the parties should be not 
restricted by every mandatory requirement of applicable procedural law, but only 
fundamental aspects of due process necessary to guarantee that the parties have a fair 
trial.
7.7 Criticisms of Art. V(l)(d)
Although a significant development is made by Art. V(l)(d), as compared with the 
Geneva Convention of 1927, by reducing the role of the law of the seat of arbitration 
in favour of party autonomy, it may still be criticised in comparison with 
contemporary arbitration laws. For example, while Art. V(I)(d) allows enforcement
See, At H addad Bros Enterprises Inc v M/S AGAP  635 FSupp 205 (US Court o f Appeal 3rd Cir 
1986). See also, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform 
Judicial Interpretation 324; Redfeni and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial 
Arbitration  277;Garnett and others. International Commercial Arbitration  pp 21-23, 106; A El- 
Alidab, 'New York Convention On the Recognition and Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards ' 
(Beirut) (special edition) The Lebanese Review o f  Ai*ab and International Aihitration (in Aiabic) 32. 
Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration  para 21-14; K Sajko, 
'The New  York Arbitration Convention o f 1958 from the Yugoslav Point o f View: Selected Issues' in P 
Sarcevic (ed) Essays on International Commercial Arbitration (Graham & Trotman, London 1989) 
211; Dicey, M onis and Collins, Conflict o f  Laws 639.
See supra ch 3 para 5.2.
See, eg, French N ew Code o f Civil Procedure o f  1981, Art. 1502; Swiss Private International Law of  
1987 Alt. 190; The Swiss Private International Law o f 1987 Ait. 190. See also, Yugoslav law of  
conflict o f  laws o f 1982, Art.99 (which provides only that the existence o f the alleged iiTegularities are 
to be determined according to the law o f  the arbitration agreement), cited in Sajko, 'The N ew York 
Aibitration Convention o f 1958 from the Yugoslav Point o f  View: Selected Issues’ 211.
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to be refused if the composition of the tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, was not in 
accordance with the law of the seat of arbitration, French law for example allows 
enforcement to be refused on the basis that such matters were not in accordance with 
the law of the seat of arbitration only if the parties have actually specified that law to 
govern the arbitral proceedings.
Another criticism is that Art. V(l)(d) appears to be drafted deficiently since the 
authors of the NYC used the words “failing such agreement”, which might indicate 
that the agreement must be explicit and therefore an implied agreement might be not 
sufficient. There might appear to be force in this criticism, since Art. V(l)(a) uses the 
words “failing any indication thereon”. Nevertheless, this shortcoming appears to 
create no practical difficulty since Art. V(l)(d) has generally been intei'preted to cover 
both expressed and implied agi'eement.
A more significant criticism is that the criteria used in Art. V(l)(d) may exceptionally 
create real dilemmas for arbitrators. In cases where the agreement of parties would 
violate the mandatory requirements of the procedural law of the seat of arbitration, 
arbitrators may stmggle to render an internationally enforceable award. If they 
comply with the agreement of the parties and therefore violate the mandatory laws of 
the seat of the arbitration, the court of that country might set aside the award, and 
enforcement may be refused in other countries on the basis of Art. V(l)(e). On the 
other hand, if they apply the mandatory nonns of the seat in a manner that is contrary 
to the agreement of the parties, the enforcement of the award may be refused in other 
countries under of Art. V(l)(d). Prof van den Berg says this side-effect of Art. V 
(l)(d) is unfortunate but apparently inevitable.
French N ew Code o f Civil Procedure o f 1981, Art. 1502.
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration  989.
See, David, Arbitration in International Trade 399.Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, 
Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration  990.
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration  990.
See, eg, Rederi Aktiebolaget Sally v S.r.I Termarea (1979) IV YBCA 294 (Italy Court o f Appeal 
1968) pp 295-96. See also, David, Arbitration in International Trade 399; van den Berg, The New York 
Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation  pp 327-30; Gaillard and
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To avoid such dilemmas, it may be suggested that irregularities of composition and 
procedure resulting from failure to comply with the agreement of the parties should 
not lead to enforcement being refused as long as they were justified by the 
(mandatory) law of the seat of arbitration. This suggestion has been adopted by 
some courts and rejected by others. It may be concluded that although the above 
approach might, in some way, defeat the key puipose which Art. V(l)(d) was 
designed to achieve (i.e. that the law of the seat should apply only if there is no 
agreement by the parties on procedural issues), it can be considered in other way as 
reasonable (and arguably desirable) in the light of the general pro-enforcement bias of 
the NYC. Again, the above-mentioned dilemmas stem from the attempt of the NYC to 
take into account both the wishes of the parties’ in Art. V(l)(a) and (d) and the law of 
the seat in Art. (V)(e). Nonetheless, such dilemmas hardly ever arise in reality, since 
Art. V(l)(d) is itself rarely invoked in practice. Moreover, the fact that a court in the 
seat of arbitration sets aside an award does not inevitably mean that enforcement will 
be refused in other countries, as will be seen in the following Chapter.
7,8 Irregularities in the Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal
The arbitral proceedings cannot begin until the composition of the arbitral tribunal has 
been established and the arbitrator(s) chosen. Parties are, as a general rule, free to 
choose their own arbitrators, and therefore the composition of the arbitral tribunal 
should essentially be based on the agi'eement of the parties. If there is no such 
agreement, then the composition of the arbitral tribunal should be organized according 
to the law of the seat of arbitration. Enforcement of the award may be resisted under
Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration  para 1702; 
Davidson, Arbitration 349;Soo, 'International Enforcement o f  Arbitral Awards' at 256.
van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 330.
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration  para 1702; Davidson, Z/'/j/Vra/mn 394.
See, eg, Al Haddad Bros Enterprises Inc v M/S AGAP  210; M inistiy o f  Public Works o f  Tunisia v 
Société Bee Freres 688.
See, eg, Rederi Aktiebolaget Sally v S.r.I Termarea pp 295-96. See also for the view that the 
agreement o f  the parties should be granted absolute priority whether or not such agreement is in 
conflict with a mandatory provision o f the procedure law o f the arbitration seat, UN Doc. 
ACN.9/W G.II/W P.42p 92 fn 5; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on 
International Commercial Arbitration  para 1702.
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Art. V(l)(d) if  the composition of the arbitral tribunal deviates from the agi'eement of 
the parties or, failing which, the law of the seat.
However, an examination of case-law shows that Art. V(l)(d) is often unsuccessfully 
pleaded in resisting enforcement. For instance, in Imperial Ethiopian Government 
V Baruch-Foster Corp brought before a US court of appeal, the respondent sought to 
contest enforcement alleging that the arbitration agi'eement had been violated because 
the third arbitrator was a member of a commission drafting a civil code for the 
winning party (i.e. the Ethiopian government), whereas the arbitration agreement 
provided that that the third arbitrator should have no direct or indirect connection with 
either party. The court of appeal affinned the enforcement of the award, agreeing with 
the district court’ conclusion that the respondent had waived any objections to the 
composition of the arbitral tribunal before the enforcing court, since it had failed to 
raise such objections in due time during the arbitration. The US Court went on to 
conclude that the respondent had failed to show that the objection was asserted in 
good faith and for any reason other than delay.
Moreover, in a case that came before a Hong Kong high court, arbitrators were, 
according to the parties’ agreement, supposed to be selected from a list of arbitrators 
operating from Beijing while they were actually selected from a list of arbitrators 
operating fi'om Shenzhen. The losing party thus pleaded that the composition of the 
arbitral tribunal did not comply with the agreement of the parties, and thus requested 
the court to refuse enforcement. The Court stated that a giound for refusing 
enforcement had been made out, but nonetheless granted enforcement of the award on 
the ground that the parties had agi'eed to CIETAC arbitration and the arbitrators were 
on CIETAC list as well. Moreover, the court held that the losing party was estopped 
from raising this objection at the stage of enforcement since the losing party had not 
challenged the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal during the arbitration proceedings. 
For these reasons, the court exercised its residual discretion to enforce the award.
See, eg, Imperial Ethiopian Government v Baruch-Foster Corp ; Al H addad Bros Enterprises Inc v 
M/S AGAP  ; China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch v Gee Tai Holdings Co 
Ltd  ; Ministry o f  Public Works o f  Tunisia v Société Bee Freres pp 688, 690; X  v X  (2004) XXIX  
YBCA 673 (Gemiany Court o f  Appeal 20 Oct 1998) pp 675-76; Karaha Bodas Co LLC  v Perusahaan 
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Burnt Negara pp 296-98.
Imperial Ethiopian Government v Baruch-Foster Corp .
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notwithstanding the existence of the defence of Art. V(l)(d). In this regard, the 
Judge said:
If the doctrine of estoppel can apply to arguments over the written fonn of 
the arbitration agreement under Article 11(2), then I fail to see why it 
cannot also apply to the gi'ounds of opposition set out in Article V. It 
strikes me as quite unfair for a party to appreciate that there might be 
something wrong with the composition of the tribunal yet not make any 
formal submission whatsoever to the tribunal about its own jurisdiction, or 
to the arbitration commission which constituted the tribunal and then to 
proceed to fight the case on the merits and then 2 years after the award 
attempt to nullify the whole proceedings on the gi'ounds that the 
arbitrators were chosen from the wrong CIETAC list.
The Judge went on to state:
I think ... that even if a giound of opposition is proved, there is still a 
residual discretion left in the enforcing court to enforce nonetheless. This 
shows that the grounds of opposition are not to be inflexibly applied. The 
residual discretion enables the enforcing court to achieve a just result in 
all the circumstances ... .
Furthermore, in a case held by a German court of appeal, a German respondent 
contend that enforcement of a foreign award rendered in Russian against him should 
be not confirmed on the giound that the arbitrator appointed on his behalf was not 
able to speak any German as he had requested, and therefore the arbitral tribunal was 
incorrectly composed. The Court however rejected his objection, finding that, 
according to the applicable rules, each party had 30 days to appoint its arbitrator. 
After the respondent failed to do so within the time limit, the arbitral institution sent 
him a further request to appoint his arbitrator. In reply, he empowered the president 
of the Russian chamber of commerce to appoint an arbitrator on its behalf, requesting 
that the arbitrator should speak Gemian. However, according to the court, a mere lack 
of the requested language did not lead to an iiTeguIarity in the composition of the 
arbitral tribunal, since the applicable arbitration rules provided that the right of 
appointment was transfened to the chairman of the Russian Chamber of Commerce 
where the respondent failed to appoint its arbitrator within the prescribed period, so
China Nanhai Oil Joint Sendee Corporation Shenzhen Branch v Gee Tai Holdings Co Ltd pp 220-
27.
ibid 225.
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that the respondent lost any right to state binding requirements in respect o f the 
arbitrator appointed in his behalf. Fuithennore, the court considered the Gennan 
respondent to be estopped from raising an objection regarding the arbitrator, since 
according to the applicable law such an objection had to be raised within 15 days of 
appointment, and he did not raised his objection until six months had elapsed.
The foregoing cases illustrate that the courts have naiTowed the effectives of the 
defence of defective composition of the tribunal by applying the principle of good 
faith and waiver to estop the losing party from contesting the enforcement, because he 
did not do so during the arbitration proceedings.
Another example of an unsuccessful attempt to invoke this defence is a case in which 
the losing party contended that the composition of the tribunal was not in accordance 
with the agreement of the parties, as the award was made by a sole arbitrator, whereas 
the agreement of the parties provided for three arbitrators. The US Court of Appeal 
however held that this irregularity was not fatal to the validity of the award since Art. 
V(l)(d) of the NYC allows enforcement of an award that, although not complying 
with the parties' agi’eement, is in accordance with the law of the seat of arbitration, in 
this case England. Under English law a dispute may be decided by a sole arbitrator 
appointed by one party, if the other fails to appoint an arbitrator. Thereby, the eourt 
affirmed the enforcement of the award. The same conclusion was made by a 
Spanish Supreme Court and an Italian court of appeal.
Yet, the above contention of the US Court that Art. V(l)(d) o f NYC “allows 
recognition of an award which, although not in accord with the parties' agreement, 
complied with the laws of the country where the arbitration occurred” is not 
consistent with the letter of Art. V(l)(d) which provides that the procedural law of the 
arbitration seat will alternatively be taken into account only if the agreement the 
parties thereon is absent. It would be more accurate, to say that the US court here
X  V X  (Germany Court o f  Appeal 20 Oct 1998) pp 675-76. See also, ICrolI, 'Recognition and 
Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards in Gennany' pp 169-70.
A l H addad Bros Enterprises Inc n M/S AGAP  210.
X V  Naviera Y.S.A (1986) XI YBCA 527 (Spain Supreme Court 1982) 528.
Efxinos Shipping Co Ltd  v Rawi Shipping Lines Ltd  (1983) VIII YBCA 381 (Italy Court o f Appeal 
1980) 382.
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seemed to have followed the approach taken by some courts that enforcement should 
be granted even though the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the 
agi'eement of the parties, as long as it was in accordance with law of the country in 
which the arbitration was held. The aim of this approach appears to give priority to 
the more-favourable-provision to enforcement whether the rules agreed upon by the 
parties or the rules of the arbitration seat. Thus, the approach may find its support in 
the intended purpose of the NYC to facilitate the enforcement of foreign awards 
wherever possible according to its Art. VII(l).
Furthennore, in a case before a French court of appeal, the respondent challenged the 
enforcement of a foreign award on basis that the composition of arbitral tribunal was 
not in accordance with the agi’eement of the parties since the arbitral tribunal was 
composed of three arbitrators, where as the arbitration ageement provided for two 
arbitrators. The court however rejected the objection and ganted enforcement, since 
the tribunal could not operate with two arbitrators under the mandatory law of the 
seat. It explained,
The will of the parties expressed in the arbitration clause to submit their 
future disputes to arbitrators designated by them cannot hustrate the 
provision of Art. 263 of the CCCP (i.e. the Tunisian Code of Civil and 
Commercial Procedure) which prescribes an uneven number of the 
arbitrators. The two arbitrators did nothing more than make themselves 
subject to the above-mentioned mandatory law. Therefore this gound is 
rejected.
In this case, although the constitution o f the arbitral tribunal clearly deviated from the 
agreement of the parties, the French court did not see this deviation as sufficient 
gounds for reftising enforcement, as the composition of the tribunal was justified by 
the mandatory law of the arbitration seat. This approach may appear to be odd for a 
French court to take, as French law tends to regard the will of the parties as superior 
to any national law. Yet once again the French court here was probably applying 
those rules which most favoured enforcement under the more favourable right
M inistry o f  Public Wot‘ks o f  Tunisia v Société Bee Frer’es 688.
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provision of Art. VII of the NYC, which is in line with the pro-enforcement bias of 
the NYC.
In contrast, it is exceptional that the irregularity of the composition of the arbitral 
tribunal has actually led to a refusal of enforcement under Art. V(I)(d). Yet, an Italian 
court o f appeal refused enforcement of a foreign award on the ground that, contrary to 
the agreement of the parties which required three arbitrators to make the award, the 
award was however made by two arbitrators in London. Although making an award 
by two arbitrators was in accordance with the English Arbitration Act 1950, the 
Italian Court held that, according to Art. V(l)(d), English law would only apply if 
there were no ageem ent by the parties, but the parties had agreed on a tribunal of 
three arbitrators. In this decision, the Italian Court put much emphasis on the 
priority of party autonomy over the laws of the arbitration seat. This is in line with the 
emphasis of the provision, but of course the result may be contrasted with the cases 
mentioned above where enforcement has been ganted, despite the procedure adopted 
being contrary to the agreement of the parties, since it conformed to the law of the 
seat.
Again in Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A v Encyclopaedia Britannica a US district 
court denied the plaintiffs petition to enforce a foreigi award for several reasons, one 
of which was that the failure of the two arbitrators to attempt to ag'ce on a third 
arbitrator was not in accordance with the ageement of the parties, and thereby Art. 
V(l)(d) was properly invoked. This conclusion was then affirmed by a US court of 
appeals.
7.9 Irregularities in Arbitral Procedure
As has already been seen, the ageem ent of the parties regarding the arbitral procedure 
is subject to the most fundamental requirements of due process, the first principle to
ibid 685.
Rederi Aktiebolaget Sally v S. r. 1 Termarea pp 295-96.
Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A v Encyclopaedia Britannica 2003 WL 22881820 (US District Court 
o fS D N Y 2 0 0 3 )p p  9-11.
Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A v Encyclopaedia Britannica 403 F3d 85 (US Court o f Appeals 2nd 
Cir 2005).
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In practice, however, this defence is rarely successfully invoked before the courts.
See, eg, Hainan Machinery Impori and Expot't Corp v Donald & McArthy Pte ltd  (19970 XXII 
YBCA771 (Singapore High Court 1994) pp 774-77; Food Services o f  Aamerica Inc v Pan pacific 
Specialties Ltd  (2004) XXIX YBCA 581 (Canada Supreme Court 1997) pp 586-89; Irrdustrial Risk 
Insw'ers v M .A.N Gutehoffrrungshutte GmbH  141 F3d 1434 (US Court o f  Appeals 11th Cir 1998) pp 
1442-43; Trxmsocean Shipping Agency P Lit v Black Sea Shipping (1998) XXIII YBCA 713 (India 
Court o f  Appeal 1998) pp 716-18; Manufacturier (Slovenia) v Exclusive Distributor (Get'many) pp 
693-95; Minrnetals Gerimany GmbH v Ferco Steel Ltd  pp 745-46.
German Buyer v English Seller (Germany Court o f  Appeal 27 Jul 1978) 267.
Shipowner v Time Charierer (2000) XXV YBCA 714 (Germany Court o f Appeal 30 Jul 1998) 716. 
'^Ubid.
Food Services o f  Aamerica M e v Pan pacific Specialties Ltd  pp 586-89.
be followed by the arbitrators in conducting the arbitration. If the parties do not reach 
agreement on procedural rules, the procedure then will be governed by the law of the 
seat of arbitration. Accordingly, if the arbitrators fail to comply with the parties’ 
agreement, or failing such ageement, the law of the seat in relation to the arbitral 
procedure, enforcement of their award may be refused in conformity with Art.V(l)(d).
For example, an unsuccessful attempt was made by a losing party to persuade a 
Gennan court of appeal to refuse enforcement of a foreigi award made in London, on 
the basis that the arbitrators did not list the reasons for the decision in the award. The 
court however dismissed this argument, holding that such absence of reasons did not 
constitute a procedural iiTegularity under Art. V(l)(d) since the applicable law (i.e.
English law) did not require it. The same approach was taken more recently by that &
court, the court holding that failing to provide reasons in the award is not a procedural |
inegularity. The same court further held that lack of an oral hearing did not violate '
Art. V(I)(d) since the ageed procedural rules in that case allowed an award to be 
rendered without an oral hearing.
I:Similarly, in a case where the losing party contended that the arbitral procedure was 
not in accordance with the International Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association ageed upon by the parties, because the arbitrators did not give reasons in 
their award, the Canadian Supreme Court held that the failure to give reasons was not 
part of the arbitral procedure and therefore not a gound for refusing enforcement.
More importantly, the Court further stated that even if the failure was a procedural 
mishap, it was not sufficiently serious to justify refusing enforcement.
j i
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;
In the above cases, the courts adopted the view that the failure of international 
arbitrators to give reasons is not sufficiently serious in and of itself to constitute a 
gound upon which the enforcing court may reflise enforcement of the foreign award.
ibid .
See, eg, M ondial Grain Distributors Com Inc v Atlantica Canarias SA (1991) XVI YBCA 599 
(Spain Supreme Court 1984) 601; China Agribusiness Development Corp v Balli Trading 80; Karaha 
Bodas Co LLC v Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara pp 1281-82; China 
Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch v Gee Tai Holdings Co L td  pp 220-27; X  v X  
(Germany Court o f  Appeal 20 Oct 1998) pp 675-76.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v Hammermills Inc 1992 WL 122712 (US District Court D.C
1992).
The Canadian Supreme Court also held that the losing party had waived the right to 
raise this procedural objection at the stage of enforcement, because it had proceeded 
with arbitration without promptly stating an objection in writing thereto as provided 
for in the ageed Arbitration Rules. This is just one of a number of cases where |
-rcourts have rejected procedural objections at the stage of enforcement because the 
party seeking to resist enforcement had, for no sufficient reason, failed to raise such 
objections before the arbitral tribunal. "
Additionally, In Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v Hammermills Inc a party 
argued that enforcement of the award should be refused under Art. V(l)(d) because 
the applicable procedural rules (the ICC Rules) had been violated by the arbitrator by 
inserting into the award the amount o f the legal costs to be assessed against it after the 
draft award had been approved by the ICC Court. It was argued that the parties having 
agreed that all under the contract would be settled through arbitration according to the 
ICC Rules, consequently any violation of ICC Rules would necessarily constitute a 
violation of the ag'eement of the parties under Art. V(l)(d). A US district court 
rejected this argument, holding that:
The Court does not believe that section 1(d) o f Article V was intended, as 
...(the respondent) argues, to pennit reviewing courts to police every 
procedural ruling made by the Arbitrator and to set aside the award if any 
violation of ICC procedures is found. Such an interpretation would 
directly conflict with the "pro-enforcement" bias of the Convention and its 
intention to remove obstacles to confmnation of arbitral awards. A major 
purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to avoid delay and unnecessary 
expense to the parties ..., and the delay that would result from reviewing
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procedural rulings of the arbitrators would be substantial) (citation 
omitted).
The court went on to conclude that:
The Court believes that a more appropriate standard of review would be to 
set aside an award based on a procedural violation only if such violation 
worked substantial prejudice to the complaining party. Whatever the 
scope of section 1(d), however, the Court concludes that it is not 
applicable here because ...(the respondent) has not met its burden of 
establishing that a violation of ICC procedure occurred.
Nevertheless, there is a number of cases in which a procedural inegularity has led to 
enforcement of a foreign award being refused under Art.V (l)(d). Thus a Swiss court 
of appeal refrised to g a n t enforcement o f foreign award on the basis that the arbitral 
procedure followed by the tribunal violated the procedure ageed upon by the parties. 
This involved a contract of sale containing an arbitration clause providing for 
arbitration according to the arbitration mles of the Hamburg Commodity Association. 
The buyer initiated proceedings in a two-stage arbitration (the first regarding the 
quality of the goods, the second regarding damages). The seller refused to participate, 
as he wished to have the dispute settled in a one-phase arbitration. An award was 
made in favour of the buyer who then sought enforcement in Switzerland. However, a 
Swiss court of appeal affinned the decision of a court of first instance in refusing to 
enforce the award on the gound that the procedure followed by the tribunal was not 
in accordance with the ag ’eement of the parties, because the arbitration mles of the 
Hamburg Commodity Association did not provide for a two-phase arbitration. The 
Swiss Court appeared to lay g ea t emphasis on the supremacy of party’ autonomy.
Another example was a Dutch court of first instance court that refused to order 
enforcement of a Russian award on the basis that, in an arbitration held under the 
Rules of the International Commercial Arbitration Court (ICAC) in Moscow, the 
arbitral tribunal had eiTed in holding that a challenge request had been filed after the 
expiry of the time limit provided for in those Rules. The court therefore concluded
ibid 5.
”  ibid .
Firm in Hamburg (buer) v Corpoation A. G in Basel (seller) (1976) I YBCA 200 (Switzerland Court 
o f Appeal 1968).
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that the arbitral proceedings were not in accordance with those Rules and thus the 
ageem ent of the parties. Yet, it has to be mentioned that the court also considered 
this inegularity to constitute a violation of due process as recogiised in the 
Netherlands as the arbitral tribunal had denied the respondent a valid right to 
challenge.
Furthermore, a Turkish court of Appeal refused enforcement of a foreign award under 
Art. V(l)(d), finding that the arbitral tribunal had violated the arbitration ageem ent in 
deciding that the parties, by stating in the arbitration agreement that Turkish law 
would apply, had ageed only on the substantive law to be applied in the dispute, 
leaving the arbitral tribunal free to apply Swiss law to the arbitral procedure. The 
Turkish court intei’preted the agreement as applying Turkish law to both substance 
and procedure.
It may be concluded that the cases law mentioned above, despite the few cases in 
which the award was refused enforcement, show that national courts have generally 
been reluctant to refuse enforcement under Art. V(l)(d), a line which is consistent 
with the general principle of interpreting Art. V naiTOwly whenever possible, in 
favour of enforcement. This has been achieved in different ways. Some courts, for 
example, declined to refuse enforcement because the procedural irregularities were 
not sufficiently serious. What constitutes a serious irregularity is a matter for the 
discretion of the enforcing court. Some courts rejected the objections because no 
adequate proof was supplied. Other courts exercised their residual discretion to g an t 
enforcement regardless of the existence of inegularities, especially when the losing 
party did not raise his objections previously during the arbitral proceedings (i.e., the 
principle of waiver). If there is a conflict between the ag’eement of the parties and the 
(mandatory) law of the arbitration seat, some courts relied upon the mles which are 
more favourable to enforcement. More importantly, the above attitude of the courts 
reflects their wish to achieve a proper balance between party autonomy, and the wide 
power that should be given to arbitrators to achieve efficiency in conducting the 
arbitral proceedings.
Goldtron Limited  v M edia M ost B. V (2003) XXVIII YBCA 814 (Netherlands Court o f  First Instance 
2002) pp 818-19.
Osuuskunta METEX Andelslag V.S v Turkiye Electrik Kurumu Genel Mudurlugu General 
D irectorate  pp 8 1 1 -12.
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7.10 The Position in Saudi Arabia
7.10.1 General
It may be thought important at the outset to make some points regarding the 
requirements for the composition of arbitral tribunals under Saudi law and their scope 
of application. This is particular importance as several commentators (including Saudi 
commentators) have raised the question whether the Saudi enforcing courts would 
regard the restrictions imposed by Saudi arbitration laws on the choice of arbitrators 
as also applicable in the context of a foreign arbitral award sought to be enforced in 
SA under the NYC. In particular, some commentators doubted whether a foreign 
award made by a non-Muslim or by a woman would be deemed enforceable by the 
Saudi Courts.
With regard to the requirement of Islam, the IRSAL of 1985 Art. 3 stipulates, among 
several requirements, that “ The arbitrator shall be a Saudi national or Muslim 
expatriate”. This provision clearly lays down that an arbitrator must be Muslim. 
Yet there is no explicit provision under the SAL of 1983 nor its Implementation of 
1985 preventing women from acting as arbitrators, although, according to the 
majority of Shari ’ah schools, including the Hanbali School followed in SA, a female 
may not act as an arbitrator.
The above requirements are plainly applicable to domestic arbitration held in SA. But 
this is not the question here. Rather, the question should be addressed is whether these 
requirements are also applicable to international arbitration or, in other words, to a 
foreigi award sought to be enforced in SA under the NYC? The above requirements 
can simply be deemed to be limited to domestic arbitration held in SA for several 
reasons. First, the last part of Art. 3 of the IRSAL of 1985 lays down that “In the case
M Alhoshan 'The Symposium o f  European-Arabian Arbitration' cited in El-Ahdab, Arbitration in 
Arab Countries v 2 p 242; El-Ahdab, 'Saudi A abia  Accedes to the New York Convention' p 9E
IRSAL o f 1985, A-t.3.
See, S Al-Hasen, The Shari'ah Rules o f  Arbitration (Al-Narjes, Riyadh 1996 'in A abic') 49; 
Gattorah, Arbitration in the Light o f  the Islamic Shari'ah pp 123-25; M Al-Kalidy, 'The Capacity of 
Abitrator in Islamic Jurisdiction ' (Symposium o f Abitration in Islamic Shariah Dubi 2001 'in 
A abic') pp 7, 28; S Jameel, 'Arbitration In Islamic Shari'ah and its Important o f Settling Disputes ' 
(Symposium of Abitration in Islamic Shariah Dubi 2001 'in Arabic’) pp 17- 18; Aag Beeg, 'Abitration 
in Islamic Shari'ah and Islamic Fiqh ' pp 14-15.
7.10.2 Irregularities in the Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal
In relation to the defence that the arbitral tribunal is irregularly composed, in one case 
a Saudi party having requested a Saudi court to refuse enforcement of the award on 
the ground that the arbitral tribunal was not properly constituted since one of the three 
arbitrators was not a Muslim, the court decided to enforce the award, applying a 
foreign law which did not demand that all arbitrators should be Muslim. This 
indicates that the Saudi courts would distinguish between national and international 
arbitration in dealing with the enforcement of arbitral awards, and that the lack of 
Muslim arbitrators would certainly not prevent enforcement of a foreign award.
7.10.3 Irregularities in the Arbitral Procedure
IRSAL of 1985, A t.3 .
See, Al-Ajlan, Compilation ofjudicia l principles pp 61-62; the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 
155/T/4 dated 1415 H (1994); the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 43/T/4 dated 1416 H (1995); 
the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 187/T/4 dated 1413 H (1992); the 4th Review Committee, 
decision No. 156/T/4 dated 1413 H (1992).
See, eg, the 2nd Review Committee, deeision No. lO/T/2 dated 1419 H (1998); the 9th 
Administrative Panel, decision No. 32/D/A/9 dated 1918 H (1997),
See, the 9th Administrative Panel, decision No. 32/D/A/9 dated 1918 H (1997).
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of more than one arbitrator, the umpire shall have a knowledge of Shari’ah rules,
commercial regulations, customs and traditions applicable in Saudi Arabia” . This
part indieates that this provision is concerned with domestic arbitration in SA, as
arbitrations held outside SA are usually covered by non-Saudi laws. So, in this case,
the arbitrator usually need not be knowledgeable about Shari’ah rules, commercial
regulations, customs and traditions applicable in Saudi Arabia and, so need not be
Muslim either. Second, the Saudi courts adopt the principle that if there is an
agreement between a Saudi party and a foreign party to resort to arbitration rules /
outside SA under foreign laws, the Saudi party is bound by that arbitration and its
rules as well as its outcome. It goes without saying that such arbitrations may be
.run by arbitrators some of whom are non-Muslim or women. Third, the Saudi
enforcing courts have ganted enforcement of several fb re ig  awards rendered entirely |
or partly by non-Muslim arbitrators.
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As regards the defence that the arbitral procedure has been of iiTegularly conducted, 
in one case a Saudi company alleged that a foreigi award had been rendered under 
an arbitral procedure that contravened Saudi procedural law and that the arbitration 
had been held in Jordan, although the arbitral agreement provided for arbitration in 
Paris. The Court held that the ageem ent between the parties indicated clearly that 
any disputes would be settled by ICC Arbitration in Paris, which meant that the 
arbitral procedure was not subject to Saudi procedural law of the competent courts. 
Moreover, as the ICC had itself decided to refer the dispute to its arbitrator in Jordan 
confiiTning his award thereafter, the award could be considered to be an ICC award 
made under its rules. The court therefore enforced the award, which decision was 
confinued by the Saudi Court of Appeal.
These two cases illustrate that the Saudi courts will not regard every violation of the 
applicable procedure as sufficient gound to decline enforcement, an approach 
entirely in conformity with intention of the NYC.
7.10.4 The Applicable Law
As regards the question of the applicable law, the above considerations show 
undoubtedly that the Saudi courts would initially give weight to the parties’ 
agreement with regard to the composition of the arbitral tribunal and the arbitral 
procedure. In the absence of such ageement, there appears to be no clear-cut answer. 
Nonetheless, in one case where it was not clear whether or not there was an ageement 
regarding the arbitral procedure, the Saudi court applied Egyptian procedural law, 
as Egypt was the seat of the arbitration, a conclusion which was affinned by the 
Saudi court of appeal. This may give some indication that the Saudi courts are 
willing to respect the law o f the arbitration seat, if the parties fail to ag ee  upon the 
law governing the arbitral procedure. Additionally, one may suggest that from a
the 25th Subsidiary Panel, decision No. 1 l/D/F/25 dated 1417 FI (1996), 
ibid pp 3-4, 6, 8.
the 2nd Review Committee, decision No. 208/T/2 dated 1418 H (1997). 
the 18th Subsidiaiy Panel, decision No. 8/D/F/18 dated 1424 FI (2003). 
ibid.
the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 36/T/4 dated 1425 H (2004).
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purely theoretically legal point of view the Saudi courts should apply the law of the 
arbitration seat in line with the provisions of Art. V(l)(d), since the Saudi Arabia has 
adhered to the NYC.
7.11 Conclusions
Art. V(l)(d) provides that a foreign arbitral award is liable to be refused enforcement 
if  the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure did not confonn 
with parties agi'eement , or, failing such agreement, with the law of the arbitration 
place. Art. V(l)(d) has rarely been invoked in comparison with the other giounds of 
Art. V. This may be because both Art. V(l)(b) and Art. V(l)(d) are related to alleged 
procedural breaches. Yet, Art. V(l)(b) deals particularly with violation of basic 
standards of due process (e.g. fair hearing), whereas, Art. V(l)(d) focuses on non- 
compliance with the other aspects of arbitral procedure (not regarded as due process).
The provisions of Art. V(l)(d) support the principle of party autonomy in reducing the 
influence of the law of the seat of arbitration by giving priority to the agi'eement of the 
parties in governing the composition o f the arbitral tribunal and the arbitral procedure. 
Only if there is no agi'eement thereon will these issues be governed by the law of the 
seat of arbitration. Yet, the parties’ agreement has generally been held to be not 
absolute in these matters, but rather subject to those fundamental rules of the 
procedural law which reflect the essential requirements of due process of the state 
where enforcement is sought in terms of resisting enforcement under Art. V(l)(b) and 
Art. V(2)(b).
The priority given to the agreement o f the parties under Art. V(l)(d) might lead to 
dilemma where the agi'eement of the parties is contrary to the mandatory law of the 
seat of arbitration. In this case, if the arbitrator complies with the agreement of the 
parties, regardless of the mandatory rules of the seat, the award might be set aside by 
a court of the country where the arbitration was held, and therefore may lead to 
enforcement being refused under Art. V(l)(e). But, the arbitrator takes the opposite, 
enforcement may be refused under Art. V(l)(d).
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Art. V (l)(d) has in practice proved to constitute no significant threat to enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards in SA and other countries. Like the other grounds for 
refusing enforcement of an award, Art. V(l)(d) has led to very few refusals of 
enforcement, mainly because the courts have generally construed this defense 
narrowly. This naiTow inteipretation can be seen clearly when courts hold that a 
violation of the parties agreement or the law of the seat of arbitration does not 
necessarily constitute a gi'ound for refusing enforcement unless the violation is 
serious. It has also frequently been held that a party is estopped form raising an 
objection to enforcement if did not raise this objection earlier during the arbitration.
In SA, the specific conditions imposed by the Saudi arbitration laws upon arbitrators 
(e.g. to be Muslim) have proven to be not applicable to international arbitration and 
would not prevent enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. The Saudi courts, like 
most courts of contracting States, construe irregularity in arbitral procedure or 
composition of the tribunal narrowly in favour of enforcement. So far all attempts in 
which the Saudi Courts have been called upon to reflise enforcement of foreign award 
on these grounds have proved unsuccessful.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Award not Binding or Set Aside or Suspended
8.1 Introduction
Art. V(l)(e) of the NYC provides the fifth ground for refusal of enforcement of 
foreign awards. This ground contains three sub-grounds. First, the award has not yet 
become binding. Second, the award has been annulled in its country of origin. Third, 
the award has been suspended in its country of origin. In this regard, Art. V(l)(e) 
establishes that the foreign award may be refused enforcement if the party against 
whom the award is invoked proves that:
The award has not yet become binding, on the parties, or has been set 
aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or 
under the law of which, that award was made. ’
This chapter thus will discuses the following related issues: first, the natural binding 
force of the ward and its effects on enforcement. Secondly, whether the setting aside 
of the award in the seat of arbitration should always block enforcement in other 
countries under the NYC. Thirdly, the effect of suspension of the award in the seat of 
arbitration on its enforcement under the NYC. Finally, the position in Saudi Arabia 
thereon will be examined.
8.2 Not binding
8.2.1 Eliminating Double-Exequatur
Art. V(l)(e) lays down that enforcement of a foreign award can be declined if the 
party resisting enforcement asserts and proves that the award has not become binding. 
Under the Geneva Convention of 1927, the party seeking enforcement of the foreign 
award bears the burden of proving that the award has become “final” in the country
NYC o f 1958, Ai't.V(l)(e).
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where the award was made, in order that it might be enforceable in other countries.  ^
This requirement has been taken to mean that the party seeking enforcement would 
have first to seek some sort of leave for execution of the award from the court of the 
country in which the award was rendered so as to show that the award was final. This 
requirement therefore had led in practice to the problem of so-called “double­
exequatur” because of the fact that the party seeking enforcement would also have to 
seek leave to execute the award from the court of the country where enforcement is 
sought. However, according to the legislative history of the NYC, a suggestion of 
introducing a requirement that an award under the NYC should be final was rejected 
mainly on two gi'ounds;
First of all, it would be normally impossible for the party seeking 
enforcement to submit a negative proof that the enforcement of the award 
has not been suspended or that no appeal has been lodged against the 
award, and it seemed therefore illogical to impose the burden of the such a 
proof on the person seeking enforcement. ... (Secondly), the enforcement 
authorities might inteipret it as requiring a prior exequatur or other form 
of ratification of the award by the competent judicial authorities of the 
country where arbitration took place, and thus make it necessary to 
duplicate enforcement action both in the countiy where the award was 
made and in the country where the award is to be relied upon. ^
In attempting to eliminate the problem of “double exequatur”, which has generally 
been perceived as cumbersome and ineffective, the drafters of the NYC employed the 
term “binding” rather than the tenu “final”. Consequently, it has been almost 
unanimously accepted by the courts  ^ and the commentators  ^ that the award does not
 ^Geneva Convention o f 1927, Ait.4(2).
 ^UN E/CONF.26/2para 15,
" See, UN Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.17p 3
 ^ See, eg, Animalfeeds Inti Corp v SAA Becker & Cie (1977) II YBCA 244 (France Court 1970); 
Bobbie Brooks Ins v Lanificio Walter B an d SAS 291; Lanificio Walter B an d  S.a.S v Bobbie Broolcs 
Inc pp 235-36; the English High Court in Rosseel N .V  v Oriental Commercial & Shipping Co Ltd 
[1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep 625 (UK QBD Com Ct 1990) 628; Gaetano Butera v Pietro & Romano Pagnan 
299; Italian Party v Swiss Company pp 827-28; A SA v B Co Ltd & C SA (2004) XXIX YBCA 834 
(Switzerland Supreme Court 2003 ) pp 838-39.
® See, in general, Gaja, International Commercial Arbitration para I.C.4; van den Berg, The New York 
Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation pp 337-38; van den Berg, 
'Consolidated Coimnentary' (2003)' at 660; Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International 
Commercial Arbitration  pp 454, 467; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on 
International Commercial Arbitration  para 1677; Bom , International Commercial Arbitration  737; 
Dicey, Momis and Collins, Conflict o f  Laws para 16-117; Merkm, Arbitration law  para 19.56; Bishop
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have to be declared enforceable by the court of the seat of arbitration in order to be 
enforceable under the NYC in other country. Indeed, abolishing the requirement of 
“double exequatur” contained in the Geneva Convention of 1927 is one of the main 
achievements made by the NYC.
8,2.2 When the Award Become Binding
Unlike the Geneva Convention of 1927, which determines when an award becomes 
“final”,  ^ the NYC does not define the word “binding”. This silence leaves the 
meaning of that term in a position of ambiguity. Thus, two main views have emerged 
in relation to the question when does an award become “binding” under Art. V(l)(e);
First View: Reference to the Law of the Country of Origin
The first view, which is adopted by many courts  ^ and a number of authors,  ^ is that 
the binding character of an award should be detennined by the law of the country of 
its origin. So, an award should only be regarded as being binding if it had become so 
under the law of the seat of arbitration. In this regard, an Italian court of appeal held 
that the question when an award made in England became binding should be 
determined under English law rather than Italian law, so that court leave to enforce 
the award was not required in order to make the award binding. In support of this 
view, it was argued that since Art. V(l)(e) also provides that the award must not have 
“been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or
and Martin, 'Enforcement o f Foreign Aibitral Awards' 25; Dicey, M om s and Collins, Conflict o f  Laws 
para 16-117.
’ See, Geneva Convention o f 1927, Ait. 1 (d),
 ^ See, eg. Carters Ltd  v Francesco Ferraro 277; Animalfeeds Inti Corp v SAA Becker & Cie (France 
Court 1970); Seller (Denmark) v Buyer (Germany) (Germany Court o f  A ppeal 16 D ec 1992) 541; 
Oil & National Gas Commission v the Western Comp o f  North America (1988) X lll YBCA 473 (India 
Supreme Court 1987 ) pp 485-87,
 ^ In favour o f this view, see, Gaja, International Commercial Arbitration para 1.C.4 and citations in fn 
74; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbiti^ation 
paras 1681-1682, 1684 and citations in fn 59. See also in general, van den Berg, The New York 
Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 341; R N azzini, 'The Law 
Applicable to the Arbitral Award'(2002) 5 (6) Intl Arb L R 179 at 185; Merkin, Arbitration law  para 
19-56.
See, Carters Ltd v Francesco Ferraro 277.
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under the law o f  which, that award was made” (emphasis added), it would be 
paradoxical if the same law was not to be also applicable to determine the issue of 
whether an award becomes binding given its relationship to the issue of setting aside 
or suspending the award. In other words, the arbitral tribunal will have in mind that 
the award must be valid and binding under the law of the seat, so as to avoid either 
party taking proceedings to set it aside. Additionally, it was thought unreasonable to 
refuse enforcement of an award because it was not considered to be binding under the 
law of the country where enforcement is sought (and enforcement might of course be 
sought in more than one country), although the same award had previously been 
considered binding and therefore enforceable under the law of the arbitration seat. '  ^
Furthermore, no legal instrument can be regarded as binding outwith a particular legal 
system. The NYC itself does not explain when an award becomes binding. Thus the 
meaning o f ‘binding’ must derive from the legal system of the seat of arbitration,
Second View: Autonomous Determination under the NYC
The second view, which appears to have recently gained increasing approval of many 
courts and the majority of commentators, is that the term of “binding award” 
should be given an autonomous meaning for the pui*pose of the Art. V(l)(e), 
independent of the applicable law in the country of origin of that award. It is 
reasonably clear that the text of Art. V(l)(e) does not require that the binding force of
" See, Gaja, International Commercial Arbitration para I.C.4.
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration  para 1682.
See, eg. Carters Ltd v Francesco Ferraro (Italy Court o f Appeal) 277; Inter-Arab Investment 
Guarantee Corp v Banque Arabe Intl d'investissements (1999) XXIV YBCA 603 (Belgium Supreme 
Court 1998) pp 610-11; AB Gotaverken v General National Maritime Transport Co (1981) VI YBCA  
237 (Sweden Supreme Court 1979) 240; Film Distributor v Film Producer (2004)XXIX YBCA 754 
(Gennany High Court o f Appeal 2002) 758; SNOC v Keen Lloyd Resources L td  (2004) XXIX YBCA  
776 (Hong Kong High Court 2001) pp 111- 83; Rosseel N.V v Oriental Commercial & Shipping Co 
Ltd  (UK QBD Com Ct 1990) 628.
See, eg, P Sanders, ’A Twenty Years Review of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
o f Foreign Arbitral Awards'(1979) 13 Intl Lawy 269 at 275; van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' 
(2003)' 660; van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a UnifoiTn 
Judicial Interpretation pp 341-45; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on 
International Commercial Arbitration  para 1679; David, Arbitration in International Trade 400; Lew, 
Mistelis and Ki'èoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration para 26-101; Di Pietro and 
Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 166; 
Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  468; Davidson, 
Arbitration 395; Nazzini, 'The Law Applicable to the Arbitral Award'186.
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the award be detennined by the law of the country of origin. In particular, the first 
part of Art. V(l)(e) does not use the expression “the country in which, or under the 
law of which, that award was made” in relation to the issue of a binding award, 
whereas the second part of that provision uses that expression in relation to the issue 
of the setting aside or suspension of the award. This could indicate, as a logical 
consequence, that whether or not the award has become binding is a question to be 
decided independently from the law of the seat o f the arbitration. Otheiwise, it would 
amount to bringing back a fomi of double exequatur, a problem which the drafters of 
the NYC clearly intended to avoid by using the term “binding” instead of “final”.
In addition, arguments have been advanced against the view that the question of 
whether the award has become binding is to be detennined by the law of the seat of 
the arbitration. Accordingly, it is submitted that:
The problem with this inteipretation is (firstly) that it leads to uneven 
application of the New York Convention. If every State is free to adopt its 
own criteria for recognising the binding nature of the award between the 
parties, the result will be that the New York Convention no longer binds 
Contracting States. Indeed, each State, by specifying its own criteria for a 
binding award, could suiTcptitiously evade the conditions of maximum 
rigour laid down by the New York Convention for the recognition of the 
award. In this way, each State, while respecting the letter of the 
Convention, would be at liberty to violate its spirit, by imposing 
unreasonably strict criteria for valid awards. (Secondly) This theory only 
considers the first step of the analysis, in that it recognises that the arbitral 
award can be made binding by all the domestic legal systems. However, it 
fails to take the further step to identify the conflict rule which is 
applicable to the award at the enforcement stage under the New York 
Convention. (Thirdly) The coiTect methodological approach is to derive a 
conflict mle from within the Convention itself to determine whether or not 
the award should be considered binding. The Convention does not literally 
state that the binding force o f the award is a matter for the law of the 
country of origin to decide. An effort should be made to avoid implicit 
refeiTal to domestic law, if it is not absolutely necessary. In practice, the 
arbitral award is often seen as the fruit o f party autonomy and, therefore,
P Sanders, 'A Twenty Years Review o f the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement o f  
Foreign Arbitral Awards'(1979) 13 International Lawyer 269275; 342; Nazzini, 'The Law Applicable to 
the Arbitral Award'fn 50.
See, Sanders, 'A Twenty Years Review o f the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards' pp275-76; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration  
awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 166.
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immediately binding between the parties, whatever national law might 
apply (footnotes omitted).
For these reasons the better view seems to be that the “binding” character of the word 
should be have an autonomous meaning under the NYC. Yet, this is not the end of the 
story since there are divergent views as to what an autonomous determination of the 
term “binding” entails.
8.2.3 Approaches to the Autonomous Determination of Binding Award
Proponents of the autonomous detennination theory have advanced a variety of views 
as regards the question of the moment at which the award can be deemed binding 
under the NYC. The main approaches are outlined below.
First, an odd inteipretation is that the tenn “binding award” is simply identical in 
meaning to the word “final”, so that the NYC reiterates the requirements of the 
Geneva Convention of 1927 in a more condensed and abstract form. In this regard, 
it was said that “an award cannot become binding until all means of recourse, both 
ordinary and extraordinary, have been exhausted and all fomialities completed”. 
Yet, since the intended purpose of the drafters of the NYC was undoubtedly to avoid 
the problem of “double exequatur” by using the word “binding” rather than “final”, 
this interpretation was soon rejected.
Secondly, it was submitted that a foreign award would always be considered as 
binding once it is rendered, even though the award is still open to means of recourse 
in the place in which the arbitration took place. Additionally, it has even held that
Nazzini, 'The Law Applicable to the Aibitral Award' pp 186-87.
In favour o f this approach, See, Kestler Fames, the Guatemalan delegate, UN Doc. 
E/CONF.26/SR.17 pp 12, 14; Koral, the Turkish delegate, UN Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.17 pp 4-5,13; 
Kroll, 'Recognition and Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards in Gennany' at 171; Berthold 
Goldman Arbitrage in Encyclopédie Dalloz-Droit International (1968) 288, cited in Gaillard and 
Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration  para 1679.
Kestler Fames, the Guatemalan delegate, UN Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.17p 14
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration  para 1679,
See, Fertilizer Corp o f  India v IDI Management Inc 957-958; Rosseel N .V v Oriental Commercial 
& Shipping Co Ltd  628; Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corp v Banque Arabe Intl 
d'investissements pp 610-1 i; WM Tupman, 'Staying Enforcement o f  Arbitral Awards under the New
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an award is, in principle, binding once it is rendered, even if it is then set aside or 
suspended.
Thirdly, it has been suggested by a few courts and several authors that a foreign award 
can be regarded as binding as far as it is not subject to a review by a second arbitral 
tribunal. This means that the award becomes binding once it is no longer open to 
an appeal to a second arbitral body, even if the possibility of appeal to a competent 
court still exists.
Fourthly, the view most favoured by courts and the majority of authors is that a 
foreign award is binding for the puiposes of Art. V(l)(e) as soon as there is no further 
possibility of an appeal on the merits (ordinary recourse) to a second arbitration 
tribunal or a court. This approach is based upon the distinction between ordinary and 
extraordinary recourses. Ordinary means of recourse connotes any genuine appeal on
the merits to a second arbitral tribunal or a court. The continuing availability of such q
York Convention '(1987) 3 (3) Ai'b Intl 209 at 211-212. See, in general, Bom, International 
Commercial Arbitration pp 740-41.
See, Hiscox v Outhwaite [1991] 2 WLR 1321 (UK CA); Chromalloy Aeroservices Inc v Arab 
republic o f  Egypt ; Pabalk Ticaret Ltd Sirketi v Norsolor SA (1986) XI YBCA 484 (France Supreme 
Court 1984) pp 489-90; Polish Ocean Line v Jolasry (1994) XIX YBCA 662 (France Supreme Court
1993) 663; Hilmarton L td  v Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation OTV pp 656-57; Egypt v 
Chromalloy Aeroservices Inc (1997) XXII YBCA 691 (France Court o f Appeal 1997) pp 692-93;
Kajo-Erzeugnisse Essenzen GmbH  v DO Zdravilisce Radenska (1995) XX YBCA 1051 (Ausria 
Supreme Court 1993) pp 1055-56; Kajo-Erzeugnisse Essenzen GmbH v DO Zdravilisce Radenska 
(1999) XXIV YBCA 919 (Austria Supreme Court 1998)) pp 924-25. See, also in general, Bom ,
International Commercial Arbitration  741.
See, Fertilizer Corp o f  India v IDI Management Inc ( US District Court ) pp 957-58; David,
Arbitration in International Trade 40; Dicey, Morris and Collins, Conflict o f  Laws para 16-117. Bishop 
and Martin, 'Enforcement o f Foreign Aibitral Awards' 25; Soo, 'International Enforcement o f Arbitral 
Awards' at 256. See, also in general, Gaja, International Commercial Arbitration  fn 74; Bom,
International Commercial Arbitration  741; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard. Goldman 
on International Commercial Arbitration para 1676.
See, eg, French Seller v Gennan (F.R) Buyer (1977) II YBCA 234 (Germany Court 8 Jim 1967)' AB 
Gotaverken v General National Maritime Transport Co (1981) VI YBCA 237 (Sweden Supreme Court 
1979) Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corp v Banque Arabe Intl d'investissements (Belgian 
Supreme Court) 611; SPP Ltd v Egypt pp 489-90; Film Distiibutor v Film Producer (the German 
High Court o f Appeal) 758; SNOC v Keen Lloyd Resources Ltd (the Hong Kong High Court) pp 777- 
83; A SA v B Co Ltd & C SA (the Swiss Supreme Court) pp 838- 39.
In favour o f this approach, see, eg, Matteuci, the Italian delegate, UN Doc. E/CONF.26/SR. 17pp 13;
Colin. The Israeli delegate, UN Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.17 p 14; Sanders, 'A Twenty Years Review of the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards'275; van den Berg, The 
New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 354; Lew,
Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration para 26-102; Davidson,
Arbitration 395; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York 
Convention o f  1958 166; A Redfem and M Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial 
Arbitration (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London 1999)468.
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means of recourse would prevent the award from becoming binding. Extraordinary 
means of recourse cover any irregularities that do not involve the merits o f the award, 
particularly procedural inegularities, including those which may lead to actions being 
brought to set the award aside. The bringing of such actions would not preclude an 
award from becoming binding. In support of this approach, it has been submitted 
that “a different inteipretation of ‘binding’ would render meaningless the limitation 
contained in gi'ound that the award has been set aside”. (This refers to the fact that it 
is a gi'ound for resisting enforcement that the award has been set aside or suspended 
by a court o f  the country in which or under the law o f wflich it was made.) In addition, 
it was argued that the above-mentioned distinction between ordinary and 
extraordinary means of recourse was in the minds of the drafters of the NYC, and its 
insertion into Ait, V(l)(e) was only finally rejected because it was not known in 
certain legal systems, or canted a different meaning in different systems.
It can be seen that the term “binding” has generated a diversity of interpretations. This 
diversity is not unexpected since it first appeared among the drafters of the NYC, 
leading some of them to suggest strongly that the tenn must be replaced by a more 
suitable tenn. Some authors consider the debates between the drafters regarding the 
meaning of ‘binding’ as extremely confusing. The possibility of negative 
consequences of it inclusion was predicted at that time of the NYC Conference by the 
Dutch delegate, Prof Sanders, who stated:
What does this word “binding” mean? The term is the result of a 
compromise and will, I fear, cause a diversity of interpretations in 
countries where enforcement is sought and the defendant tries to prevent
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 342; Sanders, 'A Twenty Years Review o f  the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement o f Foreign Aibitral Awards'275.
Sanders, 'A Twenty Years Review of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement o f  
Foreign Aibitral Awards'275.
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 342.
See, UN Doc. E/CONF.26/SR. 17 pp 12-14.
See, David, Arbitration in International Trade 400; Gharavi, The International Effectiveness o f  the 
Annulment o f  an Arbitral Award  60.
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execution in proving to the competent authority that "the award has not 
yet become binding on the parties.
However, after consideration of the arguments, the tenu “binding” was finally 
adopted as a compromise, despite its expected ambiguity, as it was thought to have 
fewer shortcomings than the term “final”, which had created the problem of the 
“double exequatur”.
It may be worth mentioning that, unlike the outcome of mediation and conciliation, all 
arbitral awards are generally considered as binding once they had been made just 
like the judgment of a court. But, since Art. V(l)(e) allows enforcement to be refused 
if  the award has not yet become binding on the parties, this suggests that the NYC 
intended to give the losing party some sort of recourse. As has been seen above, the 
majority of authors and many courts have taken this to mean that the availability of 
ordinary means of recourse (i.e. a genuine appeal on the merits) to a second arbitral 
tribunal or a court would prevent an award from being binding for the purpose of Art. 
V(l)(e), while the availability of extraordinary means of recourse would not. This 
approach might be said to be without merit because the proposal to insert the 
expression “has not become binding in the sense that award is still open to ordinary 
means of recourse” was finally rejected by the drafters of the NYC. Moreover, if the 
availability of an appeal to a court is to be regarded as preventing an award from
Pieter Sanders ‘New  York Convention on tlie Recognition and Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral 
Awards’ (1959) 6 Netherlands International Law Review 43at 55, cited in D Freyer and H Gharavi, 
'Finality and Enforceability o f  Foreign Aibitral Awards: From "Double Exequatur" to the Enforcement 
o f  Annulled Awards: A Suggested Path to Unifonnity Amidst Diversity'(1998) 13 (1) ICSID Review - 
Foreign Investment Law Journal 101 at 104
See, eg, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules o f 1976, Art.32(2) which states that:
The award shall be made in writing and shall be final and binding on the parties. The 
parties undertake to carry out the award without delay.
And ICC Arbitration Rules o f 1998, Ai1.28(6) which stats that:
Every Award shall be binding on the parties. By submitting the dispute to arbitration 
under these Rules, the parties undertake to cany out any Award without delay and shall 
be deemed to have waived their right to any fomi o f  recourse insofar as such waiver can 
validly be made.
And English Arbitration Act 1996, s.58(1) which establishes that:
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an award made by the tribunal pursuant to an 
arbitration agreement is final and binding both on the parties and on any persons 
claiming through or under them.
See also, Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  pp 
361 ,468 .
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being binding, this should surely be in relation to extraordinary means of recourse that 
do not involve the merits of the award, as courts generally do not allow the re­
examination of the merits of arbitral awards. In addition, by replacing the term 
“final” with the term “binding” to avoid the problem of “double exequatur”, the 
drafters of the NYC apparently intended to make an award enforceable as soon as it is 
made, even if it is still opens to appeal before a court. Therefore, it may be suggested 
that all means of recourse whether ordinary or extraordinary should not prevent an 
award from becoming binding, unless the parties expressly agree otherwise. This 
conclusion would be supported by Art. VI o f the NYC which provides that:
If an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has been 
made to a competent authority referred to in article V (1) (e), the authority 
before which the award is sought to be relied upon may, if it considers it 
proper, adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the award ... . ^^
This Article indicates that an appeal to the competent court in the place of arbitration 
is merely a giound for adjourning enforcement proceedings, and then only if  the 
enforcing court considers it as a proper appeal. Consequently, this would clearly mean 
that an appeal to a court in the place of the arbitration should not consider as a ground 
for refusing enforcement under Art. V(l)(e), and therefore would not bar an award 
from being binding. The same argument might apply by analogy in regard to an 
appeal to a second arbitral tribunal. Accordingly, it may be suggested that, for the 
puiposes of Art. V(l)(e), the award should be deemed to be binding once it is 
rendered, regardless o f the possibility of appeal, unless the parties had agreed 
othei’wise. This suggestion has the advantage of interpreting the tenn “binding” in a 
mamier that minimises the possibility of enforcement being refrised, which after all 
serves the general goal of the NYC to promote and facilitate enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards, limiting the chances of enforcement being refused whenever possible. 
Moreover, this approach has also the merit of promoting parties’ autonomy.
8.2.4 Case Law
33 NYC o f  1958, Art.VI.
See, Freyer and Gharavi, 'Finality and Enforceability o f Foreign Aibitral Awards: From "Double 
Exequatur" to the Enforcement o f Annulled Awards: A Suggested Path to Unifonnity Amidst 
Diversity' 106; Gharavi, The International Effectiveness o f  the Annulment o f  an Arbitral Award  63.
See, eg, Rosseel N.V v Oriental Commercial & Shipping Co Ltd  628; Inter-Arab Investment 
Guarantee Corp v Banque Arabe Intl d'investissements pp 610-11; Film Distributor v Film Producer 
758; SNOC V Keen Lloyd Resources Ltd  pp 777- 83; Italian Party v Swiss Company pp 827- 28; A 
SA V B Co L td & C SA pp 838-39. see, also in general, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration  
Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 332.
Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corp v Banque Arabe Intl d'investissements pp 610-11.
SNOC V Keen Lloyd Resources Ltd  p 780.
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Although the absence of a definition of the tenu “binding” has created an obstacle to a 
uniform interpretation of the term, which one might have expected to generate costly 
litigation and lengthy delays in enforcement, in practice this ambiguity has not 
blocked enforcement of awards in most cases. The Belgian Supreme Court, for 
example, has confinued a decision granting enforcement of an award made in Jordan, 
rejecting the objection that the award was not binding under the law of the Jordan 
where the award was rendered. The court reasoned that it does not follow from Art. 
V(l)(e) that the binding nature of the award can only be determined pursuant to the 
law of the country of origin. The court went on to hold that:
' The question whether the award is open to such recourse is to be solved 
by refen'ing, successively and one in the absence of the other, to the 
arbitration agreement, the law that it designates for such purpose, last, the 
law of the country in which the award was rendered.
Therefore, the court concluded that Jordanian law was not applicable to the question 
of whether the award was binding, since priority was given to the arbitration 
agreement, which provided that the award would be final, binding and enforceable 
from the day it was rendered. In addition, a Hong Kong high court rejected an 
objection against enforcement of a foreign award on the basis that the award was not 
yet binding because an appeal had been launched in France where the award was 
made. The court held that the award is considered to be binding when it no longer 
open to appeal on the merits, even if an action to set aside has been initiated before a 
court of the country of origin.
In another case, a defendant opposed enforcement of an award made in New York on 
the giound that the award had not yet become binding because the parties had agreed 
“that any proceedings to confimi or vacate the arbitration award will be brought in the
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US District Court of New York”. The English Commercial Court rejected this 
argument and granted leave to enforce the foreign award, holding that an agreement 
that proceedings to confmn a foreign award in the country where it was made did not 
prevent enforcement in England, because that agreement did not deprive the award of 
its binding character, and did not make enforcement abroad subject to such 
confirmation. In particular, the Court held that:
The Joint Stipulations do provide that proceedings to confmn the award 
must be brought in the District Court of New York. There is, however, a 
difference in United States law between proceedings for confinnation of 
an award, and proceedings for enforcement of an award. One can take 
proceedings in the country in which an award is made (although it is not 
required under the New York Convention) to confmn the award, being 
declaratory relief, without seeking enforcement of the award. The Joint 
Stipulations relate to confirmation proceedings. They do not expressly 
touch the subject of enforcement of the award. ... In any event, it is 
impossible to imply into a provision dealing with proceedings to confirm 
an award, a provision restricting enforcement abroad.
The English Court went on to uphold “the ordinary rule that an arbitration award is 
‘binding’ immediately upon publication and continues to bind the parties unless it is 
set aside or suspended by a competent judicial authority”, or the party opposing 
enforcement can prove that the parties have agieed that the award cannot be enforced 
without the authorisation of the court of the place where the award was rendered. 
This approach is of particular importance, since it considers an award to be binding 
once it is made, regardless the possibility of any further appeals, unless agreed 
otherwise by the parties.
8.3 Award Set Aside
8.3.1 General
The second part of Art. V(l)(e) provides that the enforcing court may refuse 
enforcement if the party opposing enforcement can prove that the award has been set 
aside or suspended by a competent court of the country in which, or under the law of
Rosseel N .V v Oriental Commercial & Shipping Co L td  628. 
ibid 627.
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which, that award was made. The competent authority as mentioned in the second leg 
of Art. V(l)(e) and Art. VI is always the court of the country where the award was 
made. These two Articles establish the principle that the jurisdiction to set aside or 
suspend the award is exclusively gi’anted to the court of the place in which the award 
was made. Accordingly, a decision to set aside by a court elsewhere must be given no 
weight at all by enforcing courts.
Yet, It is important to note that this ground can be invoked to refuse enforcement only 
if the award has been successfully set aside or suspended in the place of origin, but 
not where the party resisting enforcement has merely initiated an application for 
setting aside or suspending the award in that country. In the latter situation he is only 
entitled to a possible adjournment of the decision on enforcement as laid down in Art. 
VI of the NYC.^^
8.3.2 Enforcement of Previously Set Aside Awards
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 350. He has stated that the pluase “or under the law o f which, that award was made” 
contained in Ai t. V (l)(e) refers to the theoretical case in which the parties agreed upon a foreign law to 
govern the award which is different from the law o f the country in which the award was made. So, it 
has been obseiwed that:
[T]he plirase “or the countiy in which, or under the law o f  which” is somewhat out o f  
tune with Article. V (l)(a) which accords the primaiy role to the law as chosen by the 
parties, and the subsidiaiy role to the law o f the countiy where the award was made. 
Although Article. V (l)(e) reverses this order, this has no legal consequence.
Nonetheless, courts have interpreted the plirase "or under the law o f which, that award was made" as 
refen'ing exclusively the procedural and not the substantive law. See, eg, Intl Standard Elec Corp v 
Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera  745 FSupp 172 (US District Court SD NY 1990) 178; M  & C 
C oip V Erwin Behr GmbH & Co KG  87 F3d 844 (US Court o f Appeals 6th Circ 1996) 848; Karaha 
Bodas Co LLC v Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Biimi Negara 289. See also. Dicey, 
Morris and Collins, Conflict o f  Laws para 16-119,
'** See, eg, N orsolor v Pabalk  (1982) VII YBCA 312 (Austria Supreme Court 1980); Coutinho Caro 
USA Inc & Co V Marcus Trading (20001) XXVI YBCA 894 (US District Court Connecticut 2000) 
901; Gabon v Swiss Oil Cor (1989) XIV YBCA 621 (Cayman Grand Court 1988) pp 623-25; Nicor 
Intl Corp El Pasa Cor (2004) XXIX YBCA 1140 (US District Court SDF 2003) 1157; Empresa 
Colombiana de Vias Eerreas v Drummond Ltd  653; Four Season Hotels & Resorts BV v Consorcio 
Barr SA (2004) XXIX YBCA 882 (US District Court SDF 2003) pp 893-96; Karaha Bodas Co LLC v 
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara  289. See also, van den Berg, 'Consolidated 
Commentary’ (2003)' pp 572, 662.
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation  350; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on Inteimational 
Commercial Arbitration  para 1687.
4#
Ch 8: Award not Biding or Set Aside or Suspended 224
Chromalloy Aerosennces Inc v Arab republic o f  E g y p t .
Hilmarton L td v Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation O T V .
See, eg, E Gaillard, 'Enforcement o f Awards Set Aside in the Country o f Origin; The French 
Experience' (ICCA Congress Series no 9 Paris 1998) 505; D Rivkin, 'The Enforcement o f Awards 
Nullified in the Countiy o f  Origin; The American Experience' (ICCA Congress Series no 9 Paris 1998) 
528; A  El-Kosheri, 'The Enforcement o f  Awards Nullified in the Country o f  Origin' (ICCA Congress 
Series no 9 Paris 1998) 544; K Sachs, 'The Enforcement o f  Awards Nullified in the Countiy o f Origin: 
The German Perspective' (ICCA Congress Series no 9 Paris 1998) 552; Freyer and Gharavi, 'Finality 
and Enforceability o f Foreign Arbitral Awards: From "Double Exequatur" to the Enforcement o f  
Annulled Awards: A Suggested Path to Unifoimity Amidst Diversity'101;R Chan, 'The Enforceability 
o f Annulled Foreign Aibitral Awards in the United States: A Critique o f  Chromalloy'(1999) 17 (1) 
Boston Univ Intl L J 141; M Flwang and A Chan, 'Enforcement and Setting Aside o f  International 
Arbitral Awards - The Perspective o f  Connnon Law Countries' (ICCA Congress Series no 10 New  
Delhi 2000) 145; P Mayer, 'Revisiting Hilmarton and Clnoinalloy' (ICCA Congress Series no 10 2000 
N ew  Delhi 2000) 165; C Drahozal, 'Enforcing Vacated International Arbitration Awards: An Economic 
Approach'(2000) 11 Am Rev Intl Ai'b 451; Gharavi, The International Effectiveness o f  the Annulment 
o f  an Arbitral Award .
In favour o f this approach from courts, see, eg, Claude Clair v Louis Berardi (1982) VII YBCA 319 
(France Court o f Appeal 1980); Baker Marin L td  v Chevron Ltd 191 F3d 194 (US Court o f  Appeals 
2nd Cir 1999); Marin I Spier v Calzaturificio Tecnica 71 F Supp 2d 279 (US District Court SDNY  
1999); MIR Meauteahhitlik v KB Most-Bank KG - A40/4363-03 (Russia Appeal Court 29 July 2003); 
X  V X  (2000) XXV YBCA 717 (Germany Court o f Appeal 28 Oct 1999) 719; The Chinese Supreme 
people’s Court Notice on the implementation o f the NYC, cited in Chang, 'Enforcement o f  Foreign 
Arbitral Awards in the People's Republic o f China' pp 468-69.
In favour o f this approach horn writers, see, eg, A Rogers, 'The Enforcement o f Awards Nullified in 
the Country o f  Origin’ (ICCA Congress Series no 9 Paris 1998) 548; E Schwartz, 'A Comment on 
Cliromalloy-Hilimarton, a l'americaine'(1997) 14 (2) J Intl Arb 125 at 131; G Sampliner, 'Enforcement 
o f Nullified Foreign Arbitral Awards - Chromalloy Revisited'(1997) 14 (3) J Intl Aib 141; Rognlien, 
the Norwegian delegate at the N Y C ’s Conference, UN Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.17p 11; Dicey, Morris and 
Collins, Conflict o f  Laws para 16-118; Ajons ‘Enforcing Annulled Arbitral Awards -  A Comparative 
V iew ’ (2000) 7 Croat Arbit Yearb 55, cited in Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International 
Commei^cial Arbitration  para 26-110 fir 167; Giarding ‘ The International Recognition and 
Enforcement o f  Arbitral Awards Nullified in the Countiy o f Origin’ in Briner, et al (eds) Law o f  
Intrenational Business and Dispute settlement in the Century (2000) 205, cited in Lew, Mistelis 
and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration para 26-110 fn 167; See also in 
general, Mayer, 'Revisiting Hilmarton and Chromalloy' 165; R Smit, 'International Arbitration o f  
Infrastructure Project Disputes and the Enforcement Regime Under the N ew York Convention' (2003) 
<http://www.stblaw.com/content/Publications/pub224.pdf> (accessed 27/2/2006) 12.
Recently, especially after the Chromalloy US case and the French exceptional case 
o f Hilmarton, the question whether an arbitral award that has been set aside in its 
country of origin should be nevertheless enforced in another country under the NYC 
has given rise to extensive debate in international arbitration literature and practice.
In answering this question, four main approaches have been advanced:
First, the conservative approach, which appears to be adopted by many courts and 
writers, is that an award set aside in the place of origin is, as a general rule, not 
enforceable elsewhere under Art, V(l)(e). This approach is simply based upon the
letter of Art. V(l)(e) which provides that the enforcement of awards may be refused if
'ithe award has been set aside in the country where it was made. The Convention
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specifically contemplates that the state in which, or under the law of which, the award 
is made, will be free to set aside or modify an award in accordance with its domestic 
arbitral law. It is argued that arbitral awards derive their force from the legal system 
of the country in which they are made, and, accordingly, the nullifieation of an award 
by the courts of that country deprives the award of force in other countries, as 
recognised by Art. V(l)(e). In other words, an award set aside by a court of the 
country in which it was rendered simply no longer exists and, therefore, is incapable 
of enforcement in any other jurisdiction. Prof van den Berg stated that:
The disregard of annulment of the award ... involves basic legal concepts.
When an award has been annulled in the country of origin, it has become 
non-existent in that country. The fact that the award has been annulled 
implies that the award was legally rooted in the arbitration law of the 
country of the origin. How then is it possible that courts in another 
country can consider the same award as still valid? Perhaps some theories 
of legal philosophy may provide an answer to this question, but for a legal 
practitioner this phenomenon is inexplicable. It seems that only an 
international treaty can give a special legal status to an award
notwithstanding its annulment in the country of origin.
This justification, however, has been criticized on the basis that the existence of an 
award, as an expression of a contract between the parties, cannot be assumed to be a
matter for the exclusive determination by the courts in the State where it was
rendered. The criticism follows the approach common to most questions that involve 
a conflict of laws; if a forum properly establishes jurisdiction, a matter can be 
determined as valid in accordance with the laws of that fomm despite lacking validity 
under the laws of another. Moreover, the conseivative approach would pose an 
obvious danger to the hannonisation of the legal regime of international arbitration by 
inviting the application of national criteria which may be contrary to the
48 See, Marin I  Spier V Calzaturificio Tecnica p 285.
See, in general, Smit, 'International Arbitration o f  Infrastructure Project Disputes and the 
Enforcement Regime Under the N ew  York Convention' p l2; UN Doc. A/CN.9/460 para 137;
AJ van den Berg, 'Annulment o f Awards in International Arbitration' (International arbitration in the 
21st centuiy: towards "judicialization" and unifonnity? 1992) 161, cited in Gharavi, The International 
Effectiveness o f  the Annulment o f  an Arbitral Award  84.
See, in gemera, UN Doc. A C N .9/460, para 137,
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contemporary international consensus. However, this approach has been also used 
to support the conservative view, as will be seen below.
Another argument in favour o f the conservative approach is that, giving the enforcing 
court discretion to enforce foreign awards although they have been set aside in the 
country of origin would lead to different results in different countries, and therefore 
would threaten the international hannony of the enforcement of foreign awards 
intended by the NYC. In criticising this argument, it has been said that such a lack 
of harmony is a common and even normal situation under international private law in 
which the world is divided into a multiplicity of sovereign States. Each country has a 
legitimate right to assess the value of the award by reference to its own criteria and its 
own conflict of laws rules, and the result will inevitably differ from country to 
country. More specifically, it is unanimously admitted in the field of arbitration that 
when an award has been affmned by a court of the seat of the arbitration, the courts of 
other country where enforcement is sought still have jurisdiction over the enforcement 
of the award in their tern tory, and may refuse to grant enforcement if the award is not 
in compliance with the requirements of their own laws. If it is acceptable to disregard 
the court of the arbitration seat’s judgement in confirming the award, why should it be 
necessary to abide by its judgment in the converse situation, namely when it has 
annulled the award? International harmony is not more important in the first situation 
than in the second.
A further argument for supporting the conseivative approach is that when the parties 
have agreed to hold the arbitration in a particular country, it can presumed that they 
have freely chosen to be subject to the laws of that country. Accordingly, enabling an
In this regard, it was argued that one can imagine a situation where the courts o f  the place o f  
arbitration apply criteria for the annulment o f awards which are clearly contrary to the contemporary 
international consensus, such as allowing review o f  the merits o f  awards or invalidating awards for 
failure to abide by pointless fonnalities, which neither party had raised during the arbitration. That is 
bad enough. But one can also imagine criteria which would be internationally intolerable, such as 
invalidating awards because all the arbitrators were not o f a certain religion, or were not o f the male 
gender. See, Paulsson, 'Awards set aside at the place o f arbitration' 24.
See, in general, Mayer, 'Revisiting Hilmarton and Cliromalloy' 170.
^Nbid pp 170-71.
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enforcing court to disregard the setting aside of the award by a court in the seat would 
circumvent the will of the parties.
The seeond approach, which seems broadly liberal, is that the setting aside of an 
award abroad must be excluded as gi’ound for refusing enforcement. Thus, an 
enforcing court simply would not be required, nor indeed entitled, to give any weight 
to what a foreign court may have done to an award. Therefore, the award must be 
enforced even if it has been set aside by a court of the seat of arbitration. This 
approach has been progressively established by four separate French decisions and 
seems to hold sway in France. It is based on ignoring article V(l)(e) entirely, on the 
view that the NYC under article VII allows each country to adopt a more liberal 
regime in favour of enforcement. This approach would entirely displace the control 
flinction of enforcement jurisdictions. If an award meets the criteria of the 
enforcement jurisdiction, the judge there simply would not be required, nor indeed 
entitled, to give any weight to what a foreign court may have done to an award; that 
would be a matter of purely local consequence in that country. However, this 
argument has been considered to be too radical, and contrary to cun’ent expectations 
of both lawyers and users. Relying on Art. VII to totally exclude the setting aside 
gi ound of Art. V(l)(e) has been criticised on the ground that, unlike France, not every 
country has provisions for enforcing annulled awards which are more favourable than 
the NYC. Hence, it is argued that virtually all countries except France have domestic 
laws which considers that the setting aside of an award in the country o f origin is a 
ground for refrising of enforcement. Therefore, for example, when the US District 
Court enforced the annulled award in Chromalloy on the gound that it could not deny 
a party’s right to rely on US domestic laws for enforcement because the FAA 
provided more-favourable provisions the NYC, it was criticised because the FAA in 
fact has no such provisions. Moreover, enforcing courts igioring Art. V(l)(e)
See, in general, UN Doc. A C N .9/460 para 142.
See, eg, Pabalk Ticaret Ltd Sirketi v Norsolor SA (the French Supreme Court 1984) pp 489-90; 
Polish Ocean Line v Jolasry (the French Supreme Court 1993) 663; Hilmarton Ltd  v Omnium de 
Traitement et de Valorisation OTV (the French Supreme Court 1994) pp 656-57; Egypt v Chromalloy 
Aeroservices Inc (French Court o f Appeal 1997) pp 692-93. See, also in general, Paulsson, 'Awards set 
aside at the place o f  arbitration' 24.
See, van den Berg, 'The Application o f the N ew  York Convention by the Courts' 33
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entirely is argued to constitute a real obstacle to the unifonTiity of international 
arbitration and to demonstrate the limits o f any harmonization through model laws.
A further argument in favour of enforcing the annulled award was that the practice of 
enforcement of awards set aside in their country of origin would increase the 
effectiveness and the popularity of international commercial arbitration as a binding 
dispute settlement mechanism. It would also avoid rendering international arbitral 
awards ineffectual by discouraging courts of those countries from setting aside awards 
rendered against their citizens and, especially, their government or state 
corporations.
The third approach is that the setting aside o f an award by a court in the arbitration 
seat should not lead to an absolute refusal to enforce that award in other countries, but 
should rather be subject to the discretionary power of the court where enforcement is 
sought. This approach can be supported by reference to the same arguments as the 
second approach. But it is particularly based upon the permissive character of Art. 
V (l) by using the tenn “may”. It is argued that the non-mandatory nature of Ar ticle 
V(l)(e) would permit the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award that has been set 
aside in its country of origin, because it provides only that an enforcing court “may” 
refuse enforcement of such awards, not that it “must” do so. Yet, this argument is 
open to criticism. Prof Sanders stated:
See, Chan, 'The Enforceability o f  Annulled Foreign Arbitral Awards in tire United States: A Critique 
o f Clu'omalloyT62; Gharavi, The International Effectiveness o f  the Annulment o f  an Arbitral Award 
pp 99-100.
See, Gharavi, The International Effectiveness o f  the Annulment o f  an Arbitral Aw ard  pp 86-87.
See, Sampliner, 'Enforcement o f  Nullified Foreign Arbitral Awards - Cluomalloy Revisited'141 at 
165; Gharavi, The International Effectiveness o f  the Annulment o f  an Arbitral Award
See, in general, Freyer and Gharavi, 'Finality and Enforceability o f  Foreign Arbitral Awards: From 
"Double Exequatur" to the Enforcement o f Annulled Awards: A Suggested Path to Uniformity Amidst 
Diversity' 109.
“  In favour o f  this approach form courts, See, eg, Chromalloy Aerosennces Inc v Arab republic o f  
Egypt (US District Court Colu 1996). In favour o f this approach from writers, see, eg, Davidson, 
Arbitration 396; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration  para 
26-104; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York 
Convention o f 1958 169.
See, eg, Chromalloy Aeroseiwices Inc v Arab republic o f  Egypt pp 909, 914; Smit, 'International 
Arbitration o f  Infiastructine Project Disputes and the Enforcement Regime Under the New York 
Convention' 12; W Park and J Paulsson, 'TFIE Binding Force o f the IN trenational Arbitration 
Awards'( 1982-1983) 23 Virginia J Intl L 253 at 258.
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In my understanding, “may” points to the requirement that the party 
against whom enforcement is sought must first have proven that one of the 
following grounds exists, but that once one or more of the grounds are 
proven, refusal of enforcement will follow. ... In conelusion, enforcement 
of an annulled award cannot be based upon the use of “may” in the 
heading of Article V”.
Similarly, the US Court of Appeal has said in Baker Marin Ltd v Chevron Ltd  that 
“under the Convention and principles of comity, it would not be proper to enforce a 
foreign arbitral award when such an award has been set aside by the Nigerian 
courts ”.
The fourth approach is that the amiulment of an award by a court of the country of 
origin may lead to reflisal of enforcement abroad under Art. V(l)(e) only if such 
amiulment is based on grounds comparable to the grounds listed in Art. V(l)(a-d) of 
the NYC. This approach goes back to article V(l), and proceeds on the basis that 
its language is permissive which seems to gi'ant the enforcing court discretion to 
enforce an award that has been annulled in the place where it was rendered. As 
regards how the enforcing court should use its discretion, it is suggested that it should 
distinguish between “international standards” and “local standards”. International 
standards would comprise those grounds for annulment which consistent with grounds 
listed in paragraphs (a) through (d) of article V (l) of the NYC. But the gt'ounds of 
annulment would be deemed as local standard if  they are different than those in Art. 
V(l)(a-d) of the NYC. Under this proposal only decisions to set aside based on an 
international standards would constitute giounds for refiising enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards, whereas setting aside based on any other grounds would not prevent
P Sanders, Quo vadis arbitration? : sixty years o f  arbitration practice : a comparative study (Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague 1999) pp 77-78; Gharavi, The International Effectiveness o f  the 
Annulment o f  an Arbitral Award  97.
Baker Marin Ltd v Chevron Ltd 195. Likewise, the Chinese Supreme people’s Court Notice on the 
implementation o f the NYC confimis that if the party resisting enforcement proved that the award 
contained one o f the grounds specified in Art. V (l), the Chinese competent court shall reject the 
application to enforce the award. See, Chang, 'Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards in the People’s 
Republic o f China' pp 468-69.
In favour o f  this approach, see, Paulsson, 'Awards set aside at the place o f arbitration' 25; Bishop 
and Martin, 'Enforcement of Foreign Aibitral Awards' 28; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  
international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 175-176. See, also in general, van 
den Berg, 'The Application o f  the New York Convention by the Courts' 33; UN Doc. A C N .9/460 para 
143; Mayer, 'Revisiting Hilmarton and Clii'omalloy' pp 165-76.
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enforcement o f the award in other countries. The proponents of this approach also 
argue that it would lessen the temptation to issue amiulments based on local standards, 
as well being entirely consistent with the 1961 European Convention, thus 
contributing to hannonisation.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, the present question appears to be 
problematic and controversial. Indeed, a leading authority on the Convention, Prof 
Berg, cannot decide whether he favours the first or the fourth approaeh. Yet, the 
fourth approach may appear to be the most convincing, since it constitutes a 
compromise solution between the extreme conservative and extreme liberal 
approaches. Also, it to be borne in mind that although the convention allows only 
competent courts in the seat of arbitration to set aside an award, this should be not 
inteipreted to mean that the NYC recognizes any grounds available in the country of 
origin for setting aside the award even if not consistent with the grounds mentioned in 
Art. V(a) to (e) of the NYC, as this would mean that all manner o f grounds from 
different national laws would be indirectly introduced as grounds for refusing 
enforcement under Art. V(l)(e). This would breach the key principle, which clearly 
intended by the drafters and unanimously adopted by the courts, that enforcement of 
binding foreign awards may be refused only by giounds exhaustively listed in Art. V 
of the NYC. Finally, this approach should not affect the application of Art. VII 
allowing the wining party to seek enforcement under any more-favourable- provisions 
available in the country where enforcement is sought.
8.3.3 Successful Case Law
Setting aside as ground for resisting enforcement has rarely been raised due to the fact 
that arbitral awards that have been set aside in the country of origin are not common.
Nonetheless, it was generally assumed that an award could not be enforced under 
the NYC if it has been set aside in its country of origin. Consequently, enforcement 
has been denied in several cases on the basis that the award has been set aside in the 
seat of arbitration. For example, a French court of appeal refused enforcement of
See, Paulsson, 'Awards set aside at the place o f arbitration' 25, See, also in general, UN Doc. 
A C N .9/460 para 143.
See, van den Berg, 'The Application o f the New  York Convention by the Courts' 33.
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award rendered in Geneva because the award had been set aside by Geneva Court of 
Appeal which considered the award was arbitrary. In another case, the Gennan 
Court of Appeal revoked leave to enforce an award when it was set aside in Moscow 
where it had been made. Again, in Baker Marin Ltd v Chevron Ltd a US court of 
appeal refused to enforce two awards rendered in Nigeria on the basis that the awards 
were set aside by a Nigerian court on the grounds that the arbitrators had improperly 
awarded punitive damages, gone beyond the scope of the submissions, incoiTcctly 
admitted parole evidence, and made inconsistent awards. A US district court denied 
enforcement, holding that under Art. V(l)(e), “it would not be proper to enforce a 
foreign arbitral award under the Convention when such an award has been set aside 
by the Nigerian courts”. On appeal the plaintiff argued that the awards were set 
aside by the Nigerian courts for reasons that would not be recognized under US law as 
valid grounds for vacating an arbitration award, and that under Article VII of the 
NYC (allowing enforcement where local law favours it), it might invoke US national 
arbitration law, regardless of the action of the Nigerian court. The Court of Appeal 
rejected this argument holding that
It is sufficient answer that the parties contracted in Nigeria that their 
disputes would be arbitrated under the laws of Nigeria. The governing 
agreements make no reference whatever to United States law. Nothing 
suggests that the parties intended United States domestic arbitral law to 
govern their disputes.
With reference to certain works of Prof Berg, the Court additionally noted as a 
practical matter that:
[Mjechanical application of domestic arbitral law to foreign awards under 
the Convention would seriously undermine finality and regularly produce 
conflicting judgments. If a party whose arbitration award has been vacated 
at the site of the award can automatically obtain enforcement of the 
awards under the domestic laws of other nations, a losing party will have 
every reason to pursue its adversary “with enforcement actions from
Claude Clair v Louis B era rd i.
™ Y v  Y  (Germany Court o f  Appeal 28 Oct 1999) 719. 
Baker Marin Ltd V Chevron Ltd  pp 194-96. 
ibid pp 196-97.
Ch 8: Award not Biding or Set Aside or Suspended 232
country to country until a court is found, if any, which grants the 
enforcement”, (citation omitted)
The plaintiff also contended that Art. V employs pemaissive rather than mandatory 
language, providing that enforcement “may” be refused, which implies that the 
enforcing court might have discretion to enforce the awards, regardless of the fact that 
they had been set aside by the Nigerian Court. The US Court of Appeal rejected also 
this contention, holding that it was sufficient answer that plaintiff had shown no 
adequate reason for refusing to recognize the judgments of the Nigerian court. The 
Court went on to distinguish the Chromalloy case where a US district court enforced a 
foreign award although it has been set aside in Egypt where it was made. It held that:
Unlike the petitioner in Chromalloy, (the plaintiff) is not a United States 
citizen, and it did not initially seek confinnation of the award in the 
United States. Furthemiore, (the defendants) did not violate any promise 
in appealing the arbitration award within Nigeria. Recognition of the 
Nigerian judgment in this case does not conflict with United States public 
policy. (Whereas the US District Court in Chromalloy) concluded that 
Egypt was seeking "to repudiate its solemn promise to abide by the results 
o f the arbitration," and that recognizing the Egyptian judgment would be 
contrary to the United States policy favoring arbitration.
In another US case, the District Court in Marin I  Spier v Calzaturificio Tecnica SpA 
relied on the decision in Baker Marine to refuse enforeement of an award made and 
set aside in Italy. However, some of the justifications presented by the US Court of 
Appeal in Baker Marin Ltd  v may be criticised. First, the Court refused to apply the 
provision of Art. VII(l) of the NYC that pemiits a party seeking enforcement to rely 
on laws in the enforcing state which are more favourable to enforcement, merely 
because the governing agreements made no reference to United States law. Yet, Art. 
VII(l) does not make the ability to rely on provisions in the law of the enforcing state, 
which are more favourable to enforcement, dependent on the agi'eement of the parties. 
Indeed, Art. VII(l) entitles ‘any interested party’ to rely on such provisions. 
Secondly, the attempt to distinguish Chromalloy on the basis that, “unlike the 
petitioner in Chromalloy, (the plaintiff) is not a United States citizen”, lacks merit.
ibid 197 hi 2.
^Ubid 197 and fn 3.
Marin I  Spier v Calzaturificio Tecnica
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since it makes the application o f the NYC contingent on the nationality of the parties, 
despite the fact that the NYC aims to facilitate the enforcement of foreign awards, and 
in most cases a foreign party will seek enforcement of such awards against a citizen 
party.
In a more recent case, a Russian commercial court declined to enforce an award on 
the basis that it had been set aside by a Stockholm district court, the award being 
made in Sweden. As an appeal was rejected, the Russian Court of Appeal finding that 
the commercial court had correctly noted that the award had been set aside by the 
competent Swedish court, which constitutes giounds for refusal of recognition and 
enforcement.
8.3.4 Unsuccessful Case Law
Conversely, the traditional view that the setting aside of an award in its country of 
origin should bar its enforcement in other countries under Art. V(l)(e) has recently 
been challenged by courts in France, Belgium, Austria and the USA, those courts 
granting enforcement of awards which had been set aside in their respective seats of 
arbitration.
The French Courts were the first to consider enforcing awards which had been set 
aside. On several occasions since 1984, French courts have taken the line that they 
may enforce awards that have been set aside in their state of origin. The first French 
case to do so was Norsolor, where an award made in Austria was annulled by a court 
of appeal of Vienna on the giounds of transnational rules. The French Court of 
Appeal having refused to enforce the award on the basis of Art. V(l)(e), the French 
Supreme Court overturned that decision, holding that Art. VII of the NYC provides 
that the provisions of the Convention do not deprive any interested party o f any right 
he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the country where enforcement is 
sought. Accordingly, the enforcing court cannot refuse enforcement when its own
MIR Meauteahhitlik v KB Most-Bank , cited in D Tapola, 'Recent Case Law on the Recognition and 
Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards in Russia'(2005) 22 (4) J Intl Arb 331 p 5.
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national laws pemiit it, and this award wonld be enforceable in France under Art. 12 
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In the Polish Ocean Line case (1993), although enforcement was opposed on the basis 
that the award has been suspended, the French Supreme Court mled on both 
principles of suspension and setting aside of an award, confinning a judgement of the 
French Court of Appeal gi'anting leave to enforce an award that had been rendered 
and suspended in Poland. The French Supreme Court stated;
Art. VII of the 1985 New York Convention, to which both France and 
Poland are parties, does not deprive any interested party of any right it 
may have to avail itself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the 
extent allowed by the law of the country where such award is sought to be 
relied upon. As a result, a French court may not deny an application for 
leave to enforce an arbitral award which was set aside or suspended by a 
competent authority in the country in which the award was rendered, if  the 
grounds for opposing enforcement, although mentioned in Art. V(l)(e) of 
the 1958 New York Convention, are not among the gi'ounds specified in 
Art. 1502 of the NCPC. The Court of Appeal was therefore correct in 
deciding that the setting aside action in Poland and the Polish court’s 
decision to suspend enforcement cannot justify a refusal o f enforcement of 
the award in France.
Equally, in the Hilmarton case (1994) the French Supreme Court upheld the decision 
of the French Court o f Appeal confirming the enforcement of an award made and set 
aside in Switzerland, holding that:
The lower deeision correctly held that, applying Art. VII of the [1958 
New York Convention], OTV (the winning party) could rely upon the 
French law on international arbitration concerning the recognition and 
enforcement of international arbitration awards rendered abroad, and 
especially upon Art. 1902 NCCP, which does not list the ground provided 
in Art. V of the 1958 Convention among the gi'ounds for refusal of 
recognition and enforcement.
Lastly, the award rendered in Switzerland is an international award which 
is not integiated in the legal system of that State, so that it remains in
77
78
See, Pabalk Ticaret Ltd Sirketi v Norsolor SA pp 489-91. 
Polish Ocean Line vJ o la siy  663.
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existence even if set aside and its recognition in France is not contrary to 
international public policy,
Finally the French Court of Appeal in the Chromalloy case (1997) affinned a decision 
of a lower court gr anting enforcement of an award notwithstanding its having been 
rendered and set aside in Egypt. The Court again relied upon the more-favorable- 
provisions right provided by Art. VII of the NYC, and accordingly concluded that;
A French judge may refuse to grant exequatur only in cases specified and 
limitatively enumerated by Art. 1502 of the New Code of Civil Procedure 
(NCCP) which is his national law in this matter and on which Chromalloy 
is thus authorized to rely. Art. 1502 NCCP does not contain a number of 
grounds for refusal o f recognition and enforcement which are provided in 
Art. V of the 1958 Convention, the application of which, consequently, is 
precluded. The award made in Egypt is an international award which, by 
definition, is not integrated in the legal order of that State so that its 
existence remains established despite its being annulled and its 
recognition in France is not in violation of international public policy.
Thus, the ground developed by the Arab Republic of Egypt to support its 
appeal is unfounded.
The above French decisions show a welcome clarification of the principle that the 
setting aside of an award in the country in which it was made does not in itself 
constitute gi'ounds for refusing enforcement of an award pursuant to the applicable 
criteria of France law and Art. VII of the NYC, and that such a principle is not 
contrary to the French conception of international public policy. In light of the 
French cases mentioned above, the possibility of enforcement of an annulled award is 
today firmly established as a clearly defined principle in France, a fact which has 
produced contrasting reactions.
Hilmarton Ltd  v Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation OTV pp 656-57,
Egypt V Chromalloy Aeroservices Inc pp 692-93.
However, for literary criticisms o f  French cases, see, Gharavi, The International Effectiveness o f  the 
Annulment o f  an Arbitral Aw ard  pp 81-82.
See, Gaillard, 'Enforcement o f  Awards Set Aside in the Country o f Origin; The French Experience' p 
507; Gharavi, The International Effectiveness o f  the Annulment o f  an Arbitral Award  77.
See, in general, Gaillard, 'Enforcement o f Awards Set Aside in the Country o f  Origin; The French 
Experience' 516 and fns 42, 43; Gharavi, The International Effectiveness o f  the Annulment o f  an 
Arbitral Award  pp 81-82.
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In Belgium in the Sonatrach case (1988), a Court of first instance declined to oveitum 
a decision by the president of the court of first instance of Brussels granting 
enforcement of an award rendered in Algeria and annulled by the Algerian Court of 
Appeal. It also refused to suspend its decision on enforcement until all ordinary and 
extraordinary means of appeal against the annulment order were used up before the 
Algerian Supreme Court. The court reasoned that the annulment o f the award in the 
country of the arbitral seat is not included among the grounds for revising of 
enforcement listed in Art. 1723 of the Belgian Judicial Code. It also decided that Art. 
V(l)(e) was inapplicable, as Algeria had not yet adopted the NYC when the award 
was made. Regardless o f being frequently mentioned, the above case is not a true 
example of a court enforcing an annulled award under the NYC, given that the NYC 
was not applicable. As there is no other case in which a Belgian court has enforced an 
award which has been set aside, the position remains unclear in Belgium.
The Austrian Supreme Court in the Radenska case (1993) overturned the judgment of 
the Court of Appeal refusing enforcement of an award rendered in Belgrade on the 
gi'ound that it had been annulled in its country of origin for breach of public policy of 
Serbia. The Austrian Supreme Court applied Art. IX(2) of the European Convention 
on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961 which states that the setting aside of 
an award in a contracting state will only constitute a ground for refusing enforcement 
in another contracting state if the award has been set aside for reasons specified in the 
Convention. The Court held that:
Art. IX(2) para. 1 of the European Convention restricts the application of 
the terms of Aid. V(l)(e) of the New York Convention admitting the 
setting aside of an award- without any restriction- as a gi'ound for refusing 
its enforcement, to the grounds for such a refusal enumerated in Art.
IX(1). The violation of the public policy of the country o f origin does not 
figure in this enumeration. Thus pursuant to Art. IX of the European 
Convention, the setting aside of the present award is not a reason to refuse 
its enforcement.
84 SONATRACH v Ford Bacon & D avis Inc (1990) XV YBCA 370 (Belgium Court o f First Instance
1988) pp 372-76.
Kajo-Erzeugnisse Essenzen GmbH V D O  Zdravilisce Radenska (1993) pp 1055-56.
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The Austrian Supreme Court confirmed its approach again in 1998 in the same case, 
The cases mentioned above, illustrate that the Austrian Supreme Court appears to 
be the first authority to adopt the principle that enforcement of a foreign award may 
be refused only if the setting aside in the country of origin occurred on one of the 
grounds listed in Art. V(l)(a-d) of the NYC (as provided by Art. IX(1) of the 
European Convention of 1961). Therefore, violation of, for example, the public policy 
of the country in which an award has been annulled does not amount to a gi'Ound for 
refrising enforcement because it is not listed among those grounds.
In the Chromalloy case, as seen above, an award rendered and annulled in Egypt was 
enforced in France in 1997. Prior to this leave to enforce was granted in US by a 
Court of the District of Columbia in 1996 on three grounds. First, the Court held that 
Article V(l)(e) was discretionary, not mandatory, relying on the use of the word 
"may". Therefore, it took the view that an enforcing court is granted a discretion 
whether or not to enforce an award where the grounds under Art. V for refusing 
enforcement are satisfied, including the case where an award has been annulled in the 
country of origin. Secondly, the court also relied upon the more-favourable- 
provisions right provided for by Art. VII(l) o f the Convention. The Court claimed 
that Art. VII(l) required it to examine the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the 
domestic arbitral law of the United States, where the award was sought to be 
enforced. The Court then found that American law did not allow an enforcing court to 
refrise enforcement of an award affected by eiTor of law. The Court therefore 
concluded that enforcement of the award was proper, so as not to deprive the plaintiff 
of its right to enforcement under United States law. Finally, the Court noted that the 
arbitration ag-eement provided that the award was not to be subject to any appeal or 
other recourse before the Egyptian courts, by providing that the decision of the 
arbitrators would be “final and binding”. Accordingly, the application to an Egyptian 
court to set the award aside was held to be a repudiation o f that ag'eement, and the
Kajo-Erzeugnisse Essenzen GmbH  v D O  Zdravilisce Radenska (1998) pp 924-25. 
Chromalloy Aeroseiwices Inc v Arab republic o f  Egypt pp 909, 914.
ibid pp 909-10, 914.
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view was taken that recognition of the Egyptian annulment decision by the US Courts 
would violate the clear US public policy in favour of final and binding arbitration.
It is worthwhile to observe that the US District Court in Chromalloy inteipreted Art. 
VII(l) of the NYC as mandatory in requiring enforcement of an award if such an 
award is enforceable under the laws and treaties applicable in US. However, the 
foundations of that decision have been subject to criticism by the most distinguished 
experts. Prof van den Berg stated that the approach of the US District Court in 
Chromalloy.
is unclear since the opinion is rather confusing, mixing residual 
discretionary power with US standards for setting aside awards and 
applying half-heartedly the more-favourable right provision of Art. VII(l) 
of the Convention ( “cheiry picking” which is not allowed under the 
Convention). The opinion is a bad precedent for what might be a good 
cause.
In particular, as regards the court’s inteipretation of the permissive language (i.e. 
''may be refused”) of Art. V to mean that the enforcing court is not bound to refuse 
enforcement of a foreign award even if that award has been set aside in the country of 
origin, Prof Fouchard sarcastically said “it is only today, apparently, that the 
discovery has been made that the application of the gounds for refusing enforcement 
may be optional for the courts... .” Prof Sanders also believes that “may” cannot be 
interpreted as granting a discretionary power to enforce an annulled award. More 
sigiificantly, the FAA in implementing the NYC, like the official French version of 
the Convention, uses a formula that appears to give no discretionary power at all to
®Ubid pp 912-13,
Hwang and Chan, 'Enforcement and Setting Aside o f International Ai'bitral Awards - The Perspective 
o f Common Law Countries' 149.
See, eg, Rogers, 'The Enforcement o f  Awards Nullified in the Countiy o f Origin’ 548; Chang, 
'Enforcement o f  Foreign Arbitral Awards in the People's Republic o f China' 34. See, also in general, 
Gharavi, The International Effectiveness o f  the Annulment o f  an Arbitral Award  pp 96-107; Rivkin, 
'The Enforcement o f Awards Nullified in the Country o f Origin: The American Experience' pp 528-43 
and fns 5, 6. Chan, 'The Enforceability o f Annulled Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States: A  
Critique o f Cliromalloy'.
van den Berg, 'The Application o f the New  York Convention by the Courts’ 34.
Fouchard, 'Suggestions to Improve the International Effieacy o f Arbitral Awards' pp 607-8.
Sanders, Quo vadis arbitration? : sixty yeat's o f  arbitration practice : a comparative study pp 77-78; 
Gharavi, The International Effectiveness o f  the Annulment o f  an Arbitral Aw ard  97.
US Federal Arbitration Act, Chap. 2 Sec. 2007 which states that:
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the enforcing court. Even more sigiificantly, the District Court’s grounds for 
ganting enforcement of an annulled award were not followed by the US Court of 
Appeal in Baker Marin nor the US District Court in Marin I  Spier. Therefore, the 
principle on which awards which have been set aside might yet be enforced under the 
NYC remains unclear in the USA.
Finally, it may be thought significant to recall that most of the Courts that enforced 
awards which had been set aside mainly relied upon Art. VII. of the NYC - the more 
favourable-right provision.
8.4 Suspension
The second part of Art. V(l)(e) provides that the enforcing court may refuse 
enforcement if the party opposing enforcement can prove that the award has been 
suspended by a competent court of the country in which, or under the law of which, 
that award was made. There is no definition of the term “suspended” under the NYC, 
and therefore it is unclear what the drafters precisely meant thereof. However, this 
formula is generally construed to “refer presumably to a suspension of the 
enforceability or enforcement of the award by the court in the country of origin” until 
it decides over an application to set the award aside. It is to be observed that, just 
like the setting aside ground, an award has to be successfully suspended by the court 
of the place where the award was made in order to allow the losing party to invoke 
this gound for resisting enforcement under Art. V(l)(e). Thus, the suspension of the 
award can not be relied upon as a non-enforcement gound if the party resisting 
enforcement has merely initiated an application for setting aside or suspending the 
award in the seat of arbitration. In that case, a party is entitled at best to an 
adjournment of the decision on enforcement as laid down by Art. VI.
Within thi'ee years after an arbitral award falling under the Convention is made, any party 
to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction under this chapter for an 
order confinning the award as against any other party to tlie arbitration. The court shall 
confmn the award unless it finds one o f the grounds for reflisal or deferral o f  recognition 
or enforcement o f  the award specified in the said Convention, (emphasises added)
96 See, Gharavi, The International Effectiveness o f  the Annulment o f  an Arbitral Award  pp 97-98.
See, van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' (2003)' 664; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, 
Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration  1690.
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It may also be observed that several courts have confirmed the principle that, in order 
to be a gound for refusing enforcement of the award, its suspension must have been 
successfully ordered by the relevant court in the seat of arbitration. Therefore, any 
suspension of an award that results automatically from the operation of law in the seat 
is not sufficient for refusal of enforcement under Art. V(l)(e).
The suspension gound however has very rarely led to enforcement being refused. A 
rare example of a successfiil attempt to invoke the gound is found in the decision of a 
Swiss court of appeal confinning a lower court’s refusal to enforce an award rendered 
in France because that award was subject to an application for setting aside before a 
French court, and filing such an application automatically suspends the enforcement 
o f an award under French law. Yet, this approach is at odds with the general 
approach mentioned above that mere initiation of an application for setting aside, or 
automatic suspension of an award as a result of operation of law in the arbitral seat are 
not enough to allow enforcement to be refused, but are rather only gounds for a 
possible adjournment of the decision on enforcement under Art. VI. A better example 
is a decision of a French court of appeal to adjourn its decision on enforcement of an 
award rendered in Austria until the Austrian court of appeal had given its decision on 
an appeal against the award.
Conversely, an example of an unsuccessful defence to enforcement based on the 
suspension of the award is provided by the decision of the French Supreme Court in 
which it confimied a judgement of the French Court of Appeal ganting leave to 
enforce an award rendered and suspended in Poland, holding that by applying Art. VII 
to allows reliance on domestic laws which are more favourable to enforcement, the 
suspension of the award in Poland could not justify refusing enforcement of the award
See, eg, AB Gotaverken v General National Maritime Transport Co pp 241-42; SPP Ltd v Egypt 
pp 489-90; JVlute Knight ISA v Nu-Swift (English HC 14 Jul 1995, uni'eported), cited in Davidson, 
Arbitration  397; Gabon v Swiss Oil Cor pp 623-25. See, also in general, Davidson, Arbitration  397; 
van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' (2003)' 664; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, 
Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration  para 1690; Bishop and Martin, 'Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards' 28; Dicey, Morris and Collins, Conflict o f  Laws para 16-120; Sajko, 'The 
New  York Arbitration Convention o f 1958 from the Yugoslav Point o f  View: Selected Issues' 212 fn 
46.
See, Continaf BV  v Polycoton SA (1987) XII YBCA 505 (Switzerland Court o f Appeals 1985).
Norsolor SA v PaZja/Æ H c a r e / (1983)  VIII YBCA 362 (France Court o f  Appeal 1981).
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in France, because such an action was not among the gounds for refusing 
enforcement specified in Art. 1502 of the French Code of Civil Procedure.
8.5 The Position in Saudi Arabia
8.5.1 Not Binding
As regards the gound that the award has not become binding, it to be noted first that 
Saudi Arbitration law provides no answer as to the binding nature of foreign arbitral 
awards and when they my be regarded as having become binding. Yet, the Circular of 
the Grievance Board regarding enforcement of foreigi judgments and arbitral awards 
of 1985, Art. 1 lays down that the scope of recognition and enforcement of fo re ig  
judgnents in SA is merely exclusive to final judgments. Similarly and more 
precisely, Art. 5 of the same Circular states that the competent court, when 
considering petitions to enforce foreign arbitral awards, has to ensure that the foreign 
award has become final in the country in which it had been rendered. From such 
stipulations, one might reasonably think that the finality requirement is also applied to 
enforcement under the NYC in SA, a requirement that leads to the problem of so- 
called "double exequatur”. Indeed, this what one Saudi lawyer thinks, stating that in 
order to be enforceable under the NYC in Saudi, the award has to be binding i.e. final 
and not subject to annulment or suspension by the court of the state where it was 
made. Yet this is without doubt wrong for several reasons. First, although that 
Circular generally concerns enforcement of foreign judgments and awards, it was 
released before SA adopted the NYC, and refers particularly to the Arab League 
Convention on Enforcement of Judgments and Awards of 1952, which requires any 
judguent or award to be final. Secondly, after adhering to the NYC, finality in an 
award is no longer required for enforcement of NYC’ awards in SA, since the NYC 
inserted the word "binding" instead of “final” clearly to avoid the problem o f "double
Polish Ocean Line V Jolasty  663.
the Circular o f the Grievance Board regarding Enforcement o f  Foreign Judgments and Arbitral 
Awards, no 7 dated 15/8/1405 H (1985), Ai t. 1
ibid Art. 5.
M Koman, 'Status o f Enforcement o f a foreign arbitral award in the Kingdom '(1999) 50 (5) The 
Markets 58.
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exequatur”, which existed under the Geneva Convention of 1927. Thirdly, Saudi 
courts have in several cases enforced fo re ig  awards without requiring that should be 
final or be declared enforceable by the courts of the seat. So, the Saudi courts have 
confinned the principle that finality is not required or, in other words, that leave to 
enforce in the country of origin is not required under the NYC, a principle that is 
almost unanimously affirmed by the courts of other states.
As to the question when the foreign award can be considered to have become binding 
for the purposes o f Art. V(l)(e), Saudi arbitration law, as stated above, is silent in 
relation to this matter. Therefore, it is worth outlining the Shari 'ah position thereon. 
According to the prevailing perspective of Shari 'ah Scholars, including the Hanafis, 
Malikis, most of Shafts and Hanbalis, an arbitral award once issued by an arbitrator 
binds the parties to the arbitration and becomes enforceable, just like an ordinary 
judgement. Binding character is conferred on the award once it is rendered by the 
arbitrator without need of confirmation by the relevant court. The rationale of this 
principle is that the outcome o f arbitration is regarded as an outcome of a binding 
ageem ent in Shari’ah. The opponents freely appointed the arbitrator to arbitrate 
between them, and accepted his authority over their dispute. Thus, his award must 
bind them absolutely, and must be enforced as a consequence of canying out their 
arbitral ageement, since Allah the Almighty generally enjoins in Q ur’an that “O you 
who believe! Fulfil (your) obligation”. Moreover, it is said that an arbitrator is just 
like an ordinary judge, and his award is binding upon the parties to arbitration, 
otheiwise it would render the whole arbitration useless and simply a delaying device 
and a waste o f money, time and effort. Furthermore and more sigiificantly, the
See, the 9th Administrative Panel, decision No. 32/D/A/9 dated 1918 H (1997); the 25th Subsidiary 
Panel, decision No. ll/D /F /25  dated 1417 H (1996); the 2nd Review Committee, decision No. 208/T/2 
dated 1418 H (1997).
See, in general, S Saleh, Commercial arbitration in the Arab Middle East : Shari'a, Lebanon, Syria 
and Egypt (2nd edn, Hart, Oxford 2006) 68; Al-Qaradaghi, 'The General Principles o f  Arbitration in 
Islamic Fiqh ' pp 29, 35; Aag Beeg, 'Arbitration in Islamic Shari'ah and Islamic Fiqh ' 23; Al-Nashmi, 
'International Arbitration and Arbitrating in Islamic Shari'ah' 28; Al-Sartawy, 'The Scope of 
Ai'bitration and the Power o f  the Aibitrator' pp 9, 16; Gattorah, Arbitration in the Light o f  the Islamic 
Shari'ah 84; A El-Alidab, Arbitration: Its Provisions and Sources (Noful Paris 1990 "in Arabic") vol 1 
p 89; Rifat, National and International Commercial Arbitration in the Kingdom o f  Saudi Arabia pp 
72-73.
The Qur’an, ATMa'idah [5:1].
See, Al-Sartawy, 'The Scope o f Arbitration and the Power o f  the Arbitrator' 16; Rifat, National and 
International Commercial Arbitration in the Kingdom o f  Saudi Arabia ' pp 70-72; Z Al-Zaid,
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majority of Islamic Jurisprudents support the view that an arbitral award should not 
be, in principle, subject to judicial review (i.e. on the basis of error of fact or law), and 
cannot be revoked by the court, unless it involves obvious unfairness or breach of the 
basic principles of Shari'ah. This principle has been officially affirmed by the 
Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA), which says that an arbitral award, once issued, is 
binding and must be respected by all parties to the arbitration, without being subject 
to judicial revocation, unless it constitutes a clear injustice or breach of the Shari’ah 
principles.
The same principle has been followed in several cases by Saudi courts in enforcing 
foreign arbitral awards. In first case, a Saudi enforcing court (the 9^ ’’ Administrative 
Panel) stated that an arbitral award becomes binding once is rendered, according to 
the majority of Scholars of Islamic Jurisprudence. Similarly, another Saudi 
enforeing court (the 25^ *^  Subsidiary Panel) conceded that a foreigi award rendered in 
Jordan by a sole arbitrator appointed by the ICCA became final when confirmed by 
the general secretary of the ICCA in Paris, and was therefore enforceable under the 
NYC in SA. This approach was then affinned by the Appeal Court. Yet, it is 
not clear what the Courts exactly meant by ‘final’ here. The best g e s s  is that the 
courts intended to embrace the general view of Shari’ah Scholars that an award binds 
the parties and is not subject to judicial reviews. In the third case that came before a 
Saudi enforcing court (the 18^ '’ Administrative Panel), a Saudi party opposed 
enforcement of an Egyptian award on several grounds, one o f which was that the 
award had not become binding since an appeal was still taking place in the Egyptian 
courts. The Saudi Court however rejected this objection, holding that the binding
'Arbitration; Its Definition and its Importance ’ (Session o f  the Shariah and law Principles o f 
Arbitration, Riyadh 2002 'in Arabic’ ) 12.
See, in general, Al-Zaid, 'Arbitration; Its Definition and its Importance ' 14; A Al-Sadan,
'Enforcement o f  Ai'bitral Awards and its Difficulties ' (Symposium o f Conciliation and Arbitration, 
AlTaif Saudi Ai'abia 2004 'in Arabic') 29; Rifat, National and International Commercial Arbitration in 
the Kingdom o f  Saudi Arabia  pp 72-73; Al-Qaradaghi, 'The General Principles o f Arbitration in 
Islamic Fiqh ' pp 29, 35; Aag Beeg, 'Arbitration in Islamic Shari'ah and Islamic Fiqh ' pp 23-24; Al- 
Sartawy, 'The Scope o f Arbitration and the Power o f  the Arbitrator' 16; El-Alidab, Arbitration: Its 
Provisions and Sources vol 1 p 88.
The Islamic Fiqh Academy, 'Decision No. 91 (8/9) About the Principle o f  Arbitration in Islamic 
Fiqh'(1996) 2 (9) Islamic Fiqh Academy Journal 5. paras I, 5.
the 9th Administrative Panel, decision No. 32/D/A/9 dated 1918 H (1997) p 11.
the 25th Subsidiaiy Panel, decision No. 1 l/D/F/25 dated 1417 H (1996) p 5.
the 2nd Review Committee, decision No. 208/T/2 dated 1418 H (1997) 5.
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nature of the award was not affected by the existence of means of recourse against the 
award in its country of origin, a factor which does not block enforcement of a fo re ig  
award in SA. This decision was afterwards affirmed by the Appeal Court.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that Saudi courts adopt a friendly principle 
under the Shari’ah that an arbitral award becomes binding once it is issued by the 
arbitrator, and becomes enforceable in SA without need for a previous leave of 
enforcement or a fonual confirmation by the court in the arbitral seat. It also 
illustrates that Saudi courts follow the principle that an award is enforceable even if it 
is still open or subject to an appeal in its country of origin.
8.5.2 Setting Sside and Suspension
As regards the issue of setting aside or suspension the award, there are no provisions 
nor case law available to shed light on the attitude of the Saudi courts regarding the 
 ^enforcement of an award that has been set aside or suspended in its country of origin. 
Thus, it has been alleged that it is difficult to enforce such an award in SA. One 
author contended that grounds for annulment remain governed exclusively by national 
laws which are extremely diverse, ranging fi'om the clear and liberal provisions of the 
French Code of Civil Procedure to the unpredictable and conservative provision of the 
Saudi Arbitration R eglation which empower the Saudi Courts to hear challenge the 
award without, however, listing the gounds for the challenge. ’
Yet, the opposite could be a rg ed , and not listing the gounds under the Saudi law for 
challenging domestic awards can be seen as an advantage for supporting the 
enforcement of annulled fo re ig  awards in SA. This is because the fact that Saudi law 
does not specify gounds of challenge means it implicitly refers to the Shari’ah rule, 
which does not allow courts to review or vacate arbitral awards, unless in exceptional 
cases such as plain unfairness. Thus from a theoretical point of view, one may suggest 
that enforcement of award which have been set aside or suspended might be possible 
in SA under the application of Art. VII of the NYC (i.e. the more-favourable-
the 18th Subsidiary Panel, decision No. 8/D/F/18 dated 1424 H (2003) pp 5-6. 
the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 36/T/4 dated 1425 H (2004).
 ^ Gharavi, The International Effectiveness o f  the Annulment o f  an Arbitral Award  pp 39, 115.
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provision) for two reasons. Firstly, because Saudi domestic law, like French law, does 
not explicitly nor implicitly contain annulment or suspension of an award as a gound 
for refusing enforcement. Secondly, according to the principle adopted by the 
majority of Shari’ah scholars, an arbitral award once rendered would not be liable to 
challenge or revocation by the court, unless it violates essential principles of the 
Shari ’ah such as clear injustice.
Finally, it may be observed that, as was seen above, when a Saudi party requested the 
Saudi enforcing court (the 18'*’ Administrative Panel) to refuse enforcement of the 
fo re ig  award because of an appeal against the award in Egypt where it was made, the 
Court, not only declined to refuse enforcement, but did not adjourn its decision on 
enforcement until the appeal was resolved as provided in Art. VI. This case may 
indicate that the Saudi courts are willing to enforce a fo re ig  award even if it has been 
suspended in its country of origin.
8.6 Conclusion
According to the first part of Art. V(l)(e), enforcement of a foreign award may be 
refused if it has not become binding. This however does not require a previous leave 
of enforcement or a formal confinnation from the court of the country of the 
arbitration seat, the so-called “double exequatur”. This has almost unanimously been 
affinned by the courts including the Saudi Courts.
On the question of when a foreign award can be deemed as to have become binding, 
there are diverse views. Some courts refeiTed to the applicable law of the country of 
the arbitration to resolve this issue. Others interpret the word binding as autonomous 
of the law o f that state. The latter approach has given raise to several alternative 
interpretations, the prevailing inteipretation being that the award becomes binding 
when it is no longer open to a genuine appeal on the merits (i.e. ordinary recourse) to 
a second arbitral tribunal or to a court. A few courts and authors believe that the 
award should be considered binding in so far as it no longer subject to an appeal to a 
second arbitral tribunal, whereas a handful consider the award to be binding as soon 
as it is rendered even if it is still open to any further means of recourse. The latter 
approach is adopted by the majority of scholars of the Shari’ah, and has been
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followed by the Saudi courts on several occasions. To the best knowledge, no award 
has ever been refused enforcement on this ground.
According to the second part of Art. V(l)(e), enforcement of a fo re ig  award may be 
refused if it has been set aside or suspended by the competent court of the country of 
origin. Such setting aside and suspension must be have been effectively decided by a 
court in its country of origin in order to constitute a gound for refusing enforcement 
under Art.V(l)(e). Thus, the mere raising of an action to annul or suspend the award 
is not a gound for refusing enforcement under Art. V(l)(e), although it is a gound 
for a possible adjournment under Art. VI. Moreover, automatic suspension of an 
award by the operation of law in the country where the award was made has been 
generally considered to be insufficient for enforcement to be refused under Art. 
V(l)(e). This gound has also rarely seen enforcement being refused.
Although the gound that the award was set aside has been rarely invoked to oppose 
enforcement, it has been successfully invoked in a number of cases. However, courts 
in France, Austria and the US have shown themselves willing to enforce arbitral 
awards even if the have been set aside in their country of origin, relying on (i) the 
discretionary power of the enforcing court provided by the pemiissive langage (i.e. 
may) of Art. V(l), and (ii) the more-favourable-provision principle stated by Art. 
VII(l).
There is considerable controversy as to whether the previous annulment of an award 
in its country of origin should block its enforcement in other countries under the 
NYC. The most conseiwative view is that such an annulment should, as a matter of 
principle, block enforcement. Another view is that such an annulment should be 
totally disregarded. A third view is that enforcement of annulled awards should be left 
to the discretion of the enforcing court. The final approach is that if the annulment is 
based on gounds that similar to those listed in Art. V(l)(a-d) ( i.e. international 
standards of annulment), then it may block enforcement in other countries, but the 
application of national standards of annulment should be disregarded internationally.
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CHAPTER NINE 
N on-Arbitrability
9.1 Introduction
The sixth gound for refusal of enforcement is non-arbitrability. Having discussed the 
gounds o f Art. V(l)(a-e), which must be raised and proven by the party resisting 
enforcement, it is now time to consider the gounds set forth in Art. V(2)(a-b) which 
can be raised by the enforcing court of its own motion to safegard the ftmdamental 
values of the country where enforcement is sought. These gounds are the non­
arbitrability of the dispute and the fact the award breaches public policy. The 
arbitrability of the dispute is a precondition of the validity of both the arbitration 
ageem ent and the arbitral award. Thus, Art. V (l) lays down that:
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if 
the competent authority in the country where recogition and enforcement 
is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter o f the difference is not capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the law of that country. '
This chapter is devoted to the examination of several important matters concerning 
non-arbitrability as a gound for refusing enforcement of foreigi arbitral awards under 
Art. V(2)(a) of the NYC. It first discusses the relationship between the arbitrability 
and public policy defences. Secondly, it examines the question of what system of law 
is applicable to determine whether a matter is arbitrable or not. Thirdly, it outlines the 
diversity o f national laws regarding the issue of arbitrability. Fourth, it points out the 
distinction between domestic and international arbitrability. Fifth, it examines 
relevant case law. Finally, the Saudi Arabian position regarding the question of 
arbitrability and its application as a gound for refusing enforcement of fo re ig  
awards will be highlighted.
' NYC o f 1958, Art,V(l)(a).
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9.2 The Relationship between Arbitrability and Public Policy
It may be though appropriate to ask at the outset whether arbitrability simply 
constitutes one aspect of public policy, and if so, whether non-arbitrability should be 
listed as a separate ground from public policy under Art. V(2)(l)? Many authors have 
a rg e d  that including non-arbitrability as a separate gound for refusing enforcement 
is superfluous, since its subject matter is deemed to form part of the concept of Public 
Policy under Art. V(2)(b).  ^ The legislative history of the NYC shows that the French 
delegate objected to the separation of inarbitrability from public policy on the gound 
that this could tempt a court “to give international application to rules which were of 
exclusively domestic validity and that the exception of incompatibility with public 
policy was quite sufficient”.  ^ Nonetheless, it was decided to retain inarbitrability as a 
separate defence under Art. V(2)(a), as proposed by the ICC draft of 1953 and the 
ECOSOC draft of 1955, following the Geneva Convention of 1927. ^
Other commentators are supporting the separation, a rg in g  that the inarbitrability 
gound derives from the exclusive jurisdiction of national courts. As such. Art. 
V(2)(a) aims to provide a type of scrutiny different from those provided by Art. 
V(2)(b). Art. V(2)(a) invokes the jurisdiction of a State authority, and constitutes an 
absolute procedural bar to the recogiition of an arbitral award, in*espective of its 
findings, whereas Art.V(2)(b) is concerned with the merits of awards, and with setting 
standards to be respected by arbitrators and their awards.  ^ In addition, non-
 ^ See, eg, Sanders, 'A Twenty Years Review o f the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement o f  
Foreign Ai'bitral Awards’ at 270; Gaja, International Commercial Arbitration para I.C.5; van den Berg, 
The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation pp 360, 
368; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration  para 1704; Garnett and others, International Commercial Arbitration  108 ; Redfem and 
Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  pp 149, 471; Lew, Mistelis and 
Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration  para 26-111; T Carbonneau, The 
Exuberant Pathway to Quixotic Internationalism: Assessing the Folly o f  Mitsubishi'! 1986) 19 
Vanderbilt Journal o f Transnational Law 265 at 270; A Sheppard, 'Interim Report on Public Policy as 
a Bar to Enforcement o f  International Arbitralawards' (International Law Association London 
Conference 2000) 15.
 ^UN Doc. E /C O N F.26/SR .llp7.
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 368.
 ^ Geneva Convention o f 1927, Art. 1(b).
 ^ See, H Ai'fazadeh, 'Arbitrability under the New York Convention: the Lex Fori Revisited'(2001) 17 
(1) Arb Inti 73 at 83.
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arbitrability relates both to the enforcement of the arbitral ageement and to the 
enforcement of the award, where the public policy defence applies only to the 
enforcement of the award.  ^ Moreover, no sigiificant difficulties have occurred in 
consequence of separating the non-arbitrability and public policy defences. ^
9.3 Law Applicable to Questions of Non-Arbitrability
The NYC requires a dispute to be arbitrable at both the pre-award stage in order to 
enforce the arbitral ageement, and the post-award stage in order to enforce a foreigi 
award. But while Art. 11(1) merely requires the arbitration ageement to concern ‘a 
subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration’ without indicating which law 
should determine the question of arbitrability, Art. V(2)(a) provides explicitly that it is 
a ground for resisting enforcement that “the subject matter of the difference is not 
capable of the settlement by arbitration under the law o f ’ the country where 
enforcement is sought.  ^ Thus, it is unanimously recogiised by the courts that the law 
of the country where enforcement of the award is sought must be applied to determine 
the question of the arbitrability of the dispute at the stage of enforcement of the 
award. Yet, some writers a r g e  that arbitrability may also be determined under 
some other law, such as the law to which the parties have subjected the arbitral 
ageem ent to or the law of the country where the award was rendered. * * The latter
 ^ Carbonneau, The Exuberant Pathway to Quixotic Internationalism: Assessing the Folly o f Mitsubishi' 
270.
® See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : TowatAs a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 369.
‘’ NYC o f 1958, Ai-t.V(2)(a).
See, eg, Italian Party v Swiss Company 828; Thyssen Haniel Logistic Inti GmbH v Barna 
Consignataria SL (2001) XXIV YBCA 851 (Spain Supreme Court 1998) 852; Consmaremma -  
Consorzio v Hermanos Escot M adrid SA 859; Audi-NSU Auto Union A,G v S. A. Adelin Petit & Cie 
(1980) V YBCA 257 (Belgium Supreme Court 1979); Nitron Inti Corp v Golden Panagia Maritime 
Inc (2000) XXV YBCA 924 (US District Court SD NY 1999) 927; Seven Seas Shipping Ltd v Tondo 
Limitada (2000) XXV YBCA 987 (US District Court SD NY 1999) 989; Société Van hopplynus v 
Société Coherent Inc (1997) XXII YBCA 637 (Belgium Court o f First Instance 1994) 640.
From writers also, see, eg, Arfazadeh, 'Aibitrability under the N ew York Convention: the Lex Fori 
Revisited' pp 74, 85; van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' (2003)' at 630; Di Pietro and Platte, 
Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 176; Lew,
Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration  para 26-113.
" See, in general, Gaja, International Commeixial Arbitration  para LC.5 and fh 82; van den Berg, The 
New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation  369.
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view has been strongly criticized. Not only is it out of line with the unanimous 
judicial opinion, but it also comes up against the fact that non-arbitrability is deemed 
so significant by the NYC that an enforcing court can raise the issue of its own 
motion. Furthennore, the language of Art. V(2)(a) is entirely straightfoward in 
refen'ing the question of arbitrability exclusively to the law of the country where 
enforcement of the award is sought, and a contrary interpretation is unthinkable. 
Moreover, as arbitrability is generally considered to fonn part of public policy, it 
would appear therefore logical that enforcing courts would only apply their national 
standards to the issue.
9.4 Non-Arbitrability in Domestic Laws
What is the justification for refeiTing the question of arbitrability to the national law 
of the country in which enforcement is sought? The primary reason appears to be that 
each country is entitled to determine which disputes must be resolved judicially, to 
ensure that essential domestic standards regarding social, moral, political and 
economic policy are not subject to potential compromise via non-judicial means of 
disputes settlement. Of course, this reference to the national law of the enforcing 
court means that a unifonn standard for what matters are or are not arbitrable is 
missing from the NYC. On the contrary, national laws often impose restrictions on 
what type of issues can be arbitrated, but those restrictions vary from country to 
country. Each country has its own concept of what disputes should be the exclusive 
domain of national courts and which can be refeiTed to and resolved by arbitration. 
Therefore, a number of subject maters which are arbitrable under the law of one state
See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 369; Gaja, International Commercial Arbitration fn 82.
However, inarbitrablity under the law governing the award may indirectly play a role at the 
enforcement stage under the NYC if the award has been set aside on the inhabitability defence in the 
country of origin. Enforcement may then be declined under Aid. V (l)(e) o f the NYC. See, van den 
Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation  369.
See, A Okekeifere, 'Public Policy And Arbitrability Under The UNCITRAL Model Law'(1999) 2 (2) 
Inti Arb L R 70 at 72; Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  
148; Davidson, Arbitration  373; P Baron and S Linigcr, 'A Second Look at Arbitrability'(2003) 19 (1) 
A lt  Inti 27.
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are not arbitrable in another state where the interests involved are deemed to be more 
important.
Examples of subject matters that are generally considered as non-arbitrable under 
national laws are matters of criminal or family law, protection of certain weaker 
parties, such as minor children, and the detennination of the status (e.g. insolvency or 
bankruptcy) of an individual or a corporate entity. In certain countries one may add to 
issues such as competition and anti-trust law, the determination of intellectual 
property rights, securities transactions, fraud, cormption, bribery (on a contract), 
disputes regarding investment in national resources and disputes involving the state or 
state entities that are not allowed to arbitrate at all or which require prior authorisation 
to do so.
In some countries, particularly those of a common law backgound, the issue of non­
arbitrability is governed by case law only, leading to uncertainty in areas where 
precedents are lacking. In other countries, particularly those of a civil law 
backgound, the issue is dealt with by statute. For example, Art. 2060 of the French 
Civil Code provides that:
It is not penuissible to submit to arbitration matters of civil status and 
capacity of individuals, or relating to divorce or judicial separation of 
spouses, or disputes concerning public communities and public 
establislunent, and, more general, all matters which concern public policy. 
However, certain categories of public establishment of an industrial or
See,in general, Gaja, International Commercial Arbitration  para para I.C.5; Lew, Mistelis and 
Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration  paras 9-2, 9-5; van den Berg, The New  
York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 369; Baron and 
Liniger, 'A Second Look at Arbitrability' 27; Bishop and Martin, 'Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral 
Awards’ 31 ; Red fern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  471.
See, eg, Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  149; Lew, 
Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration  paras 9-2, 9-6, 9-41; van den 
Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 369; 
"Qom, International Commercial Arbitration  246.
This is the case, eg, in US. See, Baron and Liniger, 'A Second Look at Arbitrability'28; Bora, 
International Commercial Arbitration  246.
This is the case, eg, in UK. See, Sutton and Gill, Russell on Arbitration  pp 12- 13; Davidson, 
Arbitration  61.
See, in general, UN Doc. A/CN.9/460 para 32; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International 
Commercial Arbitration  para 9-19; Soo, 'International Enforcement o f Ai'bitral Awards' at 257.
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commercial character may be authorized by decree to submit to 
arbitration.
Likewise, Ait. 806 of the Italian Code of Civil procedure provides:
The parties may have the disputes arising between them decided by 
arbitrators, with the exception of the disputes provided for in Articles 409 
[i.e. individual labour disputes] and 442, 1 [i.e. social security and 
obligatory medical aid] those concerning issues of personal status and 
marital separation and those other disputes which may not be the subject 
of a settlement.
Chinese Arbitration law also establishes under Art. 3 that: “The following disputes 
may not be arbitrated: (1) Marital, adoption, guardianship, support and succession 
disputes; (2) administrative disputes that shall be handled by administrative organs as 
prescribed by law”.
It can be obseiwed that excluding certain issues from the scope of arbitration reflects 
the fundamental policies of most countries. An example would be a foreigi award 
ganting divorce, while other non-arbitrable issues, such as disputes regarding 
financial provision on divorce, are less fundamentally objectionable. Similarly, 
while criminal liability is obviously not capable of private resolution, given the public 
interest therein, there is no reason why the civil consequences of criminal behaviour 
should not be arbitrable. Thus, it has been held that in order to consider a matter as 
non-arbitrable by the enforcing court, the special national interest must be more than 
incidentally involved in the resolution of dispute. Equally, the mere fact that an 
issue of national interest may incidentally figure in the resolution of foreign 
arbitration proceedings for a breach of contract claim does not make the dispute non- 
arbitrable. Rather, certain categories of claims may be non-arbitrable beeause of the 
special national interest vested in their resolution.
French New Code o f Civil Procedure o f 1981, Ai't. 2060.
Italian Code o f  Civil procedure, Art.806.
Chinese Arbitration Law o f  1994, Art. 3.
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration para 1706.
24 See, Davidson, Arbitration 61.
Parsons & Whittemore Overse 
Arbitral Awards' 29; van den Berg, 'The Application o f the N ew York Convention by the Courts' 374.
as Co v RAKTA 975; Bishop and Martin, 'Enforcement o f Foreign
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9.5 The Distinction between Domestic and International Arbitrability
The NYC makes no distinction between domestic and international arbitrability, as 
Ai*t.V(2)(a) simply refers the question of arbitrability to the national law of the 
country in which enforcement is sought. Thus, it was generally accepted that 
contracting countries were entirely free to detennine disputes that are not capable of 
resolution by arbitration in their own realm for the purpose of Art.V(2)(a). However, 
there is an increasing trend in recent times to distinguish between national and 
international non-arbitrability in order to limit the scope of the latter concept. This 
means that what national law considers to be non-arbitrable in relation to domestic 
arbitration would not be necessarily deemed so in relation to international arbitration. 
Thus, enforcing courts should interpret the restrictions imposed by national law upon 
arbitrability nairowly if the arbitration is related to international transactions. The 
underlying rationale of this distinction is that the needs of international trade are 
different from those of domestic commerce. As seen above, the exclusion of some 
matters from arbitrability under national law reflects the political, social and 
economic prerogatives of the state and its general attitude towards arbitration. These 
elements would require a balance between the mainly domestic importance of 
reserving particular matters to be dealt with judicially, and the more general public 
interest of promoting international trade and comity through an effective means of 
dispute settlement. Such considerations have led to the conclusion that the scope of 
arbitrability in the international arbitration context may be wider than the purely 
national context. Thus several US cases have emphasised that the congressional 
interest in encouraging international trade and commerce through arbitration of
In favour o f this approach from courts, see, eg, Fritz Scherk v Alberto-Culver Co 417 US 506 (US 
Supreme Court 1974); Mitsubishi M otors Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc 473 US 614 (US 
Supreme Court 1985). In favour o f this approach from authors, see, eg, Gaja, International 
Commercial Arbitration para I.C.5; van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentai^' (2003)' 667; van den 
Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation  630; 
Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration 
para 1707; Carbonneau, 'The Exuberant Pathway to Quixotic Internationalism: Assessing the Folly of 
Mitsubishi' 271; Bom, International Commercial Arbitration  278; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration  para 26-113; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  
international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 176; Redfem and Hunter, Law  
and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  148; Bishop and Martin, 'Enforcement of 
Foreign Ai'bitral Awards' 26,
See, Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration para 9-35; Di 
Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 
178; Redfem and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 148; Baron and 
Liniger, 'A Second Look at Ai'bitrability'27.
Ch 9: Non-Arbitrability 254
transnational dispute (as manifested by the countries’ accession to the NYC) should 
prevail over any concern that such matters were intended to be specifically reseiwed 
for judicial resolution. In addition, this distinguishing between national and 
international non-arbitrability may be further supported by the fact that such a 
distinction appears to be one aspect of the recent trend of distinguishing between 
national and international public policy under Art. V(2)(b) of the NYC, which will 
be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Consequently, courts in several 
countries have considered subject matters, such as antitrust and securities 
transactions, to be arbitrable in international cases, although they are not capable of 
settlement by arbitration under national law.
However, the above distinction has been guffly  criticised on the gound that it 
compromises national interests in favour of the foreign policy objectives of the 
enforcing state.^^ It has been said that:
The doctrine that ... (the court wanted to affirm the unbounded scope of 
the arbitral internationalism) is excessive and does injustice to the 
domestic antitrust in public law by minimizing the public policy character 
of antitrust regulation. The spectre of the talisman is becoming all too 
real; if  such fundamental issue as antitrust matters (and RICO claims) can 
be submitted to arbitration, what possible limits could there be to the 
reach of arbitrability in the international (and also possibly in the 
domestic) context? The confiising and potentially dangerous shift of 
domestic public law concerns to the enforcement stage is likely to be 
ineffectual, destined to act as the shadow of a safeguard rather than a
genuine means of protection The court’s rush to eradicate all national
legal constraints not only compromises legitimate national concerns, but 
also threatens the integrity of international arbitral adjudication itself, 
ft'ustrating its normal tendency to seek gndance and appropriate limits 
from external factors. The court’s failure to acknowledge logical, sensible 
and necessary restraints countermands the basic consensus o f the New 
York Arbitration Convention and moves closer to placing international
See, Garnett and oihQV&Nnternational Commercial Arbitration  108.
See, in general, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration  para 1707; van den Berg, 'Consolidated Connnentaiy' (2003)' 667.
See, infra ch 10 para 10.5.
31 See, eg, Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc . 
See, eg, Fritz Scherk v Alberto-Culver Co ,
See, Garnett and others. International Commercial Arbitration
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dispute resolution thorough arbitration in a realm of “a national” 
lawlessness.
Given the tendency to distinguish between national and international arbitrability in 
order to broaden the scope of the latter, several commentators have suggested that 
attempts should be made to draw up a generally acceptable list of non-arbitrable 
subject matters in the context of international arbitration in order to reduce the risk of 
uncertainty caused by the diversity in the laws of contracting states regarding non­
arbitrability, and to establish a unifonn international standard for the application of 
the non-arbitrability defence under Art. V(2)(a). It was added that if  such unifonnity 
seems unfeasible, then each state should at least make a list of non-arbitrable claims 
so as to provide certainty and easy access to information about such issues. 
Proponents concluded that if neither suggestion seemed feasible, a mere attempt in 
that direction would be desirable, since the result of a world-wide discussion would in 
itself be revealing and usefnl.
The above proposals, however, provoked criticism from several distinguished 
commentators on the NYC who believe that the creation of such lists is highly 
unlikely, even if they were restricted to three or four items. In particular, Prof 
van den Berg stated that establishing a list of non-arbitrable matters for each 
Contracting State will prove to be difficult since the basic question of which matters 
are non-arbitrable is still unclear in various states. Moreover even where the law is 
clear, a list could not easily lay down all the necessary kinds of subtle distinctions 
within the law. He continues that it would be difficult to reduce to writing all cases in 
which the distinction between domestic and international public policy could be
Carbonneau, 'The Exuberant Pathway to Quixotic Internationalism: Assessing the Folly of 
Mitsubishi' pp 297-98.
See, UN Doc. A/CN.9/64 para 172; UN Doc. A/CN.9/460 paras 33-34; G Griffith, 'Possible issues 
for an annex to the UNCITRAL Model Law' (Enforcing arbitration awards under the New York 
Convention: experience and prospects 1998) 46. See, also in general, Sanders, The work o f  UNCITRAL 
168; van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 375.
See, Sanders, The work o f  UNCITRAL 168; van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  
1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 375; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, 
Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration para 1709; Okekeifere, 'Public Policy 
And Ai'bitrability Under The UNCITRAL Model Law' 77.
See, Sanders, The work o f  UNCITRAL 168.
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made. In addition, such a list would vitiate instead of improving the existing situation, 
as it may tempt States to reverse the order by considering as arbitrable only the claims 
expressly laid down in the list. Therefore, the question to which extent the 
distinction between domestic and international arbitrability can be applied or, more 
precisely, the question which subject issues are arbitrable under the international 
standard remains unclear.
Finally, mention may be made of the fact that a further definition of the scope of non­
arbitrability or, in other words, a further restriction on the field of arbitrability can be 
found when a contracting state has used the second reservation of Art. I (3) of the 
NYC which allows the state at the time of adherence to the Convention to “declare 
that it will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, 
whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the national 
law of the State making such declaration”. 44 States from 137 contracting States 
have used this reseiwation so far, which may lead to a potential exclusion of any 
non-commercial disputes, such as civil, labour and governmental disputes, from the 
application of the NYC.
9.6 Case Law
Notwithstanding the diversity of contracting countries regarding non-arbitrability and 
the consequent lack of unifonnity under the NYC, the non-arbitrability defence has 
been invoked in relatively few cases. It has been argied that this is mainly due to
van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 375.
NYC o f 1958, Ai't.I(3). See, also, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : 
Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation pp 373-74.
UNCTIRAL, 'Status; 1958 - Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral 
Awards' .
eg, A US District Court has declined a motion to refer dispute over the salvage o f a U.S. warship to 
arbitration in London, holding that relation arising out o f  the activities o f warship have never been 
deemed as commercial, and the US used the commercial reservation laid down in Art. I (3) o f the 
NYC. See, BV Bureau Wijsmuller v United States 291.
See, van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' (2003)' 666; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, 
Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration  para 1708; Bishop and Martin, 
'Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards' 31; Sajko, 'The New York Arbitration Convention o f 1958 
from the Yugoslav Point o f View: Selected Issues' 208.
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the application of the distinction between domestic and international public policy. 
Yet, the main reason appears to be that the non-arbitrability defence is often raised at 
the pre-award more than at the enforcement stage.
In confonnity with the principle of inteipreting Art. V narrowly and the principle of 
distinction between domestic and international aipitrability, national courts have often 
reftised to decline enforcement of foreign awards on the basis of non-arbitrability. 
For example, a US court of appeals in Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v RAKTA 
rejected the defendant’ argument against enforcing a foreign award that the dispute 
sigiificantly affected US foreigi policy, specifically with Egypt with whom the US 
had severed relations. The court held that “simply because acts of the United States 
are somehow implicated in a case one cannot conclude that the United States is rightly 
interested in its outcome.” The court thus concluded that “there is no special national 
interest in judicial, rather than arbitral, resolution of the breach of contract claim 
underlying the award in this ease.”
On the other hand, the defence of non-arbitrability has been successfully invoked only 
in few cases. An exceptional example of a successful attempt to invoke Art. V(2)(a) 
is a case in which a dispute regarding the temiination of an exclusive distributorship 
agreement was held to be non-arbitrable. In this case, Audi (a Gennan car 
manufacturer) terminated the distributorship of their Belgian distributor and 
commenced arbitration in Zurich as provided for by the arbitration agreement. The 
arbitral tribunal rendered its award in favour of Audi holding that the agreement was 
duly terminated and the distributor was not entitled to recover any damages from 
Audi. However, the Belgian Supreme Court relied on Art. V(2)(a) to refuse 
enforcement of the award in view of the need for protection of the Belgian agency as
van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' (2003)' 667.
See, eg, Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v RAKTA ; X  (Syria) v X  (Germany Court o f  Appeal 
1998) 669; Exclusive Distributor (Spain) v Seller (Germany) (2004) XXIX YBCA 715 (Germany 
Court o f Appeal 2000) 719; Italian Party v Swiss Company 828; Fincantieri-Cantieri navali italiani 
SpA and Oto M elara SpA v M  and arbitral tribunal (1995) XX YBCA 766 (Switzerland Supreme 
Court 1992) 770.
45 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v RAKTA 975.
See, for successful invocation o f  the non-arbitrability ground, Audi-NSU Auto Union A.G v S. A. 
Adelin Petit & Cie ; Scherk Enterprises Aktiengesellschaft v Société des Grands Marques (1979) IV 
YBCA 286 (Italy 1977) 288; Libyan Ainerican Oil Co v Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiiya  482 
FSupp 1175 (US District Court D.Colum 1980); Eddie Javor & Fusion- Crete Inc v Luke Francoeur & 
Fusion- Crete Products Inc (2004) XXIX YBCA 596 (Canada Supreme Court 2003) 602.
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the weaker party. It noted that according to the Belgian law of the Unilateral 
Tennination of Concession for Exclusive Distributorships for an Indefinite Time, any 
disputes arise out of this law are exclusively reserved for the judicial resolution of the 
Belgian courts.
A further exceptional example of refusal of enforcement on the gound of non­
arbitrability emerges in LIAMCO v Libya where Libya nationalized LIAMCO’s 
assets within Libya. To resist this process, LIAMCO sought to arbitrate as provided 
for in the concession agreement. The arbitration ended with an award in favour of 
LIAMCO, but the US district court refused to enforce it against Libya on the gound 
that Libya’s nationalization, being an act of state, is a subject matter not capable of 
being resolved by a private arbitral tribunal. The court noted that:
Had this question been brought before this court initially, the court could
not have ordered the parties to submit to arbitration because in so doing it
would have been compelled to mle on the validity of the Libyan
nationalization law ... [which would therefore breach] the act of state 
j  j .  ■ 49doctrine.
Likewise, the Italian supreme court has refiised to enforce a foreign award rendered in 
Zurich regarding trade marks disputes on the gound that such disputes are deemed 
not arbitrable under Italian law.
9.7 The Position in Saudi Arabia
9.7.1 Non-Arbitrability under Saudi Laws
How would the Saudi courts deal with the non-arbitrability defence under Art. 
V(2)(a)? The SAL of 1983 sets forth a general rule regarding the domain of 
arbitrability, rather than listing the non-arbitrable matters. So, Art. 2 of that Law states
Audi-NSU Auto Union A.G v S. A. Adelin Petit & Cie .
Libyan American Oil Co v Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahitya . 
'•Ubid 1178.
Scherk Enterprises Aktiengesellschaft v Société des Grands Marques 288.
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that “Arbitration shall not be permitted in cases where conciliation is not allowed.” 
But what are these cases in which conciliation is not pennitted? Art. 1 of the IRSAL 
of 1985 offers some examples, providing, “Arbitration in matters wherein conciliation 
is not permitted, such as hudoud, laan between spouses, and all matters relating to the 
public order, shall not be accepted.” Hudoud means the prescribed or fixed 
punishments for certain crimes, such as theft, adultery, alcohol drinking and Highway 
robbery. Laan (divorce because of adultery) means a fonu of separation that happens 
between a husband and wife after five oaths which are taken by both spouses if one 
accuses the other of committing adultery.
Why does Saudi arbitration Law use the capability for conciliation as the measure of 
arbitrability? There is an Islamic jurispmdential backgiound behind the adoption of 
that criterion, since the schools of Islamic jurisprudence differ on the question of 
arbitrability. The Hanbali School adopts the view that arbitration is allowed in all 
disputes that can be resolved by the court since the arbitrator is just like a judge. 
But the majority of Islamic Jurisprudential schools (including Hanafi, Maliki and 
Shafi) agree generally that any rights that can be subject to compromise, conciliation 
or forgiveness by people are arbitrable and vice versa. They generally agree that 
matters representing the right of God, such as fixed punislrments, are not capable of 
settlement by arbitration since these matters have a public dimension and thus cannot 
be subject to compromise, forgiveness or conciliation except by the government or its 
representative (i.e. the competent court), whereas matters of purely private right such 
as property dispute are arbitrable, since such rights are of purely private interest and 
therefore can be subject to forgiveness, compromise and conciliation. So their 
justification is based on the giound that arbitration is not permitted in matters other 
than those in which the adversaries may relinquish or compromise their rights. Yet,
S A L o f 1983, Art. 2.
IR SA L of 1985, Art. 1.
”  See, Al-Zaid, 'Arbitration; Its Definition and its Importance ' pp 10-11; Al-Hasen, The Shari’ah 
Rules o f  Arbitration  38; Gattorah, Arbitration in the Light o f  the Islamic Shari'ah 82; Jameel, 
'Ai'bitration In Islamic Shari'ah and its Important o f Settling Disputes ' pp 19-21; Al-Naslimi, 
'International Ar bitration and Ai'bitrating in Islamic Shari'ah' 18; Al-Sartawy, 'The Scope o f Arbitration 
and the Power o f the Arbitrator' 7.
See, Al-Hasen, The Shari'ah Rules o f  Arbitration 38; Gattorah, Arbitration in the Light o f  the 
Islamic Shari'ah pp 75-83; Aag Beeg, 'Arbitration in Islamic Shari'ah and Islamic Fiqh ' pp 17-20; 
Jameel, 'Arbitration In Islamic Shari'ah and its Important o f Settling Disputes ' pp 19-21; Al-Nashmi,
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they differ on matters of mixed rights. For example, Qisas (retribution or punishment 
for murder) has a right of God (i.e. a public right) because it concerns the security and 
safety of the whole community. On the other hand, it contains rights of individuals 
(private rights), as the next of kin of a murder vietim are recommended to forgive the 
murderer or to compromise the matter with him, rather than insisting on their right 
that the murderer be executed by the Islamic mling authority. The opinion that 
appears to cany more weight regarding mixed rights is that if the subject matters is 
closer to a right of God then it is not arbitrable. But if it is closer to an individual right 
then it would be arbitrable. Saudi arbitration law thus use the capability for 
conciliation as a determining factor of arbitrability in order to draw the attention to the 
fact that although the Hanbali School is officially followed in SA, the law here 
however follows the approaeh of other Islamic Jurisprudential schools regarding the 
question of arbitrability.
Thus, Art. 2 of the SAL and Art. 1 of its Implementation have been inteipreted to 
ex elude criminal issues and some family matters. Criminal issues such as Hudoud 
(fixed punishments), Tazir (discretionary punishments), Qadhf (libel) as well as Qisas 
(punishment of murderers) are all reseiwed to the jurisdiction of courts only. Some 
family matters such as, laan (divorce because of adultery), nasab (descent), whether a 
person is an inheritor or not, custody or guardianship over an infant, and whether a 
maiTiage contract is valid are deemed to be not eligible for arbitration. However, 
the financial consequences of a void m ami age or the evaluation of the amount of 
alimony to be paid are allowed to be settled by arbitration.
In addition, issues pertaining to public order are not arbitrable by the virtue of Art. 3 
of the SAL and Art. 1 of the IRSAL of 1985. This means that disputes relating to the 
government authorities or agencies are within the expulsive competence of the Board
'International Arbitration and Arbitrating in Islamic Shari'ah' pp 18-19; Al-Sartawy, 'The Scope of  
Arbitration and the Power o f the Arbitrator' pp 4-7.
See, Al-Zaid, 'Arbitration; Its Definition and its Importance ' 11; Al-Hasen, The Shari'ah Rules o f  
Arbitration  37.
See, A Al-Rodaiman, 'Arbitration law and its procedures in the Kingdome o f Saudi Ar abia ' (Session 
o f  the Shariah and law Principles o f  Arbitration Riyadh 2002 'in Arabic' ) 4; El-AIidab, 'Arbitration in 
Saudi Arabia under the New Arbitration Act, 1983 and its Implementation Rules o f  1985: Part 1' pp 37- 
38.
El-Alldab, 'Arbitration in Saudi Aiabia under the New Arbitration Act, 1983 and its Implementation 
Rules o f 1985: Part 1 'part one 38.
Ch 9: Non-Arbitrability 261
of Grievance and cannot be referred to arbitration, unless the consent of the President 
of the Council of Ministers is obtained. Yet, this restriction on Saudi government 
authorities might have less practical importance in the context of international 
arbitration, as seen earlier.
On the other hand (apart from the subjects mentioned above), all other disputes (e.g. 
commercial , civil and labour disputes) are considered as being capable o f resolution 
by arbitration since they can be subject to conciliation. In this regard and as far as 
the NYC is concerned, it is to be noted that unlike many contracting States, SA did 
not use the second resei*vation contained in Art. 1(3) of the NYC to restrict the 
application of the NYC to commercial disputes only.
Finally, it may be worth mentioning that some writers have submitted that some 
commercial disputes such as disputes amongst partners of a company or between a 
company and its partners, disputes concerning commercial agency contracts, and 
disputes between a foreign contractor and his Saudi sponsor are not allowed to be 
arbitrated according to various Saudi regulations. However, this submission seems 
to be without merit, as these restrictions are no longer valid, having been made before 
the SAL of 1985 and its implementation of 1985 which contain no such restrictions. 
Besides, the broad field of arbitration under the Hanbali School has it own direction 
and should take into consideration when interpreting the non-arbitrable issues under 
the Saudi arbitration, since the Hanbali doctrine is officially adopted in SA.
9.7.2 Case Law
The non-arbitrability defence has been invoked against enforcement in the Saudi 
courts in two cases. In the first one, a Saudi enforcing court (the 18^ *’ Subsidiary 
Panel) rejected an attempt to block enforcement of an award concerning the building
See, SAL of 1983, Art.3; IRSAL o f  1985, Art.8; Turck, 'Saudi Arabia '11.
See, supra Ch 3 para 3.9.2
See, Z Alqurashi, 'Ai'bitration Under the Islamic Sharia'(2003) 1 (2) Oil, Gas & Energy Law 
Intelligence , para 5.4; El-Alidab, 'Arbitration in Saudi Arabia under the N ew Arbitration Act, 1983 and 
its Implementation Rules o f  1985: Part 1' 8; Turek, 'Saudi Arabia '11.
See, El-Ahdab, 'Arbitration in Saudi Arabia under the New Arbitration Act, 1983 and its 
Implementation Rules o f  1985: Part 1' 9; Turck, 'Saudi Arabia ' pp 11-13.
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of a wall around a university and the purchase of land, holding that these subject 
matters are deemed to be capable of settlement by arbitration. In the second case, 
another Saudi university opposed enforcement of an award rendered in favour of a 
Dutch company. It based its objection mainly on the ground that the dispute was not 
allowed to be resolved by arbitration because a university is a government body 
belonging to the Saudi High Education Ministry and Saudi Law bans the government 
bodies hom resorting to arbitration. A Saudi enforcing court (The Administrative 
Panel) agieed with the university that, as a matter of Saudi law, the disputes are 
relating to administrative or governmental matters and therefore not arbitrable, as a 
role, but reseiwed to jurisdiction of the Board of Grievance. However, the Court held 
that sinee the contract between the university and the company contained an 
arbitration clause, and the University had participated in the arbitral procedure, it was 
not fair to accept the University’s objection of non-arbitrability after the award had 
been made against it. The Court supported its conclusion by relying on the principles 
of Shari 'ah to achieve a just result by the virtue of the following principles. First, the 
Shari ’ah provision emphatically upholds the moral obligation to ftilftl one’s contracts 
and undertakings, as expressed in the Q ur’an: “O you who believe! Fulfil all 
obligation” as well as in Prophet’s Hadith: “Muslims are bound by their clauses 
except for a stipulation that makes the unlawftil lawful or makes the lawftil unlawful.” 
Secondly, the majority of Shari ’ah Scholars adopt the principle that the arbitral 
award is binding upon parties. As a consequence, the Court granted the Dutch 
Company’s petition to enforce the arbitral award against the Saudi University. This 
case is particularly significant in illustrating the attitude of the Saudi Courts that 
arbitrability should be accorded a wide scope, and in demonstrating their willingness 
to inteipret the restrictions imposed by Saudi law upon arbitrability very narrowly in 
the context of international arbitration.
9.8 Conclusion
the 18th Subsidiary Panel, decision No. 8/D/F/18 dated 1424 H (2003) p 5. 
The Qur'an, Al-Maidah [5:1].
Reported by Ibn Hibban, Sahih , no 257.
65 the 9th Administrative Panel, decision No. 32/D/A/9 dated 1918 II (1997) p 11.
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In this chapter, special attention was paid to the non-arbitrability ground under 
Art.V(2)(a) of the NYC. It was noted that, unlike the grounds listed under Art. V(l), 
an enforcing court may of its own motion to refuse enforcement on the grounds of 
non-arbitrability (Art.V(2)(a)) and breaching of public policy (Art.V(2)(b)) as they 
involve with the fondamental interests of the country where enforcement is sought. It 
was obseiwed that despite being listed as a separate ground under Art.V(2)(a), the 
non-arbitrability defence is generally deemed to form part of the principle of public 
policy under Art. V(2)(b).
As regards the applicable law, it was seen that courts had invariably taken the view 
that the question whether the subject matter of the dispute is arbitrable or not is to be 
determined by reference to the law of the country where enforcement is sought, as 
indeed is explicitly provided by Art. V(2)(a). Therefore, there is a lack of a uniform 
standard as to what matters may not be refoned to arbitration under the NYC, that 
question vary from country to country according to the domestic concept of 
arbitrability, albeit that there were certain matters that were usually non-arbitrable in 
any state. At the same time, there was found an increasing trend to distinguish 
national from international non-arbitrability in order to limit the latter scope. By this 
was meant that what national law considers to be non-arbitrable in relation to 
domestic arbitration would not be necessarily deemed so in relation to international 
arbitration, so that enforcing courts should see the scope of non-arbitrability as more 
limited in international cases. While suggestions that a general list of non-arbitrable 
subject matters in the context of international arbitration should be drafted have come 
to nothing thus far, courts have nonetheless generally interpreted domestic restrictions 
on arbitrability naiTowly in the context of international arbitration. This is a 
significant achievement for the application o f the NYC.
It was remarked that the non-arbitrability defence has been invoked in relatively few 
cases, and has rarely led to a refusal of enforcement a foreign award, although this 
may be due to the fact that non- arbitrability is more often raised at the pre-award 
more than the enforcement stage.
It was found that Saudi laws has a fairly wide view of arbitrability. Just as 
importantly, Saudi Courts have interpreted the non-arbitrability defence nanowly, 
favouring the enforcement of foreign awards. Therefore, in practice the non­
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arbitrability defence constitutes no real threat to the enforcement of foreign awards 
under Art. V(2)(a) of the NYC in SA.
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CHAPTER TEN 
Violation of Public Policy
10,1 Introduction
The seventh and final ground for refusing enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
enslii'ined in Art. V of the NYC is that enforcement of the award would violate the 
public policy of the enforcing Country. This is also the second of two grounds listed 
under Art. V (2) which may be raised by the enforcing court on its own motion, 
without a request of the party resisting enforcement. Accordingly, Art. V(2) of the 
NYC states that:
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refosed if 
the competent authority in the country where recogiition and enforcement 
is sought finds that:
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the 
public policy of that country. ^
This chapter aims to examine the public policy giound under Art. V(2)(b) of the 
NYC, concentrating on both relevant principles and judicial practice. It will firstly 
outline the importance of the public policy defence. Secondly, it will examine 
attempts to define public policy under Art. V(2)(b). Thirdly, it discusses the law 
applicable to that Public policy. Fourthly, the principle of distinction between national 
and international public policy will be examined by considering; (i) international 
public policy; (ii) transnational public policy. Fifthly, it will then deal with the issues 
that are commonly invoked in practice as violations of public Policy under Art. 
V(2)(b). Finally, the considerations relevant to the concept public policy giound and 
its application in Saudi Arabia will be focused on.
10. 2 The Importance of the Public Policy Defence
'N Y C  o f  1958, Ai-t.V(l)(b).
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Public policy is a well-known defence in international relationships. Indeed, it is 
deemed to be one of the most fundamental principles in private international law and 
is accepted by the law of every country.  ^ It is a means for a state to refuse to give 
effect to foreign acts, judgments or awards in its territory if they are found to be 
offensive to the basic principles of its own system.  ^ Therefore, the public policy 
giound has long been a basis for refusing enforcement, which can be found in almost 
every international convention  ^ and treaty pertaining to enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards.  ^ Accordingly, Art. V(2)(b) of the NYC establishes the public policy 
exception to enforcement as an acknowledgement of the power of each contracting 
state to exercise final control over foreign awards to ensure that the fundamental 
interests, policies, creeds and morals of that nation are safe from serious violations 
that may be caused by enforcements of foreign awards. ^
However, it should be obseiwed that while the NYC generally places significant 
emphasis on party autonomy under Art. V (l) in general, the public policy exception 
under Art. V (2)(b) indicates that such autonomy is not without limits. The Public 
policy principle thus defines the boundary between party autonomy in the settlement 
of disputes on the one hand and the interests of the forum state on the other, putting 
them in direct competition. ^
 ^ See, J Lew, 'Recognition and Enforcement o f  Arbitration Awards in England'(1976) 10 Inti Lawy 425 
at 432.
 ^ See, P Turne and J Paulsso, 'Grounds For Rehisal O f Recognition And Enforcement Under The New  
York Convention: A Comparative Approach' (UNCITRAL, Experts Group Meeting on Dispute 
Resolution and Corporate Governance, Vienna 2003) 7.
 ^ Apart from the Washington Convention o f 1965, on the Settlement o f  Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals o f Other States. See, Washington Convention o f 1965, Art. 52 and Ar t. 53(1).
 ^ See, van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 360; H Seriki, 'Enforcement o f  Foreiglm Arbitral Awards and Public Policy - a Note of 
Caution’(2000) 3 ADRLJ 192 at 195; ILA Committee on International Commercial Arbitration, 
'Interim Report on Public Policy as A Bar to Enforcement o f  International Arbitral Awards' (ILA 
Conference London 2000) 2.
cf. van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation 360.
’ See, Kroll, 'Recognition and Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards in Germany' at 172; A 
Barraclough and J Waincymer, 'Mandatory Rules o f Law in International Commercial 
Arbitration’(2005) 6 Melbourne J Inti L 205 pp 206, 243; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative 
International Commercial Arbitration  para 26-144; Delvolvâe, Rouche and Pointon, French 
arbitration law and practice  156.
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In addition, since the purpose behind the public policy ground in Art. V(2)(b) is 
generally acknowledged, it is rare to find suggestions that the giound should be 
removed entirely. Yet, is has been argued;
The public policy defence set forth in Article V(2)(b) of the New York 
Convention permits the circumvention of the Convention’s objective; the 
uniform enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. As this circumvention is 
contrary to the goals of the international community, the New York 
Convention should be amended to remove Article V(2)(b), thus giving the 
Convention its intended effect. ®
However, the above suggestion appears to be too simplistic to be realistic. One can 
hardly deny the necessity for each state to have the right to safeguard its most 
fundamental economic, legal, moral, political, religious and social standards in the 
context of international affairs. Indeed, the public policy defence allows states to 
adopt the NYC without sacrificing their basic national interests, and may be seen as 
one of the main reasons why it has been largely adopted by 137 countries.
10.3 Definition of Public Policy under Art. V(2)(b)
A key question is whether there is a definition of public policy under Art. V(2)(b). 
Although public policy (or ordre public) has been for a long time a giound for 
refiising enforcement of foreign laws, judgments and arbitral awards, there is no 
precise definition of its contents. This is not an unexpected fact as one of national 
public policy’s essential characteristics is its uncertainty and ambiguity, and its vague 
nature is hence well recognised. This because the principle o f public policy touches 
a very gi'eat variety of subjects, and its content changes as public convictions.
® Roy, 'The New York Convention and Saudi Arabia; Can a Country Use the Public Policy Defense to 
Reflise Enforcement o f  Non-Domestic Aihitral Awards?'at 953.
 ^ See, Redfem, 'Commercial Arbitration and Transnational Public Policy' pp 1-2; ILA Committee on 
International Commercial Arbitration, 'Interim Report on Public Policy as A Bar to Enforcement of 
International Arbitral Awards' 4; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration  para 26-115; Dicey, Morris and Collins, Conflict o f  Laws 642; A Sheppard, 'Public Policy 
and the Enforcement o f  Arbitral awards: Should there be a Global Standard?'(2004) 1 (1) Transnational 
Dispute management, para I.
See, P Lalive, 'Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Ai'bitration’ 
(ICCA Congress Series no 3 New York 1986) 309. Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international 
arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 179; M Buchanan, 'Public policy and
International Connnercial Ai'bitration'(1988) 26 (3) Am Bus L J 511 at 513.
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beliefs, and interests change fi'oin time to time and from country to country. 
Burroughs J. said in the 19^ '’ century in Richardson v Mellish that:
Public policy ... is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it 
you never know where it will carry you. It may lead you hom the sound 
law. It is never argued at all, but when other points fail.
Yet, it is said that the very ambiguity of public policy is intended to make its scope 
flexible so as to enable courts to decide its content in the light of changing national 
interests, needs, attitudes and convictions.
As far as Art. V(2)(b) is concerned, the NYC offers no definition of the term “public 
policy,” nor does it provide guidance as to how that tenn should be applied as a 
giound for refusing enforcement of foreign award. As a result, the public policy 
ground set forth in Art. V(2)(b) has created the most discussion and litigation, and 
often overlaps with other gi'ounds such as Art. V(l)(a) (capacity of the parties or 
invalid arbitral agi'eement). Art. V(l)(b) (violation of due process), Art. (l)(c) (excess 
of jurisdiction). Art. V(l)(d) (improper procedure or composition of the arbitral 
tribunal), and Art. V(2)(a) ( non-arbitrability).
It is generally accepted that the concept of the public policy is incapable of precise 
definition in the context of enforcement of arbitral awards. The English Court of 
Appeal in DST  v Rakoil emphasised that:
Considerations of public policy can never be exhaustively defined, but 
they should be approached with extreme caution. ... It has to be shown 
that there is some element of illegality or that the enforcement of the
See, Redfem, 'Commercial Arbitration and Transnational Public Policy' 2; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration  para 26-117; Sheppard, 'Public Policy and the 
Enforcement o f  Aihitral awards: Should there be a Global Standard?', para I.
Richardson v Mellish [1824-1834] All ER Rep 258 (UK Court o f Common Pleas ).
See, A Biah, 'Features and conditions o f  communication with the other; means and mechanisms' (We 
and Other 2006 'in Arabic'); Delvolvâe, Rouche and Pointon, French arbitration law and practice  156.
See, Bishop and Martin, 'Enforcement o f  Foreign Arbitral Awards' p 32.
See, ILA Committee on International Commercial Arbitration, 'Interim Report on Public Policy as A 
Bar to Enforcement o f International Arbitral Awards' p 4; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative 
International Commercial Arbitration  para 26-115; Dicey, Moiris and Collins, Conflict o f  Laws 642; 
Seriki, 'Enforcement o f  Foreighn Arbitral Awards and Public Policy - a Note o f Caution' 196; 
Sheppard, 'Public Policy and the Enforcement o f Arbitral awards: Should there be a Global Standard?', 
para I.
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award would be clearly injurious to the public good or, possibly, that 
enforcement would be wholly offensive to the ordinary reasonable and 
fully informed member of the public on whose behalf the powers of the 
State are exercised.
The same conclusion has been reached by the Indian Supreme Court in obseiwing that 
“the concept of what is for the public good or in the public interest or what is 
injurious or harmful to the public good or public interest has varied fi'om time to 
time”. Most recently, the Swiss Supreme Court observed, with regard to the use of 
public policy in the context of Art. V of the NYC and Art. 109(2) of the Swiss Law on 
Private International Law, that,
The fleeting character of public policy may be inherent to the concept, due 
to its excessive generality; the wide scope of the almost countless 
opinions proffered in this regard would tend to prove it ... . [A]ll attempts 
to answer the numerous recurring questions raised by the interpretation of 
this concept merely resulted in raising further thorny or polemical 
questions... .
On the other hand, there have been attempts to provide a general definition of the 
concept. The US Court of Appeals in Parsons v Whittemore defined public policy 
simply as “the forum state’s most basic nations of morality and justice”. A Russian 
district court concluded that the public policy of the Russian Federation would be 
breached only if the award violated “the basis of the State’s political and legal system 
and legal order of the Russian Federation”. A German court of appeal has stated 
that:
According to German law, an arbitral award only violates public policy 
(under Art. V(2)(b) of the NYC) when it violates a norm that regulates
Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft MBH  v Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Co [1987] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 246 (UK Court o f Appeal) 254.
Renusagar Renusagar Power Co. Ltd v General Electric Co (1995) XX YBCA 681 (India Supreme 
Court 1993) 696,
Tensaccia SPA v Freyssinet Terra Armata RL (Switzerland Supreme Court 2006, umeported ), cited 
in M Reisman, 'Law, International Public Policy (so-called) and Ai'bitral Choice in International 
Commercial Ai'bitration' (ICCA Congress Series no 18 Montreal 2006)13 fn 3 .
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v RAKTA . 974.
Kotraco v V /0 Rosvneshtorg (1998) XXIII YBCA 735 (Russian District Court 1995) 737. see also, 
Tume and Paulsso, 'Grounds For Refusal O f Recognition And Enforcement Under The N ew York 
Convention: A Comparative Approach' 9,
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state or economic principles or when it is unacceptable at odds with the
Gennan principles of justice. 21
The Egyptian Supreme Court considers public policy to consist of “social, political, 
economic or moral bases which relate to the supreme interests o f the community”, 
while the Korean Supreme Court suggests its basic tenet is to "protect the 
fundamental moral beliefs and social order of the enforcement country from being 
harmed by enforcement of a foreign award.
Prof Lew as well observes that while a totally comprehensive definition of public 
policy has never been proffered:
... it is clear that (it) reflects the fundamental economic, legal, moral, 
political, religious and social standards of every State or extra-national 
eommunity. Naturally public policy differs according to the character and 
strocture of the State or community to which it appertains, and covers 
those principles and standards which are so sacrosanct as to require their 
maintenance at all costs and without exception.
Yet, none of the above definitions make obvious what may or may not violate public 
policy. Therefore, the ILA Committee on International Commercial Arbitration report 
regarding public policy gi'ound attempted to provide more details thereon by dividing 
the classifications of public policy grounds into procedural and substantive. 
Substantive categories of public policy would include infringing mandatory laws or 
fundamental principles of law, and acting contrary to good morals or national interests
Manufacturer (Slovenia) v Exclusive Distributor (Germany) 696. Similarly, The German Supreme 
Court stated that: "From the viewpoint o f German procedural public policy, the recognition o f a foreign 
arbitral award can therefore only be denied if  the arbitral procedure suffers from a grave defect that 
touches the foundation o f  the State and economic foundations". See, charterer (Geman) v shipowner 
(Rmoanian) (1987) XII YBCA 489 (Germany Supreme Court 1986) 490. Besides, the German 
Supreme Court has held that: A violation o f  essential principle o f German law (order public) exists 
only if the arbitral award contravenes a mle which is basic to public or commercial life, or if  it 
contradicts the Gennan idea o f justice in a fundamental way. See, BGH, 12 July 1990- III ZR 174/89, 
NJW 1990 p 3210, cited in ILA Committee on International Commercial Ai'bitration, 'Interim Report 
on Public Policy as A Bar to Enforcement o f International Arbitral Awards' 5 fn 9; Kroll, 'Recognition 
and Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards in Gennany' 172.
A El-Kosheri, ‘Commentaiy on Public Policy under Egyptian Law’, cited in Buchanan, 'Public 
policy and International Commercial Ai'bitration' 525.
Adviso N V V Korea Overseas Construction Corp (1996) XXI YBCA 612 (Korea Supreme Court 
1995) 615.
J Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration : A Study in Commercial Arbitration 
Awards (Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. 1978) 532.
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or foreign relations. Procedural categories might include fraud or corruption, breach 
of natural justice or due process, lack of impartiality, lack of reasons in the award, 
manifest disregard of the law or the facts, annulment of the award at the place of 
arbitration. This classification however might not be universally accepted as it 
emerges from case law in a limited number of countries. Indeed, examples abound 
where awards have been enforced despite suffering from certain of the above 
‘defects’. Besides, public policy has, by its very nature, a dynamic character, so that 
any classification may crystallise public policy only at a certain period of time.
10.4 Law Applicable to Public policy under Art. V(2)(b)
Having obseiwed that the concept of public policy is difficult to define, the next 
logical question that should be presented is what law would govern the public policy 
under the NYC. As has been seen above, the NYC does not define public policy, but 
rather refers the question to the laws of the enforcing country. Art V(2) clearly 
invokes the law of the enforcing country to govern both (a) the issue of non­
arbitrability and (b) the issue of violation of public policy. Thus, the public policy 
refeiTed to in Art. (V)(2)(b) is plainly the public policy ml es of the country where 
enforcement is sought. In this respect, the Supreme Court of India rejected the 
argument that the use of the words “public policy” in the Indian statute which enacted 
the NYC, rather than the words “public policy o f India”, meant that those words were 
not restricted to Indian public policy, but also extended to the public policy of the law 
governing the contract and the law of the arbitration seat.
ILA Committee on International Commercial Ai'bitration, 'Interim Report on Public Policy as A Bar 
to Enforcement o f International Ar bitral Awards' pp 15, 17-30.
See, Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration  para 26-117.
See, Renusagar Power Co. L td  v General Electric Co (India Supreme Court 1993) pp 701-2; 
Eddie Javor & Fusion- Crete Inc v Luke Francoeur & Fusion- Crete Products Inc 602; Redfem and 
Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration 472; Gaillard and Savage (eds), 
Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration para 1710; Di Pietro and 
Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 180; 
Merkin, Arbitration law  para 19.58; ILA Committee on International Commercial Ai'bitration, 'Interim 
Report on Public Policy as A Bar to Enforcement o f  International Arbitral Awards' 30.
See, Renusagar Power Co. Ltd  v General Electric Co pp 701-702.
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However, and exceptionally, there are some circumstances in which the enforcing 
court may take account of the public policy mles of a foreign country. Thus, an 
English court might not enforce a contract governed by the law of a foreign country 
which requires perfonnance in such a country, if  the contract is unlawflil according to 
the law of that country. For example, a contract, involving the purchase of personal 
influence to be perfonned in England would not be enforced on the basis that it is 
contrary to English domestic public policy. But where such a contract is to be 
performed abroad, an English court might enforce it if performance is not contrary to 
the domestic public policy of the country in question. In the same way, an arbitral 
award giving effect to such a contract has been held to be enforceable in Engl and.
It may be concluded that since the NYC does not spell out the contents of public 
policy, but rather refers the issue to the law of the enforcing country, and since 
national laws do not provide a precise definition of the concept, it is clear that the 
ultimate decision on what may violate public policy of the enforcing country is left to 
the discretion of the courts of that country. Hence, it may differ not only from state to 
state, but from case to case, fi'om time to time, and from court to court of the same 
country.
10.5 Distinction between National and International Public Policy
10.5.1 Introduction
When considering an allegation that enforcement would breach public policy, should 
enforcing courts apply the same standards they apply to domestic awards? The 
general trend is in favour of a negative answer, since the purposes of domestic and
See, Delvolvâe, Rouche and Pointon, French arbitration law and practice  157; ILA Committee on 
International Commercial Arbitration, 'Interim Report on Public Policy as A Bar to Enforcement of  
International Arbitral Awards' pp 18, 31; Merkin, Arbitration  /nw paras 19.75, 19.76
See, Westacre Investments Inc v Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co Ltd  [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep 65 (UK 
Court o f  Appeal) 74; Lemenda Trading Co Ltd  v African M iddle East Petroleum Co Ltd  [1988] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 361 (UK QBD Comm Ct); Merkin, Arbitration low  paras 19.75, 19.76; ILA Committee on 
International Commercial Arbitration, 'Interim Report on Public Policy as A Bar to Enforcement of 
International Arbitral Awards' 31.
There were only a few writers o f the opinion that foreign awards should subject to the same standard 
of public policy that applicable to domestic awards. See, Kroll, 'Recognition and Enforcement of  
Foreign Arbitral Awards in Germany' 172 fn 3.
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international relations are different. Indeed, it is generally felt important to make a 
distinction between domestic and international public policy in the context of 
enforcing foreign awards as will be seen below. Yet, within this general trend there is 
significant diversity in judicial and theoretical approaches. Two main approaches are 
presented blow.
10.5.2 International Public Policy
The first approach involves the application of “international public policy”. It means 
that the principles of domestic public policy of the state in question is to be applied 
very nanowly to the enforeement of foreign awards. Accordingly, it is emphasised 
that not every breach of a mandatory rule of the enforcing state justifies the denial of 
enforcement of foreign awards, since while breach of public policy must infringe a 
mandatory rule, not every mandatory rule involves an issue of public policy. 
Therefore, foreign awards should be refused enforcement only if they clearly violate 
the most fundamental principles of the enforcing country. That is to say, although 
international public policy is not independent of the standards of domestic public 
policy of the enforcing country, it reflects only a restricted version of these 
standards.
This approach is increasingly accepted by the majority of courts and authors, as 
well as being expressed in some national legislation. Prof Sanders stated years ago
See, van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentaiy' (2003)' at 665; Sheppard, 'Public Policy and the 
Enforcement o f Arbitral awards: Should there be a Global Standard?'.
See, M Buchannan, 'Public policy and International Commercial Ai'bitration'(1988) 26 (3) American 
Business law Journal 511 at 514; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on 
International Commercial Arbitration  paras 1711, 1712; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  
international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 181.
See, e, Firm P  (US) v Firm F  (Germany) (Germany Court o f  Appeal 3 Apr 1975) ; Renusagar 
Power Co. Ltd v General Electric Co (India Supreme Court 1993) pp 696-702; Kersa Llolding Co v 
Infancourtage at 626; Manufacturer (Slovenia) v Exclusive Distributor (Germany) (Geiman Court of 
Appeal 1999) 696; Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co L td  pp 674, 691.
See, eg, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commeivial 
Arbitration  para 1712; van den Berg, 'Consolidated Coimnentary' (2003)'665; Di Pietro and Platte, 
Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 181; Davidson, 
Arbitration  374; Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration  473; 
Redfem, 'Commercial Arbitration and Transnational Public Policy' 3; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration  paras 26-114, 26-126, 26-145; Kroll, 'Recognition 
and Enforcement o f  Foreign Aihitral Awards in Gennany' 172;
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that the concept of international public policy covers a narrower field than domestic 
public policy. In terms of judicial support, the Korean Supreme Court has held that 
regard should be given to both international public policy and domestic concerns, so 
that Art. V(2)(b) of the NYC must be construed narrowly. A German court of 
appeal, after making reference to the principle of distinction between domestic and 
international public policy, obseiwed that in the case of foreign awards not all 
contraventions of mandatory provisions of German law constitute a breach of German 
public policy, as the latter only includes extreme cases. Another German Court of 
Appeal stated that:
According to German law, an arbitral award only violates public policy 
(under Art. V(2)(b) of the NYC) when it violates a nonn that regulates 
state or economic principles or when it is unacceptably at odds with the 
German principles of justice. This agrees with the opinion held by a large 
majority that also ft'om the point of view of public policy the recognition 
o f foreign arbitral awards is subject to a less stringent regime than is the 
case with domestic arbitral awards, because there is a distinction between 
national and international public policy.
The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, while rejecting the suggestion that the public 
policy giound under Art. V(2)(b) of the NYC meant “some standard common to all 
civilised nations”, however noted that often the contents of public policy of the 
fomm would coincide with the public policy content of many other eountries, which 
therefore could accurately be deemed as international public policy. More clearly, 
a Luxembourg court of appeal has expressly refeiTcd to international public policy, in 
stating that:
According to the (New York) Convention, the public policy of the state 
where the arbitral award is invoked is ... not the internal public policy of 
that country, but its international public policy, which is defined as being
See, eg, French N ew Code o f Civil Procedure o f 1981, Art, 1498 and Art. 1502. (5); Portuguese 
Code o f  Civil Procedure o f  1986, Art. 1096 (f); Lebanese New  Code o f Civil Procedure o f 1983, Arts. 
814, 817(5); Algerian Decree no. 83.9 o f 1993, Art. 458 bis 23(h).
Sanders, 'Consolidated Commentary' (1979)'at 251.
Adviso NV V Korea Overseas Construction Corp 615.
Firm P  (US) v Firm F (Germany) (Germany Court o f  Appeal 3 Apr 1975) 241.
Manufacturer (Slovenia) v Exclusive Distributor (Germany) 696.
Hebei Import <6 Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd  675,
42 ibid 691.
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“all that affects the essential principles of the administration of justice or 
the perfonnance of contractual obligations”, that is, all that is considered 
‘as essential to the moral, political or economic order’ ... . (emphasis 
added)
Likewise, the Indian Supreme Court has interpreted public policy restrictively when 
dealing with the question of whether it should apply the narrower concept of public 
policy in the sense in which it is applied in the field of private international law, or the 
wider concept of public policy as applicable in domestic law. The Court concluded 
that the narrower interpretation should prevail and violation of public policy in the 
field of private international law must invoke something more than the violation of 
Indian law. Consequently, enforcement would be refused only if such enforcement 
would be contrary to (i) the fundamental policy of Indian law; or (ii) the national 
interest of India; or (iii) justice or morality.
In addition, the term of “international public policy”, rather than simply “public 
policy”, is also referred to by several national statutes. For example, the French 
New Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 1502(5) provides that:
Appeal of a court decision granting recognition or enforcement is only 
available ... if recognition or enforcement is contrary to international 
public policy.
This provision has been inteipreted however as follows:
The international public policy to which Article 1502.5 refers can only 
mean the French conception of international public policy or, in other 
words, the set of values a breach of which could not be tolerated by the 
French legal order, even in international cases.
Kersa Holding Co v Infancourtage 625.
Renusagar Power Co. L td  v General Electric Co pp 701-2.
See, French New  Code o f  Civil Procedure o f 1981, Ait. 1498 and Ait. 1502. (5); Portuguese Code o f  
Civil Procedure o f 1986, Ait. 1096 (f); Lebanese N ew  Code o f Civil Procedure o f  1983, Arts. 814, 
817(5); Algerian Decree no. 83.9 o f  1993, Ait. 458 bis 23(h).
French N ew Code o f Civil Procedure o f 1981, Ait. 1498 and Art. 1502. (5).
Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration 
para 1648; Delvolvâe, Rouche and Pointon, French arbitration law and practice  pp 156, 157.
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Consequently, a French court of appeal has applied the principle of distinction 
between domestic and international public policy by holding that:
A breach of domestic public policy -  assuming it has been established- 
dose not provide the grounds on which to appeal against a ruling granting 
enforcement in France of a foreign arbitral award, because Article 1502 5 
only refers to cases in which the recognition or enforcement of an award 
be contrary to international public policy.
Following the French provision, the New Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure Art, 817 
(5) states that the enforcement of an award made abroad or in an international 
arbitration may be appealed against if its enforcement “violates a rule relating to 
international public policy”. Likewise, The Portuguese Code of Civil Procedure 
refers to the international public policy, as it states that "for the (foreign) award to be 
confirmed it is necessary: that it contains no decisions contrary to the principles of 
Portuguese international public policy (emphasis added)”. the latter provision, as 
can be noted, is more direct in emphasising that the application and content of 
“international public policy” is still specific and subjective to Portugal’s perception of 
that concept as the country where enforcement is sought.
10.5.3 Truly International or Transnational Public Policy
The second approach is so-call “transnational public policy” or “tmly international 
public policy”, which has been adopted and developed by some writers, and
Intrafor Cofor v Gagnant (France Court o f Appeal 12 Mar 1985), cited in Gaillard and Savage (eds), 
Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Abitration, para 1647 fn 368 .
Lebanese New  Code o f Civil Procedure o f  1983, A t . 817 (5).
Portuguese Code o f Civil Procedure o f 1986, Art. 1096 (f).
See, ILA Committee on International Commercial Abitration, 'Interim Report on Public Policy as A 
Bar to Enforcement o f International Arbitral Awards' 6.
The tenn “transnational law” is not new as it was referred to by Judge Jessup in his lectures at Yale 
thirty years ago. Then it was presented in great details and supports by PieiTe Lalive in his report o f  
“Transnational (or Tmly International) public policy an International Abitration” at the ICCA 
Congreess no 3 in 1986. see, Redfem, 'Commercial Abitration and Transnational Public Policy' 
l;Lalive, 'Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International A bitration '.
See, eg, Lalive, 'Transnational (or Tm ly International) Public Policy and International Abitration' 
pp 257-318; Buchanan, 'Public policy and International Commercial Abitration' 514 and fn 15.
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accepted by a few courts. Unlike international public policy which is based on each 
state’s individual view of that concept, truly international or transnational public 
policy is intended basically to encompass nothing more than rules and policies 
considered imperative by the international community, rather than any individual 
state. Thus, it only includes principles that represent an international consensus as 
to essential principles or fundamental nonns of conduct that must always apply in the 
law of international trade. It is suggested that the concept of this kind of public 
policy compromises “fundamental rules of natural law, principles of universal justice, 
jus cogens (compelling law) in public international law, and the general principles of 
morality accepted by what are refeiTed to as civilised nations”. Moreover, it has 
been observed that while transnational public policy closely resembles international 
public policy, they are clearly distinct. The latter unavoidably embodies the particular 
character of public policy within each individual state, whereas the former is less 
restrictive, reflecting the common fundamental values of the world community.
With regard to the courts, although there appear to be no cases in which the theory of 
transnational public policy is expressly applied, in a small number of cases a court has 
made reference to that theory. For instance, although an Italian court of appeal stated 
that Art. V(2)(b) involves international public policy, it however defined that concept 
as a “body of universal principles shared by nations of similar civilization, aiming at 
the protection of fundamental human rights, often embodied in international 
declarations or conventions”. Equally, the Swiss Supreme Court appeared to be in 
favour of taking into consideration a “universal conception of public policy, under
See, eg, Allsop Automatic Inc v Tecnoski snc (1997) XXII YBCA 725 (Italy Court o f Appeal 1992) 
726; W V F  and V (Switzerland Supreme Court 30 Dec 1994), cited in ILA Committee on 
International Commercial Abitration, 'Interim Report on Public Policy as A  Bar to Enforcement o f  
International A bitral Awards' 7 .
See, Tume and Paulsso, 'Grounds For Refusal O f Recognition A id  Enforcement Under The New  
York Convention: A Comparative Approach' 7.
See, Lalive, 'Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration' 287; 
Buchanan, 'Public policy and International Commercial Arbitration' 514,
See, ILA Committee on International Commercial Abitration, 'Interim Report on Public Policy as A  
Bar to Enforcement o f  International A bitral Awards' pp 6-7; Turne and Paulsso, 'Grounds For Refusal
O f Recognition A d  Enforcement Under The New York Convention: A Comparative Approach' 8. 
See, Buchanan, 'Public policy and International Commercial Abitration' 514.
See, Allsop Automatic Inc v Tecnoski snc 726.
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which an award will be incompatible with public policy if it is contrary to the 
fundamental moral or legal principles recognized in all civilised countries”.
Yet, the concept of transnational public policy has attracted harsh criticism. First, it 
is said that the text of Art. V(2)(b) leaves no room for doubt in making reference to 
the enforcing country’s conception of international public policy, and not to a truly 
international public policy rooted in the law of the community of nations. The logic of 
Art. V(2)(b) of the NYC is to enable the country where enforcement of foreign 
awards is sought to protect its fondamental convictions from being breached by 
foreign awards. Therefore, it is completely natural that enforeement of a foreign 
award should be viewed in the light o f frmdamental considerations of the enforcing 
country’s law. Secondly, (truly) international public policy is a term of almost 
unlimited and protean potential and its application would therefore lead to great 
uncertainty. Accordingly, the distinguished commenter Dr Redfem has very 
recently said that any scholar charged with the task of codifying “transnational public 
policy” would be entitled to shed a bitter tear. Thirdly, unlike in international law, 
public policy in domestic law is a legal concept with a verifiable judicial histoiy. 
Transnational public policy could be an easy way for those claiming to have an 
insight into the heart and the soul of international law to affect their own preferences 
without being obliged to prove that they become customary international law. 
Fourthly, protecting the virtue of international commercial arbitration does not require 
such a slippery and malleable concept, as no national legal system exists which fails 
to defend fundamental principles of justice and morality.
“  See, W v F a n d  V.
See, eg, H ebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co L td  (Hong Kong Court o f Final 
Appeal 1999) 675; Reisman, 'Law, International Public Policy (so-called) and A bitral Choice in 
International Commercial Abitration' pp 12-17; Redfem, 'Commercial Abitration and Transnational 
Public Policy' ; Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration paras 1648, 1712.
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration  paras 1648, 1712.
“  See, Reisman, 'Law, International Public Policy (so-called) and Abitral Choice in International 
Commercial Ahitration' pp 12-13; Redfem, 'Commercial Abitration and Transnational Public Policy'
pp 1-2.
See, Redfem, 'Commercial Abitration and Transnational Public Policy' 1.
See, Reisman, 'Law, International Public Policy (so-called) and Abitral Choice in International 
Commercial Abitration' pp 16-17.
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10.6 Case Law for Common Violations of Public Policy
It is important firstly to mention that, although Art. V(2)(b) is the most invoked 
giound in resisting enforcement of foreign awards, its invocation is rarely successfiil.
It may also be worth recalling that the lack of a definition of public policy has led to 
considerable overlap between Art. V(2)(b) and other grounds, such as Art. V(l)(a) 
(incapacity of the parties or invalid arbitral agi'eement), Art. V(l)(b) (violation of due 
process). Art. (l)(c) (excess of jurisdiction), Art. V(l)(d) (improper procedure or 
composition of the arbitral tribunal), and Art. V(2)(a) (non-arbitrability).
Yet, there are various issues that are commonly invoked in practice as violations of 
public policy under Art. V(2)(b). Thus, this section will attempt to identify the issues 
which are most frequently raised in case law in this context. These issues will be 
divided into several common categories, some of which are procedural, and others 
substantive, although some issues may come under more than one category.
10.6.1 Corruption
The public policy defence has been invoked, but often unsuccessfully, on the ground 
that the underlying contract or arbitral procedure is illegal because, for instance, the 
award deals with issues such as conmption, fraud, bribery, smuggling, drug 
trafficking, prostitution or slavery. The Report of the UNCITRAL Commission on 
International Trade Law states that:
It was understood that the teim ‘public policy’, which was used in the 
1958 New York Convention and many other treaties, covered fundamental 
principles of law and justice in substantive as well as procedural respects.
See, Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration  para 1713; Lew, Mistelis and Krèoll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 
para 26-118; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York 
Convention o f  1958 184; Kroll, 'Recognition and Enforcement o f  Foreign A bitral Awards in Germany' 
14; Seriki, 'Enforcement o f Foreighn A bitral Awards and Public Policy - a Note o f Caution' 195.
cf, Kersa Holding Co v Infancourtage (Luxembourg Court o f Appeal 1993) 625; Westacre 
Investments Inc v Jugoimport SPDR Holding Co Ltd  [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep 111 (UK QBD Comm Ct); 
AAO TForeign Economic Association (Vo) Technostroyexport v International Development and Trade 
Seiwices Inc ; X  (Syria) v X  (Germany Court o f  Appeal 1998) pp 669-70; Eiiropcar Italia SpA v 
Maiellano Tours Inc 156 F3d 310 (US Court o f Appeals 2nd Circ 1998) pp 315-16; Llarendra H  
Mehta et al v Mukesh H  Mehta et al (2000) XXV YBCA 721 (India Supreme Court 1999) pp 726-27.
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Thus, instances such as coiTuption, bribery and fraud and similar serious 
cases would constitute a ground for setting aside.
By way of example, in Westacre Investments Inc v Jugoimport SPDR Holding Co Ltd 
an ICCA award rendered in Swaziland related to an agreement, governed by Swiss 
law, for the supply o f military equipment from Yugoslavia to Kuwait under which it 
was alleged that bribes were to be made to Kuwaiti officials to obtain the contract. 
After falling to set aside the award in Swaziland on the ground of public policy, the 
plaintiff sought enforcement of the award in England. The defendant challenged the 
enforcement on the gi’ound that the contract was void and immoral as it included an 
agreement to purchase personal influence and to bribe Kuwaiti officials to obtain the 
contract, and was therefore contrary to public policy in England. The English Court 
held first that if proved that the underlying contract was indisputably illegal at 
common law, an award would be unenforceable in England for it would be contrary to 
public policy. Yet, it dismissed the challenge, reasoning that it was requested to 
enforce the award rather than the underlying contract. ™ As to whether it should allow 
a re-opening of the arbitrators’ findings of fact on the bribery issue, the Court stated 
the underlying contract was governed by Swiss law and the allegation of illegality of 
the contract had been raised before the arbitral tribunal and the Swiss courts, but they 
all found that the contract was valid under the laws applicable to it. Thus, it was 
inappropriate that an English court should rehear that issue. The Court concluded that:
[N]o doubt that an English Court would give predominant weight to the 
public policy of sustaining the parties' agreement to submit the particular 
issue of illegality and initial invalidity to ICC arbitration rather than to the 
public policy of sustaining the non-enforcement of contracts illegal at 
common law.
The Court fiirther emphasized that:
That conclusion is not to be read as in any sense indicating that the 
Commercial Court is prepared to turn a blind eye to eoiTuption in 
international trade, but rather as an expression of its confidence that if the
UN Doc. A/40/17, para 297.
Westacre Investments Inc v Jugoimport SPDR Holding Co Ltd  74. 
ibid 132. 
ibid 129.
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issue of illegality by reason of coiTuption is referred to high calibre ICC 
arbitrators and duly determined by them, it is entirely inappropriate in the 
context of the New York Convention that the enforcement Court should 
be invited to retry that very issue in the context of a public policy 
submission.
The respondent appealed the decision, and Waller L.J. sought to summarise the 
relevant principles as follows:
(1) There are some mles of public policy which if infringed will lead to 
non-enforcement by the English Court whatever their proper law and 
wherever their place of performance, but others are based on 
considerations which are purely domestic.
(2) Contracts for the purchase of influence are not in the former category.
(3) Thus contracts for the purchase of personal influence if to performed 
in England would not be enforceable as contrary to English domestic 
public policy.
(4) But where such a contract is to be performed abroad, it is only if 
performance would be contrary to the domestic public policy of that 
country also that the English Court would not enforce it.
He further confmned that the desirability that arbitral awards should be final is itself a 
dimension of public policy, stating:
The Court is in this instance perfonning a balancing exercise between the 
competing public policies of finality and illegality; between the finality 
that should prima facie exist partieularly for those that agi ee to have their 
disputes arbitrated, against the policy of ensuring that the executive power 
of the English Court is not abused.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the enforcement of the award. It 
concluded that although the underlying contract which alleged to involve hrihery 
would have been contrary to the public policy of Kuwait, its enforcement was not 
contrary to the public policy of Switzerland. Consequently, it would not be contrary to 
English public policy to enforce an award that did not offend public policy under the
ibid 131.
Westacre Investments Inc v Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co Ltd 74. 
ibid pp 80-82.
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proper law of the contract or the curial law, even if English public policy might have 
taken a different view.
In the above case the English courts sought to balance the importance of finality of 
awards and the need to curb illegality, ultimately favouring enforcement by taking a 
restrictive view of public policy. Indeed, applying an international public policy 
standard. It further shows that English courts are willing to support enforcement to the 
extent that violation of mandatory rules of a foreign country (i.e. Kuwait) does not 
constitute a giound for refusing enforcement, as long as it is not contrary to England 
public policy. By contrast, if the law applicable to the contract is not violated the 
courts may favour enforcement even if this conflicts with domestic English public 
policy.
10.6.2 Irregularity of Procedure or Due Process
Although breach of due process and procedural irregularity are separate gi'ounds 
under Arts. V(l)(b) and V(l)(d), often such matters are dealt with as violations of 
public policy Art. V(2)(b), as will be seen below. Yet, sometimes courts may not 
allow such issues to be raised under the public policy ground. For example, a Hong 
Kong court in Qinhuangdao Tongda Enterprise Development Co And Another v 
Million Basic Co Ltd, refrised to consider a plea that enforcement of an award 
rendered in Beijing should be refused on the giound that a party had no oppoitunity to 
present its case, so that enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of Hong 
Kong. After considering the principle of interpreting public policy nan'owly, the court 
held that:
The public policy ground for refusal must not be seen as a catch-all 
provision to be used wherever convenient. It is limited in scope and is to 
be sparingly applied.
The court was not prepared to allow the defendant to raise issues o f iiTegularity in the 
arbitral procedure under the public policy defence.
ibid .75
Qinhuangdao Tongda Enterprise Development Co And Another v Million Basic Co Ltd 
ibid 178.
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However, allegations of violation of due proeess or inegular procedure have 
frequently been invoked under the public policy ground, albeit usually without 
success. It may be appropriate to give brief examples since most aspects of 
violation of due process or procedural irregularity have already been discussed in 
detail in the context of Art. V(l)(b and d). One example is where a French court of 
appeal refused to enforce an award rendered in Gennany on the basis of public policy 
because the Gennan court had suspended the statutory limitation period without 
jurisdiction. Yet, on appeal the Supreme Court overturned the earlier decision, 
reasoning that “the mle whereby a claim before a court which has no jurisdiction 
suspends a limitation period is not part of the French conception of international 
public policy”. In another case, enforcement of an award rendered in Turkey was 
opposed on grounds of public policy, the respondent alleging that it had not been 
gi'anted the right to be heard, as the tribunal had refused its motion to take evidence 
which had not already been heard in earlier arbitration proceedings. A Gennan court 
of appeal rejected this objection holding that such preclusion of evidence did not of 
itself part form a breach public policy. The eourt suggested that the refusal of such 
motions would only amount to a denial of the right to be heard and thus a violation of 
the publie poliey if it was shown that the evidence could have caused the case to be 
decided differently. Moreover, a Luxembourg court of appeal rejected a challenge 
to enforcement on the ground that the award violated mandatory principles of due 
process and thus was contrary to public policy. The Court held that since the award 
had not been challenged in the country of origin, and since neither the impartiality nor 
the independence of the arbitrators had been criticised, there had been a fair trial, so 
that enforcement of the award would not violate Luxembourg international public
Davidson, Arbitration  401,
See, eg, Czechoslovak Firm C v German (FR) OHG Sch & B Sch <&. Personally (1977) II YBCA 235 
(Gennany Supreme Court 1969); X  SA (Switz) v Y (Spain) (1983) VIII YBCA 406 (Spain Supreme 
Court) 407; Mediterranean Shipping Co v URCOOPA 1998 Bull Civ I, No 227 157 (France Supreme 
Court 1998), cited in Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration  para 1659-1 ; Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co L td  (the 
Hong Kong Court o f Final Appeal 1999) pp 691-92; Italian Party v Swiss Company pp 828-29; 
Union de Cooperativas Agricolas Epis Centre v La Palentina SA pp 538-39;
See, supra Ch 3 & Ch 2,
Mediterranean Shipping Co v URCOOPA , cited in Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, 
Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration  para 1659-1.
X  V X  (Germany Court o f Appeal "Oberlandesgericht Bremen, 2 Sch 4/99" 30 Sep 1999,
Unreported) , cited in, S Kroll, 'Gennany: Setting Aside A  Award'(2001) 4(4) International 
Abitration Law Review N26 at N 27 .
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policy, Yet the important point was that the court was prepared to consider this 
challenge under the public policy heading.
Nonetheless, a few cases have actually seen enforcement reflised on the giound of 
public policy where there has been a lack of due process. For example, a German 
Appeal Court refused to enforce a foreign award on the public policy ground where 
there was an extreme violation of the principle of fair hearing by the arbitrator, and 
the award was made without the respondent having an opportunity to obtain full 
knowledge of the claim.
10.6.3 Lack of Impartiality of the Arbitrator
It goes without saying that it is a fundamental requirement upon every arbitrator to act 
impartially throughout the arbitral process. This requirement is violated if the 
arbitrator, for example, has a personal interest in the case. Consequently, the lack of 
impartiality of arbitrators has frequently been invoked under the public policy head, 
but often unsuccessfully. One example of unsuccessful challenge is a case where 
the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal overturned a decision refusing enforcement of 
a foreign award on the ground that the award was contrary to public policy of Hong 
Kong, as there was a strong case of apparent bias. The Court held that there must be 
compelling reasons to deny enforcement of a NYC award on public policy gi'ounds, 
concluding that;
I think that a distinction can and should be made between the effect of 
actual bias and that of apparent bias. (When I say "bias" I mean a lack of 
the impartiality required of judges and arbitrators.) Actual bias would be 
more than our courts could overlook even where the award concerned is a 
convention award. But short of actual bias, I do not think that the Hong
See, Kersa Holding Co v Infancourtage pp 623-24, 626.
Finn P  (US) v Firm F (Germany) (Germany Court o f  Appeal 3 Apr 1975) 241.
See, van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' (2003)' 667; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  
international arbitration awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 187.
See, eg, Fitzroy Engineering Ltd  v Flame Engineering Inc ; Buyer (PR China) v Seller (Japan) 
(1995) XX YBCA 742 (Japan High Court 1994) pp 743-44; Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek 
Engineering Co Ltd (Hong Kong Court o f  Final Appeal 1999) 676; Manufacturer (Slovenia) v 
Exclusive Distributor (Germany) (German Court o f Appeal 1999); Transocean Shipping Agency P  Lit 
V Black Sea Shipping 718; Logy Enterprises L td v Haikou City Bonded Area Wansen Products 
Trading Co (1998) XXIII YBCA 660 (Hong Kong Court o f  Appeal 1997) pp 662-65.
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Kong courts would be justified in refusing enforcement of a convention 
award on public policy grounds as soon as appearances fall short of what 
we insist upon in regard to impartiality where domestic cases or 
arbitrations are concerned. Our stance must be that something more 
serious even than that is required for revising such enforcement. In 
adopting such a stance, we would be proceeding in conformity with the 
stance generally adopted in regard to convention award enforcement by 
the commercial jurisdictions whose decisions from around the globe . . . .
87
Another unsuccessful example is Fitzroy Engineering, Ltd v Flame Engineering, Inc 
In opposing enforcement of an award made in New Zealand, the defendant alleged 
that its New Zealand counsel had a conflict of interest in that he had acted for the 
adversary, so that enforcement should be denied on the public policy ground. After 
confirming the importance of intei‘preting the public policy ground very narrowly, a 
US district court held that the defendant had failed to submit evidence suggesting that 
the potential conflict of interest identified would render enforcement of the award 
offensive of US’s most basic nation of morality and justice. Again in AAOT Foreign 
Economic Association (Vo) Technostroyexport v International Development and 
Trade Services Inc a US court of appeals rejected the defendant’s allegation that 
enforcement of an award rendered in Russia should be reflised on the public policy 
g'ound of Art. V(2)(b) because the arbitral tribunal was corrupt. The court relied on 
the principle of waiver, holding that:
The settled law of this circuit precludes attacks on the qualifications of 
arbitrators on giounds previously known but not raised until after an 
award has been rendered. Where a party has knowledge of facts possibly 
indicating bias or partiality on the part of an arbitrator he cannot remain 
silent and later object to the award of the arbitrators on that ground. His 
silence constitutes a waiver of the objection.”
Similarity, in Imperial Ethiopian Government v Baruch-Foster Corp the defendant 
having opposed enforcement on the ground that the president of the arbitration panel 
had served for four years as a draftsman of a civil code for the Ethiopian government
Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd  676.
Fitzroy Engineering Ltd  v Flame Engineering Inc . similarly, Transmarine Seaways Corp o f  
Monrovia v M arc Rich & C AG  480 FSupp 352 (US District Court SD N Y  1979) pp 357-58.
AAOT Foreign Economic Association (Vo) Technostroy export v International Development and 
Trade Services Me 982.
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(the prevailing party) fifteen to twenty years earlier, the US Court of Appeal held that 
there was no substance in the allegations.
By contrast, a Swiss Court of first Instance refused enforcement on the giound that 
the Swiss public policy requirement of independence and impartiality of arbitrators 
was violated where the arbitrator had been the lawyer of the wimring party for years, 
and had drawn up the contract, naming himself as arbitrator in the event that there be 
a dispute as to interpretation, and a prohibiting his removal under a penalty of Swiss 
Francs 1,000,000. Similarly, the French Supreme Court has refused to enforce an 
Italian award on the giound of violation of French public policy, where an arbitrator 
was connected to one of the parties, and having sat on both French and Italian arbitral 
panels dealing with the case, had conveyed to the latter erroneous infonnation of such 
nature to influence that tribunal's decision on jurisdiction.
10.6,4 Lack of Reasons in Award
According to the arbitration laws of many countries, it is a mandatory requirement 
that the award must include the reasons for the decision. Such laws, considered it 
important to provide adequate explanations of the reasons on which the arbitral award 
is based because it is necessary to infonn the party how justice has been done in their 
case. While the absence of reasons prevents the parties seeking to prove that the 
arbitrators were wrong, by contrast, it is customary in several Common law 
countries not to give reasons for the award.
Imperial Ethiopian Government v Baruch-Foster Corp 337.
X v X  (Switzerland Court o f  first Instance 26 May 1994) pp 758-62.
Excelsior Film TVsrl v UGC-PH (1999) XXIV YBCA 643 (France Supreme Court 1998) 644.
See, eg, Brazilian Arbitration Act o f 1996, Art. 26(11); French N ew  Code o f Civil Procedure o f 1981, 
Art. 1471; Italian Code o f Civil procedure, Art. 823 (3); Chinese Arbitration Law o f  1994, Art.54; 
Russian International Commercial Arbitration Law of 1993, Art. 31(2). See also, van den Berg, 
'Consolidated Commentaiy' (2003)' 668; Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration 
awards : the New York Convention o f  1958 pp 189-90.
See, van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' (2003)' 668.
See, Di Pietro and Platte, Enforcement o f  international arbitration awards : the New York 
Convention o f  1958 190.
See, van den Berg, 'Consolidated Commentary' (2003)' 688
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In practice, the issue of lack of reasons has frequently been raised under the public 
policy head. However, the courts generally appear not to consider lack of reasons as a 
matter of international public policy, so that it does not constitute a gi'ound for 
refusing enforcement of foreign awards, notwithstanding that the giving reasons may 
be mandatory under the relevant national law. Thus, an Italian court of appeal has 
enforced an award rendered in US, rejecting the objection that the award violated 
Italian public policy because it lacked reasons (which are mandatory under Italian 
law). The Court Concluded that:
It is fondamental principle that the violation of the public order must be 
appreciated on the basis of the decision and not the reasoning of the 
award. The New York Convention does not provide any requirement as to 
the reasoning for an arbitral decision. Furthennore, the Convention 
excludes a re-examination of the merit of the award, from which it follows 
that the reasoning has no relevance. Moreover, the fact that the reasoning 
constitutes a principle of the Italian Constitution is not important because 
what is fundamental in Italian law of procedure may not be considered as 
such be foreign legislative and judicial authorities (such as US law and the 
European Convention of 1961 on International Commercial Arbitration).^^
Similarly, where it was alleged that enforcement of an award made in Turkey would 
contravene German public policy because it did not reveal why the tribunal had 
judged the respondent's defences insufficient, a German court of appeal held that 
although it would be incompatible with German internal public policy for arbitrators 
to merely state that they had considered all the facts without giving any detailed 
reasoning, this did not violate international public policy, which would be only 
contravened if the award were so contrary to the fondamental principles of German 
procedural law that the result could not be fair, or if it contained substantial errors 
touching upon the very foundations of public and economic life. Equally, a Belgian 
court o f first instance has rejected a similar challenge, holding that failure to provide
See, eg, Bobbie Brooks Ins v Lanificio Walter B an d SAS 292; Isaac Glecer v M oses Israel Glecer 
& Estera Glecer-Nottman ; Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corp v Banque Arabe Inti 
d ’investissements pp 651-52, 666-67; Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corp v Banque Arabe et 
International d ’investissements SA (1998) XXIII YBCA 644 (France Court o f Appeal 1997) pp 652- 
53] X  V X  (Germany Court o f  Appeal "Oberlandesgericht Bremen, 2 Sch 4/99" 30 Sep 1999,
Unreported) cited in, S Kroll, 'Germany: Setting Aside An Award'(2001) 4 (4) Intl Arb L R 26 at 
N27.
Bobbie Brooks Ins V Lanificio Walter B an d  SAS 292.
X  V X  (Germany Court o f  Appeal "Oberlandesgericht Bremen, 2 Sch 4/99" 30 Sep 1999,
Unreported) cited in, Kroll, 'Germany: Setting Aside An Award' at N27.
'I
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reasons in the award does not violate public policy in Belgian private international 
law. This decision was upheld by the Belgian court of Appeal.
10.6.5 Mandatory Laws
Mandatory laws have been described as imperative provisions of laws that must be 
applied inespective of the applicable law to a contract or the procedural rule chosen 
by the parties, reflecting states’ internal or international public policy. Frequent 
examples of mandatory laws are competition and antitrust laws, cuiTency controls, 
certain tax laws, import/export laws, environmental protection laws, and measures of 
embargo, blockade or boycott rules, laws to protect parties presumed to be in an 
inferior bargaining position (e.g. wage-eamers or commercial agents), law 
governing interest rates, and even mandatory procedural law.
Nonetheless, in the context of enforcement of foreign awards, it is generally accepted 
by courts that not all national mandatory rules embody public policy. For example, 
the Swiss Supreme Court has said that substantive public policy is not necessarily 
contravened where a foreign award is not in conformity with mandatory provisions of 
Swiss law.'^'^ Furthermore, a German court of appeal, after making reference to the 
principle of distinction between domestic and international public policy, obseiwed 
that in the case of foreign awards not all contraventions of mandatory provisions of 
German law constitutes a breach of Gennan public policy, since the latter only 
includes extreme cases.
Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corp v Banque Arabe Intl d'investissements pp 651-52, 666-67.
See, Barraclough and Waincymer, 'Mandatoiy Rules o f Law in International Commercial 
Arbitration' 206; P Mayer, 'Mandatoiy Rules o f Law in International Arbitration'(1986) 2 Arb Intl 274 .
See, in general, BaiTaclough and Waincymer, 'Mandatoiy Rules o f Law in International Commercial 
Arbitration' 206; Mayer, 'Mandatory Rules o f Law in International Arbitration' 275; ILA Committee on 
International Commercial Arbitration, 'Interim Report on Public Policy as A Bar to Enforcement o f  
International Arbitral Awards' 17.
See, eg. Inter Maritime Management SA v Russin & Vecchi (1997) XXII YBCA 789 (Switzerland 
Supreme Court 1995) 797; Renusagar Power Co. Ltd v General Electric Co (India Supreme Court 
1993) 702; Firm P  (US) v Firm F (Germany) (Germany Court o f  Appeal 3 Apr 1975) 241; Bobbie 
Brooks Ins v Lanificio Walter B an d  SAS 292; Adviso N V v Korea Overseas Construction Corp (Korea 
Supreme Court 1995) 615.
Inter M aritime Management SA V Russin & Vecchi 797.
Firm P  (US) v Firm F  (Germany) (Germany Court o f  Appeal 3 Apr 1975) 241.
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In the light of above consideration, courts have often declined to deny enforcement of 
foreign awards on publie policy giounds simply because they were contrary to 
national mandatory laws. For example, the Korean Supreme Court has rejected an 
allegation that enforcement of a foreign award would violate Korean public policy 
just because the limitation period under Dutch law applied in that award is contrary to 
the mandatory Korean law thereof. The Court noted that the violation of mandatory 
provisions of Korean law does not of itself necessarily constitute a valid reason to 
refuse enforcement under the public policy exception. Enforcement should be reflised 
only if it is contrary to the morality or social order of Korea. In another case, a 
respondent resisted enforcement of a foreign award on the grounds that the amounts 
awarded were unreasonable and excessive in terms of Swiss law. The Swiss Supreme 
Court dismissed the objection, holding that public policy should be understood in the 
narrow sense, and even more so as far as enforcement of foreign awards is concerned. 
It suggested that enforcement of an award should only be refused on the public policy 
ground, if  it amounted to an intolerable breach of Swiss law, or otherwise breached 
the fundamental principles of the Swiss legal system. The fact that an award ran 
contrary to a mandatory provision of Swiss law, such as the prohibition of compound 
interest, did not of itself infringe substantive public policy. Moreover, an Italian 
court of appeal rejected an objection that enforcement would violate Italian public 
policy because an award ordered payment in US dollars, contrary to the Italian foreign 
currency exchange law. The court held that ordering payment in dollars does not 
violate Italian public policy.
By contrast, the Laminoirs-Trefleries-Cableries de Lens SA v Southwire Co & 
Southwire International Corp case is a rare example of the public policy defence 
being successflilly used. The respondent opposed enforcement of a foreign award on
See, eg, X  SA (Switz) v Y (Spain) (Spain Supreme Court 1981); Adviso N V  v Korea Overseas 
Construction Corp (the Korean Supreme Court 1995) 615; Andre & Cie SA v Molino e Pastificio di 
Ponte San Giovanni SpA (1985) X YBCA 458 (Italy Court o f  Appeal 1981) 461; Inter Maritime 
Management SA v Russin & Vecchi (Switzerland Supreme Court 1995) pp 797-98; X  (Syria) v X  
(Germany Court o f  Appeal 1998) 672; Abbott Laboratories v Baxter Intern Inc 2002 WL 467147  
(US District Court ND Illinois 2002); Baxter International Inc v Abbott Laboratories 315 F3d 829 (US 
Court o f  Appeals 7th Circ 2003).
Adviso NV  V Korea Overseas Construction Corp 615.
Inter Maritime Management SA v Russin & Vecchi pp 797-98.
Andre & Cie SA v Molino e Pastificio di Ponte San Giovanni SpA 461.
Ch 10: Violation o f  Public Policy 290
the ground that the tribunal adopted a French legal rate of interest which contravened 
the US public policy because the rate was excessive. The court agi'eed and refused to 
enforce that portion of the award, holding that the arbitrators’ decision that interest 
rates should rise by an additional 5% p.a. two months fi'om the date of the award in 
accordance with the French statute was “penal rather than compensatory and bears no 
reasonable relation to any damage resulting from delay in recovery of the sums 
awarded”, and therefore clearly offensive to US public policy. ^
10.6.6 National Interests/ Foreign Relations
Enforcement of a foreign award may be opposed on public policy grounds where it 
might threaten a state’s national interests or prejudice foreign relations. In the leading 
case o f Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v RAKTA, the American party sought to 
resist enforcement on the basis that would significantly affect US foreign policy 
because relations with Egypt would be damaged. The US Court o f Appeals first 
acknowledged that extensive construction of the public policy defence would vitiate 
the basic effort of the NYC to remove pre-existing obstacles to enforcement. The 
court held further that:
[T]he Convention's public policy defense should be construed narrowly. 
Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on this basis only 
where enforcement would violate the forum state's most basic notions of 
morality and justice. '
The Court therefore concluded that US public policy was not to be equated with 
national policy (in the diplomatic or foreign policy sense), and that it would not refuse 
to enforce an award in favour of an Egyptian party simply because of tensions at that 
time between the United States and Egypt. This was later followed by a US district 
court in National Oil Corp v Libyan Sun Oil Corp where it was contended that 
enforcement of the award would violate US public policy as it was in favour of the 
Libyan Government, a state known to sponsor international ten'orism. The Court
Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens SA v Southwire Co & Southwire International Corp . 
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v RAKTA . 973,
' ‘Gbid . 974.
"Gbid .
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confirmed the principle that the public policy ground had to be inteipreted naiTowly, 
continuing,
To read the public policy defense as a parochial device protective of 
national political interests would seriously undermine the Convention’s 
utility. This provision was not meant to enshrine the vagaries of 
international politics under the inbric of ‘public policy’. ’
The Court noting that the US still recognised the government o f Libya, had not 
declared war on it, and had specifically given it pennission to bring the action, 
therefore dismissed the challenge. ' ' ^  Again, in Dalmia Dairy, the English Court of 
Appeal held that it would not be contrary to English public policy to enforce an award 
in favour of a national of one friendly state (India) against a national of another 
friendly state (Pakistan), even though those states were enemies of one another. ’
10.6.7 Case Law Analysis
The foregoing cases show that, since the NYC does not define the contents of public 
policy, an extensive range of procedural and substantive issues is frequently raised 
under this, thus a hannonisation of the applications under this ground is somewhat 
remote. Yet, the cases illustrate that the public policy defence is often rejected for 
these reasons. First and most importantly, because national courts have acknowledged 
that the concept of public policy in Art. V(2)(b) is international, which is more 
restrictive than considerations of domestic public policy, so that the public policy 
defence should be inteipreted very nanowly, and applied only to very serous 
violations. Secondly, courts sometimes deem a losing party to have waived his right 
to raise public policy at the stage of enforcement when that party failed to raise such 
objection before the arbitrator or the court of the arbitration seat, as in the AAOT case 
and the Kersa Holding Co case mentioned above. Thirdly, courts sometimes enforced 
the award because the alleged violations of public policy had no vital impact on the 
outcome of the arbitration. Fourthly, some courts limited their review of the award to 
the decision itself and refused to look at whether the underlying contracts violated
National Oil Corp v Libyan Sun Oil Co 733 FSupp 800 (US District Court D Delaware 1990) 819, 
ibid 820.
Dalmia D aily Industries Ltd v National Bank o f  Pakistan [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep 223 (UK CA) 224.
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public policy. Fifthly, some courts attempted to strike a balance between the 
protection of their essential national interests and values on the one hand, and their 
foreign relations and international interests on the other, the latter including the 
commercial benefits deriving fiom the finality o f foreign awards.
It might be suggested that defences such as incapacity of the parties, invalidity of the 
arbitral agreement, violation of due process, excess of jurisdiction, defective 
composition of the tribunal, or procedural irregularity should not be allowed to be 
raised under the public policy ground, as these are already established as grounds 
under in Art. V (l). Such giounds were established to allow the losing parties to 
protect their legitimate rights, and thus can be invoked only by that party who has to 
prove them, whereas the public policy giound in Art. V(2)(b) can be raised by the 
enforcing court on its own motion, as it is intended to allow the enforcing court to 
protect the essential principles, interests and morals of that country. These 
considerations indicate that the NYC intended to exclude grounds listed in Art. V(l) 
from the scope of public policy in Art. V(2)(b). The above suggestion would limit the 
range of applications of the public policy ground in confonnity with the prevailing 
spirit of narrow interpretation of the grounds under Art. V, and would thus serve the 
general policy of “pro-enforcement bias” of the NYC.
Finally, it may be noticed that the principle of international public policy has often 
been applied against foreign governments or private parties. It is not clear how the 
principle of international public policy is to be applied when a foreign award is 
contrary to the interests of the enforcing country itself, as where the award is made 
against its government or agencies.
10.7 The Position in Saudi Arabia
10.7.1 Introductory Remarks
In general, SA has been frequently stigmatised as having a conseiwative and negative 
attitude towards international arbitration. In fact, it is commonly cited as the black
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sheep of international arbitration. It was referred to in just such a manner by three 
speakers and one paper just during the June 2006 ICCA Congress held in Montréal.^
In particular, the Public policy gi'ound is widely considered as the greatest obstacle to 
enforcement of foreign awards in SA. However, no one was able to provide a 
single case in which enforcement was reflised on this ground. The justification for this 
general allegation is likely to be the fact that the Saudi legal system is essentially 
based upon the Shari'ah principles and all modem Saudi statutes have to be in 
confonnity with the main bases of Islamic Shari’ah. One western writer, for 
instance, states that:
In trying to assimilate into the Western world, Saudi Arabia and other 
Islamic countries are facing difficult questions regarding the abandonment 
of their cultural history. Saudi Arabia has traditionally been hostile to the 
recognition and enforcement of non-domestic arbitral awards, finding 
these awards contrary to Saudi Arabian law and public policy. During the 
1950’s, Saudi Arabia Courts refused to enforce many non-Saudi Arabian 
arbitral awards, finding them degrading and disrespectftil to Saudi 
Arabia’s Islamic legal system.
While another writer observes that:
The scope of this public policy exception, which could affect the 
implementation of the New York Convention in any Contracting State, is
See, eg, Gharavi, The International Effectiveness o f  the Annulment o f  an Arbitral Award  pp 39, 
115; Reisman, 'Law, International Public Policy (so-called) and Arbitral Choice in International 
Commercial Arbitration' 10; Mason, 'International Commercial Arbitration; Saudis Accept N.Y. 
Convention' at 26; Roy, 'The N ew  York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Countiy Use the Public 
Policy Defense to Refuse Enforcement o f  Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?' pp 921-22; El-Ahdab, 
'Saudi Arabia Accedes to the N ew York Convention'; Cattan, 'Saudi Arabia'
See, for instance, Reisman, 'Law, International Public Policy (so-called) and Arbitral Choice in 
International Commercial Arbitration' 10.
In this mamrer, see, eg, Roy, 'The N ew York Convention and Saudi Ar abia: Can a Country Use the 
Public Policy Defense to Refuse Enforcement o f Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?' 922; Mason, 
'International Commercial Arbitration; Saudis Accept N.Y. Convention' 26; Akaddaf, 'Application o f  
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale o f Goods (CISG) to Arab 
Islamic Countries: Is the CISG Compatible with Islamic Law Principles?' at 23; El-Ahdab, Arbitration 
in Arab Countries vol. 1 pp 242-43; ELAlrdab, 'Arhitration in Saudi Arabia under the New  Arbitration 
Act, 1983 and its Implementation Rules o f 1985: Part 2' pp 50-51.
See, eg, El-Ahdab, 'Saudi Arabia Accedes to the New York Convention' 91; Roy, 'The New York 
Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Country Use the Public Policy Defense to Refuse Enforcement o f  
Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?' 922; Cattan, 'Saudi Arabia' 246,
Roy, 'The New York Convention and Saudi Aiabia: Can a Country Use the Public Policy Defense to 
Refuse Enforcement o f Non-Domestic Aibitral Awards?' at 922.
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of particular relevance in the context of Saudi Arabia, where the Shari’ah 
is the paramount law and, in effect, the ultimate expression of Saudi 
Arabian public policy. Shari’ah precepts are not always reconcilable with 
modem commercial practice. The Saudi Arabian Board of Grievances (the 
enforcement courts), in reliance on the public policy exception, is likely to 
refuse to enforce arbitral awards or such parts thereof as are deemed to be 
contrary to the Shari’ah.
Similarly, Dr. El-Ahdab noted that the significant crisis facing the enforcement of 
foreign awards in Saudi Arabia is that of the notion of public policy as defined by the 
Shari'ah. Indeed, he suggests that the concept o f public policy is sometimes defined 
in a very broad manner by the court, who often state that arbitration abroad or based 
on foreign law of itself violates public policy. The question whether these 
theoretical allegations are well founded will be explored below, but after having 
discussed the nature of Saudi public policy.
10.7.2 SharPah and Saudi Public Policy
The Saudi legal system is deeply rooted in Islamic Shari'ah mles. The mles of 
Shari’ah regulate not only, as one might think, the religious life of Muslims, but their 
commercial and political activities as well. Art. 1 of the Saudi Constitutional Law 
emphasises that:
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with 
Islam as its religion; God's Book and the Prophet's Sunnah (traditions), are 
its constitution.,. . (emphasis added)
Art. 7 of the same law further lays down that:
The regime derives it power from the Holy Qur'an and the Prophet's 
Sunnah which rule over this law and all other State Laws.
As regards the judicial system, Art. 48. of the Saudi Constitutional Law states that:
Cattan, 'Saudi Aiabia' 246.
See, El-Alidab, 'Ai'bitration in Saudi Ai'abia under the N ew  Aihitration Act, 1983 and its 
Implementation Rules o f  1985: Part 2’ 48.
Saudi Basic Law o f Governance o f 1992, Art. 1.
125 ibid Art. 7.
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The courts will apply, in the cases brought before them, the rules of the 
Islamic SharVah in accordance with what is indicated in the Book {Qur'an) 
and the Sunnah, and statutes decreed by the Ruler which do not contradict 
the Book or the Sunnah.
With regard to arbitration, Art. 20 of the SAL of 1983 stipulates, particularly, that the 
award must be not contrary to Shari’ah in order to be granted leave to enforce. It 
states that:
An arbitral award shall be enforceable when it becomes final by order of 
the authority originally competent to hear the dispute, this order shall be 
made on the request of any of the concerned parties after ascertaining that 
there is nothing that prevents its enforcement in Shari'ah. (emphasis 
added)
More particularly, the Circular of the Grievance Board regarding enforcement foreign 
judgments and arbitral awards of 1985 requires conformity with public policy by 
affirming that:
The Arab League Convention on Enforcement of Judgments (and Awards 
of 1952) empowers the competent court in the country where enforcement 
is sought to refuse to enforce the foreign award if it contradicts the public 
policy or the good public morals of the enforcement country, and that 
court has the discretion to estimate this matter. Accordingly, it is not 
possible in any case to grant execution o f any foreign award that violates 
any general principles o f  Shari’ah (such as interest), since the Islamic 
Shari’ah is the constitution and highest reference for the judiciary and the 
governance in Saudi Arabia (emphasise added).
The above provisions make it clear beyond doubt that the Islamic Shari’ah based 
upon Q ur’an and Sunnah has sovereignty over the Saudi legal system, and that 
therefore the Islamic Shari’ah mles constitutes Saudi public policy in the context of 
enforcing arbitral awards. Yet, it is important to note that although the Shari’ah is the 
main source of Saudi public policy, some aspect of administrative law may also fonn
ibid Art. 48.
S A L o f 1983, Art. 20.
the Circular o f the Grievance Board regarding Enforcement o f Foreign Judgments and Arbitral 
Awards, no 7 dated 15/8/1405 H (1985), Art.s. 3, 5.
™ See, Al-Samaan, 'The Settlement o f  Foreign Investment Disputes by Means o f Domestic Arbitration 
in Saudi Arabia' at 235; El-Ahdab, 'Saudi Arabia Accedes to the N ew York Convention' 88; Turck, 
'Saudi Arabia ’ 27,
S A L o f 1983, Art. 3.
A El-Aiidab, 'General Introduction on Arbitration in Arab Countries ' in P Sanders and AJ van den 
Berg (eds) International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer, 1998) Suppl. 11 p 14.
M Al-Marzouqi, Legislative Authority in the Kingdom o f  Saudi Arabia  (Obeikan, Riyadh 2004 'in 
Arabic') 83,
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part of public policy, such as, the non-arbitrability of administrative disputes 
without obtaining authorisation from the President of the Council of Ministers.
10.7.3 Definition of Saudi Public policy
Having seen that the Shari’ah rules constitute the Saudi public policy, the key 
question is whether all mandatory rules of Shari ’ah constitute public policy in the 
context of enforcement of foreign awards under the NYC. Is there a definition of 
public policy for the puipose of enforcing foreign awards? Before dealing with this 
question, it may be helpful to define briefly the concept of Shari’ah. Generally 
speaking, Shari’ah means the Islamic divine law based on the teachings of the Q ur’an 
and the traditional sayings and doings of Prophet Muhammad {Hadith and Sunnah), 
prescribing religious, moral, secular duties and in some cases penalties for 
lawbreaking. Some of these rules are mandatory while others are not (recommending 
things to do or to avoid).
As regards the definition of Saudi public policy, it seems that, as in other countries, 
there is no precise definition of the Shari 'ah mandatory rules which constitute Saudi 
public policy. Nonetheless, there are attempts to give a general explanation of public 
policy in Muslim law I general, and in SA in particular. One writer has said that:
In Muslim Law, the concept of public policy is based on the respect of the 
general spirit of the Shari’a and its sources (the Koran and the Sumra, etc.) 
and on the principle that “individuals must respect their clauses, unless 
they forbid what is authorized and authorize what is forbidden.
Moreover, a Saudi writer defines public policy, in a way close to the definition in 
other countries, as “a collection of political, social and economic foundations that a 
society stands upon in a certain time”. Dr. El-Ahdab further says, in the context of
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enforcement of arbitral awards, that Saudi public policy is the Shari 'ah. The prophet 
(PBUH) says the following: “Muslims must comply with the conditions (provided for 
by the Shari’ah) because no condition ever forbade a good action or authorized an evil 
one.” Ibn Taymiyya, one of the main leaders of the Hanbali School applied in Saudi 
Arabia, explains this rule of Public Order as follows: The rule in the contracts and 
conditions is validity, whereas the exception is the illegality only for those voided or 
prohibited by a text (of Q ur’an or Sunnah) or by analogy {Qiyas). Shari’ah, for 
example, has forbidden aleatory contracts or those containing interest. He concluded 
that as a general rule, the criterion for Saudi Public policy is “the Public Interest”. 
Although this explanation has the merit of confinning the rule of the validity of 
contracts indicating a narrow reading of the concept of Saudi public policy, on the 
other hand it suggests a wide scope by including every Shari’ah obligatory rules. The 
conclusion that Saudi public policy is “the public interest” remains vague and very 
broad.
A further definition that has been set forth is that Public policy in Saudi Arabia 
includes matters which are explicitly prohibited by Islamic Shari’ah, such as interest 
and gambling, as well as matters relating to administrative law. Yet, not all aspects 
of administrative law are considered to be matters of public policy.
Thus, it might be suggested that the concept of Saudi public policy as a giound for 
reflising enforcement of foreign awards should be limited to “the general principles of 
Shari’ah and some fundamental rules of administration”. This suggestion may be 
supported by the text of Art. 3 of the Circular of the Grievance Board in which it 
confinus that “it is not possible in any case to giunt execution of any foreign award 
that violates any general principles o f  Shari'ah f. This provision indicates clearly 
that not every breach of mandatory rules of Shari’ah would constitute a part of public 
policy, but only breach of the general principles of Shari’ah would do so, such as 
questions of interest, gambling, prostitution, and manifest injustice.
See, El-Alidab, 'Arbitration in Saudi Ai’abia under the New Arbitration Act, 1983 and its 
Implementation Rules o f 1985; Part 2' 56. See also, El-Alidab, Arbitration: Its Provisions and Sources 
vol 1 p 89.
See, Al-Samaan, 'The Settlement o f  Foreign Investment Disputes by Means o f Domestic Ai’bitration 
in Saudi Arabia' at 223.
the Circular o f  the Grievance Board regarding Enforcement o f Foreign Judgments and Arbitral 
Awards, no 7 dated 15/8/1405 H (1985), Art.. 3.
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10.7.4 Distinction between Domestic and International Public Policy
It has fi'equently been doubted whether that Saudi courts will enforce foreign awards, 
for example, made by non-Muslim arbitrators, or governed by non-Islamic laws, or 
including compensation for lost profits or opportunities or awarding interest, 
regardless of Saudi national mandatory rules, on the ground that national public 
policy is not the same as international public policy. Alternatively such issues will be 
held to be contrary to Saudi public policy and thus the awards will not be enforceable.
Accordingly, the crucial question which needs to be investigated is whether Saudi 
law or Saudi courts distinguish between domestic and international public policy.
There appear to be no explicit reference to “international public policy” by the Saudi 
arbitration laws or courts. However, the substantive meaning of that doctrine (i.e. 
interpreting domestic public policy nanowly in the context of enforcing foreign 
awards) is well recognised in Saudi Arabia. This can be seen by a comparative 
consideration between the pluases used in the provisions relating to enforcement of 
domestic and foreign awards. As regards enforcement of domestic awards. Art. 20 of 
the SAL stipulates that “An arbitral award shall be enforceable ... after ascertaining 
that there is nothing that prevents its enforcement in S h a r i f .  This Article refers to 
Shari’ah in a wide term (i.e. there is nothing) without any limitation, and thus can be 
construed literally to include every mandatory rules of shari'ah. Whereas, in the 
context of enforcement of foreign awards, Arts. 3, 5 of the Circular of the Grievance 
Board clearly limits the concept of the Shari’ah public policy by stating that a foreign 
award would be not enforceable if it “violates any general principles of Shari’ah)”. 
The use of the qualifier “general” indicates that not every violation of mandatory rules 
or principles of Shari’ah by a foreign award would amount to a giound for refusing 
enforcement. Only violation o f  a general principle of Shari’ah” would do so.
This comparison of the two provisions suggests that the Saudi authorities intend to 
take into account the principle that the concept of public policy in relation to foreign 
awards is naiTower than in relation to domestic awards, inviting the application o f an
See, eg, ILA Committee on International Commercial Arbitration, 'Interim Report on Public Policy 
as A Bar to Enforcement o f International Arbitral Awards’ 21; El-Ahdab, 'Saudi Arabia Accedes to the 
N ew  York Convention' 91; Roy, 'The New York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Countiy Use the 
Public Policy Defense to Rehise Enforcement o f Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?' pp 950, 259 fn 259.
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international public policy standard. Judicial supports for this conclusion can be seen 
below.
10.7.5 Common Examples of Saudi Public Policy
Having noted that Saudi legislation appears to concede the principle of a distinction 
between national and international public policy, the question arises as to whether the 
Saudi courts have recognised that principle in practice as well in dealing with the 
public policy exception to the enforcement of foreign awards. In answering this 
question, the Saudi judicial attitude will be examined in the light of issues that are 
ftequently raised as examples of violations of Saudi public policy, such as a foreign 
award made by non-Muslim arbitrators, or governed by non-Islamic laws, or included 
compensation for lost profit opportunities or containing interest. These common 
examples are now considered in turn:
10.7.6 Awards Made by Non-Muslim Arbitrators.
It has been suggested that the enforcement of a foreign award may be refused by the 
Saudi courts on the gi'ound of public policy if it was rendered by non-Muslim 
arbitrators. The IRSAL of 1985 specifies that arbitrators must be Muslim. Yet 
by applying the distinction between domestic and foreign awards, the Saudi courts do 
not considérer foreign awards made by non-Muslims to be contrary to Saudi public 
policy. They adopt the rule that if a Saudi party agrees with a foreign party to arbitrate 
outside SA, he is bound by the decision of the arbitrators even if they are not Muslim.
For example, a Saudi Appeal Court (the 4^ '^  Review Committee) has held where an 
arbitration agreement provides that any dispute between the parties will be resolved
M Alhoshan 'The Symposium o f  Euwpean-Arabian Arbitration', cited in El-Ahdab, Arbitration in 
Arab Countries v 2 p 242; El-Alidab, 'Saudi Arabia Accedes to the N ew  York Convention' p 91; ILA 
Committee on International Conamercial Ai'bitration, 'Interim Report on Public Policy as A Bar to 
Enforcement o f International Arbitral Awards' 21.
IR SA L of 1985, Art.3.
See, Al-Ajlan, Compilation o f  Judicial principles pp 61-62; the 4th Review Committee, decision 
No. 155/T/4 dated 1415 H (1994); the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 43/T/4 dated 1416 H 
(1995); the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 187/T/4 dated 1413 H (1992); the 4th Review  
Committee, decision No. 156/T/4 dated 1413 H (1992).
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by arbitration in the US, that it means that the parties plainly agree to resolve their 
difference by arbitration in that country and the Saudi party therefore cannot repudiate 
that agi'eement. The same conclusion has been reached in relation to arbitration in 
Austria and France. Accordingly, the Saudi courts have never refused to 
enforce a foreign award rendered abroad because it was entirely or partly made by 
non-Muslim arbitrators. In fact the opposite is true.
10.7.7 Governed by Non-Islamic Laws
Similarly, it was thought that Saudi Courts may hold foreign awards governed by non- 
Islamic law to be against Saudi public policy and therefore not enforceable in Saudi 
Arabia. It is true that the IRSAL of 1985 particularly requires the arbitrators, in 
issuing their awards, to follow the provisions of Islamic Shari’ah and Saudi 
applicable laws. Nonetheless, by applying the distinction between domestic 
arbitration and foreign arbitration, the application of this provision is considered to be 
limited to domestic awards and to have nothing to do with foreign awards. Moreover, 
SA is required, by adherence to the NYC, to enforce foreigi awards which are often 
governed by non-Islamic law. Consequently, the Saudi courts adopt the rule that, if an 
agreement between a Saudi party and a foreign party provides for arbitration abroad, 
it will be deemed to binding even if  governed by non-Islamic law, such as the law 
of France, the US or Austria. This consequently means that applying non- 
Islamic law to govern foreign awards will not be in itself deeiued to be a violation of
the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 43/T/4 dated 1416 H (1995).
the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 187/T/4 dated 1413 H (1992); the 4th Review Committee, 
decision No. 156/T/4 dated 1413 H (1992).
the 3rd Review Conmiittee, decision No. 15/T/3 dated 1423 H (2002),
See, eg, the 2nd Review Committee, decision No. lO/T/2 dated 1419 H (1998); the 9th 
Administrative Panel, decision No. 32/D/A/9 dated 1918 H (1997).
See, Roy, The N ew York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Country Use the Public Policy 
Defense to Refuse Enforcement o f Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?' pp 950, 259 fii 259.
IRSAL o f 1985, Art. 39.
pp 61-62; the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 155/T/4 dated 1415 H (1994). 
the 3rd Review Committee, decision No. 15/T/3 dated 1423 H (2002). 
the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 43/T/4 dated 1416 H (1995). 
the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 187/T/4 dated 1413 H (1992)
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Saudi public policy in so far as they are not contrary to the general principles of 
Shari’ah. Thus, the Saudi courts have enforced several foreign awards although they 
were not governed by Islamic Shari’ah, while on the other hand no case can be 
found in which enforcement of a foreign award was refused because it had been 
governed by non-Islamic law.
10.7.8 Compensation for Lost Profit or Opportunity
It has been argued that compensation for lost profit is not recognised by the Hanbali 
Doctrine, which applies in Saudi Arabia, and may therefore be held to be contrary to 
Saudi public policy in the context of enforcement of foreign awards. It should be 
pointed out at the outset that one general condition for compensation is that the loss or 
damage has actually happened. Application for compensation for actual loss, 
including the legal and arbitration costs, are clearly accepted within Saudi judicial 
practice. Reference to the term “actual loss” means that the plaintiff has to prove that 
such loss had taken place or was certain as result of the default in contractual 
obligations. The courts are not willing to award compensation upon a mere 
presumption or possibility. This condition has caused diversity among contemporary 
Shari 'ah scholars regarding the issue of compensation for lost opportunity of future 
benefits including future profits. Until recently applications for this kind of 
compensation were not commonly raised by parties before Saudi court. Thus, 
although the principle of compensation for lost future benefits including profits has 
been accepted by some Saudi courts, it is not yet established as a settled principle.
the 25th Subsidiary Panel, decision No. ll/D /F /25  dated 1417 PI (1996); the 2nd Review  
Committee, decision No. 208/T/2 dated 1418 PI (1997);
See, El-Ahdab, 'Saudi Arabia Accedes to the New York Convention' 91; ILA Committee on 
International Commercial Ai'bitration, 'Interim Report on Public Policy as A  Bar to Enforcement o f  
International Arbitral Awards' 21.
See, eg, the 18th Subsidiary Panel has enforced a foreign award including arbitration and lawyer 
costs. See, the 18th Subsidiaiy Panel, decision No. 8/D/F/18 dated 1424 H (2003), This decision was 
upheld by the 4th Review Committee. See, the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 36/T/4 dated 1425 
H (2004).
See, P Pompeo, 'East Meets West: A Comparison o f Government Contract Dispute Resolution in the 
Common Law and Islamic Systems'(1992) 14 (4) Loyola Los Ang Intl & Comp L J 815 at 843-44. For 
judicial practices, see, the 2nd Review Connnittee, decision No. 235/T/2 dated 1415 PI (1994); the 4th 
Review Connnittee, decision No. 197/T/4 dated 1409 H (1989); the 1st Review Committee, decision 
No. 30/T /l dated 1419 H (1998); the 1st Review Committee, decision No. 152/T/l dated 1412 H
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As regards enforcement of awards, a case came before a Saudi enforcing court (the 
10th Subsidiary Panel) in which there was an application for enforcement of a 
foreign award containing compensation for lost future profits. In this case, disputes 
arose out of a contract between a Romanian car company and a Saudi party in which 
the former gave the latter rights to market, sell, and service its cars and spare parts in 
Saudi Arabia. The disputes were submitted to arbitration as the contract provided for, 
and an award was made in favour of the Romanian company. The award ordered the 
Saudi party to pay the damages including a sum of $2,131,58 as a compensation for 
loss of profit because the Saudi party had failed to continue to buy the amount of cars 
agi'eed upon; a sum of $253,760,50 as compensation for loss of profit because the 
Saudi party failed to continue to buy the amount of spare parts agreed upon; and a 
sum of $250,000 as compensation for damage to reputation. When the Romanian 
company sought to enforce the award in a Saudi court, the Saudi party opposed 
enforcement on the grounds that the Romanian company had breached Saudi 
mandatory rules in that it had sent cars which were not in conformity with Saudi 
mandatory standards and measurements. It claimed that this violated their contract 
which provided that “since (the Saudi party) is legally responsible before the Saudi 
consumers to ensure that all cars it sells meet the standards applicable in Saudi Arabia 
..., (the Romanian company) guarantees that the quality of its cars is in conformity 
with standards and measurements applied in Saudi Arabia, and (the Saudi party) 
cannot therefore be held legally responsible for refusing to receive or distribute any 
amount coming from the first party which is contrary to the legal specifications 
required in Saudi Arabia.” The Saudi party also argued that the award breached the 
Islamic Shari’ah as it ordered compensation for loss profit and moral damages.
The court agi'eed with these arguments, finding that the Saudi party had proved that 
the cars in question were contrary to the mandatory standards and measurements of 
Saudi Arabia so that the Saudi office of standards and measurements seized all 
Romanian company’s cars at the Saudi distributor’s branches. More importantly, the 
court continued that the award aimed mainly to compensate the plaintiff for lost friture
(1991); the 12th Subsidiary Panel, decision No. 21/D/F/12 dated 1414 H (1993); the 2nd Review 
Committee, decision No. 89/T/2 dated 1415 H (1994); the 2nd Commercial Panel, decision No. 
65/D/TJ/2 dated 1420 H (1999); the 3rd Review Connnittee, decision No. 202/T/3 dated 1420 II 
(1999).
the 10th Subsidiary Panel, decision No. 20/D/F/10 dated 1416 H (1995) pp 1-10.
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profits and for moral (reputation) damages arising from the dispute. This, in the
opinion of the court, was contrary to Shari’ah principles which require that the
damage clearly occurred, whereas the loss of profits and reputation damages
alleged by the plaintiff was not certain but merely potential. Accordingly, the court 
refused to enforce the foreign award.
The plaintiff appealed and the court of appeal (the 2nd Review Committee) voided the 
lower court’s decision on several grounds including the fact that its decision dealt 
with the award’s merits, a matter which was beyond its jurisdiction. More 
significantly, in reaching the conclusion that the compensation for lost profit and 
moral damages contained in the award was contrary to Shari’ah mles, it held that the 
lower court had given justifications in general terms and wide phrases, whereas it 
should have established the non-eompliance of the foreign award with Islamic 
Shari’ah by using evidence and arguments derived from the unanimity of Islamic 
Scholars or from the Islamic Fiqh (Jurisprudential) Academies or the Council of 
Senior Scholars confirming that compensation for lost profit, opportunity or moral 
damages would violate Islamic Shari’ah. Thus, the appeal court sent the case back to 
the lower court to reconsider it again in the light of the appeal court’s remarks.
The above case illustrates that the appeal court was in favour of enforcement since it 
criticized the lower court review of the merits of the award. It also indicates that the 
court of appeal was reluctant to refuse enforcement of the foreign award on the basis 
that compensation for lost profit, opportunity or moral damages would constitute a 
violation of Shari’ah mles (Saudi public policy). This approach of the court of appeal 
has been accepted by other appeal courts in several cases relating to domestie 
disputes. For example, the court of appeal (the 4th Review Committee) states that
The author has proven, in a deep study, that compensation for damage to reputation and moral is 
lawful in Islamic Shari’ah. See, W Al-Tuwaigri, Protection o f  the Copyright in Islamic Jurisprudence 
and Statute (the Higher Judicial Istitute Riaydh 1999 'unpublished thesis') pp 208-21
the 2nd Review Committee, decision No. 235/T/2 dated 1415 H (1994).
the 4th Review Committee, decision No. 197/T/4 dated 1409 H (1989); the 1st Review Committee, 
decision No. 30/T/l dated 1419 H (1998); the 1st Review Committee, decision No. 152/T/l dated 1412 
H (1991); the 12th Subsidiaiy Panel, decision No. 21/D/F/12 dated 1414 H (1993); the 2nd Review 
Committee, decision No. 89/T/2 dated 1415 H (1994); the 2nd Commercial Panel, decision No, 
65/D/TJ/2 dated 1420 II (1999); the 3rd Review Conmiittee, decision No. 202/T/3 dated 1420 H 
(1999).
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compensation covers both actual loss and lost profit. However, the difficulty lies 
in proving the lost oppoitunity or lost profit as a matter of certainty or predominant 
probability, and therefore allegations of such loss do not often succeed in practice.
Yet, the Saudi courts should relax their domestie standard of eompensation for lost 
profits when dealing with foreign awards. They should take into consideration the 
position of some early jurists of Shari’ah. Contrary to what one may think, although it 
was not common at the time of early scholars of Islamic Shari’ah, the idea of 
compensation for lost future benefit (including profits) was confinned on various 
occasions by some distinguished scholars of Shari’ah, For instance, Ibn Taymiyya, 
from Hanbali Doctrine, states as a rule that damage, which requires compensation, is 
of two types: (i) loss of something which exists (e.g. actual loss); (ii) loss of 
something that was certainly on the way to happening. Besides, Kharchi, Ibn 
Sahnoun and ATGaravi fr om Maliki Doctrine, say that he who extorts money from 
another and detains it at length, will be liable for a sum equivalent to the profit that 
could have been made if  the money had remained with the owner.
10.7.9 Interest
The most eommon example of breaeh of Saudi public policy is legal or contractual 
interest. Arbitrators outside Saudi Arabia nonnally grant legal or contractual interest 
alongside the main damages to be paid to the aggrieved party. Yet, it is clear that the 
Saudi courts will not confer leave to execute interest in foreign awards since they 
deem interest to enter into the forbidden foiunwork of usury {riba) under the Islamic
the 4th Review Conmiittee, decision No. 197/T/4 dated 1409 H (1989).
For unsuccessful cases, see, the 1st Review Committee, decision No. 268/T /l dated 1419 FI (1998); 
the 1st Review Committee, decision No. 140/T/l dated 1420 FI (1999);
But for successful eases, see, the 12th Subsidiaiy Panel, decision No. 21/D/F/12 dated 1414 H (1993), 
confirmed by the 2nd Review Committee, decision No. 89/T/2 dated 1415 H (1994); the 2nd 
Commercial Panel, decision No. 65/D/TJ/2 dated 1420 H (1999), confirmed by the 3rd Review  
Conmiittee, decision No. 202/T/3 dated 1420 H (1999).
A Ibn Taymiyya, Alfatawa Alkobra  (Dar al-Kutub al-ihniyah, Beirut 1988 'in Arabic') vol. 4 p 489.
M Al-Kharchi, Al-Kharchi Ala Khalil ('in Arabic') vol. 6 p 146.
A AFGaravi, Al-Thakirah (in Arabic) vol. 8 p 317-318.
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Shari'ah. In principle, The Qur'an and Hadith dearly prohibit usury. In his book 
(The Qur ’an), Allah (the Almighty) forbids usury {riba) in peremptory language and 
warns those dealing in it with the severest threat such as:
But Allah has permitted trading and forbidden Riba (usury). So 
whosoever has receives an admonition from his Lord and desists shall not 
be punished for the past, and his case is for Allah (to judge); but whoever 
returns [to dealing in Riba (usury)], those are the companions of the Fire; 
they will abide internally therein. Allah will destroy Riba (usury) and will 
give increase for Sadaqat (deeds of charity, alms, etc.) And Allah likes 
not every sinning disbeliever.
Moreover, Allah (the almighty) as well as his Prophet Mohamed (PBUFI) have 
declared war against the usurer, unless he stops dealing in Riba. In this regard, Allah 
says:
O you who believe, fear Allah and give up what remains (due to you) 
from Riba (usury), if you are (really) believers. And if you do not, then be 
informed of a war [against you] from Allah and His Messenger. But if you 
repent, you shall have your capital sums. Deal not unjustly (by asking 
more than your capital sums), and you shall not be dealt with unjustly (by 
receiving less than your capital sums).
In addition to these prohibitive Q ur’anic verses that deter dealing in Riba and 
accepting interest, many other prohibitive Hadiths are stated in the prophet’s Sunnah 
(tradition). That is, the Prophet Mohamed (PBUH), for example, regards Riba as one 
of the great destructive sins. He also cursed the one who accepts Riba, the one who
Usury {Riba) in Islamic Shari’ah is divided into two categories; (a) Excess [Al-Fadl] Usury (To sell 
a certain amount o f anything for a greater quantity o f  the same thing); (b) Delay [Al-Nasi'ah] Usury 
(Conditioned excess for delay o f  payment or to take interest on lent money). See, S Al-Fawzan, A 
Summaiy o f  Islamic Jurisprudence (Al-Maiman Publishing House, Riyadh 2005 ' in Arabic') vol. 2 p 
38.
The Qur'an, Al-Baqarah [2: 275-276] 
ibid [2: 278-279],
Reported by M Al-Bukliari, Sahih al-Bukhari (in Arabic)no. 2266; Muslim, Sahih Muslim no. 258.
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pays it, the one who records it and the two witnesses to it. Furthennore, Muslim 
scholars unanimously prohibited usury {riba) in general.
In the light of the foregoing strong prohibitions of Riba (usury) under Islamic 
Shari’ah, one may understand why the Saudi courts consistently refuse to grant or 
enforce interest. Thus, it is not surprising when Art. 3 of the Circular of the Grievance 
Board specifies interest to be contradictory to the general principles of Shari’ah, as it 
reads:
It is not possible in any case to grant execution of any foreign award that 
violates any general principles of Shari’ah, and this has been consistently 
continued in the judicial precedents of the (competent courts) ... in which 
execution of interest contained in foreign awards was prevented.
In confonuity with the above prohibitive provisions of usury, the non-enforceability 
of interest has been eonsistently continued by the Saudi courts. For example, a 
Saudi enforcing court (the 25th Subsidiary Panel) granted execution of an ICCA 
award in favour of a Dutch party, apart from the award of interest, holding that it is 
contrary to the rules of Islamic Shari’ah. This decision was then upheld by the 
Court of Appeal.
Yet, a few contemporary Islamic scholars argue in relation to the problem of default 
in payiuent that if the debtor is dilatory (i.e. financially capable and not in constrained 
circumstances such as poor or declared insolvent), the judge should, by the request of 
the creditor, ordered the debtor to pay the creditor not only the capital of delayed 
payment or debit, but also an extra compensation to cover the unjustified
Reported by Muslim, Sahih Muslim no. 4069.
See, eg, Ibn al-Monther, Al-ljmaa  (Dar al-Athar, Cairo 'in Ai'abic') 107; Ibn Qudamah, Al-Mughnai 
vol. 5 pp 421-22; S Al-Dakhil, 'Compensation for Damages caused by Payment Evasion (Part 1)' 
(2006) Almoslim (in Ai'abic) <http://www.almoslim.net/rokn_elmy/sbow_article_main.Ghn7id-730> 
(accessed 15/7/2006); M Ibn Rushd, Bedaiat A l M ajtahid  (beirat Lebanon 1992 ’ in Ambic') vol. 2 p 
161;
the Circular o f the Grievance Board regarding Enforcement o f Foreign Judgments and Arbitral 
Awards, no 7 dated 15/8/1405 H (1985), Ai't. 3.
See, eg, the 25th Subsidiary Panel, decision No. 1 l/D /F/25 dated 1417 II (1996) 8; the 2nd Review  
Committee, decision No. 208/T/2 dated 1418 H (1997) 6; the 10th Subsidiary Panel, decision No. 
20/D/F/10 dated 1416 H (1995) 2;
the 25th Subsidiary Panel, decision No. 1 l/D/F/25 dated 1417 H (1996) 8.
the 2nd Review Committee, decision No. 208/T/2 dated 1418 H (1997) 6.
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procrastination. They consider this extra in payment to be justified under Islamic 
Shari’ah and not usury, since it is determined by the judge rather than the parties to 
the contract (i.e. pre-determining the percentage of the interest in case of overdue 
payiuent). One might apply the same conclusion by analogy on the interest 
contained in foreign awards. However, it is most unlikely, at least for the near 
future, that the Saudi eourts will follow this argument, since they are highly 
influenced by the opinion of the vast majority o f (early and contemporary) Islamic 
scholars who consider such extra payment due to default in payiuent to be forbidden 
usury. In this manner, the Islamic Fiqh Academy, a subsidiary of the Organization 
o f the Islamic Conference, passed a resolution on this issue as follows:
If the buyer/debtor delays the payiuent of installments after the specified 
date, it is not penuissible to charge any amount in addition to his principal 
liability, whether it is made a pre-condition in the contract or it is claimed 
without a previous agi'eement, because it is Riba (usury), henee prohibited 
in Shari'a.
It is prohibited (Haram) for a solvent debtor to delay the payiuent of the 
installments from their due dates. However, it is not penuissible in Shari'a 
to impose a compensation in case he delays the payment.
In favour o f  this approach, see, M Al-Zarqa, 'About the Legitimacy o f  Imposing the Dilatory Debtor 
to Compensate the Creditor '(1996) 3 (2) Journal o f Islamic Economic Studies 11 'in Arabic'; A Ibn 
Munay, Total opinions and research Sheikh Abdullah Ibn Munay (in Arabic); vol. 3 pp 191-261.
See, N Al-Shareef, 'Tliree Obstacles on Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Principles ' Al-Eqtisadiah 
(2731 ,3 /4 / 2001 'in Arabic') 5 .
See, eg, The Islamic Fiqh Academy, 'Decision No. 51 (2/6) About Sales on Installments'll990) 6 (1) 
Islamic Fiqh Academy Journal 193 s. 3, 4; the Islamic Fiqh Academy, 'Decision No. 109 (3/12) About 
Penalty Provision'(2000) 12 (2) Islamic Fiqh Academy Journal 91 s. 4; IF A the Muslim World League, 
'Decision No. 8/11 (1989) about Whether Is it Permissible for the Bank to Impose a Fine on the Debtor 
Because o f the Delay in the Repayment o f  Debt in Due Time?' (1989) 11th Session 
<http://www.themwl.org/Fatwa/default.aspx?d= 1 &cidi= 128&1=AR&cid= 10> (accessed 23/7/2006); A 
ALSalous, Islamic Economy and Contemporaiy Jurisprudence Issues (Dar AI-Thgafah, Qatar Doha 
1995 'in Ai'abic') vol. 2 p 564; MT Usmani, Researches on Contemporary Jurisprudential Issues (Dar 
alkalam, 1998) 37; Y Al-Shubaily, Investment banking Products and their Provisions in Islamic 
Jurisprudence (Dar Ibn Aljwzi, Riyadh 2005 'in Arabic') vol. 1 pp 625-56; Al-Dalchil, 'Compensation 
for Damages caused by Payment Evasion (Part 1)' ; N Al-Jofan, 'Compensation for Lost Benefit ' ( 
2006) Almoslim (in Arabic) <http://’vmw.almoslim.net/rokn_elmy/show_article_main.cfm?id=1501 > 
(accessed 15/7/2006).
The Islamic Fiqh Academy, 'Decision No. 51 (2/6) About Sales on Installments' s. 3.
ibid s, 4. Similarly, the Islamic Fiqh Academy, 'Decision No. 109 (3/12) About Penalty Provision's. 
4. Where it was decided that “It is pem issib le to include a Penalty Provision in all financial contracts 
except when the original commitment is a debt. Imposing a Penalty Provision in debt contracts is usury 
in the strict sense. ... [I]t is impermissible, for instance, to make a Penalty Provision in Installment Sale
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Similarly, the Islamic Fiqh Academy, a subsidiary of the Muslim World League, has 
come to the same conclusion. Accordingly, it is evident that the Saudi courts 
would not enforce interest contained in foreign awards.
The next question needs to be raised is whether an award granting interest would be 
held completely unenforceable or whether the only the part awarding interest will be 
reflised enforcement, so that the rest o f the award will remain enforceable as far as it 
is not clearly against public policy {Shari’ah principles). Saudi judicial practice 
confonn that partial enforcement is applied in this situation and consequently several 
foreign awards have been granted enforcement apart from interest.
Yet, it is worth mentioning that some plaintiffs by themselves dropped the sum of 
interest h'om their petition to enforce their awards. By way of example, a Dutch 
party requested a Saudi court to enforce an ICCA award, except for the part relating to 
the bank interest, reasoning that it breaches the Islamic Shari’ah rules. By contrast, 
it is said that some arbitral tribunals, in order to avoid the refusal of the Saudi courts 
to enforce the interest included in foreign awards, have included amounts representing 
of interest within the main sum of the award without identifying it separately as 
interest.
The above considerations show that the Saudi enforcement courts clearly deem 
interest included in foreign awards to constitute a violation of Saudi public policy 
(general principles of Shari’ah) and therefore not enforceable in Saudi Arabia. Thus, it 
can be concluded that interest is the only definite matter in which the probability of 
distinction between domestic and international public policy in the context of 
enforcement of foreign awards is not available in SA.
on a debtor who delays repayment o f outstanding installments, whether due to insolvency or payment 
evasion”.
the Muslim World League, 'Decision No. 8/11 (1989) about Whether Is it Penuissible for the Bank 
to Impose a Fine on the Debtor Because o f the Delay in the Repayment o f  Debt in Due Time?'
the 9th Administrative Panel, decision No. 32/D/A/9 dated 1918 H (1997); the 25th Subsidiary 
Panel, decision No. I l/D/F/25 dated 1417 FI (1996) 8; the 2nd Review Committee, decision No. 
208/T/2 dated 1418 FI (1997); the 18th Subsidiaiy Panel, decision No. 8/D/F/18 dated 1424 FI (2003); 
the 4th Review Conuuittee, decision No. 36/T/4 dated 1425 II (2004).
See, eg, the 25th Subsidiary Panel, decision No. 1 l/D/F/25 dated 1417 H (1996) pp 5, 8; the 2nd 
Review Conuuittee, decision No. 208/T/2 dated 1418 H (1997) 2; the 10th Subsidiaiy Panel, decision 
No. 20/D/F/10 dated 1416 H (1995) 2.
the 25th Subsidiaiy Panel, decision No. 1 l/D /F/25 dated 1417 H (1996) 8.
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10.8 Conclusion
The public policy defence under Art. V(2)(b) of the NYC has long been a traditional 
and flindamental ground for refusing enforcement which can be found in most foreign 
laws and international conventions dealing with enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards. The basic aim of Art. V(2)(b) is to allow each contracting state to protect its 
most flindamental economic, legal, moral, political, religious and social principles 
from being harmed by enforcement of foreign awards. While the NYC gives a 
significant emphasis to party autonomy under Art. V(l), the Convention puts 
limitations on this freedom under the public policy ground of Art. V(2).
The concept of public policy under Art. V(2)(b) could be practically problematic. The 
NYC does not spell out the concept and contents of public policy, but rather it refers 
this matter to the law of the country where enforcement is sought. National courts 
confirmed that the law governing the concept of public policy in Art. V(2)(b) is the 
law of the enforcing Country, Yet, the concept of public policy, by its nature, is 
ambiguous and lacks precise determination under national laws, its contents varying 
from country to country. This has led to uncertainty and inconsistencies in the 
interpretation and application of the public policy ground o f Art. V(2)(b), creating 
overlaps with other gi'ounds, such as Art. V(l)(a) (incapacity of the parties and invalid 
arbitral agreement), Art. V(l)(b) (violation of due process), Art. (l)(c) (excess of 
jurisdiction), Art. V(l)(d) (improper procedure or composition of the arbitral 
tribunal), and Art. V(2)(a) ( non-arbitrability). Such uncertainty and overlaps 
potentially could give the losing party wide opportunities to resist enforcement or at 
lest to delay it.
Yet, despite such uncertainty and inconsistencies, the public policy ground has not 
generated any serious obstacle to enforcement of foreign awards since national courts 
have generally interpreted public policy under Art. V(2)(b) as meaning international 
public policy rather than domestic public policy, the former being much nanower 
than the latter. Thus, many issues sought to be invoked under the public policy ground 
have been rejected by the courts whether they were procedural issues (such as 
procedural iiTegularity, lack of reasons, bias) or substantive issues (such as corruption, 
violation of mandatory laws, national interests or foreign relations).
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In SA, public policy means the general principles of Islamic Shari’ah and some 
fundamental administrative ml es. Allegations that enforcement of foreign awards is 
extremely difficult or impossible because of the Saudi concept of public policy were 
found to be largely without merit. Indeed, the Saudi courts are reluctant to refuse 
enforcement of foreign awards on the basis of public policy, unless there are very 
serious violations. This is because the distinction between domestic and international 
public policy is recognised by the Saudi courts. Thus for example they have gianted 
enforcement of foreign awards made by non-Muslim arbitrators, or governed by non- 
Islamic laws, although such matters are contrary to the mandatory Saudi domestic 
law. Also, it is likely that the Saudi courts would consider that compensation for lost 
profit or opportunities would not violate Saudi public policy. Thus, the award of 
interest in awards is the only issue that plainly deemed by the Saudi courts to 
constitute a serious infringement of Saudi public policy, and consequently awards will 
be generally enforced except for the part related to interest.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
General Conclusion
11.1 Introduction
I do not presume to think that this treatise settles every doubt in the minds 
of those who understand it, but I maintain that it settles the greater part of 
their difficulties. No intelligent man will require and expect that on 
introducing any subject I shall completely exhaust it; or that on 
commencing the exposition of a figure I shall frilly explain all its parts. ’
The main objective of this thesis has been to examine and evaluate the giounds listed 
under Art. V of the NYC for refusing enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in terms 
of both theoretical considerations and concrete application by the courts, especially 
the Saudi Arabian courts. In this concluding chapter only the main results of the study 
will be addressed, since each of the previous chapters has contained its own 
conclusions, and it not appropriate to reproduce them here. This chapter will thus 
consider in turn: general observations regarding the NYC, shortcomings in Art. V of 
the NYC, conclusions relating to Saudi Arabia, general recommendations regarding 
the NYC, and recommendation relating to Saudi Arabia.
11.2 General Observations
The NYC has achieved an extraordinary degree of success in its main object of 
promoting and facilitating a large degree of uniformity in securing the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards throughout the world, and continues to do so. One important 
reason behind that success is the fact that the NYC has achieved wide acceptance, the 
number of the states acceding to it numbering 137 (as at September 2006). That 
number covers states hom  every region of the world, including most major trading 
nations.
M Maimonides, The guide fo r  the perplexed  (2nd edn, Routledge, London 1904) 2.
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Art. V has itself played an important role in the success of the NYC. The fact that the 
gi’ounds for reflising enforcement set forth in Art. V are reproduced identically in 
Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 
1985, and to more or less the same effect in many international and regional 
conventions dealing with the enforcement of foreign awards suggests that Art. V 
reflects a broad consensus in the international community regarding the grounds on 
which enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be refused.
Moreover, Art. V reduces the ehanees of opposing enforcement by specifying the 
exclusive gi'ounds on which enforcement o f foreign awards may be reflised, 
preventing contracting states from adding other grounds. Unless one of the specified 
gi'ounds is established, a court has no discretion to refuse to enforce a NYC award. 
By contrast, the NYC does not prevent contracting states from fiirther restricting the 
gi'ounds for refusing enforcement, since Art. VII (1) acknowledges the right of a party 
to avail itself of any law or treaty that might exist in the enforcement state which is 
more favourable to enforcement of foreign awards than the NYC itself. Accordingly, 
although enforcement of an award that has been set aside by a competent authority at 
the place of arbitration may be refused pursuant to Art. V(l)(e), such an award may 
however be enforced, for example, in France, since French law does not recognise the 
nullification of an award in its country of origin as a ground to refuse enforcement of 
a foreign award.
Art. V does not allow enforcing courts to re-examine the merits of the award, while 
the grounds for refusing enforcement under Art. V must be construed narrowly and 
may be applied in serious cases only. Indeed, even where such a gi’ound is proved, the 
enforcing court may still have a residual discretion to grant enforcement when it feels 
appropriate to do so. Moreover, unlike previous conventions, the NYC does not 
demand that the party seeking enforcement prove the validity of the award, but 
instead insists that the party opposing enforcement must prove the existence of the 
grounds for reflising enforcement. Additionaly, rather than refusing enforcement of 
the award entirely. Art. V pennits courts to enforce awards partially, if the 
enforceable parts of an award can be separated. These factors together reflect the 
general policy of the NYC known as its “pro-enforcement bias”.
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It was seen that the foregoing features and principles have been affinried many times 
by the courts of contracting states. Additionally, many courts are reluctant to refuse 
enforcement of foreign awards where the giounds advanced for refusal have already 
been considered and rejected by the arbitral tribunal. At the same time several courts 
have regarded the losing party as estopped from contesting foreign awards at the stage 
of enforcement where it has participated without objection in the arbitral proceedings. 
As far as refusing enforcement on the basis that the award offends against the public 
policy of the enforcing state is concerned, there is an increasing trend towards 
applying international rather than purely domestic public policy.
Thus courts have generally applied a powerful presumption in favour of the finality 
and enforeeability of awards under the NYC, construing the giounds that would 
justify denying enforcement narrowly, and refusing enforcement only in the most 
serious cases. Indeed, the cases reviewed in this thesis show clearly that the grounds 
set forth in Art. V have been for the most part unsuccessfully invoked and have rarely 
led to foreign arbitral awards being denied enforcement.
Art. V of the NYC pays attention to the need for balance between the right of parties 
and the right of the enforcing state. Thus, Art. V (l) aims to emphasise that arbitral 
justice offers the parties advantages and safeguards that are no less than those offered 
by ordinary justice, whereas Art. V(2) intends to grant each contracting state the right 
to protect the basic interests of its nation.
The NYC still serves the international commercial community very well, and its 
general underlying pro-enforcement policy has created clear, universal trends towards 
supporting a friendly culture for international arbitration, and has chiefly assisted in 
making arbitration a desirable and secure method of resolution for international 
commercial disputes.
11.3 Shortcomings of Art. V
On the other hand, the present study unveils some shortcomings in Art. V. One major 
shortcoming is that whilst Art. V (l) seems to afford the parties a gieat deal of 
autonomy in choosing particular arbitral procedures to resolve their disputes to decide
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which law should governing the arbitral agi'eement and procedure, Art. V(2) limits 
that autonomy by making it subject to compliance with the public policy and law as 
to arbitrability of the enforcing state.
Another shorteoming is the requirement of Art. 11(1) (also referred to under Art. 
V(l)(a)) that the arbitration agi'eement be in written form. This requirement of writing 
excludes oral arbitral agieements, although the main contract is frequently made 
orally. Moreover, Art. 11(2)’s definition of what eonstitutes an agi'eement in writing 
(i.e. an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agi'eement, signed by the parties 
or contained in an exchange of letters or telegi ams), does not appear to conform with 
modern practices of international trade, since the means of communication have 
drastically changed in the last 48 years. Yet, the definition in Art. 11(2) is generally 
deemed to be only a list of examples of the means of commercial communications 
commonly used in 1958, rather than an exclusive list. Thus, courts have usually 
interpreted the writing requirement broadly so as to include many different forms of 
modem communications, such as telex, fax, e-mail and other means of e- 
communi cation.
A further shortcoming is that Article V(l)(e)makes it possible for courts to refuse to 
enforce foreign awards if they have been set aside by the courts in the country where 
they were rendered. This creates a potential weakness in the Convention system, by 
making the enforceability of an award subject to all domestic giounds for challenging 
it in the country where it was rendered. This would violate the general principle that 
the grounds for reflising enforcement are exclusively listed under Art. V. It was 
suggested that to avoid the indirect creation of extra gi'ounds, setting aside should not 
justify enforcement being refused under Art. V(l)(e), unless it was based on giounds 
similar to those available under Art. V(l)(a-d). Moreover, several national courts, 
notably in France, Austria and the USA, have shown themselves willing to enforce 
arbitral awards even if they had been set aside in the country of origin, relying either 
on Art. VII(l) which allows reliance on a more liberal domestic regime in favour of 
enforcement, or on the marginal discretion of the enforcing court indicated by the 
permissive language of Art. V.
An additional shortcoming is that the Art. V leaves the determination of a number of 
important matters, such as the violation of due process, non-arbitrability, and breach
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of public policy, to the law of the country where enforcement is sought. This has led 
to uncertainty and diversity in interpretation of these giounds, which in turn reduces 
the scope of uniformity of enforcement under the NYC. Yet, such diversity tends to 
be more theoretical than practical, and has not created any serious mischief in the 
actual enforcement of foreign awards.
Finally, the defence of state or sovereign immunity was found to be the only serious 
barrier to enforcement under the NYC. While an agreement of a state or a state entity 
to arbitrate disputes related to its commercial acts {acta jure gestionis) is generally 
held to be a waiver of immunity from the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal, it would 
be not held to be a waiver of immunity from execution. The plea of state immunity is 
a eommon obstacle to enforcement of international provisions, and the NYC contains 
no explicit provisions to assure enforcement against a state or a state agency. 
However, several courts have allowed enforcement of a foreign award against the 
commercial assets of a foreign sovereign.
To sum up then, most of the problems associated with Art. V have proved to be 
theoretical rather than practical. Moreover, they are more often associated with the 
bare text of NYC than with its judicial interpretation and application. Thus perceived 
shortcomings in the text and structure of the NYC have been overcome by liberal 
interpretation and application in the light of the general policy of pro-enforcement 
bias.
11.4 The NYC in Saudi Arabia
This thesis has paid particular attention to the operation of the NYC in Saudi Arabia 
and has shown that any fears that it might operate in a restrictive way in Saudi Arabia, 
and in particular that its operation might encounter difficulties with the Islamic 
Shari’ah are not well founded. On the contrary, the rules of the Islamic Shari’ah^ 
especially the Hanbali School officially adopted in Saudi Arabia, were found to be 
consistent with most principles of international arbitration and to support the 
enforcement of foreign awards. For example, the Shari'ah upholds the following 
principles; a very expansive definition of what constitutes a valid arbitral agreement, 
the binding and final nature of arbitral awards, party autonomy, and the requirements
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of a fair trial. At the same time the Saudi courts have also supported the NYC, 
confirming that the enforcement of foreign awards may be opposed only on the 
limited giounds listed under Art. V, and that re-examination of the merits of foreign 
awards is not permissible. Moreover, they have insisted that the party opposing 
enforcement bears the onus of proving the existence of the giounds for refusal, and 
have construed the giounds for challenging enforcement narrowly.
This thesis reached the conclusion that foreign arbitral awards are, as a rule, 
enforceable in Saudi Arabia under the NYC, even if they have been rendered by
female arbitrators, non-Muslim arbitrators, or governed by non-Islamic laws. The last 
two issues can be taken as examples of the distinction between Saudi national and 
international public policy.
However, it is evident that the Saudi courts would not enforce the interest contained 
in a foreign award because this violates the general principles of Shari’ah that 
strongly forbid interest. Yet the rest of the award would still be enforceable. Finally, 
it is unclear whether an award would be enforced against Saudi state agencies. It was 
seen that the Saudi Arbitration law of 1983 Art. 3 requires a Saudi state agency to 
obtain the consent of the President of the Council of Ministers in order to resort to 
arbitration. Although it was suggested that such a requirement appeared to be 
applicable to domestic more than international arbitration, it is still not clear in 
practice whether an arbitral award is enforceable if it was made against a Saudi state 
agency which resorted to arbitration without having obtained such authorization. In 
the only case to address the issue an inferior Saudi court held that although the 
enforcement of such an award would violate Art. 3, enforcement should be granted 
aecording to the general principles of Shari’ah that place significant emphasis on the 
moral obligation to fulfil one’s contracts and undertakings. This brave and 
extraordinary approach can be taken as a practical example of relying on more liberal 
provision in favour of enforcement.
Finally, the numbers of cases in which enforcement of foreign arbitral awards have 
been sought before the Saudi enforcing courts are notably not many. This probably 
because Saudi losing parties have often implemented the awards against them 
voluntarily, or the wining parties often seek enforcement against Saudi losing parties’
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assets out side Saudi Arabia, or the awards that rendered against Saudi parties are 
themselves not many.
11.5 General Recommendations
Suggestions to resolve the shortcomings in the NYC by amending its text or even by a 
new convention are definitely not appropriate at the present time. This is because the 
Convention is very simple and continues to be extraordinarily successful in achieving 
its main task of promoting enforcement of both arbitral agreements and foreign 
arbitral awards, especially as most apparent shortcomings have been overcome by 
appropriate judicial interpretation. Moreover, there are very considerable practical 
difficulties involved in changing any part of the Convention, one o f which is 
achieving the consent of the 137 ratifying states.
It is very important that the courts and laws of the contracting states should continue 
to promote a liberal and hannonized inteipretation of the NYC, especially Art. V, in 
the light of both the original objective of the Convention and the needs of modem 
business practice. This would significantly contribute to the alleviation of any 
shortcomings in the text.
In order to make the NYC more effective and reduce diversity in judicial applications, 
UNCITRAL should reconsider the creation of an international committee to provide 
guidance of how the NYC should be interpreted by the courts. This committee should 
issue an annual report regarding developments in the application and interpretation of 
the NYC. It is also highly desirable to produce a possible Model Law on the 
implementation of the Convention. Such a Model Law could hannonize the 
interpretation of the NYC and ensure a uniform enforcement procedure.
The Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration is quite efficient in monitoring judicial 
decisions applying the NYC and providing important commentaries to promote 
uniform judicial interpretation of the NYC. Nonetheless this work cannot of itself 
achieve hannonisation for several reasons. It has failed to report court decisions in 
many contracting countries such as Saudi Arabia. It is accessible only to those who 
understand the English language because it produced only in English. Its comments
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reflect only the personal opinions of the editor, rather than those of an official 
international committee. Besides, it is available only for an expensive fee.
Therefore, UNCITRAL, with the participation of all contracting States, should seek to 
collect and analyze all court decisions applying the NYC. Although such a 
compilation would have no binding authority on national courts, it would certainly 
provide them with useful guidelines and a persuasive source for more harmonized 
interpretation of the Convention. It would also be important to publish the above 
compilation in the six official languages of the UN, and make them easily accessible 
online. These would certainly be extremely helpful for judges, academics, and 
practitioners dealing with international arbitration and the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards.
The NYC should be regularly included on the agenda of national and international 
arbitration conferences and workshops.
It would be particularly beneficial to raise judicial awareness regarding developments 
in the operation of the NYC. This could be achieved by UNCITRAL establishing an 
international association to regularly bring together judges from across the world who 
specialise in the area, or at least organizing a regular programme for them so that they 
might discuss how a more unifonn and friendly application of the NYC might be 
achieved, exchanging views and sharing experiences. Moreover, information about 
international commercial arbitration in general and the Convention’s functioning in 
particular should be included as apart of the judicial educational programme institute 
of each adherent state. The opportunity offered by Art. VII(l) to utilise domestic 
provisions which are more favourable to enforcement than the NYC has perhaps been 
under utilised in practice. Thus, efforts should be made to encourage courts to take 
advantage of this possibility, and to encourage legislators in states which do not have 
provisions more favourable to enforcement than the NYC, to produce such provisions. 
This might be achieved by the creation of a model law by UNCITRAL, in order to 
ensure consistency of application.
11.6 Recommendations concerning Saudi Arabia
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Saudi Arabia should update its implementing legislation, which dates back to 1985, 
whereas Saudi Arabia adhered to the NYC in 1994. It is important for the Saudi 
government to overcome the in*ational fear of international arbitration practice. The 
Saudi System must clarify its position concerning the capacity of a state agency to 
enter into international arbitration without having obtained the consent of the 
President of the Council of Ministers. That requirement should be limited to state 
agencies that deal with sensitive and vital public issues, such as the state security or 
the main source of national income (i.e. oil). It is also recommended that Saudi 
Arabia enact a modem international arbitration law consistent with both the principles 
o f Shari’ah and modem standards in international arbitration, such as represented by 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. Such a law 
would be helpful in creating a pro-business environment, seizing the benefits of the 
increase in international commercial activities, achieving rapid economic giowth in 
Saudi Arabia, and capitalizing on the Kingdom’s competitive strengths as the global 
capital of energy and a major hub between East and West.
It is crucial that the competent authority ( i.e. the Board of Grievances) and the 
Ministry of Justice start publishing judicial decisions as soon as possible, making 
them easily accessible online, in order to advance the knowledge of the judiciary, 
lawyers and legal scholars regarding relevant precedents, thus helping to clarify many 
vague legal issues. Many misconceptions about enforcement of foreign awards in 
Saudi Arabia have been enhanced because the decisions of the Saudi courts have not 
been published so far.
The Organization of the Islamic Conference (QIC), or the like, should establish an 
international commercial arbitration centre with arbitration rules based on Shari’ah. 
Such a centre would provide an alternative dispute resolution forum for Muslims who 
would rather arbitrate before Muslim arbitrators who are very knowledgeable about 
the Shari’ah laws.
Muslim seholars and judges who are specialists in Shari’ah should make every effort 
to explain the rules and theories of Shari’ah regarding international commercial law 
including arbitration, UNCITRAL must also include such Shari’ah scholars in the 
membership of each working group. These are vital steps towards better 
understanding and the resolution of differences between the Islamic and non-Islamic
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world which are a legacy of misconceptions, misapprehensions and lack of knowledge 
about Shari’ah rules.
It is recommended that Saudi judges, academic and arbitrators, especially the Saudi 
Arbitration Group, participate in international commercial arbitration conferences and 
seminars held all over the world. This is a momentous opportunity for them and their 
counterparts from other countries to achieve a mutual understanding by listening to 
what each other has to say on the issues of international trade in general and 
international arbitration in particular.
The Higher Judicial Institute in Riyadh should take the leading role in organizing 
regular workshops and symposiums for Saudi judges to focus on issues relating to the 
developments in national and international arbitration, making them frilly aware of the 
obligations involved in applying the NYC. It is recommended that the Institute issues 
a quarterly journal on comparative research on national and international arbitration 
under Shari’ah and other modem national and international arbitration laws. It is also 
recommended that the Institute should include national and international arbitration as 
a part of the curriculum of a masters degree designed for junior judges.
Currently, jurisdiction over the enforcement foreign awards is given to the subsidiary 
courts, whereas jurisdiction over national arbitration and the enforcement of domestic 
arbitral awards is given to the commercial courts. The latter appear to be more 
familiar with arbitration issues and therefore should also be the competent courts for 
enforcing foreign awards under the NYC. The Saudi courts should continue to 
support and liberalize enforcement of foreign arbitral awards wherever it is possible to 
achieve the following favourable goals: to improve the reputation of the position 
Saudi Arabia takes towards international arbitration; to reduce attempts to enforce 
awards against Saudi parties’ assets in foreign countries; and above all to provide 
adequate security and encouragement for foreign parties to do business with Saudi 
parties.
It is hoped that the thesis will provide a useful guide for interpreting the grounds for 
refusing enforcement set out in Art. V of the NYC, especially in Saudi Arabia. It is 
also hoped that the recommendations of the thesis will be deemed as a modest 
contribution towards making the NYC operate more efficiently and more uniformly,
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as well as allowing Saudi Arabia to become a friendly forum for the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards.
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Appendix A: the New York Convention of 1958
The United Nation Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958
Article I
1. This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement o f  arbitral awards made in the 
territory o f a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement o f such awards are 
sought, and arising out o f differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to 
arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement 
are sought.
2. The term "arbitral awards" shall include not only awards made by arbitrators appointed for each case 
but also those made by permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties have submitted.
3. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, or notifying extension under article X 
hereof, any State may on the basis o f reciprocity declare that it will apply the Convention to the 
recognition and enforcement o f  awards made only in the territory o f another Contracting State. It may 
also declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences arising out o f legal relationships, 
whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the national law o f the State 
making such declaration.
Aiticle II
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to 
submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in 
respect o f a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable 
o f settlement by arbitration.
2. The tenn "agreement in writing" shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration 
agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange o f letters or telegrams.
3. The court o f a Contracting State, when seized o f an action in a matter in respect o f which the parties 
have made an agreement within the meaning o f this article, shall, at the request o f one o f the parties, 
refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or 
incapable o f being performed.
Article III
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Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with 
the mles o f procedure o f  the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in 
the following articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees 
or charges on the recognition or enforcement o f arbitral awards to which this Convention applies than 
are imposed on the recognition or enforcement o f domestic arbitral awards.
Article IV
1. To obtain the recognition and enforcement mentioned in the preceding article, the paity applying for 
recognition and enforcement shall, at the time o f  the application, supply.
(a) The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof;
(b) The original agreement referred to in article II or a duly certified copy thereof.
2. If the said award or agreement is not made in an official language o f  the country in which the award 
is relied upon, the party applying for recognition and enforcement o f  the award shall produce a 
translation o f these documents into such language. The translation shall be certified by an official or 
sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent.
Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement o f the award may be refused, at the request o f the party against whom 
it is invoked, only if  that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and 
enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to them, under 
some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it 
or, failing any indication thereon, under the law o f  the country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice o f the appointment o f the 
arbitrator or o f the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms o f the 
submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope o f the submission to 
arbitration, provided that, if  the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from 
those not so submitted, that part o f the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to 
arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition o f  the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the 
agreement o f the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law o f the country 
where the arbitration took place; or
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(e) The award has not yet become binding, on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a 
competent authority o f the country in which, or under the law o f  which, that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement o f an arbitral award may also be refused if  the competent authority in 
the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter o f the difference is not capable o f settlement by arbitration under the law o f that 
country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement o f the award would be contrary to the public policy o f  that country. 
Article VI
If an application for the setting, aside or suspension o f the award has been made to a competent 
authority referred to in article V (1) (e), the authority before which the award is sought to be relied 
upon may, if  it considers it proper, adjourn the decision on the enforcement o f the award and may also, 
on the application o f the party claiming enforcement o f  the award, order the other party to give suitable 
security.
Article VII
1. The provisions o f the present Convention shall not affect the validity o f multilateral or bilateral 
agreements concerning the recognition and enforcement o f arbitral awards entered into by the 
Contracting States nor deprive any interested party o f  any right he may have to avail himself o f an 
arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties o f  the country where 
such award is sought to be relied upon.
2. The Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses o f 1923 and the Geneva Convention on the Execution 
of Foreign Aihitral Awards o f 1927 shall cease to have effect between Contracting States on their 
becoming bound and to the extent that they become bound, by this Convention.
Article VIII
1. This Convention shall be open until 31 December 1958 for signature on behalf o f any Member o f the 
United Nations and also on behalf o f any other State which is or hereafter becomes a member o f any 
specialized agency o f  the United Nations, or which is or hereafter becomes a party to the Statute o f the 
International Court o f Justice, or any other State to which an invitation has been addressed by the 
General Assembly o f  the United Nations,
2. This Convention shall be ratified and the instrument o f  ratification shall be deposited with the 
Secretary-General o f  the United Nations.
Article IX
Appendix A: the New York Convention o f  1958 358
1. This Convention shall be open for accession to all States referred to in article VIIÎ.
2. Accession shall be effected by the deposit o f  an instrument o f accession with the Secretaiy-General 
o f  the United Nations.
Article X
1. Any State may, at the time o f signature, ratification or accession, declare that this Convention shall 
extend to all or any o f the territories for the international relations o f  which it is responsible. Such a 
declaration shall take effect when the Convention enters into force for the State concerned.
2. At any time thereafter any such extension shall be made by notification addressed to the Secretary- 
General o f  the United Nations and shall take effect as from the ninetieth day after the day o f receipt by 
the Secretary-General o f  the United Nations o f  this notification, or as from the date o f  entry into force 
o f  the Convention for the State concerned, whichever is the later.
3. With respect to those territories to which this Convention is not extended at the time o f signature, 
ratification or accession, each State concerned shall consider the possibility o f  taking the necessaiy 
steps in order to extend the application o f this Convention to such tenitories, subject, where necessary 
for constitutional reasons, to the consent o f the Governments o f such tenitories.
Article XI
In the case o f  a federal or non-unitary State, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) With respect to those articles o f  this Convention that come within the legislative jurisdiction o f  the 
federal authority, the obligations o f the federal Government shall to this extent be the same as those o f  
Contracting States which are not federal States;
(b) With respect to those articles o f this Convention that come within the legislative jurisdiction of 
constituent states or provinces which are not, under the constitutional system o f  the federation, bound 
to take legislative action, the federal Government shall bring such articles with a favourable 
recommendation to the notice o f the appropriate authorities o f constituent states or provinces at the 
earliest possible moment;
(c) A federal State Party to this Convention shall, at the request o f any other Contracting State 
transmitted tlii'ough the Secretary-General o f the United Nations, supply a statement o f  the law and 
practice o f  the federation and its constituent units in regard to any particular provision o f this 
Convention, showing the extent to which effect has been given to that provision by legislative or other 
action.
Article XII
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1. This Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date o f  deposit o f the third 
instrument o f  ratification or accession.
2. For each State ratifying or acceeding to this Convention after the deposit o f  the third instrument o f  
ratification or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after deposit by 
such State o f  its instrument o f ratification or accession.
Article XIII
1. Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by a written notification to the Secretary- 
General o f the United Nations. Denunciation shall take effect one year after the date o f receipt o f the 
notification by the Secretary-General.
2. Any State which has made a declaration or notification under article X may, at any time thereafter, 
by notification to the Secretary-General o f the United Nations, declare that this Convention shall cease 
to extend to the territory concerned one year after the date o f the receipt o f  the notification by the 
Secretary-General.
3. This Convention shall continue to be applicable to arbitral awards in respect o f  which recognition or 
enforcement proceedings have been instituted before the denunciation takes effect.
Article XIV
A Contracting State shall not be entitled to avail itself o f the present Convention against other 
Contracting States except to the extent that it is itself bound to apply the Convention.
Article XV
The Secretary-General o f the United Nations shall notify the States contemplated in article VIII o f the 
following:
(a) Signatures and ratifications in accordance with article VIII;
(b) Accessions in accordance with article IX;
(c) Declarations and notifications under articles I, X and XI;
(d) The date upon which this Convention enters into force in accordance with article XII;
(e) Denunciations and notifications in accordance with article XIII.
Article XVI
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1. This Convention, o f which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts shall be equally 
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives o f  the United Nations.
2. The Secretary-General o f  the United Nations shall transmit a certified copy o f this Convention to the 
States contemplated in article VIII,
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Appendix B: The Saudi Arbitration Law (SAL) of 1983 
Article 1
The parties may agree to arbitrate a specific existing dispute; a prior agreement to arbitrate may also be 
made in respect o f  any dispute resulting from the performance o f a specific contract.
Article 2
Arbitration shall not be permitted in cases where a settlement (Arabic: sulh) is not allowed. An 
agreement to arbitrate (Arabic: al-ittifaq ala al-tahkim) may not be made except by those who have 
capacity to act.
Article 3
Government Agencies are not allowed to resort to arbitration for settlement o f their disputes with third 
parties except after having obtained the consent o f the President o f the Council o f  Ministers. This 
ruling may be amended by resolution o f  the Council o f Ministers.
Article 4
The arbitrator shall have expertise and be o f  good conduct and behaviour, and shall have full legal 
capacity. If there are several arbitrators, their number shall be uneven.
Article 5
The parties to the dispute shall file the arbitration instrtiment (Arabic: wathiqat al-tahkim) with the 
Authority originally competent to hear the dispute. The instrument shall be signed by the parties or 
their authorized attorneys, and by the arbitrators, and it must state the details o f  the dispute, the names 
o f  the arbitrators and their acceptance to hear the dispute. Copies o f the documents relating to the 
dispute shall be attached.
Article 6
The Authority originally competent to hear the dispute shall record the applications for arbitration 
submitted to it, and take a decision approving the arbitration instrument (Arabic: wathiqat al-tahkim).
Article 7
If the parties have agreed to arbitrate before the occurrence o f the dispute, or if the arbitration 
instmment relating to a specific existing dispute has been approved, then the subject matter o f  the 
dispute shall be heard only according to the provisions o f this Regulation.
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Article 8
The clerk o f the Authority originally competent to hear the dispute shall be in charge o f all the 
notifications and notices provided for in this Regulation.
Article 9
The arbitrators' decision shall be taken within the time limit specified in the arbitration instrument 
(Arabic: wathiqat al-tahkim), unless it is agreed to extend it. If the parties have not fixed in the 
arbitration instrument a time limit for the decision, the arbitrators shall take their decision within ninety 
days from the date on which the arbitration instrument was approved; otherwise any o f the parties may, 
if  he so desires, appeal to the Authority originally competent to hear the dispute which shall decide 
either hearing the subject matter or extending the time limit for another period.
Article 10
If the parties have not appointed the arbitrators, or if  either o f  them fails to appoint his arbitrator(s), or 
if  one or more o f the arbitrators refuses to assume his task or withdraws, or something prevents him 
from carrying out his tasks, or if he is dismissed, and there is no special agreement between the parties, 
the Authority originally competent to hear the dispute shall appoint the required arbitrators upon 
request o f the party who is interested in expediting the arbitration, in the presence o f the other party or 
in his absence after being summoned to a meeting to be held for this purpose. The Authority shall 
appoint as many arbitrators as are necessary to complete the total number o f  arbitrators agreed to by the 
parties; the decision taken in this respect shall be final.
Article 11
The arbitrator may not be removed except with the mutual consent o f the parties, and the arbitrator so 
removed may claim compensation if  he had already proceeded and if he had not been the caurse o f  
such removal. Furthermore, he cannot be removed except for reasons that occur or appear after the 
filing o f the arbitration instrument (Arabic: wathiqat al-tahkim).
Article 12
The arbitrator may be challenged for the same reasons for which a judge may be challenged. The 
request for challenge shall be submitted to the Authority originally competent to hear the dispute within 
five days from the day on which the party was notified o f the appointment o f  the arbitrator, or the day 
on which one of the reasons for challenge appeared or occuiTed. The decision on the request for 
challenge shall be taken in a meeting to be held for this purpose and attended by the parties and the 
arbitrator whose challenge is requested.
Article 13
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The arbitration shall not terminate because o f the death o f one o f  the parties, but the time fixed for
award shall be extended by thirty days unless the arbitrators decide on a further extension.
Article 14
If an arbitrator is appointed in place o f the removed arbitrator or the one who has withdrawn, the date 
fixed for the award shall be extended by thirty days.
Article 15
The arbitrators, by the majority by which the award shall be made, may, through a justified decision, 
extend the periods fixed for the award on account o f circumstances pertaining to the subject matter o f  
the dispute.
Article 16
The decision o f the arbitrators shall be taken by a majority vote and if they are authorized to reach a 
compromise solution (Arabic: sulh), their decision shall be by unanimity.
Article 17
The award document shall especially include the arbitration instrument (Aiabic: wathiqat al-tahkim), a 
résumé o f  the depositions o f  the parties and their documents, reasons for the award and its text and 
date, and the signatures o f the arbitrators. If one or more o f them refuse to sign the award, such refusal 
shall be stated in the award document.
Article 18
All awards issued by the arbitrators, even if  they are issued in relation to one o f the procedures of 
investigation, shall be filed within five days with the Authority originally competent to hear the dispute 
and the parties shall be notified by copies o f  them. The parties may submit their objections against 
what is issued by the arbitrators to the Authority with whom the awards were filed, within fifteen days 
from the date on which they were notified o f the arbitrators' awards; otherwise such awards shall be 
final.
Article 19
If the parties or one o f  them submitted an objection against the award o f the arbitrators within the 
period provided for in the preceding Article, the Authority originally competent to hear the dispute 
shall consider the dispute and shall either dismiss the objection and issue an order for execution o f the 
award, or accept the objection and decide the case.
Article 20
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The award o f the arbitrators shall be due for execution, when it becomes final, by an order from the 
Authority originally competent to hear the dispute. This order shall be issued upon request o f one o f  the 
concerned parties after confirming that there is nothing to prevent its execution legally.
Article 21
The award made by the arbitrators shall be considered, after issuance o f  the order o f  execution in 
accordance with the previous Article, as effective as a judgment made by the Authority which issued 
the order o f execution.
Article 22
Fees o f arbitrators shall be determined by agreement between the parties and unpaid sums o f such fees 
shall be deposited with the Autliority originally competent to hear the dispute within five days after 
approval o f  the arbitration instmment (Arabic: wathiqat al-talikim), and shall be paid within a week 
from the date on which the order for execution o f award is issued.
Article 23
If there is no agreement on the fees o f arbitrators, and a dispute ensues, the matter shall be settled by 
the Authority originally competent to hear the dispute, which decision shall be final.
Article 24
The decisions required for the execution o f this Regulation shall be issued by the President o f  the 
Council o f Ministers, on the basis o f a proposal made by the Minister o f Justice after agreement with 
the Minister o f Commerce and the President o f the Board o f  Grievances.
Article 25
This Regulation shall be published in the Official Gazette, and shall be effective thirty days after the 
date o f its publication.
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Appendix C; the Implementation Rules of the Saudi Arbitration Law (IRSAL) of 
1985
Chapter 1. Arbitration, Arbitrators and Parties 
Section 1
Ai'bitration in matters wherein conciliation is not permitted, such as hudoud laan between spouses, and 
all matters relating to the public order, shall not be accepted.
Section 2
An agreement to arbitrate shall only be valid if entered into by persons o f  full legal capacity. A 
guardian o f  minors, appointed guardian or endowment administrator may not resort to arbitration 
unless being authorized to do so by the competent court.
Section 3
The arbitrator shall be a Saudi national or Muslim expatriate from the free profession section or others. 
The arbitrator may also be an employee o f the state, provided approval o f  the department to which he 
belongs is obtained. In the case o f more than one arbitrator, the umpire shall have a laiowledge o f  
sharia rules, commercial regulations, customs and traditions applicable in Saudi Arabia.
Section 4
Any person having an interest in the dispute or having been sentenced to a hud or penalty in a crime of 
dishonour, or being dismissed from a public position following a disciplinary order, or being 
adjudicated as bankiaipt, unless being relieved, shall not act as arbitrator,
Section 5
Subject to the provisions o f Sections 2 and 3 above, a list containing the names o f arbitrators shall be 
prepared by agreement between the minister o f justice, the minister o f commerce and the chairman o f  
the Grievance Board. The courts, judicial committees, and chambers o f commerce and industry shall be 
informed o f such lists and the respective parties may select arbitrators from these lists or from others.
Section 6
The appointment o f an arbitrator or arbitrators shall be completed by agreement between the disputing 
parties in an arbitration instrument which shall sufficiently outline the dispute and the names o f the 
arbitrators. Agreement to arbitration may be concluded by a condition in a contract in respect o f 
disputes that may arise from the execution o f  such a contract.
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Section 7
The authority originally competent to decide in the dispute shall issue a decision for approval o f the 
arbitration instrument within 15 days and shall notify the arbitration panel o f the same.
Section 8
In disputes where a government authority is a party with others, such a government authority shall 
prepare a memorandum with respect to arbitration in such a dispute, stating its subject matter, the 
reasons for arbitration and the names o f  parties. Such a memorandum shall be submitted to the council 
o f  ministers for approval o f  arbitration. The prime minister may, by a prior resolution, authorize a 
government authority to settle the disputes arising from a particular contract, through arbitration, In all 
cases, the council o f ministers shall be notified o f  the arbitration awards adopted.
Section 9
The clerk o f the authority originally competent to decide on the dispute shall act as secretary for the 
arbitration panel, establish the necessary records for registration or arbitration application and shall 
submit the same to the concerned authority for approval o f the arbitration instrument. Such clerk shall 
also be in charge o f the summons and notices provided for in the arbitration regulations and by any 
other assignments as may be decided by the relevant minister. The concerned authorities shall make the 
necessary arrangements regarding the above.
Section 10
The arbitration panel shall fix the date o f the hearing for consideration o f the dispute within a period 
not exceeding five days from the date in which approval o f the arbitration document had been notified 
to the arbitration panel, and shall notify the disputing parties o f the same through the clerk o f  the 
authority originally competent to decide on the dispute.
Chapter II, Notification of Parties, Appearance, Default and Proxies in Arbitration 
Section 11
Every summons or notice relating to the subject matter o f arbitration made tlirough the clerk o f  the 
authority originally competent to decide on the dispute, shall be made tlirough the messenger or the 
official authorities, whether the said proceeding is requested by the disputing parties or initiated by the 
arbitrators. Police or mayors are required to assist the relevant authority in performing its duties within 
their prescribed jurisdiction.
Section 12
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The summons or notice shall be written in the Ai'abic language and shall consist o f  two or more copies 
- according to the number o f  disputing parties - and shall contain the following:
a) The date, day, month and year in which the summons or notice was made.
b) The first name, surname, title, profession and domicile o f  the party requesting the summons or 
notice, and the first name, surname, title, profession and domicile o f his representative, if  he is working 
for another person.
c) The name o f the messenger who forwarded the summons or notice, his employer and his signature 
on the original and copy o f the summons or notice.
d) The first name, surname, profession and domicile o f  the person to be summoned or notified, and if 
his domicile is not known at the time o f issuance o f the summons, then his latest domicile.
e) Title o f  the person to whom copy o f the summons has been served, and his signature on the original 
indicating receipt, or indication o f his refusal to take receipt o f the summons when returned to the 
concerned authority.
f) Name and place o f the arbitration panel, the subject matter o f procedures, and the date specified 
therefor.
Section 13
1. The papers to be served on summons shall be delivered to the respective person, or to his place o f  
domicile, and may be delivered to a chosen place o f domicile deteimined by the concerned parties.
2. In case such person is not present in his place o f  domicile, the summons papers shall be delivered to 
any person who declares that he is an agent or responsible for the business o f the person to be 
summoned, or his employee, or that he or she is living with him - such as spouse, relative or other.
Section 14
If the messenger did not find the proper person to whom the papers are to be delivered pursuant to the 
preceding section, or if  the person mentioned therein refrained from accepting the papers, the 
messenger shall state that in the original copy and deliver the same that day to the police commissioner 
or mayor or the representative o f any o f them, if  the residence of the person summoned falls within 
their authority. Also, the messenger shall within 24 hours send the person summoned at his original or 
chosen domicile a registered letter, informing that the copy had been delivered to the administration 
and stating all such details in the original copy o f the summons. The summons or notice shall be valid 
and effective from the time o f  delivei-y thereof as aforementioned.
Section 15
Appendix C: the Implementation Rules o f  the Saudi Arbitration Law o f 1985 368
Except as provided for in special regulations, the copy o f summons or notice shall be delivered in the 
following manner:
a) In matters relating to the state, it shall be delivered to the ministers, district governors, directors o f  
government departments or their representatives.
b) In matters relating to public persons, it shall be delivered to the person acting on his behalf 
according to the law, or his representative.
c) In matters relating to companies, societies and private establishments, it shall be delivered to the 
head offices, as indicated in the commercial registration, to the chairman, managing director or his 
representative from among the employees. With respect to foreign companies having branches or 
agents in Saudi Aiabia, the papers shall be delivered to the branch or the agent.
Section 16
The official in charge shall submit the arbitration file to the authority responsible for trial o f the 
dispute, for approval o f  the arbitration instrument. The clerk o f such authority shall notify the parties 
and the arbitrators o f the decision taken with respect to approval o f the arbitration instrument within 
one week from the date o f adoption o f such decision.
Section 17
On the day fixed for arbitration, the parties shall appear by themselves or through their representatives, 
by virtue o f a notarized power o f attorney, or by a proxy issued by any official authority or certified by 
one o f the chambers o f  commerce and industry. A copy o f the power o f attorney shall be kept in the file 
o f  the claim after the original has been reviewed by the arbitrator, without prejudice to the right o f the 
arbitrator or arbitrators to require the personal appearance o f  the respective party if  the circumstances 
so require.
Section 18
1. In the event o f default by one o f the parties in appearing at the first hearing, and if  the arbitration 
panel is satisfied that such defaulting party had been properly served notice, the arbitration panel may 
decide on the dispute as long as the respective parties have filed their statements o f  claim, defences and 
documentation. The award adopted shall, in such case, be considered a decision made in the presence 
o f  the parties. However, if  the defaulting party was not properly served a summons, the hearing shall be 
adjourned to another hearing so that the defaulting party is properly notified. If the defendant parties 
are many and are only partially served a personal summons, and if they have all, or those who are not 
served notice, defaulted to appear, the arbitration panel in other than urgent matters shall adjourn the 
hearing so that the defaulting parties are properly served notice, and the award adopted in such other 
hearing shall be deemed as if  made in the presence o f  all defaulting parties.
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2. Also, the award o f arbitration shall constmclively be deemed made in the presence o f the party who 
appears personally or by proxy in any o f  the hearings, or filed his statement o f defence in the claim or 
in document relating thereto. However, if  the defaulting party appeared prior to the end o f the hearing, 
any award or decision adopted therein shall be deemed null and void.
Section 19
If the arbitration panel discovers that a summons published to a defaulting party in a newspaper is not 
proper, it shall adjourn arbitration o f  the dispute to another hearing and such defaulting party shall be 
properly served a summons in respect thereto.
Chapter III, Hearings, Trial and Recordings of Claim
Section 20
The claim shall be tried openly unless the arbitration panel decides by its own motion, or if  one o f the 
parties so requests, that the hearing be held in camera for reasons appreciated by the arbitration panel.
Section 21
The arbitration o f the claim shall not, without an acceptable reason, be adjourned more than once for a 
reason attributed to one o f the parties.
Section 22
The arbitration panel shall reasonably allow each party to make his remarks and defences either orally 
or in writing in the times specified by the arbitration panel. The defendant party shall be the last to 
make submission and the panel shall complete the case and prepare the award.
Section 23
The umpire shall control and manage the hearings, direct questions to the parties or witnesses, and shall 
have the right to dismiss from the hearing anyone in contempt o f the hearing. However, if  anyone 
present commits a violation, the umpire shall record the incident and transfer it to the concerned 
authority. Each arbitrator shall have the right to direct questions and examine the parties or witnesses 
through the umpire.
Section 24
The parties may request the arbitration panel at any stage o f the claim to record their agreement in the 
minutes o f the hearing as related to admission, conciliation, assignment or otherwise, and the 
arbitration panel shall make an award o f the same.
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Section 25
The Arabic language shall be the official language to be used before the arbitration panel, whether in 
the discussions or in correspondence. The arbitration panel and the parties may not speak other than the 
Arabic language and any party who does not speak A a b ic  shall be accompanied by an accredited 
translator, who shall sign with him the minutes o f  the hearing, approving the statements made.
Section 26
Any party may request adjournment o f the proceedings for a reasonable period, that period to be 
decided by the arbitration panel, so that such a party can submit any documents, papers, or remarks 
which may be productive or have a material effect on the case. The arbitration panel may allow further 
adjournments if there is justification therefor.
Section 27
The arbitration panel shall record the facts and proceedings which take place in the hearing, in minutes 
written by the secretary o f  the arbitration panel under its supervision. The minutes shall contain the 
date and place o f  the hearing, names o f arbitrators, the secretary and the parties. It shall also contain 
statements o f the respective parties, the minutes shall be signed by the umpire, arbitrators and the 
secretary.
Section 28
1. The arbitration panel may, by its own motion, or pursuant to a request from one o f the parties, 
require the other party to produce any document which he may possess and which may have material 
effect on the proceedings, in the following cases:
a) If such document is a joint document between the parties. Such document will be deemed joint if, in 
particular, it is in favour o f  both parties or if it proves their mutual rights and obligations.
b) If one o f  the parties invoked such a document in any phase o f the claim,
c) If the regulations permit demand for delivery or release o f  such a document.
2. The application must state the following:
a) description o f the document requested
b) contents o f the document, with as much detail as possible
c) the fact in issue for which such document is called
Appendix C: the Implementation Rules o f  the Saudi Arbitration Law o f 1985 371
d) the evidence and circumstances proving that the document is under the possession o f the other party
e) the reason for obligating the other party to present the said document.
Section 29
The arbitration panel may designate the effective means o f  inquiry in the claim whenever the facts to 
be proven are proximate to the dispute and are admissible.
Section 30
The arbitration panel may disregard the evidentiary procedures it has ordered, provided that reasons for 
such disregard shall be stated in the minutes o f the hearing. The arbitration panel may not consider the 
result o f such procedures and shall state its reasons in the award.
Section 31
The party requesting testimony o f  witnesses shall specify the facts to be proved in the testimony, either 
orally or in writing, and shall accompany his witnesses in the specified hearing. Admission of 
witnesses and hearing o f  their statements shall be conducted before the arbitration panel pursuant to the 
shariatic rules, and the other party may refute such testimony in the same manner.
Section 32
The arbitration panel may cross-examine the parties at the request o f  either party or on its own motion. 
Section 33
The arbitration panel may, if  necessary, seek the assistance o f one or more experts to provide a 
teclmical report regarding a technical or material matter which may have effect on the claim. The 
arbitration panel shall mention in its award an accurate statement o f the expert's mission and the urgent 
airangements which he is permitted to take. The arbitration panel shall estimate the fees o f the said 
expert, the party who shall pay them, and the deposit to be made to the account o f the expert. In case 
such deposit is not made by the party required to do so, or by the other parties to the arbitration, the 
expert will not be bound to perfonn his duty, and the right to adhere to the decision made for the 
appointment o f the expert shall be void, if  the arbitration panel finds that the reasons given are 
unacceptable. In performing his duty, the expert may hear the statements o f both parties or others and 
shall submit a report o f his opinion on the specified date. The arbitration panel may cross-examine the 
expert in the hearing concerning the result o f  his report. If there is more than one expert, the panel shall 
specify the manner o f their performance, whether severally or collectively.
Section 34
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The arbitration panel may request the expert to provide a complementary report to overcome any 
default or omissions in his previous report and the parties may submit advisory reports to the panel. 
However, in all cases the arbitration panel shall not be bound by the expert's opinions.
Section 35
The arbitration panel may, on its own motion or at the request o f  either party, decide to move for 
inspection o f some facts or matters which were disputed and have a material effect on the claim and 
shall make a report o f the inspection proceedings.
Section 36
The arbitration panel shall obseiwe the principles o f litigation, so as to include confrontation in 
proceedings, and to permit either party to take cognizance o f the claim proceedings, to have access to 
its material papers and documents in reasonable periods o f time, and to give him a sufficient 
opportunity to present his documentation, defences and contents in the hearing, either orally or in 
writing and to record them in the minutes.
Section 37
If a preliminary issue o f a matter falling outside the jurisdiction o f the arbitration panel arose during the 
process o f  arbitration, or if  a document had been claimed to have been forged, or if criminal 
proceedings had been instituted for the forgery or for any other criminal act, the arbitration panel shall 
suspend proceedings and the date fixed for the award until a final decision is issued from the concerned 
authority in relation to that matter which had arisen.
Chapter IV. Awards, Objections and Execution
Section 38
When the arbitration panel is ready to render a decision, the panel shall close the case for review and 
deliberations. Deliberations shall be held in camera and shall only be attended collectively by the 
arbitration panel who attended the hearings. The panel shall fix, at the time the case is closed or in 
another hearing, a date for issuance o f  the award, subject to the provisions o f  articles 9, 13, 14 and 15 
o f the arbitration regulations.
Section 39
The arbitrators shall issue their awards without being bound by legal procedures, except as provided for 
in the arbitration regulations and its rules o f implementation. Awards shall follow the provisions of 
Islamic sharia and the applicable regulations.
Section 40
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When the case is closed for review and deliberation, the arbitration panel may not hear fiirther 
submissions from either o f the parties or their representative except in the presence o f  the other party, 
and shall not accept any memorandum or document without the document being reviewed by the other 
party; if  such explanation, memorandum or document is deemed material, the panel may extend the 
date fixed for the award and reopen the proceedings by virtue o f a decision stating the reasons and 
justifications therefor, and shall notify the parties o f the date fixed for continuation o f the proceedings.
Section 41
Subject to articles 16 and 17 o f the arbitration regulations, awards shall be adopted by the opinion o f  
the majority o f the arbitrators. The award shall be pronounced by the umpire in the specified hearing. 
The award shall contain the names o f the members o f  the respective panel, the date, place, and subject 
matter o f the award, first names, surnames, description, domicile, appearance and absence o f the 
parties, a summary o f the facts o f the claim, requests o f  the parties, summary o f their defences, 
substantial defences, and the reasons and text o f  the award. The arbitrators and the clerk shall, within 
seven days from the filing o f the draft, sign the original copy o f the award which comprises the above 
contents and which shall be kept in the file o f  the claim.
Section 42
Without prejudice to the provisions o f articles 18 and 19 o f  the arbitration regulations, the arbitration 
panel shall rectify any material typing or aritlimetical en'ors that may occur in its awards, by virtue o f  a 
decision to be issued on its own motion, or at the request o f  either party without pleading procedures. 
Such rectification shall be made on the original copy o f the award and duly signed by the arbitrators. 
The decision for rectification o f the award may be objected to by all possible means o f  objection if  the 
arbitration panel exceeded its right o f  rectification as provided for in this section. The decision issued 
against a request for rectification may not be objected to independently.
Section 43
The parties may request the arbitration panel which has issued the award to interpret any ambiguity in 
the text o f the award. The interpretation shall be deemed complementary in all respects to the original 
award and shall be subject as well to the rules relating to means o f objection.
Section 44
Whenever an order is issued for execution o f the arbitration award, the latter becomes an executionary 
instrument and the clerk o f the authority originally competent to try the case shall give the winning 
party the execution copy o f the arbitration award, containing the order for execution and ending with 
the following phi'ase:
“All concerned government authorities and departments shall cause this award to be executed with all 
legally applicable means even if such execution required application o f force by the police.”
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Chapter V. Fees of Arbitrators 
Section 45.
If both opponents fail to agree on the fees, a decision may be issued for division o f fees between them 
at the discretion o f  the authority originally competent to try the case; a decision also may be issued for 
payment o f  all such fees by one o f  the parties in dispute.
Section 46
Any party may object to the estimate o f  the arbitrators' fees to the authority which issued the decision, 
the objection to be made within eight days horn notification o f the fees; the authority's decision on the 
said objection shall be final.
Section 47
The concerned authorities shall execute these rules.
Section 48
These rules shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall be effective from their date o f  
publication.
